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Preface
The title o f this dissertation "Health Law," is used as meaning the interdisciplinary 
profession, intended equally for health and law focused on the historical background of 
legal medicine. During the 1 9 ^  century society became more aware o f the vital 
importance of public health, and as the definitions and demands of health extended, 
there was an increased legal focus on the availability and adequacy of establishing 
national health service.
Broadly, the specific objectives of the dissertation are:-
- to provide an understanding of the place of common and statute law
- to survey the basic concepts and contents in the major areas of health law
- to explain the sources of legal authority and the relationship between them
- to develop some familiarity with legal language and define relevant and critical legal 
issues in the application of these principles
- to understand and comm unicate how these issues are likely to be resolved, and 
evaluate legal counsel.
Therefore, the study provides description and discussion regarding professional 
discipline. A view is given on modem medical practice as seen through the eyes of the 
General M edical Council, the Council which has been the m odel on which the 
profession has founded its disciplinary proceedings.
Furthermore, the discussion will include controversial issues on certain medicolegal 
problem s, such as negligence, and assault. The dissertation explores the traditional 
development of informed consent in the doctor-patient relationship. However, consent, 
confidentiality, and disclosure of medical records have in recent
IV
years assumed ever-increasing importance. On the other hand, the problem of 
sterilization, contraception, and abortion have been elucidated.
Attention is also paid to the understanding of the principles of good public health 
law, andthe discussion includes consideration of the legal problems connected with the 
particular phasesof health work, such as Food & Drug Laws , W ater Supply 
Protection, Occupational Health & Safety Law area also reviewed.
Despite the number and variety of the subject necessarily included in a thesis of this 
character, the writer has endeavoured, as far as practicable within the limits of a single 
volume, to cover the duties of the medical practitioner, judge, health officer, lawyer 
and health authorities. The dissertation is unable to cover the whole system of the U. K. 
And therefore concentrates primarily on English Law, with some comparisons with 
the United States. In effect the aim is to highlight the various models available to the 
law- statute, judicial decision-making, and guidelines- in controlling the provission and 
practice of health care.
Lastly, in order to fulfill the pressing need, it could be of great value if this type of 
course continued to produce professionals to deploy effectively the role of health 
legislation in countries shortcoming in this field.
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1Law and Health Care System
IN T R O D U C TIO N
This study deals with health law and seeks to establish its general principles, 
which are considered in the context of the national health care system of the United 
Kingdom. It also aims to provide a framework within which debates about health 
policy are taking place, and on the basis of which policy makers may identify a 
sound ethical standard against which proposals for legislation and regulations in the 
field may be measured.
It is hoped that this study of public health and the legal aspects of medical care 
system s will contribute feedback to the im plem entation and developm ent of a 
systematic approach to an organized medical and public health law.
On this basis the thesis consists of studies of some of the medico-legal problems 
which arise in m edical practice, set against an historical background to the 
development of medical and public health law.
Health law can be an effective vehicle for combating human and environment- 
borne diseases in any society. The law as it relates to health care effects a set of 
constraints on behaviour. More importantly, the law is one determinant of health and 
of the health care delivery system. It is a means of bringing about change as well as 
preventing it, and one of the most important tools available to any one who aspires to 
change. ^
Health law can be used to identify the m ajor issues o f the legal aspects of 
medicine, dentistry and the various parts of public health.2 Health law directs the 
path in which the law serves as an instrument in order to achieve health objectives. 
The crucial figures in law relating to health care are the expert in law on the one
1- Kenneth R. W ing (ed.) The Law and the Public's Health [2nd Ed. 1, Health Adm inistration Press, 
M ichigan, 1985, introduction.
2- W illiam  J. Curran, The M edico-lceal Field. American Journal o f  Law and M edicine 1:10 [ 1979],
2hand and on the other the health professional.3
Some of the major topics generally included under health law are: abortion, 
allied health professionals and the law, confidentiality, consent to or refusal of 
medical treatment, Drafting legislation and regulations, Drug abuse and Controlled 
Substances, Mental health Law, M alpractice, Medical Records, Pharmacy & the 
Law, Public Health Law.
The headings are taken from a study of health law course in medical schools.4 
Accordingly, this dissertation may assist those who are involved in the delivery 
of health care to understand the legal constraints within which they operate and to 
adopt the relevant legal concepts.
To emphasise the point again, health legislation is the bedrock of a national heath 
policy, it covers all aspects o f the health care system in respect to the rights and 
obligations of users. It defines the demands to be fulfilled by practitioners as well as 
public health officers, and administrative health authorities, and guarantees their 
rights. ^ M eanwhile, the quality and volume of health care provision is being 
developed and delivered to cover the whole spectrum  which stim ulates the 
development of the health system in to the desired patterns.^
Health services are concerned with many aspects of law and the subject can only 
be touched upon here. For onething the position in a particular country depends 
upon the laws and legal culture of that country and it is only possible, therefore, to 
mention matters which are commonly found.
The legal framework under which health services are set up and maintained in a
3- T om  C h ristoffc l, Health and The Law. A Hand B ook for Health P ro fe ss io n a ls . Free Press, 
C ollier M acm illan N ew  York, 1982, p.7.
4- Ibid p. 8.
5 - 1 Si even The Transition to Hiph Politics in England Social P o lic y . O xford, Clarendon,
1983, p. 13.
6- John D. Finch. Health Service L a w . Sw eet & M axw ell, London, 1981, p. 27.
3country is usually contained in public health or similar statutes together with the 
regulations and orders made under those statutes. These will apply more fully to 
services provided directly by governments, but there will be aspects which apply to 
church related and other voluntary services. Points likely to be dealt with are
a, the relationship between the government department concerned [e.g. Ministry 
of Health] and the voluntary services
b, cooperation with the department usually through the district medical officer.
c, planning and organization.
It is suggested that, legislation will be and has been a vehicle to bring about 
change. It will reflect the currently felt necessities of the times and it will bend to 
meet current desires.^
Regulations are issued typically in response to the occurrence of some abuse or 
in order to anticipate problems, but, they are not a solution to all problems in health 
care as they sometimes become burdensome, although regulations o f all types are 
expected to control a national health system where objects of equity, effectiveness, 
and efficiency can be achieved even if not completely.^
[i] Law and Health Policy
Health policy clearly determines health law. Once form ulated and enacted, 
however, law and regulations shape the way health policy is translated into 
programmes or services. Legislation thus embodies health policy and then provides 
health provisions with the legal basis for implementing it.
Health legislation is extremely important in the development of health services in 
any country. Laws provide the basis, fram ew ork, and structure for health 
program m es, and regulations under the laws make explicit the details of the 
programmes. In the complex health system of the U K, & U S, composed of multiple
7- rh;irlpx Ri Myra M ontncnte. Administration o f  Health Serv ice . Nairobi. V/.im ia 1979, P. 131.
8- W H O . Pubilc Health Paper 77, G eneva, 1984, p. 30.
4and often fragmented programmes, legislation and legal regulation are essential to 
clarify definitions, boundaries, eligibility, benefits, and standards.
The dom inance of the private sector in the provision o f health care in some 
countries requires regulatory measures to promote access to services and ensure 
quality o f performance. Technological and scientific advances in medicine create 
needs for amended laws. New health problem s arising from environm ental and 
occupational hazards extend health law into new fields. Social change raises 
expectations about health care and may force the intervention of the law to clarify 
health policy and services.9
Reflecting and expressing policy, health law, like law in all fields, involves a 
balancing o f interests. Initially health law required a balancing of interests between 
the need for governmental controls to protect the population against epidemics and 
unsanitary living conditions and the requirement to safeguard the rights of private 
individuals.
As social expectations o f health care have expanded, and society has become 
more com plex, governm ent has become increasingly involved in prom oting, 
financing and regulating health services.. This trend has created legal problems 
which require a more sophisticated balancing of interests than in the past.
This process must take into account new scientific knowledge, contemporary 
social values, and the concerns of the many participants in the health care system, as 
well as the need for governmental action and the protection of individual rights. 
Today, both health policy and health law are shaped largely by basic political forces 
in many countries and by forces within the health service system. Among these 
forces are both long established and newly emerging professional groups, multiple 
public and private institutional providers of health care, private m anufacturers of 
drugs and equipment, insurance companies, and increasingly articulate and better
Q- Rmh Rnrmpr I 1 AsnccLs o f  Health P olicy . W estport. 1980, p. 443.
5organized consumers of health services.10
[ii] The Role of Health Law
The role of health law as an expression of health policy over the years may be 
well illustrated in terms of the several functions that the law performs in protecting 
the health of individuals and the community. In the approximate sequence of their 
historical development, these functions are as follows:
1] The law prohibits conduct that is injurious to the health of individuals and the 
community.
2] The law authorizes programmes and services that promote the health of 
individuals and the community.
3] The law regulates the provision of resources for health services.
4] The law provides for social financing of health care.
5] The law exercises surveillance over the quality of health care.
Evaluation of health law as it has performed these five functions, shows how law 
reflects, and expreses the health policy of the time and how it changes to implement 
new concepts.
A final classic role of the law in health services, one that has had increasing 
impact in recent times, is its attempts to assure a minimum standard for the quality of 
care. This function has traditionally been exercised through various types of 
perm ission governing personnel and facilities. M oreover, recently, it has been 
operated through malpractice suits.11
As m alpractice suits and premiums for malpractice insurance have escalated 
many changes have been proposed in the tort system of awards for medical injuries. 
Consideration is currently being given to sweeping alternatives to the entire system,
10- Ibid, at p. 439.
11- R ocm cr, op. cit., p. 439.
6such as 'no-fault' compensation regardless of negligence or culpability.
Expansion o f the surveillance of the quality o f care raises many questions 
concerning individual rights and social welfare - the external issue in public health 
law. The right to individual privacy must be balanced against the population's right 
to have access to information. The confidentiality of the doctor patient relationship 
must be balanced against the public interest in assuring an adequate level o f care. In 
general, resolution of legal issues has increasingly taken into account not only the 
individual rights of patients and providers, but also the social interest in a sound and 
equitable system of health care .12
This brief summary of the functions of law in the health care system may suffice 
to show the law's dynamism in responding to social needs. In some fields in the past, 
the law has constituted a barrier to needed health services, and accordingly, the law 
has undergone continual change. For example, in the United States compulsory 
mental hospital commitment laws before the 1960s failed either to protect patients' 
legal rights or to meet their needs for treatm ent.1^
Restrictive anti-abortion laws of the past drove desperate women, faced with 
unwanted pregnancies, to dangerous illegal abortions. As the adverse impact of such 
laws became recognized, both legislative bodies and the courts began to intervene in 
a series of actions to change them.
Similarly, as new health problems have developed or been recognized, or as 
society has moved to cope with previously unmet health needs, many laws have been 
amended and new ones enacted. Numerous examples may be cited of such new 
legislation and new judicial initiatives, in fields as diverse as regulation of the 
environm ent, drug abuse, safeguards in the food and drugs industry, and the
12- Frances H. M iller [cd]. Am erican Journal o f  Law and M edicine, B oston U niversity , Boston, 
1986, p. 460.
13- S ee generally D evelopm ents in the Law, Civil Com m itm ent o f  the M entally 111, 87 Harv. L. R e v . 
1 1 9 0 -1  1974].
7conditions of medical and public health systems.14
This affirmative view of the law should not be taken as overlooking the all-too- 
frequent gap between the black letter of the law, written in the statute books, and its 
im plem entation in actual practice. Such gaps are com m on in a large and 
heterogeneous society.
Thus, it is expected that there may be difficulties in implementing both health 
policy and the laws that provide the underpinning for that policy. However, it can be 
observed from the history of legal medicine and the evolution of National Health 
Service in the United Kingdom  that m oves have been made in the direction of 
improving health care. A more detailed discussion of legal systems, the history of 
legal medicine, professional conduct, past and current medicolegal problems, and 
public health law, will be undertaken in the following chapters.
The first part o f this discussion will focus on the law and legal system, 
respectively, and the history of legal medicine. Attention will then be paid to the 
mechanisms available to the law governing health care provision and practices. 
Thereafter, a number of topics will be highlighted to demonstrate the variety of tools 
provided by law to create, modify and control practices and standards.
14- ibid 87.
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The Law and the Legal System
M any of the decisions which health care adm inistrators, professionals, and 
technical staff must make each day are affected by legal principles and have potential 
legal consequences. Since it is impossible to secure legal advice before each decision, 
health providers must develop an understanding o f the law so that the problems 
requiring legal counsel can then be identified and other decisions can be made 
consistent with applicable legal principles.15
This section will provide a short description of legal system and tin explanation 
of some of the basic legal concepts that underlie that system. Hopefully it will 
establish a language that can be used in this thesis in explaining the substance of 
health law.
The meaning of "the law"
The first thing that has to be understood is that there is no sure or comprehensive 
way to define the law. As Arnold says.
"Obviously, 'law' can never be defined. With equal obviousness, however, it should be said that the 
adherents o f  the legal institution must never g ive  up the struggle to define law, because it is amsenlial part
o f  the ideal that it is rational and capable o f definition  Hence the verbal expenditure necessary in the
upkeep o f the ideal o f  'law' is colossal and never ending. Thdegal scientist is com pelled  by the clim ate o f  
opinion in which he finds h im self to prove that an essentially irrational world is constantlyipproaching  
rationally  " 16
Aside from a few not-worth-quoting one-line epigrammes, the law in its entirety
15- R ebert D . M iller, P rob lem s in H ospital Law [4th E d .], H o ck v ill, An A spen Publication, 
M aryland 1981, p. 1.
16- See Stevens Introduction to Jurisprudence [ 4 ^  EdJ., Butterworths, L ondon, 1979, p. 43 .
9has rarely been described in a meaningful, and accurate manner.
The fact of the matter is that the law on a given thesis can not be defined in short 
statements; nor is the law simply a set of principles from which specific answers can 
be easily drawn to cover questions which arise in specific situations. Certainly there 
are principles worth draw ing on and in some situations relatively clear-cut 
statements can be made of "what the law is" or "what I can or can not do ."17
However, in many important situations this is not possible. This is particularly 
true when dealing with the law relating to current public issues, where the law has 
not had the time to grow and evolve in relatively settled form. It would be 
misleading to try to present the law of public health in that manner, particularly to 
the lay [meaning non-lawyer] reader. This is not the character of the law .1^
The law is of course, literally the sum, set, or conglomerate of all of the laws in 
all of the various jurisdictions: the constitutions, the various statutes, the traditional 
principles o f justice that we refer to as common law, and the judicial opinions which 
interpret all three.
The law is also the legal process-how laws are made, enforced, and interpreted, 
and the theoretical fram ework of this process must be understood in order to 
understand the law. This includes notions such as the division of power between the 
branches o f governm ent, the separate roles of trial and appellate courts, and the 
difference between findings of fact and conclusions of law. One must understand the 
interrelationship of statutes and regulations, the meaning o f judicial opinions, and 
the role of individual procedural rights in ensuring that the process is not only 
efficient but satisfies opinions of "justice."19
17- S. G. K cm aghan [ed] The D elivery o f  Health Care in Urban U nderdeveloped A rea s . Am erican  
Hospital A ssociation , C hicago 1979, p.38.
18- W ing, op. cit., p. 4.
19- University o f  London, Legal Research in The U. K . [3rd Ed]., U niversity press, 1978, P. 89.
1 0
1.1 Source o f  Law
The laws of England are derived from three main roots as follows:
1] Com m on Law- the law of common practice that has grown out of the 
observance of rules and principles, added to by centuries of judicial experience and 
decisions, that is, case law.
2] Equity- law based on judge-made principles of natural justice and developed 
originally in the court of chancery. Equity originated in the residual power of the 
king to do justice where his royal courts failed to do so. It is similarly developed 
through case law.
3] Statute law- Acts of Parliament and Statutory Regulations, which emerge as 
part of the need to create law to accord with, or even anticipate, changing conditions 
of living.
In addition there is separate Ecclesiastical law which has roots as deep and varied 
as the Common Law, M ilitary Law, Commercial and Trading Law, Divorce and 
Probate. Arbitration and Tribunal practice are largely based on Statute Law.
The development of the common law and the rules of equity has been a rather 
slow, disorderly process which has needed enlightened Parliamentary Statute to 
keep pace with the progress which medicine, sociology, penology, indeed modern 
civilization, make from year to year.20
1.2 The Personnel of the Law
The administration of the law is in the hands of the judiciary officially headed by 
Lord Chancellor of the day, but in fact operated by the judges from the Lords of 
Appeal in ordinary, the Lord Chief Justice, and the Master of the Rolls.21
In addition, trial by jury brings new actions onto the state. Trial by a jury of 
one's fellow men or women, obviously more just than the older trial by ordeal, is
20- Stephen. J. H adfield. Law and Ethics for D o cto rs. Eyre & Spottisw oodc, London 1958, p. 99.
21- ibid at p. 99.
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increasingly becoming confined to criminal trials in Assize Courts, in comparatively 
rare civil cases, libel or slander actions, and in Coroner's Courts where Statutory 
law still demands a jury in certain types of cases, for example, prison deaths and 
street accidents. The latter formality has so little purpose that it is likely soon to go 
into the limbo of ancient practice.22
U nder the present law, the functions of Corner are strictly limited by the 
Corners Rules. It is not permissible for the corner to add a rider to the conclusion of 
an inquest, though "A com er who believes that action should be taken to prevent the 
recurrences of fatalities similar to that in respect of which the inquest is being held 
may announce at the inquest that he is reporting the matter to the person or authority 
who may have power to take action and report the matter accordingly"23
The coroner no longer has a duty to commit for trial persons to be charged with 
murder, manslaughter or infantcide. 24 jf appears to the Coroner to be likely that 
a person might be charged with such an offence or with causing death by reckless 
driving or with complicity in the suicide of another, then the coroner must adjourn 
the inquest and send particulars o f the evidence to the D irector o f Public
Prosecutions.25
1.3 Courts of Law
The only courts that doctors are likely to find themselves in with any frequency 
are as follow s:
1] Coroner's Courts deals with the investigation of treasure trove, deaths etc.
2. Magistrates Courts- f Petty Sessions].
3] Quarter Sessions- County or Borough.
22- ibid. at p. 98-98 .
23 -  C o r o n e r s  R u l e s  1 9 8 4  Rule  43 .
2 4 - Criminal  Law Act 1 9 7 7 .
25- C o r o n e r s  R u le s  1 9 8 4  Ru le  28.
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4] Courts- Marital.
In all these, the doctor will commonly be called to give evidence of disease or 
injury and treatment, of psychiatric examination and opinion of post-mortem and 
laboratory pathology. Courts [2] - [5] are largely engaged in the hearing of criminal 
prosecutions. Quarter Sessions requires a jury, as may coroners' courts at times.
6] County Courts. 7] High Courts. 8] Tribunals and Arbitration Courts. It is 
here that questions o f civil wrongs and liabilities, of negligence and compensation 
are under dispute: and Juries are less common.2^
1.3 Law Making and Public Health Legislation
A considerable proportion of English law is still uncodified. Its source was the 
established customs of the people as accepted and voiced by the Courts of Law. This 
unwritten law or Common Law as it is called, still grows in volume as a consequence 
of decisions o f the courts. But the great bulk o f new law has for more than a century 
originated in the House o f Com m ons, and has been prom ulgated in Acts of 
Parliament or Statutes.27
It is from Statute Law, for instance, that local authorities derive their powers; 
and the law relating to public health is almost exclusively contained in Acts of 
Parliament or subordinate legislation whose authority derives from these Acts.
The first formal step in legislation is the introduction of a Bill in the House of 
Commons or House o f Lords. Public Bills whose purpose is to alter the general law 
are alm ost always introduced by a M inister of the Crown on behalf of the 
Government. M easures in respect of health or local government are introduced by 
the Minister of Health following an outline of proposed legislation in the form of a 
"White Paper" some time before the Bill itself is in tro d u ced .^
26- ibid. at pp. 96-98 .
27- W alker R. J. The English Legal System  [4th Ed.], Butterworth, London, 1976, p. 83.
25- ibid. at p. 83
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How, then, can the law be best described? How can all of these various 
applications of the law and the legal system, the theory and the practice, be 
accurately explained?
The approach which will be taken in this discussion will be to look at their 
form ulation and describe the background and general legal principles. However, 
before embarking on examination and comment on specific issues, it may be of some 
use briefly to review the procedures which are available in the existing legal system.
1.4.1 Laws: Acts, Statutes, C onstitutions, Regulations, Judicial
Decisions, Common Laws
1.4.2 Legislation- one source of law in the United Kingdom consists of Acts 
of Parliament. An Act of Parliament is the supreme law of the land. Parliament, it is 
said, can make or unmake any law whatsoever.2^
M ost people think of laws in terms of statutes. These are written laws passed by 
legislatures at any level of government. Before passage, pending statutes are called 
bills.
Legislation: Statute law is a significant in health care provision, from the Local 
Governm ent [Scotland] Act 1973; National Health Service Reorganization Act 
1973.30 to provide basic public health services, to those Acts which set up the health 
and social services, a whole range of legislation requires local and health authorities 
to ensure the prevention of disease.31
The enactment of a Bill is only the beginning of the process of social control. 
However, the new law may be tested and clarified in the courts, it may be amended 
by a subsequent Act, or it may be adapted and extended by circulars, Statutory
29- J. D. Finch. A spects o f  Law A ffecting the Paramedical professions , Faber, London 1984, p. 18.
30- Local G overnm ent [Scotland] A ct 1973 s .142; N ational Health S erv ice  R eorganisation A ct 
1973 ss. 1-2.
31- J. A. Muir Gray Man Against D isea se . O xford U niversity Press, 1979, p .1 1 5 .
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Instrum ents {which must be laid before Parliam ent for approval), Codes of 
Practice, and Local Authority Bye Laws. The enactment of a law is also in some 
ways the end of the process of social change. A new law does not come in to being 
solely as the result of the discovery of certain facts: some Acts are passed before the 
facts of the m atter are definitely known, for example the Public Health Act of 
1848.32
For a Bill to be introduced there must be political will and a good deal of luck- 
for example some important Bills have been introduced by the winners of the ballot 
for Private M embers Bills. In the creation of political will many factors operate, 
among which the pressure groups are increasingly important.33
The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents , Age Concern, Help the 
Aged, the Medical Council on Alcoholism, the British Safety Council and Action on 
Sm oking and H ealth, are only a few of the effective pressure groups. As the 
mechanism of social change has a certain degree of indisposition, however, those 
groups who wish to oppose legislation are often more effective than those who 
support it. At certain times the opponents of fluoridation and the 1968 legislation on 
Seat Belts have been consistently successful although their numbers are small. 34 
Statutes are only one form of law. Constitutions are also laws and are the written 
legal documents establishing the government
In addition regulations may be formulated. For example, a statute that relates to 
a complex activity may be worded in very general terms, with specific details of 
legislation not determined by statute, but delegated to some governmental agency or 
official to define and enact. This is very com m on with regard to health 
legislation.35
28 - Gray, op. cit. pp. 23 &. 115. cf. Public Health Act o f  1848.
33- Gray, op. cit. p. 117.
34- G ray, op. cit. pp. 23 & 79.
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The first important point to note is that because they are authorized by statute 
and implemented under a statutory law, regulations are part of that law and have the 
full force of the law. The second thing to remember is that the term regulation has a 
very specific definition. Regulations must be enacted by the designated agency of the 
state according to a specific process.36 Usually there is a requirem ent that 
regulations be published in their proposed form and that there be opportunity for 
public input or a hearing. They may be challenged in court if they are enacted 
without the proper procedures or if their content goes beyond statutory m andate.37
1.4.3 Judicial Decision:- This can be a way of filling in the general
framework of statutes by way of judicial interpretation. When a case comes before a 
court o f law it becomes possible to say, for instance, that the law is moving in a 
certain direction, or that such and such represents the present state of the law. This 
enables clarification, for the particular set of circumstances at issue, of the terms and 
provisions of the legislation.38
The decisions of courts of law in a series of cases build up precedents, which in 
some circum stances other courts must follow in their decisions on problem s 
presented in later cases.3^
One most important case is that of medical negligence.
This is an area of the law which legislation from Parliament has hardly touched, 
so that the courts have by and large had their way in determining the sort of conduct
35- D. Kairys [ed] The P olic ies o f  Law A Progressive o f  C ritique. Panthon, N ew . York, 1979,
p. 120.
3 1 - Ibid. p 113.
37- Evershcd Francis R aym ond, The Changing R ole o f  the Judiciary in the D evelopm ent o f  Law,_6J 
C ol. L. R . 1961, p. 761.
38- Hart & Sacks, The Legal P ro cess . B asic problem s in the m aking and app lication  o f  law , 
Cam bridge, 1958, p. 421 .
39- Stone Julius, Social D im ensions o f  Law and JuspQQ H olm es B each , Pcrstonc, London 1966, PP. 
4 2 1 ,6 5 3 -
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which will amount to negligence in law, and what sort of conduct will not. A 
principal distinction between legislation and judicial decisions as a source of law is 
that legislation is generally prospective in effective, that is it provides a general 
framework within which future activities may be regulated, while judicial decisions, 
the decisions given by courts of law to determine individual disputes, are by nature 
particular.413 They relate specifically to the particular problems thrown up by the 
circumstances, allegations and claims in the particular case in issue.
1.4.4 Common law s:- These may be defined briefly as unwritten law, based 
on long- term usage and custom. Although nom inally unwritten and uncodified, 
common law is by no means vague or ill-defined. Its administration is based very 
strictly on references to past cases, and no new departure will be lightly 
entertained.41
In its medieval origins much of the common law was undoubtedly customary, 
42and Plucknett has shown how flexible was medieval custom and how capable it 
was o f being adopted to new social needs. In this period legislation and judicial 
precedent were merely regarded as the means of creating of new customs.
Customs themselves came into being very easily. Plucknett indeed, describes 
them as "instruments for legal change rather than fossilized remains of the past".43 
However, the modem common law can find but a subordinate place for custom as a 
source o f specific legal rules. The doctrine that the custom must not be contrary to 
the fundamental principles of the common law has rarely been invoked,44 and the
40- Bozem an Adda B.. The Future o f  Law in Multi Cultural W orld . Princeton [N. J.] Princeton U. 
P. 1971, p. 27.
41 - P lucknett T. F. T. Theodor, A C oncise  History o f  the C om m on L a w . O xford, C larendon Press, 
1940,
p. 156.
42 - Plucknett T. F. T. Legislation o f  Edward I, O xford, Clarendon Press 1949, Ch. 1.
43- Ibid at p. 6.
4 4 - A . R oss, On Law and Justice. Translated by Margaret Dutton, London, Stevens 1958, P.93.
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need for the custom to be treated as legally compulsory has excited a good deal more 
interest among speculative civilians than among hard-headed common law yers.45 
On the other hand, the rule that a custom to be valid must not be unreasonable 
retained a certain importance in enabling the courts to exercise a considerable 
measure of control over what local customs are admissible 46
Statute law, on the other hand is that part of the country's legislation which has 
been defined, codified and incorporated in one or other of the statutes enacted by 
Parliament. Law may be based on pre-existing common law, or it may be formed to 
deal with circumstances of recent origin, concerning which the common law has had 
no opportunity to formulate itself.47
For example, under the rules o f the common law applying to m aster and 
servant, an employer was liable to an employee for injuries arising out of the course 
of his employment. This simple rule was so modified by court decisions of a century 
or so ago, however, that recovery could be obtained only if it were shown that the 
em ployer had been negligent, that the employee was free from  contributory  
negligence, and that the injury was not due to the act of a fellow servant. Because of 
the difficulties in proving his case under the burden of these legal technicalities, the 
employee or his heir rarely recovered at common law for an injury.
'T he  harsh rules o f the common law, which had evolved in an era o f small and
scattered industry and were not adapted to the industrial progress of modern times, 
have been replaced wholly or in part by modern workmen's compensation laws. In 
1897 the Parliam ent o f Great Britain passed an Act im posing liability upon 
employers in certain dangerous trades to pay compensation to an injured employee,
4 5- Jolow iz  Herbert Felix , Roman Foundations o f  Modern L aw . O xford, Clarendon Press 1957, pp 
2 6 -28 .
4 6 - C olonial Law Journal Report 75 [Aus.l 1970, P. 81-83.
4 7 - C a stig lio n i Artura, A H istory o f  M ed icine (2nd E d]., rev ised  and en larged , N ew  York,
K n o p l9 4 7 , p. 894.
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or in case of death to his dependents, regardless of the existence of any negligent act 
by the employer or his employees.48
1.5 Conclusion
The legal system, as has been observed, is a dynamic process in establishing 
guidelines defining legal process and acting with social forces to modernise legal 
policy. It must be borne in mind that this brief outline does not purport to be a 
comprehensive picture of all that happens in the legal system. Nevertheless it may 
provide a viable instrument for identifying, organizing, and analyzing the significant 
considerations involved in legal response to social change.
This abbreviated description of the legal system, and explanation of some of the 
basic legal concepts that underlie it, was undertaken to identify the characteristics of 
law which may relate to the delivery of health care and establish a foundation for the 
discussion which follows.
Before dealing with specific examples of the contemporary interaction of law 
and medicine, it is interesting and instructive to trace briefly the history of legal 
medicine.
4 8 - W . F. D odd, A dm inistration o f  W orkm en's C om pensation, N ew  York C om m onw ealth  Fund 
1936, a lso- C. F. Sharkey, Principle Feature o f  W orkmen's C om pensation Laws, serial N o R 1090, U 
S.Bureau o f  Labor Statistics 1940.
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C H A IP T IS R  T W O  
History of Legal Medicine
Medicine has long served sociologists, either consciously or unconsciously as the 
model o f a profession, and in recent years medical sociology itself has emerged as a 
m ajor field of research.1
Obviously, a brief paper is not the place to give the whole history of medicine 
under this heading. The purpose here is not so much to give a step-by-step account of 
the origins and development of medicine, nor to list all the great names in the field, 
but rather to make a generalization about the past which might give insight into 
current conditions with regard to legal medicine.
Though there were great variations in culture between the many preliterate 
societies, ju st as there are differences in culture patterns among contem porary 
societies, medicine seems at first to have been closely allied with religion. Medicine 
as an occupation started with Shaman who was not only the physician, but the priest, 
poet, storyteller, and even chief. Shaman was the first specialist and encompassed 
most of what we now regard as the learned professions/
Based on Gradwohl’s description, Legal Medicine may be defined approximately 
as the application of medical knowledge to the administration of law and to the 
furthering of justice. In addition it will cover the legal relationships of medical 
personnel, and may also include the moral obligations which rest on them.3
Various synonyms are in uses: Medical Jurisprudence, Legal Medicine, Forensic
1- F iddes Frederick, Forensic M ed icine. [ 10 Ed.] London, Churchill 1955, p. 2.
2- Brian Inglis, Natural M edicine, m ade and printed in G .B . by W illiam  C o llin s Sons Co. Ltd., 
G lasgow , 1979, p. 52.
3- G radw ohl, I^egal M ed icine, [ed.] by Francis E. Cam ps G .B . Bristol: John W right & Sons Ltd. 
1979, p .l .
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M edicine, and Medical Law - to describe the subject which is concerned with the 
application of medical knowledge to certain branches of the law, both civil and 
criminal. Since members of the medical profession are liable to be called upon to 
render professional assistance, of the most varied type, in medicolegal cases which 
may later compel their attendance at court, it is highly important that they should 
appreciate and understand both the medical and legal aspects of the subject. For 
example, this may involve, on the part o f the practitioner, a knowledge of the 
medical aspects of the various criminal acts which may come under his consideration 
and of the medical bearing of various Acts of Parliament.4
The history of legal medicine can be traced for several thousands of years, and 
although there was then no separate specialty of legal medicine, no medicolegists 
properly speaking and no monographs on the subject, now and again law is seen to 
have influenced medicine or medicine to have affected or modified law. Evidence of 
this can be found in the earliest annals in the first known law codes and in the sacred 
books of primitive peoples.5
As Gradwohl said, medicine and law have been related from the earliest times 
and the bonds which first united them were religion, superstition, and magic, which 
are so inextricably mixed by primitive people. The function of physician and jurist 
were united in the priest. He was the intermediatory between God and man, who 
promulgated God-given law and was judge of breaches of that law. Disease and death 
were regarded as divine punishment for non-observance of the divine law or caused 
by magic or an evil sprit. Healing was the mitigation of the divine penal system and 
was to be had through the priest by prayer, sacrifice or direct treatment.6
In prim itive law, codes of religious and social precepts were often ill-
4- G laister, M edical Jurisprudence & T o x ico logy  112 E d.], L ondon, E. & S. L iv in gston  1966,
p . l .
5- G radw hole, op. cit., p. 1.
6- ibid at p. 6.
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distinguished and laws with a m edical content were often to be found in them. 
Continuing evidence of religion being related to, and uniting, law and medicine can 
be found through the ages. It is then in this common relationship of law and medicine 
to religion that they are first to be found related to each other, related in the person 
of the priest, and in the medicinal aspects of the law he promulgated, while still 
preserving the image of superiority.7
2 .1  Transitional Period
Attempts have been made to show the historical background of legal medicine 
and to establish the time in Europe when legal medicine was born as a separate 
discipline. For example, Ambroise Pare produced a book in 1575s which dealt 
with m edico-legal reports in death from wounds or im potence or loss of any 
m em bers. He discussed abortion, infanticide, death by lightening, hanging, 
drowning, feigned diseases and the differentiation of ante-and post mortem wounds. 
He dealt with poisoning by carbon monoxide and by corrosives.
The last five years of the sixteenth century produced notable works dealing with 
medico-legal matters. Andreas Libavius in Germany, wrote a work on cruentation 
or the ordeal of the b ier,9 dating from the period after the overthrow  of the 
Roman empire and continuing until the seventeenth century or later. The test was to 
touch the victim 's body and if he were guilty blood flowed from the wounds of the 
corpse. Libavious supported the practice and it was also commended by King James 
VI of Scotland in his Daemonologie published in 1597. ^
7- ibid at p. 6
8- ibid. at p. 7
9- ibid. at p. 7
1 0 - ibid at P 7 .
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2.2 Seventeenth Century Onwards
The first British propounder of legal medicine was Andrew Duncan. He became 
professor o f Physiology in 1789 in the University of Edinburgh and also gave a 
course of lectures on legal medicine and public health. He also wrote various essays 
on the subject. His next and most im portant contribution was to try to have a 
University chair established and to this end he wrote a memorial to the patrons of the 
University of Edinburgh. In it he set out the importance and necessity of the subject 
for m edical men and lawyers and dealt with both legal m edicine and public 
health. ^
The eighteenth century also saw the beginning of a change in attitudes toward 
illness associated with the enlightment, a philosophical movement which shifted the 
centre o f interest from preoccupation with the fate of the soul in another world to 
im provement of conditions in this one. It was at this time that the words "social 
science " were first approved. ^
2.3 Organizing Orthodox Medicine
The M iddle Ages had an advantage that obtains no longer: one dom inant 
religion, one social system and one universal language, in Christian Europe.
In addition to these three characteristics of the Middle Ages, two others should 
be m entioned, although they are of lesser importance. One is the distinction 
conferred by scholarship and the other the abundant opportunity for poor scholars to 
achieve an education. Learning was a greater badge of distinction in the Middle Ages 
when it was rarer than it is today. In medicine the doctor’s degree was almost equal 
to a patent of nobility.
In addition, medical knowledge during the whole period of the Middle Ages was
11- ibid a tP  8.
12- Freidson E liot & Lorber Judith, M edical Men and Their W ork , N ew  York, C hicago A ldinc
Atherton 1972, p. 91.
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not proportionate to the elapsed time, but credit must be given for the preservation 
of the writings o f the Greeks, Romans, and Jews without which the progress of 
m edicine and of general culture would have been slower. One hindrance, however, 
to advance in m edieval times was the emphasis laid on classification, on one 
schemata, on the systemazing of knowledge, rather than upon the objective study of 
facts.
W hat differentiates the orthodox method from either the ancient or medieval 
m ethod is that it definitely abandons all attempts at a com plete synthesis of 
knowledge, built up with any philosophic system, and starts by trying to get at 
definite facts and then deals with these facts them selves, with their inevitable 
consequences. ^
Organizing orthodox medicine has helped to relieve illness and has led to 
specialisation in health care. Vaccine and medicines have enabled many diseases to be 
contained adequately by primary health teams, which are best able to appreciate the 
medical needs of people within the community in relation to their family, home and 
working background. Support provided by general practitioners, other primary 
health workers like nurses, home helps, health visitors, pharmacist, dentists and the 
social services, enable sick people to lead reasonably normal lives. ^
It has been seen that medical care is undergoing a profound change. Not only has 
there been a series of advances in research, in techniques, in drugs, but also priorities 
are being considered because both medicine itself and perceptions o f what medicine 
can do are changing, as are people's expectations.
O rthodox forms of diagnosis and treatment today enjoy public confidence. 
Partly this is the consequence of growing dissatisfaction with unorthodox medicine, 
although modem drugs, it has come to be realized, are not the answer to many of the
13- Riesm an D avid . Story o f  M edicine in the M iddle A ges , N ew  York, Hocber 1936, p. 376.
14- J. V ai/.cy, National Health. G. B. Oxford Robertson 1984, p. 55.
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diseases of civilization, such as cancer, heart disorders, arthritis, allergies and the 
rest. The cost of orthodox treatment, too, has been mounting to an ever-increasing 
cost.
W ith the church abstaining, and orthodox m edicine catering only for the 
minority who could afford physicians' fees and the cost of the drugs they prescribed, 
the general public had to continue to rely on self medication reinforced by folk 
m edicine, and it was only rarely that such practices, and their practitioners, 
attracted attention.
In the circum stances physicians [allopaths] felt justified in rejecting and 
wherever possible suppressing, all evidence which conflicted with their assumptions, 
and soon they were offered that power, in a Bill i.e General Medical Council 
designed to weld British doctors into a united profession with self-regulatory 
powers. 1^
Legislation to set up the medical profession had long been urged, and proposals
were debated on a number of occasions in Parliament in the mid- 1850s. There was
general agreement that the whole structure of medical education and organization
17needed a drastic overhaul to remove anomalies and injustices.
Gradually unorthodox forms of medical treatment began to be seen as irrelevant, 
particularly in Britain after the admired National Health Service had been set up in 
1948.18
The N H S was designed as an enabling policy and plan, with a national mandate 
and national resources, whereby medicine would be the better equipped for 
nationwide obligations. It is not itself the professional practice of m edicine or
15- ibid at p. 81.
16- Inglis, op. cit., p. 53.
17- Inglis, op. cit., P. 52.
18- Inglis, op. cit.,P . 95.
2 5
nursing or public health, and the expression should not used to imply this. But it knits 
together these professional activities: it affects them profoundly and is itself largely 
determined by them. A study of the service has to ask in what degree its impact has 
promoted the advancement of medicine and thereby the advancement of health.1^
2.4 Medical Progress and the Law
Probably, alm ost every decade o f the present century has brought some 
elaboration of the complex structure of law and regulations in respect of medicine 
partly because of consumer awareness and to maximize protection of citizens in all 
areas of life, since both licit and illicit drugs have become an increasingly significant 
part of the citizen's life.
Since the 1 9 ^  century medicine has moved through a series o f stages. The 
context in which the traditional legal approach is applied has been amended. For 
exam ple, the General Medical Council,2^ Dental C ouncil21, General Optical 
Council22 etc. have been established. The professional institutions have an interest 
in safeguarding their interests and the public's interests, by exercising control in the 
provision of medical care. Professionals are required by law to render a health 
service, and em ployers, [i.e. health authorities! are responsible for the overall 
quality of care rendered.
Medicine, like society in general, has always suffered change badly. When one 
looks to the law to bring about massive changes in an entrenched system, the process 
is likely to be quite difficult to say the least. It is not idle speculation to say that this is 
so with respect to the use of the legal system to bring about changes in the health care 
system, because medicine and the law have had such mystical origins, metaphysical
19- R oss Sir Jam es Stirling, The Natinal Health Service in G . B O xford U. P. 1952, preface.
20- M edicines A ct 1983.
21- Dentists Act 1957.
22- Opticians A ct 1958.
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underpinnings, secret and symbolic rituals and such economic overtones that the 
relationship of one to the other could not be anything but traum atic .^
But the trauma now goes beyond the ancient and honorable ambivalent symbiosis 
between law and medicine. Indeed medical care is only a part of a new definition of 
health care. So at last law and medicine may be even more intimately involved in a 
joint venture to monitor changes in the system. They may again become bed fellows 
in a new political arena. In a sense, then , bed fellows will make strange p o litic s .^  
M edicine has grown and expanded largely to meet the desires o f mankind to 
solve the m ysteries o f illness and disease. Over the years, disease, illness, and 
sickness of various kinds have received special attention; great exertions of time and 
energy have been made, and large infusions o f monies to increasingly scientific 
medical research have been required to alleviate particular illnesses.
The aim was stated by Nobel laureate Macfarlane Burnet in 1952:
T he aim o f  m edicine in the broadest sense is to provide for every human being from  
conception, to death, the greatest fullness o f  health and length o f  life  that is allow ed by his 
genetic constitution and by accidents o f  life.
W hen he considered the historical development of experimentation in medical 
research to advance this end, he claimed that scientifically even that is grown out of 
human demand. Though, he pointed out that his view was that this caused a decline in 
the social a im .^
This view is, however, arguable since, if it had, in fact governed past conduct it 
would have blocked a substantial amount of medical progress.
23- A. M ilbank Render. Law and Ethics in Health C are. [N o. 7] [cd| by John B. M cK inlay, London,
the M  I T Press 1982, p. 3.
24- ibid at p.4.
2 5 - W illiam  A. S. Everm an, Human Exnerim entatiion. A  G uided Step in to the U nknow n, Preface,
O xford U niversity Press 1985, 34.
2 6 - bid.
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Lawyers and physicians alike have learned from past experiences and have 
attempted to apply that knowledge to some currently felt necessity. Both law and 
m edicine are long standing traditions. Both professions are challenged today as 
never before. This challenge comes precisely because more is expected o f the 
professions and the system is no longer controlled by them. The public demands that 
they respond to its needs and they cannot.
M edicine, especially, is facing social and legal confrontation today such as it has 
never faced before in its long history. Its practitioners are, for any num ber of 
reasons, ill prepared to deal with these assaults. At the same time the public has 
grown in sophistication and now demands much more from them with out giving in 
return a reverence alm ost akin to that which the laity form erly extended to the 
clergy. Today the public, particularly o f the developed world, views medicine in a 
light entirely different from that of just a short while ago.2^
Attitudes of awe and respectful hope have changed across nations; the general 
population now have high expectations and little patience with explanations which 
attempt to show why health care of the highest quality cannot be delivered right now 
and at a reasonable cost.
This indicates the law will be and has been a vehicle to bring about change. From 
earliest times the law has had an interest in the health of the community and presently 
there is a wide range of proposals for more effective and efficient systems for the 
delivery of health care, pursuant to which it is the responsibility o f government to
provide for and to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of the community.
The British Medical Association was formed in 1832, and on the basis of their 
proposals for effective professional control, the General Medical Council was 
created by Medicine Act 1858.29
27- Reader, op. cit., p. 5.
2 8 - Reader, op. cit., p. 183.
29- M ason J. K. & M cCall Sm ith R. A ., Law & M edical E thics. [2nd Ed.] L ondon, Buttcrworth
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To sum up, the major development of public health service, show that only 
through cooperation between the m any professional and technical, specialist 
participants in the field and specialists in the use of legal techniques, has there been 
progress from a limited epidemiologic focus to the broad areas of present concern.
The legal means were found, that is legislative programmes were developed, to 
put the developm ent of science and technology at the service of health care, and 
sometimes, almost paradoxically, legislation is also needed to deal with the problems 
created by technological advances.
Prior to the establishm ent o f effective laws to control communicable disease, 
there had been an understanding of the factors which were responsible for the spread 
of communicable disease, and of the vectors by which particular diseases are spread. 
H ow ever to legislate was also im portant in controlling com m unicable diseases. 
Neither medical science nor law can work independently. In the field of health care 
they must work together, as has been evidenced in the area of environmental control, 
such as in water and air pollution, in the field o f food and drug control, in 
occupational health and environmental health generally.
2.5 The drawback
In current times, however the medical practitioner faces serious problems due to 
litigation. E ither he is the potential evidence giver regarding the medico-legal 
problems upon which legal decisions are based, or he may be personally sued. 
Though his effectiveness is an absolute necessity, such a situation disturbs his 
attitude, and may result in his having to decide whether to continue in practice, 
where or what to practice, whether to be insured, and whether to fight a law suit.
Obviously such elements affect the doctor and indirectly his patients and the 
quality of medical care they receive. Consideration of some aspects of this problem 
1987, p. 9.
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will be discussed in later chapters.
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Health Policy and the National Health Service
This chapter provides an introduction to the policy of health services in the 
United Kingdom. It is concerned with the process o f health policy-m aking and 
implementation. The aim is to assess the organizational set-up of the National Health 
Service [NHS], its history and development; and the way in which policies for health 
services are made and implemented in central government and health authorities.
The chapter also examines the impact of the health service and considers which 
groups have power over policy-making. In addition it will briefly assess the current 
review of the health service.
The National Health Service was established in July 1948. Public provision for 
medical care was not, of course, new.
The service was built upon older foundations whose shape was sometimes all too 
evident in the adm inistrative arrangements, buildings and even attitudes carried 
forward into the new structure.1
The most significant feature of the NHS was the assumption by the state of major 
responsibility for financing and planning medical care in order to bring it within the 
reach of the whole population. Eckstein called it the only piece of pure socialism 
enacted by the post-war Labour Governm ent.2 The governm ent left its mark in 
two particular ways. One was the virtually complete nationalization of the hospitals 
formerly owned by local authorities and charitable organizations. Since non-hospital 
services were treated differently, this had the effect of institutionalizing the growing
1- A llsop Judy, Health Policy and The National Health Service . Pub. Longm an, Londonp 1984,
p. 11.
2- Eckstein Harry Horace. The E nglish Health S erv ice . Cam bridge Harvard Press, 1964, p. 172 & 
P reface.
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separation of hospital from community medicine. The other was the commitment in 
principle to provide m edical care without charge to the user at the time of 
consumption. The service was to be universal, in the sense that it covered the whole 
population, comprehensive in that it was intended to meet any need for medical care, 
and for the most part free [although, the principle had to be modified in those parts 
of the service that were least able to resist consumer demand]. It thus differed from 
the pattern of medical services in many other countries where some payment is made 
by the user, or state services are limited to particular classes of citizen e.g. the 
elderly, the indigent or insured workers.
"Good health is the bedrock on which social progress is built. A nation of 
healthy people can do those things which make life worthwhile and as the level of 
health increases so does the potential for happiness." ^
"Health affects every aspect of life. Our ability, to work, to play, to enjoy our 
families and to socialize with friends, all depend crucially upon our physical well­
being. Serious illness creates enormous pain and suffering, and even minor, transient 
ailments can be depressing psychologically, and ill health which leads to death makes 
all other services of satisfaction irrelevant."^
Those quotations underline the twin values which underpin intervention by 
modern governments in the pursuit o f health policies. Good health is seen as a 
positive benefit to both the individual and to the general public, and the provision of 
health services has been justified in terms both of fulfilling individual needs and as 
necessary for national progress. The development of health services and policies for 
health has in consequence been part of the growth of modem welfare states.*'
3- M inistry  o f  N ational H ealth & W elfare, Canada O ttawa, M inistry o f  H ealth Press, 19 7 4 , 
preface.
4 - L c Grand Julian Strategy o f  E quality, Redistribution & Social S erv ice, A llen  & U nw in , 
London 1982, P. 23.
5- R onald G . S. B row n, The C hanec in Natinal Health Service. [2nd Ed.), by R outledge & Kegan  
Paul, London 1978, P 21.
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It is salutary to review the legislation which created the framework and basis of 
the service which has now come of age, it being over forty years since the passing of 
the first National Health Service Act.
It will be useful in this introductory assessment to record what were the main 
points o f progress in medicine, prior to the establishment of the National Health 
Service Act 1946, in the years 1832—1948, respectively, and leading upto the 
National Health Service Act of 1977.
3.1 The Development of Medical Opinion and Origins of Public Pealth
Administration
This section traces the beginning and the development o f public action for the 
health of the people up to the year 1900 in the first instance.
In 1847 Dr. W. H. Duncan was appointed to be medical officer o f health for 
Liverpool, and in 1854 John Simon, the first Medical Officer of Health for London, 
looked forward to the time when there would be a National Department of Health 
with a M inister of Health, responsible to Parliament, and with the mandate 'in the 
widest sense to care for the physical necessities of human life.'^
The first o f these events, in the realm of practice, marks the beginning of the 
public health system in England. The second in the realm  of ideas marks the 
beginning of the slow logic of events which resulted in a National Health Service Act 
nearly 100 years later.
The NHS, established in 1948, was not a new radically policy of the British
welfare state. It was the product of evolution. Behind it lay centuries of tradition in
the provision o f health care and the organization of medical practitioners. It was
preceded by the National Health Insurance Act of 1911, which provided a form of
6- Public Health Journal, The Society  o f  Com m unity M edicine, V. 101 c /o  The R oyal Institute o f  
Public Health & H ygiene, 28 Portland place, o f  1987, p. 152.
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health insurance for low and lower middle income workers, and by the infamous 
Poor Law, which governed public welfare policies for centuries.^
It is no accident that public provision of medical care has had a long association 
with public provisions for the relief o f poverty. Prior to the 20*  century, the 
medical profession had very little of value to offer in the market place. The general 
practitioner could often do little more for his patients than to comfort and console 
them. Similarly, hospitals were not primarily institutions devoted to healing - they 
were places where people went to die. ^
For those who came to rely on public welfare, then, there was often little 
distinction made between "care" and "medical care" indeed there was rarely any 
reason to make such a distinction. It is for this reason that the historical origins of 
socialized medicine in Britain today are to be found in the British policies toward the 
relief of poverty- policies that were established centuries ago.9
3.2 The Social Consequence of the Industrial Revolution
Calye's10 conditions of the people questions begin from the fact, and the social 
consequence, of the Industrial Revolution. The facts are in the Blue B ooks11 and 
the responsible histories, and they would be scarcely credible if they were not in 
contemporary records and beyond dispute. To quote from industrial history.
Even in 1840 the results o f  their suffering were seen in the early deaths o f  the majority o f  
children in the crippled and distorted forms o f  the majority o f  those w ho survived ....'w ell can 1 
collect' said Lord Shaftesbury in the H ouse o f  the Lords in 1873, in the earlier periods o f  the 
factory m ovem ent, waiting at the factory gates to sec  the children com e out, and a set o f  sad, 
dejected, cadaverous creatures they were. In Bradford especia lly  the proofs o f  long and cruel toil
7- Sec R .W . Harris, National .Health. Insurance* 1911-1946  London 1946, p 38.
8- H orace, op. cit., p. 62.
9- H orace, op. cit., p. 62.
1(>" R oss Jam es Stirling The National Health Service in G. B ., An Historical and D escriptive Study, 
G eoffrey C um berlegc, O xford University Press, London 1952, p. 26.
11- ibid at p. 20.
w ere m ost rem arkable.1 ^
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3.3 The Health of the Industrial Population
The salient facts were the poverty and degradation o f the people in the
industrial towns with their concomitants: first the appalling sanitary conditions, 
including the widespread collecting of human excreta as a source of gain, and second 
the terrifying dangers of epidemic disease. ^
From this background these fifty years, 1850 - 1900, saw first the beginnings of 
public health legislation in England and then the development of the public health 
system  and practice. It is natural and right that the citizen should note with 
satisfaction the landmarks of public health progress through these years. But the true 
character of these years was that of a desperately slow and imperfect emergence of 
the industrial population from their social and economic conditions. Health should 
have been the strongest driving force for social and economic reform, instead of 
which it was allowed to be the resultant subject to the best that the doctors and 
medical officers of health could do in the unequal struggle.14
3 .4  Legislative Reform
The statesmen of the period following the Napoleonic wars and the Industrial 
Revolution had a heavy responsibility for the wellbeing of the country. In this health 
had to wait its turn. Following the Reform Act of 1832 there came in 1834 the 
Reform of the Poor Law and the establishment of the poor law com m ission.1-5 Next 
the first Public Health Act became law in 1848 and created the General Board of 
Health, a central department to encourage and supervise public health activities 
throughout England and W ales.16
12- ibid. at p. 20.
13- ibid at p. 26
14- ibid at p. 28.
15- Eckstein, The English Health Service Cam bridge 1964 p 10. cf. Stirling, op. cit., p. 28.
16- Stirling, op. cit., p. 11. & cf. Public Health Act 1848.
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In the meantime Sir John Simon, a surgeon from St. Thomas, had been appointed 
Medical Officer of Health for London in 1848, and held the post till 1855. Simon's 
work defined the conditions and means of progress of public health, namely a strong 
parliamentary and general public support for a defined public health policy on a 
reasoned conversation of the public need and interest.17
3.5 Legislation Establishment
A Royal Commission on the sanitary administration o f the country reported in 
1 8 7 1 .^  Its recom m endations went to the essentials of central and local 
organizations and led to immediate legislation which was a landmark in public 
health. The Local Government Board Act of 1871 created a central department for 
health and kindred matters under a responsible Minister. The new department took 
over the administration of the Poor Law from the Poor Law Board and the various 
function of the Privy Council and the Home Office in matters of public health and 
sanitation. Simon became its Medical Officer of Health. This should have been a 
great gain, but he found himself nearly powerless against the reactionary Poor Law 
element within the Board and he resigned in 1876.19
Many other Acts had been passed during these fifty years designed directly or 
indirectly for the prom otion of the health o f the people. These included, for 
example, the Vaccination Act of 1853 and the sewage Disposal Act of 1865-7. Then 
came the great Public Health Act of 1875, codifying the whole o f public health law 
and embodying new provisions. It was Simon's legacy to the nation. Consequently it 
continued as the principal Act, the Act of 1936.20
17- Frederick F. Cartwright, A Social History o f  M ed icine. London, Longm an, 1977, p. 110.
18- Stirling, op. c it., p. 30.
19- Stirling, op. c it., p. 30.
20- Cartwright, op. c it . , p. 111.
3 6
3.6 Establishment of the Ministry of Health and Down's Report 
Concerning Medical and Allied Services
Developments continued to take place and notable studies and reports on health 
policy appeared from to time.
The Act of 191921 had created a Ministry of Health and one of the Minister's 
first acts was to ask the new consultative council, with Lord Dawson as chairman, to 
report on the schemes necessary for the systematized provision of such medical and 
allied services as should in the council's opinion be available for the inhabitants of a 
given area.22
The report stated that the organization of medicine was failing to bring the 
advantages of medical knowledge adequately to the people. There was an increasing 
conviction that the best means of maintaining health and curing disease should be 
made available to all citizens.This could only be effected by new organization.
Preventive and curative m edicine can not be separated on any sound principle and in any 
schem e o f  m edical services m ust be brought together in c lose  co-ordination. They must likew ise  
be brought within the sphere o f  the general practitioner, w hose duties should em brace the work 
o f  com m unal as w ell as individual m edicine ....the present trend o f  the public health service
towards the inclusion o f  certain special branches curative work is tending to deprive both the
23
m edical student and the practitioner o f  the experience they need in these directions.
The service to be provided must be available for all classes of the community, 
and would be provided mainly through a system of health centers, in two categories, 
primary or general practitioner centers, and secondary or specialist centers. The 
teaching hospitals would have their place in relation to the secondary centers. 
Supplementary services would be needed for tuberculosis, mental disease, epilepsy,
21- The Ministry o f  Health Act o f  1919.
22- Great Britain o f  Health, C onsultative Council on M edical & A llied  S erv ices, Intcrm Report o f  
the Future Provision o f  M edical & A llied  Services [Chairman, Lord Daw son] HM SO, London 1920.
23- L ew is Jane, W hat Price Com m unity M edicine? G. B. Brighton W heatshcaf, 1986, P. 18.
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certain infectious diseases and orthopedic treatment. "The dominant purpose was to
provide the best service for the health of the p e o p le  we are well aware that the
realization must be allow to construct any part well and avoid mistakes in local 
effort, the whole design must be before the mind. This is an undertaking which can 
be started at once and steadily proceeded with."24
3.7 British Medical Association Report on General Medical Services
for the Nation
In 1930 the B M A issued a comprehensive study entitled 'Proposals for a 
M edical General Service for the N ation.'2-5 The scheme starts from the health 
insurance system which should be extended to the dependents o f the insured person 
and to all others of like economic status. It would give full medical services including 
specialist treatment through the family doctor. It would also give full dental and 
ophthalmic benefits and full maternity service.
Changes in the areas o f public administration would be required. The objects 
were: 1} to create a system of complete and all embracing units for local public 
health administration by removal of such functions from country district councils 
below a certain size; and 2} to treat hospital services and related medical services as 
regional problem s. The status of the M edical O fficer o f Health would be 
strengthened as the chief adviser to the Local Authority on health matters.26
The statem ents on hospital policy would entail far-reaching changes. The 
hospital service would be on a regional basis with the closest integration of the 
hospitals within each region. The new factor was the developm ent of municipal 
hospitals from 1930 onwards. The governing bodies and medical staff of voluntary 
hospitals would now have to adjust themselves to the altered conditions. As regards
24- Lord D aw son  M. O fficer, M edicine and the Stat. London [ 1920), pp. 223-4  .
25- Stirling, op. cit., p. 56. cf. Lord D aw son, loc. cit., p. 223.
26- Jane, op. cit., p. 17.
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entitlement, the Local Authority was under an obligation to recover the expense of 
hospital treatm ent from general hospital patients unless the patient could not 
responsibly be expected to pay in full. This would certainly lead under the B M A's 
general plan, to a further extension of hospital contributory schemes.27
These studies were valuable as studies o f policy and of broad lines of action. 
They prepared the way for the more comprehensive medical planning commission 
set up in 1940.28
3 .8  The Beveridge Report
In June 1941 Sir W illiam Beveridge chaired an Inter-Departmental Committee 
to undertake, with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes, a survey of 
the existing national schemes of social insurance and allied services including 
workmen's compensation, and to make recommendations.29
The report was submitted on 20 Nov. 1942. The theme of the report was the 
provision of social security and it was necessary to make three famous assumptions. 
A] systems of children's allowances, B] comprehensive health and rehabilitation 
services and finally C] a policy of maintainance of employment.30
The writer's concern is with assumption B. The case for it was not argued in the 
report: it needs little emphasis. But the point is strongly made that a comprehensive 
health and rehabilitation service is a logical corollary to the payment of high benefits 
in disability, to reduce the number of cases for which benefit is needed
The definition and scope of the health service under assumption B, is based on 
the objects of medical service given by the planning commission. The assumption
27- G cm m ill. British Search for H ealth. University o f  Pennsylvania 1960, P. 18.
28- B M A  Report, O n a General Service for the Nation* London 1940.
29- Sir W illiam  B everidge Report in Brief, Social Insurance & A llied  Serv ices London 1942, P. 
3.
30- The W estm inister Scries, Trends in the Natinal Health Service* V. 3 1964, & N H S A ct 1046, P. 
78.
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was that a comprehensive national health service would insure for every citizen 
whatever medical treatment was required and would ensure also the provision of 
dental, ophthalmic and surgical services and rehabilitation after accidents, rather 
than payment in respect of medical treatment.31
The ideal plan, however, from the standpoint of social security, was that the 
health service should provide full preventive and curative treatment of every kind to 
every citizen without exception and without economic barrier at any point. Under 
this plan there would be simply a partial contribution in the compulsory rates which 
would be transferred annually in a bulk total from insurance funds to the votes of the 
health departm ent.32
The report was form ally submitted to M inisters on 20 Nov. 1942. The 
government's study of the Beveridge proposals was by no means complete but the 
governm ent accepted the three assumptions of the Report in principle, including 
comprehensive medical treatment.33 «
3.8.1 To effect the plan
The Government announcement made in the House of Commons in 1943 was 
followed up at once by Ministers. Their intention was to proceed in three stages:
1. There would be confidential and quite tentative discussions with the medical 
profession and the health authorities.
2. M inisters then would prepare a general plan and would publish it in a white 
paper for public discussion.
3. The Government would determine formally the general plan. This would be 
em bodied in the Bills which the two M inisters would prepare and present to 
Parliam ent.34
31- M edical Planning C om m ission , British M edical Journal, 1042, P 743.
32- F. Cartwright Fox, A Social History o f M edicine London, Longm an 1977, p. 170.
3 3 - ibid p. 173.
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The confidentia l and exploratory  discussion took place in 1943 with 
representative groups. There was a m edical group nom inated by the B M A in 
association with the Royal College, and in addition there was a group representing 
the voluntary hospitals. The third group represented the M ajor Local Government 
Authorities. Consequently, the progress of the Bill was then strongly contested, both 
in standing committee and in the full House. Lastly, Lord Beveridge spoke on the 
large broad public policy of the measure. The passage should be quoted fully:
"I g iv e  m y w hole  hearted support to the B ill in particularity all its main features. O f course  
this does not do every thing that is wanted to prom ote the health o f  the people o f  this country. It is 
not intended to. Health depends on housing, nutrition, sanitation and and so  on. But the Bill docs  
do two quite essential things within its own field. The first is that it rem oves com pletely the 
econ om ic  barrier betw een sick persons and the best possib le treatment for them ....The second  
thing that the B ill does is to set up for the first tim e a true M inistry o f  Health, a national authority 
with the duty and with the pow er o f  attacking disease as a national enem y. I hope ....it is going to 
be a continual irritant to authorities which are not getting on sufficien tly  w ell with housing , 
sanitation and nutrition by saying, this is causing to do a good  deal more than w e need."3-’
After the acceptance of several Lords amendments by the Commons the bill 
received the Royal assent on 6 Nov. 1946 When the Bill became law, considerable 
spade work was necessary before implementation and the appointed day was fixed 
for 5 th July 1948.^
As a result the moral duties of the citizen had to be accepted in balance with their 
normal rights. The law and practice and the changing social customs of the land, at 
their best, offer a rough and ready and developing adjustment o f this balance. The 
complete citizen recognizes this adjustment for the moral bond of honour and 
service which it is.
Britain was the first country in the world to offer free medical care to the whole
34- ibid P. 93.
35- Cartwright, op. cit., p. 110; loc.cit., The NH S p. 93.
3 6 -1  eviir Ruth. The Reorganization NH S London, Croom H elm  1977, p. 17.
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population. M any other countries had developed com pulsory health insurance 
schemes, but under them rights to health care were generally confined to those who 
paid contributions and their dependents, and to pensioners.
Still with the basic indicator o f m edical need rather than ability to pay the 
National Health Service Reorganization Act of 1973 came in to operation.
Following the implementation of the 1946 Act in July 1948, the health service 
was organized into three district parts which were managed and financed separately.
These were - the hospital service, the local health authority service, and the 
general practitioner service. In order to improve the service to the patient and to 
ensure a more efficient use o f financial and other resources the service was 
eventually reorganized into a single m anagem ent structure, covering central, 
regional, area and some times district levels. The reorganization was effected by the 
N H S  Reorganization Act 1973.
In 1977 the provision of 1946 Act and most of the provisions of the 1973 Act 
were consolidated into the National Health Service Act 1977 The principal duty 
enunciated in section one of 1946 Act was repeated in the 1977 Act {s. 1}.
On 8 th August 1980 the Health Services Act 1980 received the Royal Assent. 
This conferred on the Secretary o f State power to make certain changes in the 
structure of the N H S if he thought it was desirable so to do.38
3.9 Complaints about the National Health Service's Deficiencies
The image of the British NHS is becoming increasingly tarnished by newspaper
headlines, British hospitals have been well on demonstrations, with heavy demands 
by the majority o f all medical and public health workers o f the nation. Amongst 
other workers of the nation, demanding for better service for better employment 
conditions were included.
37- Ibid at pp 24-25.
38- D. Finch, Health Service Law. London, Sw eet & M axwell 1981, p. 9.
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The investigative research o f British econom ist D ennis Lees recently  
sum m arized the judgm ent o f many, "when he wrote that "the substitution of 
socialized medicine for private medicine has not led to more medical care, to better 
medical care, or to more equal distribution of medical care. There is in Britain to­
day grave uncertainty about both the availability and quality of medical care."-^ 
Sim ilarly, Professor Alwyn Smith, President of the Faculty of Com m unity 
Medicine, said on the problems of the NHS, "Britain was the leader of public health a 
generation ago. It has now lost that position of pre-eminence with the result we are 
falling behind our neighbours in those very areas- child health and immunization, 
health promotion and prevention where we should be in f r o n t . D a v i d  McKie 
quoted from a report about the condition o f nursing. "We are very concerned" it 
declares "at the present acute shortages of nursing in some areas, and more so at the 
prospect of a general shortage in the future, which poses a serious set back to the 
national health service. The measures taken so far have clearly been insufficient to 
avoid shortages developing."41
The continuing crisis in the NHS brought a joint statement from the presidents of 
the Royal Colleges (of physicians, surgeons, obstetricians and gynecologists] stating 
their concern.
"Each day w c learn o f  new  problems in the N H S, beds shut, operating room s are not 
availab le, em ergency wards are closed , essential services are shut dow n in order to make
financial savings. Inspite o f  the efforts o f  doctors, nurses and other patient care is
deteriorating. A cute hospital services alm ost reached breaking point. M orale is dcprcssingly
39- A s quoted from John C. G oodm an, N ational Health Serv ice  in G B L esson s for the U SA  
D allas F isher Institute 1980, p. 2.
40 - Sec British M edical Journal N o. 293 p . 56, 1986.
41 - See The Lancet London V. 2 1 'Far Too Few Nurses to Keep the NHS G oing, 1987 p. 582 .
42 - S ee The Lancet N o  8572 London 1987 p. 1411.
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Of all three of the Royal colleges whose president's statement was reported in 
the press on Dec.7 "Almost forty years ago their predecessors wrote a letter which 
was largely responsible for the avoidance of confrontation between the Government 
and the medical profession which might have seriously damaged the NHS at its out 
set. This time it is the Government's failure to recognize that it has squeezed the NHS 
beyond endurance that threatens the main service objective of equity of access to 
health care according to need, and not to ability to pay.43
3.9.1 The 1987 White Paper
The Government has published a white paper entitled "Prom oting Better 
Health"44 seem ingly to ease the criticism  from both the m edia and medical 
professions. The W hite Paper appeared with several welcome proposals. For 
example, these include training allowances for primary care nursing and reception 
staff, com polsary retirement for family doctors at 70 years of age and financial 
support for fluoridation. In general the Government's main stated aims are to raise 
the standard of care, to establish a priority of services rendered by the family 
doctor, to promote health and to prevent disease.
In order to achieve these objectives, the Government is prepared to invest more 
money where it is required, after negotiations with concerned professionals as to the 
exact amount.
To make more effective the programme the Government pointed out that extra 
money is needed, i.e. by introducing new charges on a private sight test and dental 
examination to those who can afford i t 43
The Government has proposed to strengthen the family doctor service in order 
to promote a measure of better health care by allocating an additional fee to doctors
43- Ibid.
44- Presented to Parliam ent by the Secretary o f State for Social Services, Prom oting Better Health: 
The G overnm ent's Program m e Im proving Primary Health Care, N ov. 1987.
45- ibid.
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to encourage them to follow up and check their patients in the provision of health 
care.
M oreover, as a further improvement the government reviewed a num ber of
measures, i. e. to provide information about local medical practices, such as opening
hours and services provided. To accomplish this proposal, a family practitioner
committee and health boards will be required.
Notwithstanding, the procedures for investigating complaints against doctors,
dentists, pharmacists, and opticians established by the National Health Service
[Service Committees and tribunal] Regulations 1974, the government in the White
Paper set out its plan for accepting oral complaints through the regional or district
health authorities. Extended rights to appeal even beyond this are also given.
However, serious complaints are already dealt with by a previous statutory
procedure,46 including allegation that practitioners failed to exercise a proper
degree of skill, and allegations of professional m isconduct, but criticism s of a
47doctor's m anner would not impose liability.
The decision to support health promotion is admirable, but constraints are likely 
to persist. For example, the health check up proposal seems to ignore the past N H S 
system of regular health checkups which hereafter may well be hindered by the 
imposition of a charge, may and lead to reducing the effectiveness of the health care 
system and invites mortality which is contrary to the goal of promoting better health.
3.9.2 The 1989 White-paper Health Service Review
In general terms, the main proposals in the White Paper are intended to be 
implemented by 1991; the government summarizes the aims of the White Paper as
follows:
46- ibid.
47 - ibid.
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1] "to give patients, wherever they live in the U. K. better health care and greater 
choice of the services available; and
2] greater satisfaction and rewards for those working in the National Health 
Service who successfully respond to local needs and preferences."
In order to achieve these aims, the White Paper outlines a number o f strategies, 
which can be summerised as follows.
1. Self-governing hospitals:- The government intends to make available as many 
hospitals as possible independently. Although all hospitals are eligible to have a self- 
governing status, in the first instance it is in the large hospitals that the self- 
governing process is likely to take place. In due course, it will be left to Regional 
Health Authorities to identify the suitable hospitals for self-governing status and to 
encourage such hospitals to go independent.
The proposal indicates that new management and services should be audited, and 
outlines how self-governing hospitals should pay for such services. Managers will be 
free to decide the salary scale of their staff, and staffs in self-governing hospitals are 
to be given the chance to rem ain in the N H S scheme or to make other 
arrangements.
2. Funding hospital services :- In this part the working paper explains how the 
allocation of regional and district funding will be based, besides indicating the types 
of contracts that could be made between purchaser and suppliers of hospital services. 
Also it considers the funding of N H S staff for undergraduate medical and dental 
training.
3. General practice:- this document explains ways of reducing waiting lists for
operations, and surgical diagnostic procedures which will come under the allocated
budget, and information on how practices pass over to Regional Health Authorities
48- Presented to Parliament by the Secretary o f  State for Health, W orking for Patient, The Health 
S ervice  Caring for the 1990s, Her M ajesty's Stationery O ffice  London, January 1989 .
4 6
will need to reach agreement on their budget level.
4:- Guidance on prescribing budgets for General M edical Practitioners:- to 
cover expenses for medicines prescribed by medical practitioners, Regional Health 
Authorities will be allocated secured annual budgets to distribute to practitioners.
5. Medical audit:- A fund has been allocated for the development of the audit 
system, with the aim of improving medical care.
Discussion will take place between the government and the professions over 
arrangements for audit. Meanwhile, a District Medical Audit Advisory Committee 
chaired by a senior clinician, will be established by April 1991 in each district. 
M oreover it is the government's expectation that for primary care each Family 
Practitioner Committee will have a Medical Advisory Group.
6. Family Practitioners Committee:- It is proposed that the family practitioner 
committees would decrease their members from 30 to 11. A post will be established 
for a Chief Executive who will play an important role in guiding the transition to 
re-established Family Practitioner Committees that will be directly responsible to 
the Regional Health Authorities rather than to the Department of Health as at present.
The government is determined to end monopoly provision of N H S care, for the 
following reasons:- waiting lists are so long; there is a a shortage of staff; the salary 
paid by the private sectors is uncomputable; and above all the government sees the N 
H S as being in an intolerable condition. It assumes that the solution is not to pour 
money in to the system, but to find means by which to manage it more efficiently.
However, such proposals were not accepted by the British Medical Association, 
and it launched a campaign against the government's plan as set out in the Health 
Service W hite Paper, claiming such reform would seriously damage patient care.
Dr. John Marks the B M A'S Chairman said that the proposal will lead to 
fragm ented service and would destroy the comprehensive nature of the existing 
service.49 Dr. Marks added that, the changes would put the clock back to the time
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when patients were hunted by doctors anxious to increase their income. So he 
warned that the doctors who increased their lists would have less time to see patients.
From the point of view of patient care the BMA emphasizes its point, that the 
proposals in the W hite Paper are unlikely to be practicable, though debate should 
take place on the value of the change.50
However, it would be unwise to reject the W hite Paper totally. It is arguably 
building on a trend already under way, and may only be confronting a not surprising 
reluctance to seek different ways of tackling problems. In addition the service has 
not been encouraged to respond critically and selectively to different proposals. On 
the other hand, the government should recognize why its White Paper is opposed 
with such antagonism  and seek to answer the opposition with concrete answers 
instead of trying to reassure blandly.
M oreover, the B M A  Council approves the aims, but not the means, of the NHS 
review set out in the White Paper. The Council has restated its warning that the new 
arrangement is unlikely to meet the needs of patient care in the N. H. S., will lead to a 
fragmented service in which existing services might be d im in ish ed .^  The points 
made are: the proposals in the white paper will reduce the standard of the NHS 
patient care because it will require extra funding.
- The government's main purpose seems to be to contain and reduce the level of 
public expenditure directed to health care.
- The proposals would increase the adm inistrative accountancy cost of the 
service.
- The proposals ignore the rising costs of providing services for the elderly and
49- The Guardian and The T im es March 3, 1989.
50- British M edical A ssocia tion . N o 6681 V. 298, Tavistock Square, London W CIH 9JR, April 29  
1989, P .l 129 .
51- British M edical A ssociation. N o 6679  V .298 April 15 1989 p. 980.
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for medical advances.
On the other hand it is hard to accept that any service can be immune from
criticism, and the complaints forwarded attack the exceptional favours given to the
rich, but there is independent evidence that the proposal is to some degree
supportable. For example, an interview was held with Professor Alain Enthoven
who is one of America's leading experts on the economics of health care.
In his answer to the N H S review, he commented that, "the W hite Paper had
weak and strong points: Generally very positive!
I see several good ideas: one is self-governing hospitals. Another is the idea of
mixed economy with private hospitals to compete for the NHS patients as they do to a
limited extent to-day. Another idea is the regions would all receive their main budget
on the basis of location, adjusted for age, morbidity and the like adjustments. Greater
delegation to the local level is a good idea.
Some experimentation with budget holding by general practitioners is an idea
w ellworth exploring, though I have reservations about how the governm ent 
52proposes to do it."
When he commented on the weak points he said:
"The main weak point must be the lack of specificity about how the good ideas 
will be put together in a working system."53
Furthermore he puts importance on pilot studies: "demonstration projects are a 
very good idea. Proposed innovations should be developed locally with people who 
are keen to try them, it is mistake that the government is against it.'54
These suggestions, if they were not in the image of America's health care system, 
would have been helpful, but British society is unlikely to appreciate the U S health 
care system. Indeed as it can be seen from the recent surveys that this support for the
52- British M edical A ssocia tion . N o. 6681 V. 29 8 , April 29 1989, p. 1166.
53- Ibid.
54- Ibid.
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reforms has not greatly changed the volume and range of protest from around the
country, which has become unusually strong.
As a result there is no doubt the crisis has changed opinion in the Conservative
Party. In May 1989 the poll for Labour in the Vale of Glamorgan represented a
spectacular win, at least some of which seems to have come about as a result of
concern about the N. H. S .55
The Vale o f G lam organ had been Tory-held for 38 years, but Labour
overturned this, increasing its share of the vote, and projected to a national election
shows 42% for Labour and 38% for Conservative.^6
The 'Guardian commented' that "It was, without any doubt, the future of the
NHS and the conduct of the Prime Minister which emerged as the issues which swept
the Labour candidate to the commons for the first time and possess the seat of the
Tories for the first time in 38 years." And this was seconded by another
com m entator "...Despite all their recent tribulations, despite even the anger and
mistrust which, as the Vale of Glamorgan indisputably showed, has been generally
57aroused by her [PM] plans extensive change in the NHS." In any circumstances, 
the clearest view of the currently proposed reforms in the NHS will not solve all its 
problems. Nor will everybody be pleased with the kind of service that develops as a 
result. There will always be dissatisfaction with some of the decisions that are 
reached on the balance between the quality and the quantity of the service to be 
provided from  given resources, betw een the health care providers,and the 
consumers, and between technical efficiency and humanity in specific services. It 
cannot be ignored that there is the possibility that present distortion will persist in the 
new structure.
55- The Independent, Sutarday 6 , M ay 1989.
56- The Guardian , Sutarday 6 May 1989, p. 4.
57- Ibid at p. 22.
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If resources are insufficient to meet demand, then it is difficult to maintain the 
pattern of provision in a free service which does not reflect priority needs. The sense 
of the argument is about the kind of medical needs it will take account of and about 
those it will leave out. Individuals will have to provide for them selves, either 
through self-medication or through buying care that the NHS is unable to provide on 
a universal scale.
The current antagonistic pressures against the W hite Paper have arisen not 
because the British are collectively too poor to afford it, but sensibly, because there 
are so many other things, i. e. a higher material standard of living as well as better 
social and environment services, which they aim at; and they have to make a choice.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that the proposals will benefit those unable to pay. 
Besides, a huge fund will still be required to expand technology. If this is so would it 
not have been better to make the N H S work more efficiently within the existing 
infrastructure?
W hat is the significance of all these changes, when it might be possible to 
improve conditions for both patients and staff within the present one?
Would it be cheaper to maintain and improve present management?
Presumably there is no lack of information regarding the private health care
58problems in the U S A ,  where the consumer is under great financial p ressu re/ On 
the part of physicians and others in the U S, there is a growing concern with regard 
to medical care costs, due to the commercialization of medicine and the physicians' 
autonomy, and where because of the sysyem, U S physicians are much litigated- 
against, and paper work laden.
It has been pointed out how dangerous it would be for the N H S to follow the 
m ixed public-private model o f the U S style approach. ^  ^ e  governm ent
58- M oor FD. W ho Should Profit from the Care o f  Your Illness? Harvard M agazine, 1965 N ov.-
Dec
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succeeded in dissolving the National Health Service, physicians in Britain would 
suffer as do as their American colleagues. Hence, from the public's point of view, 
one can sense, it might be advisable to hear opinions from both the public and from 
politicians on this critical issue of the privatisation of the N H S, and to evaluate 
carefully the U S experience before implementing the proposed privatisation of the 
National Health Service partially, or as a whole, in the U K.
3.10 Comment
The legislation that established the service assumed that its function was the 
promotion of the nation's health by the efficient and equitable deployment of the 
resources needed for prevention and treatment of disease and for the alleviation of 
suffering resulting from disease that proves to be neither preventable nor curable. 
The function of its administration is therefore to ensure that the service pursues these 
aims.
In the course of its history the N H S has displayed three potential attributes: the 
equitable deploym ent of health care resources; accountability to the communities 
that it serves; and the purposeful pursuit of declared policies.
Equity:- As can be seen from the contemporary atmosphere of opposition the 
NHS administration has been handicapped in efforts to redress injustices by the 
progressive relative decline in development funds. Although the annual expenditure 
of the NHS has steadily increased, even in real terms the increase has not matched 
demand.
Accountability;- The Minister is responsible to Parliament for the NHS. More 
importantly, the health authorities are so constituted that they have some limited 
accountability to the community they serve.
59- S ilver G A. The Privatization o f  M edical C are- Caveat M cdicus Postgraduate Med. J. 1985, 61, 
1093-95.
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The progressive decline in accountability is unfortunate, although encouraging 
interest has been shown in the newly introduced system of regional review. If the 
function o f the NHS is the promotion of the community's health then it must be 
assessed in these terms, and if it is to be accountable in these term s then its 
management must embrace and command the necessary means.
Purpose:- in the context o f the challenge posed by the com plexity  of 
contemporary health needs, the most important attribute of the NHS is the capacity it 
has, or ought to have, to translate its overall aims into specific objectives, the pursuit 
of which can be intelligently planned and monitored. Most of the large scale success 
in m odern health care has been achieved by carefully conceived and executed 
programs. The best examples come from other countries, particularly ones much 
poorer than Britain. Very poor countries may find it easier to select objectives since 
they can not afford to do everything.
Therefore, from a public point of view, health is a social and economic resource, 
the promotion and maintenance of which are among the primary considerations of 
humanity. If this view is accepted then the N H S may be seen as a productive 
enterprise rather than as an expensive luxury.
And as a member state of the World Health Organization the UK is committed to 
the view that each individual has the right to the highest attainable level of health.
The optimum deployment of resources requires the maintenance of the most 
effective balance of preventive, curative, and caring activities, and adequate staffing 
in some of the less popular medical specialties has become a burning issue at present.
Last, but not least, the efficient use of health care resources implies a purposeful 
attempt to reduce health variance and demands a degree of strategic and tactical 
planning that can be achieved only by a coordinated, publicly accountable system of 
management capable of defining and pursuing realistic and specific objectives, but it 
seems that one senses the N H S regrettably has shown failure to meet this
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requirem ent and is currently moving further from it rather than towards it.
This chapter has provided a general overview of the developm ent in the 
provision of health care in the U K. It setup the historical and organizational context 
by a description o f the dynam ics of health policy form ation. M oreover, in 
concluding, the N H S is viewed as a great social experiment, and as a concrete 
expression of the development of a more humane attitude to disadvantaged groups in 
a society. In short, the service is seen as of the main planks in the welfare state. 
Hence, it is for this reason that the attention of the doctors and concerned bodies have 
focused on the contents of the recent White Paper.
It is with all this in mind that an account of the service has been given, tracing 
first its historical antecedents and the evolution of the policy, and thereafter the story 
of its planning and institution, its administration practice, and its larger problems.
54
C M A IP 'ir E E IF (Q) U R 
Public Health Law
This chapter presents a brief description and analysis of important legal issues in 
the field of public health service. It is not intended to be an encyclopedia review of 
the vast and growing field o f public health law as it applies both to the environment 
and personal health care, but rather is a compilation of research studies of selected 
issues in public health law that have been matters of debate and contention in recent 
times.
4.1 Public Health and the Law
The protection and preservation of the public health has been recognized from
time immemorial as one of the necessary duties and as one of the primary functions
of the sovereign power, of the state. Not only governm ent-organized for the
purpose, among others, of safeguarding the health of the people  ^ but all
progressive governm ents have realized that upon the efficient and effective
perform ance of this important duty depends, in large measure, the survival of
society and the social order.
W hile the rem ark attributed to one o f the Earls of Derby, that "sanitary
instruction is even more important than sanitary legislation" may be accepted as a 
2
truism, it is equally true that practical laws, reasonably and equitably enforced, 
are essential as a foundation for the public health activities of government.
Education and moral persuasion, desirable as they may be in the practice of 
public health, will not bring results unless the people realize that behind them is the 
long arm of the law.This is the inexorable law of human nature.
1- Pow ell v. Pennisvlvanial 18881, 127 U S 678, 8 S. Ct. 992, 32L. Ed. 253.
2- Sec infra by D rCharles v. Chapinp. XI.
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The legal aspects of public health administration are as important today as ever,
even though it is alleged, rightly, that the modern science of public health has
emerged from an era of dependence solely upon police measures. While the modern
Environm ental Health O fficer or Health O fficer m ust be an educator and a
statesman, rather than merely a police officer, many of his duties are still necessarily
concerned with law enforcement. As Dr. Charles v. Chapin has so cogently written:
"Thus the promotion of public health has been largely a matter of compulsion.
The state took away men's property and men's liberty... The rigorous enforcement
of isolation took away men's most cherished right, his personal liberty. Police work
is not pleasant work. It is slow work, and he who does it finds it difficult to obtain the
3
good will of those whom he coerces."
Police work, as Dr. Chapin indicates is slow, arduous, and often disagreeable,
but public health administration need not suffer from these handicaps and defects, if
public health officials are sufficiently conversant with the legal principles applicable
to their professional activities.4
Health officers must be fam iliar not only with the extent of their powers and 
duties, but also with the limitations imposed upon them by law. With such knowledge 
available and wisely applied by health authorities, public health will not remain 
static, but will progress.
4.1.1 Definition of Public Health
Health has been defined by the World health Organization as "a state of complete 
physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and 
infirmity."-’
3- C. V. ChaninThe Evolution of Preventive M edicine. Janaury 1921, J. A. M. A. 76:215.
4- J.A. T o b ev .Letial K now ledge Essential for Sanitarians. Public Health and The Law Am J. Public Health, 
June 1941, 31 : 587.
5- Hanlon, John J. & G eolge E. PicketlPublic Health Administration and Practice, St. Louis: C. V. M osby, 
1979, P. 92.
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Hanoi [1979] defines health as:
a state o f  total effective psychologic functioning; it has both a relative and an absolute  
m eaning, varying through tim e and space both in the individual and group; it is the result o f  the 
com bination o f  m any forces, intrinsic and extrinsic, inherited and contrived, individual and 
co llectiv e , private and public, m edical, environm ental and social; and is conditioned by culture, 
econ om y, law and governm ent.6
Environm ental health has been defined by Purdon [1980] as "the characteristics o f  
environm ental conditions that affect the quality o f  health....That aspect o f  public health that is 
concerned with those forms o f  life , substances, forces and conditions in the surroundings o f  man 
that m ay exert an influence on human health and well-being."7
Environmental health includes knowledge and practice of activities designed to 
preserve and improve the environment and will always represent a part of public 
health programmes. Since environmental is health usually one aspect of public health 
programmes, it is of public concern, thus the public aspect of health.
"Public health is dedicated to the common attainment of the highest level of 
physical, mental and social well-being and longevity consistent with available 
knowledge and resource at a given time and in a given space, it holds this goal as its 
contribution to the most effective social developm ent life of the individual and 
society."^
W inslow 9defines public health as "the science and art of preventing disease, 
prolonging life and promoting health and efficiency through organized community 
effort for;
[a] the sanitation of the environment
[b] the control of communicable infections
[c] the education of the individual in personal hygiene
[d] the organization of medical and nursing services for the early diagnosis and
preventive treatment of diseases, and
6- ibid.
7- Purdcn W alton A. Environmental Hcralth. New  York, Acadamic Press, 1980.
8- Pickctt.op. cit., p. 92.
9 Pickctt,op. cit., p. 92.
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[e] the development of social machinery to insure everyone a standard of living 
adequate for maintenance of health."
W hereas personal hygiene is the care of his personal health by the individual, 
Public Health, or Community Hygiene, is the care of comm unity health by the 
comm unity as a whole. It may be sub-divided into many branches, for example, 
school hygiene, [health education], industrial hygiene, and mental hygiene. Social 
hygiene usually means hygiene applied to social amelioration or reform, though the 
expression is often restricted to the control of venereal disease. When public health is 
on a national basis it is some times termed State Medicine. Sanitary science means 
environmental hygiene in relation to water supplies, sewerage, nuisance, and other 
matters. Preventive medicine is a useful expression somewhat variously employed. It 
includes at least the preventive aspects of hygiene.10
Furthermore a generally accepted definition of public health is that given by C. 
E. A. W inslow, Professor of Public Health of Yale University School of Medicine, 
who writes:
"Public health is the science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life, 
and promoting physical health and efficiency through organized community efforts 
for the sanitation of the environmental, the control of the community infections, the 
education o f the individual in principles of personal hygiene, the organization of 
m edical and nursing services for the early diagnosis and preventive treatm ent of 
disease, and the development of the social m achinery which will ensure for every 
individual a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health; organizing 
these benefits in such fashion as to enable every citizen to realize his birthright of 
health and longevity ."^
Public health conceived in these terms declares Professor W inslow, will be
10- G. J. Ronald and British M edical Association, Alxandcr Govtlv g ie n e  [3rd Ed.J, Edinburgh 1948, p.5 .
11- C. E. A. W inslow , The Untitled Fields o f Public HealtScience. SI In.si. 23, March 1920, p. 28.
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something vastly different from the exercise of the purely police power which has 
been its principle manifestation in the past.
Another professional definition of public health is that given in Sedgwick's
12principles o f sanitary science and public health, where public health is said to
include both personal hygiene and sanitation, together with administrative practices
such as analysis of vital statistics, epidemiological studies and investigations, sanitary
inspections, public health education, public health laboratory services, the
m aintenance of clinics, sanatoria, and hospitals and other activities which cannot
logically be classified under personal hygiene or sanitation.
Personal hygiene is defined as the science and art of the conservation and
promotion of personal health, while sanitation or public hygiene is defined as the
science and art of the conservation and promotion of the public health through the
control o f the environment. Sanitary science is regarded as the embodiment of the
principles that aid in an understanding of the source of infection and modes of
transmission of disease.
These definitions like all attempts at definition, are approximations only. In law,
definitions are always difficult to arrive at, but courts and eminent jurists frequently
have been responsible for impressive descriptions of, and salient comments on, the
scope and significance of public health. Thus Blackstone wrote that "the right to the
enjoyment of health is a subdivision of the rights of personal security, one of the
13absolute right of persons."
In delivering an opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Harlan 
stated on 1888: "...it is the settled doctrine of this court, that as governm ent is 
organized for the purpose, among others, of preserving the public health and the 
public health morals, it cannot divest itself of the power to provide for these
12- S. C. Prescott and M.P. Horwood, Sedw ick's.Principle o f Sanitary Science and Public Health.New York 
M acm illan, 1935, p. 54.
13- 1 Blackstone Commentaries, 1976, 129.
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i • , „ 14 objects.
One of the legitim ate and most important functions of civil governm ent is 
acknowledged to be that o f providing for the general welfare of the people by 
making and enforcing laws to preserve and promote public health and public safety. 
The power to enact and enforce is lodged by the people in the government of the 
state, qualified only by such conditions as to the m anner of its exercise as are 
necessary to safeguard individual citizens from unjust and arbitrary interference. 
But under these restrictions, the pow er exists in am ple m easure to enable 
government to make all needful regulations touching the well-being of society. It is 
therefore, extended by a system of legislative precautions, for the protection of the 
life and health of all persons within the jurisdiction of the respective country, and 
just exception based on standard can be taken to its exercise in any way that is 
reasonably necessary and proper for the promotion of the public good and for the 
protection of society from things harmful to its comfort, security and w elfare.15
A somewhat modem, although no more convincing, attitude regarding public 
health was expressed by Mr. Justice Thompson of the Illinois Supreme Court in an 
important decision handed down in 1922 in the following language.
"The health o f the people is unquestionably an economic asset and social 
blessing, and the science of public health is therefore of great importance. Public 
health measures have long been recognised and used, but the science of public health 
is o f recent origin, and with the advance o f science m ethods have greatly 
altered...Among all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws none is 
more important than the preservation of the public health."
And finally the importance of public health is epitomized in an encyclopedia of
14- Pow ell v. Pcnsvlvania.[ 18881,127 U. S. 678, 8 s ct. 992, 32 L Ed 253.
15- L. Parker and R. H. W orthington.The Law o f  Public Health and Safety and the Powers and Duties ol 
Boards o f  Health. Albany, Bender, 1892 sec I.
16- Barmore v. Robertson [1922] 302 111 , 422, 134 N. E. 815, 22, A. L. R. 835.
6 0
law with these significant words, "Health being the sine qua non o f all personal
enjoyment it is not only the right but the duty of the state or municipality possessing
the police power to pass such laws or ordinances as may be necessary for the
17prevention o f disease of the people." "Health incidentally, is the state of being 
hale, sound or whole in body, mind, or soul, and free from physical and mental 
disease." 18
Environm ental health borrows the prevention and education philosophy from 
public health practice. In essence, public health law is a specialty of administrative 
law and environmental health law is a specialty of public health law. Public health 
law and its basis are extensively reviewed in the text by Grad [ 1978]19
Public health law may be defined as that branch of jurisprudence which deals 
with the relation and application of common and statutory law to the principles and 
procedures of hygiene and sanitary science, and public health administration.
Public health law differs from, and is not a part of, medical jurisprudence, more 
properly known as legal medicine or forensic medicine, which is the science dealing 
with the application of medical facts to legal principles and legal principles to 
medical practice.20
Since m edicine is the science and art dealing with the prevention, cure, or 
alleviation o f disease, public health is sometimes considered to be a branch of 
medicine. Actually, however, public health is a science that is broader than medicine, 
because it draws for its component parts not only upon preventive medicine and to 
some extent upon curative m edicine, but also upon the arts and science of 
engineering, biology, chemistry, biochemistry, statistics, education, sociology, and
17- 1 2 Corpus Juris 913 see 39 C. J. S. 811.
18- J. A. T o h cv The Common Health. New York, Funk and W agnalls 1937.
19- Grad Frank, Public Health Law Manual W ashington, D. C., American Public Health A ssociation 1978,
p. 234. cf. Sanford M. Brown, et alEnvironmental Health Law . Prengcr Publishers, Westport, Conneclcut, US  
A 1984, p. 10.
20- James A. Tohe.v Public Health Law [3rd Ed.) N ew  York The Com monwealth Fund 1947, P. 9.
61
law.21
4.1.2 The Development of Public Health Law
Since disease is as old as mankind itself, society has realized from its earliest
beginnings that organized efforts by the sovereign power are necessary to cope with 
22plague and pestilence.
In Medieval Europe, the first sanitary laws were promulgated by King John II of
England who issued a royal edict against pollution of the Thames. In 1348, during an
epidemic of plague, Venice appointed a board of health, which established rules for
forty days' isolation of infected persons, thus giving rise to the term "quarantine." In
1274 Venice imposed a quarantine upon maritime commerce, a procedure which
was followed by other cities.
In the centuries that followed, sanitary ordinances were adopted from time to
time, but when Queen Victoria ascended the throne of the United Kingdom in 1837,
the science o f public health was virtually unrecognized by the legislature. Through
the influence of Edwin Chadwick, a lawyer who was secretary of the Poor Law
Commission, physicians were employed to investigate conditions contributing to ill
health. In 1842 Chadwick published a report on the sanitary conditions of the
laboring class and in 1843 a Royal Commission was appointed to study the health of
23the large towns and populous districts.
As a result of these activities, A General Board of Health was created in England
in 1848. According to Dr. W illiam H. Welch, the modern public health era dates
21- Hanlon John J. and George E. PickettPublic Health Administration & Practice. St. Louis: C. V. M osby, 
1979, P. 5.
22- J. A. T ohcv.Thc National Government and Public Health Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1926, Chapter 
II.
23- E. C hadwick. Parliamentary General Renort on the Sanitary Condition o f the Labouring Population in 
Great Britain. Edinburgh at the University Press 1842, p. 67; cf. M H. Jackson, G. P. Morris, P. G. Smitbh, J. 
F. Crawford, Environmental Health R efem ce Book. Buttcrworlhs, London 1989, p. 5.
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from this event, for he says, then for the first time in human history was the care of 
the health o f the people fully recognized as an important administrative function of
*  24 government.
4.1.3 Early American Health Legislation
The first sanitary legislation in America apparently was an enactment of March,
1647 or 1648 by the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony, providing for a
maritime quarantine against ships from the W est Indies, where one of the periodic
25epidemics of yellow fever was raging.
Nuisances affecting the comfort, and to some extent the health of the people were
subject to legislative control in the earliest days of the American Colonies. A law for
the control of nuisances was adopted in Massachusetts in 1692, shortly after South
Carolina had passed legislation on the same subject, although the first local board of
26health in America was organized in Baltimore in 1793.
The most noteworthy event in the progress of public health and the development
of public health law in U S was the publication in 1850 of the report of the
27Massachusetts Sanitary Commission.
This report was prepared by number of the Commission Lemuel Shattuck, who
had derived much inspiration from the work of Chadwick of England. Shattuck's
report presents a history of public health legislation, with a complete plan. He
recommended that the laws relating to public health be thoroughly revised, saying,
"we suppose that it will be generally conceded that no plan for a sanitary survey of
the state, however good or desirable, can be carried out into operation unless
established by law. The legislative authority is necessary, to give it efficiency and
usefulness. The efforts, both o f association anf individuals have failed in these
24- W . H. W elchPublic Health in Theory and Practice New Haven, Yale University Press 1925, 58.
25- H. S. Mustard Government in Public Health Com monwealth Fund, N ew  York 1945, p. 61.
26- Baltimore, Health N ew s, Dec. 1943.
27- This document is readily available in volume I o f Stale Sanitation, by W hipple, op, cit.
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matters. "28
The first instance in which the scope public health law came up for discussion in 
a court of final appeal was in the case of Gibbons v. O gden.29 Decided by the United 
States Supreme Court in 1824. Although the legal quotations involved in this case 
were whether navigation was commerce and whether the regulation o f interstate 
comm erce was a federal or state power, both sides in their argum ents had used 
quarantine acts as example upholding their contentions. The court in ruling that the 
Federal Government had the power to regulate interstate commerce, discussed state 
laws coming under the police power in these words:
"They form operation o f  that im m ense m ass o f  leg islation  w hich em braces everything  
w ithin the territory o f  the state not surrendered to the general governm ent, all w hich can m ost 
advantageously be exercised  by the states them selves. Inspection law s quarantine law s, health 
law s o f  every description... are com ponent part o f  this mass."
The earliest discussion of a state court pertaining to public health matter 
apparently is that of Coates v. Mayor and Aldermen of New York C ity , 30 decided 
in 1827. This case upheld as valid a city ordinance regulating burials, despite the 
contention that the ordinance violated the constitutional privilege of freedom of 
contract. The Court ruled that the ordinance was a public measure and a policing 
regulation, to which the right of freedom of contract must yield, since all property 
must be so used as not to injure others.
The first, and for many years the only textbook on public health law in the u s 
was that written in 1892 by Leroy Parker and Robert H. W orthington of the New
York B ar.31
28- J. W. Kerr & A. A. M oll., Organisations, Powers and Duties o f Health Authoritied?uhlic Health Buletin. 
NO. 54 U. S. Public Health Service, 1912.
29- G ibbons v. Ogden 118241, 9 wheat, I, 6 L. Ed. 23.
30- Coates v. Mayq and Aldermen o f  New York City [ 1824], 7 Cow ens 585.
31- L. Parker & R. H. W n r ih in g to n . T h e  Law o f Public Health and Safety Albam y, Bender, 1892, p. 265.
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"Public Health" wrote Benjamin Disraeli [1804-1881], Earl of Beaconsfield and 
Prime M inister of United Kingdom" is the foundation upon which rests of the
happiness of the people and the power of the state. The first duty of a statesman is the 
care o f public health.” -^T his much-quoted phrase has served as an inspiration and 
guide to many statesmen of later generations, for while it is undeniable that public
health is an essential feature of government, statesmen sometimes need a reminder of 
that fact.
4.2 Food and Drugs Law
T his is a day o f  synthetic living, when to an ever increasing extent our population is 
dependent upon m ass producers for its food drink, its cures and com plcxtions, its apparel and 
gadgets.T hese no longer are natural or sim ple products but com plex ones w hose com positions  
and qualities arc often secret. Such a dependent society m ust exact greater care than in more 
sim ple  days and m ust require from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution  
as the only protection o f  its safety and w ell-being. Purchasers can not try out drugs to determine  
w hether they w ill kill or cure... where experim ent or research is necessary to determ ine the 
presence or the degree o f  danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, nor must the 
public be expected to p ossess the facilities or the technical know ledge to learn for itse lf o f
inherent but latent dangers.
Understandably, everyone concerned with human health agrees that the food 
people eat, and the drugs they ingest play an important role in determining their 
physical and mental well-being. Thus the necessity for protecting the public health 
by regulating the sale of foods has been recognized from early times.
In the past, under common law, the sale or offering for sale o f diseased, 
adulterated, or unwholesome food constituted a nuisance and was an indictable 
offense. More recently, this common law approach has been replaced by statutory 
controls, both state and federal. In order to prevent numerous defects at federal level
32- ibid.
33- Robert H. Jackson dissenting in Dalehite v. United S ta tes, as quoted from Tom Chrisioffel Health  
and The Law . A Handbook for Health Professional^New  York the Press, A D ivision o f  M acmillan IncToilier
M acm illan Publisher, 1982, p. 195.
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the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 1938 [U S C . title 21] was established, which 
remains the basic law today, and sets the standard for regulating the production and 
distribution o f legal food and drugs, as well as the Drug Abuse Prevention and
34Control Act of 1970 that deals with the control of the abuse of illegal substances/
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 1938 prohibits involvem ent or 
delivery, introduction, or the receipt in inter state-commerce of any food, drug, 
substance, or cosmetic that is adulterated or m isbranded and the adulteration or 
misbranding of any such product in interstate commerce. It also prohibits refusal to 
permit the Federal Security Administration or its representative access to or coping 
of any record showing the movement or holding of these products in interstate 
com m erce, and prohibits refusal to permit these officials to enter or inspect 
factories, warehouses, and establishments where these products are manufactured, 
prepared or held for shipment or interstate comm erce.35
The Act states that, Food, Drugs, Devices and Cosm etics are deemed to be
adulterated under this law if
1. they contain any poisonous or deleterious substances which may render them 
injurious to health;
2. they contain any added poisonous substances;
3. they consist wholly or in part of any filthy, decomposed substance or are 
otherwise unfit for food purposes;
4. they have been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions 
whereby they may become contaminated with filth, or be injurious to health;
34 - 346 U S .15 [1953] PP. 51-52; Sec Tom C hristoffelp .211 Supra cit. and. cf.G corgc J. A nnas, Th£  
R ights o f  D octors N urses and A llied  Health P rofession a ls. B allinger P ublish ing C o. C am bridge, 
M assachusetts 1981, PP. 114-120.
35- ibid at p. 202-5
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5. the container is composed, in a whole or in part, of any poisonous or 
deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health;
6. they bear or contain coal-tar colours other than these certified by the
36Adm inistrator.
Foods are likewise deemed to be adulterated if they are, wholly or in part, the 
product of a diseased animal or an animal which has died otherwise than by 
slaughter; and if any valuable constituent has been wholly or partly omitted or 
abstracted, or any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefore; if 
damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner, or any substance has been 
added or mixed or packed with a food to increase its weight, reduce its quality or 
strength to make it greater value than it is.
In addition to these provisions drugs are likewise deemed to be adulterated if 
they purport to be drugs whose names are recognized in an official compendium but 
are o f different strength or quality and falls below that which it purports or is 
represented to possess. The official compendium recognized by the law is the U S 
Pharmacopoeia.
The law does not include soap among the cosmetics. Coal-tar hair dyes are not 
deem ed adulterated as cosmetics when their labels bear the content of the 
ingredients, and warnings of misapplication.
Foods, Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics are deemed to be misbranded by law if:
1. the labelling is false or misleading in any particular; 2. in package form 
unless the label tells the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or 
distributor and bears an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents.
3 6 . Sec FDA section 301[b], o f the Act 1938.
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3. the container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading;
4. any word, statement or other information required by or under authority of 
the act to appear on the label is not sufficiently prominent to be read and understood
37by the ordinary individual.
A food is likewise deemed to be misbranded if offered for sale under the name of 
another food; or imitation of another food, unless labelled "imitation" if it purports 
to be or is represented as a food for which a definition or standard of identity has 
been prescribed by regulation, unless it conforms to the standard and its label gives 
the standard name of the food and in so far as required by regulation, where no 
standard of identity has been prescribed, the label must bear the common or usual
38name of the food and its ingredients.
Labels of drugs must also bear adequate directions for use; adequate warnings
against use in pathological conditions or by children where the use would be
dangerous to health, also warnings against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of
adm inistration or application so as to protect all users. W here subject to
deterioration, a drug must be packed and labelled in such a m anner as the
adm inistrator requires by regulations. For failure to comply with these provisions,
drugs are considered m isbranded, as are also drugs that are dangerous to health
39when used according to the directions on the label.
The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 is adm inistered by the 
administrator of the Federal Security Agency, who is empowered to hold hearings
37- Federal Food Drug and C osm etic A ct o f  1938 section 301 [kj.
38- ibid section 403.
39- See section 303 [a].
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and prom ulgate regulations for the efficiency of the act, such regulations to take 
effect, ninety days after their insurance has taken place. The validity of such an order 
may, however, be appealed by any person adversely affected to a Circuit Court of 
Appeals o f the United States, which may affirm the order or set it aside in whole or 
in part, tem porarily or perm anently. The judgm ent is subject to review by the 
Supreme Court o f the U S.
The A dm inistrator is authorized by the law to conduct exam inations and 
investigations through officers and employees of the agency, or through any health, 
food, or drug, officer or employee of any state. A sample of any food, drug, or 
cosmetic collected for analysis under the law must be furnished on request to the 
owner or his authority or agent.40
4 .3  Liability of Individuals and Corporation in Matters Affecting
the Public Health
Every one is entitled by law to the reasonable enjoyment of life, liberty, and 
property, and to the security of his person, his family and his possessions. 
G overnm ent recognizes these rights and protects them, although the sovereign 
power may properly impose certain desirable restraints upon an individual's rights 
for the benefit of the common good. The state may always regulate, life, liberty, and 
property in the interests of the public health and the general welfare.
W henever a personal right created and sanctioned by law is violated, the 
resulting wrong to the individual is known as a tort. Among the numerous classes ol 
torts are many that involve hazards to human life and injuries to personal health. 
Although these are private wrongs, they may affect the public health, either directly 
or indirectly. The maintenance of nuisance is a tort giving rise to liability, but it may
likewise be a public offence under certain conditions.41
40- See section 701 [a] [3-4].
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So, too, disease caused by contaminated food or milk or by polluted water is a 
tort which obviously has serious public health implications. Another branch of 
private law, that of contracts, may involve matters of direct interest to the public 
health. B reaches o f contract, causing liability in cases of express or implied 
warranties o f the purity and safety of domestic water supplies, food supplies, drugs 
and biological products, m edical and nursing services, therapeutic devices and 
cosmetics, and other commodities and services, may be of direct significance to the 
public health.
The existence of these various liabilities under the law of torts and the law of 
contracts often has a salutary effect upon natural persons and corporations who are 
or m ay be potential violators of the principles and the rules of public health 
procedure.
The jurisp rudence o f public health is, however, concerned m ainly with 
constitutional administrative, municipal and public law, rather than private law.42
W here a statute, municipal ordinance, or a valid regulation having the force and 
effect o f law imposes upon any person or corporation a duty for the protection of 
others, or in the performance of which the public health is involved, a person injured 
by the violation or neglect of such a law has the right of private action against the 
transgressor for the damages sustained 43
The violation o f a public health law or regulation which results in personal 
injury automatically raises the presumption of actionable negligence in a tort case or 
of breach of contract.
Many types and classes of persons may be involved in liabilities which pertain in
the manner to the broad domain of public health protection. A private corporation is
liable under substantially the same rules as a natural person.44
41- M iller v. Horton [1891, 152 M ass. 540, 26 N. E. 1 0 0 , 10, L.R. A. 116, 23 A. S. R. 850.
41- C hristoffel, op. cit., p. 306.
43- C ooly  on lorts.
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4 .3 .1  Manufacturers and Sellers of Food
Despite the legal rule known as caveat emptor, under which the buyer purchases 
at his own risk in the absence of a warranty or of fraud, there is always an implied 
warranty that food sold for human consumption is wholesome. This rule was 
recognized by the common law ,45 but did not receive sanction in the later English 
and Am erican law. As a consequence, there has been some conflict in the earlier 
court decisions on the subject, but the principle of implied warranty seems now, with 
few exceptions, to be well established in American jurisprudence.
An implied warranty, like an express warranty, of the wholesomeness of food is 
a contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller, and is based on a privity 
of contract between them, regardless of any intent or negligence on the part of either 
the vende or the vendee. Thus a druggist who sells ice cream to a customer is liable 
for illness caused by toxic properties of the ice cream,46 and a milk dealer who 
delivers milk that causes undultant fever will be liable on an implied warranty.47
"The consequence to the customer resulting from the consumption of articles of 
food sold for immediate use", said the New York Court of Appeal in the ice cream 
case, "may be so disastrous that an obligation is placed on the seller to see to it, at his 
peril, that the articles sold are fit for the purpose for which they are intended. The 
rule is an onerous one, but public policy as well as the public health demand such 
obligation should be imposed."48
A m anufacturer of food warrants its wholesomeness to the retailer to whom he 
sells it, since there is privity of contract between them, but in the absence of a statute 
imposing this liability, there is no implied warranty between the manufacture and the
44- ibid.
45- 3 Blackstone's, com mentatories p. 166
46- Race v. Krum 222 N. Y. 410, 118, N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1918 F 1172.
47- Colonna v. R osedale Pair/. [1936 Va. 314, 186 S. E. 94.
48- Race v. Krum 222 N. Y. 410, 118, N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1918 F 1172.
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ultimate customer, where a retailer or other middleman is imposed between them. A 
retailer may, however, be liable on an implied warranty to a buyer to whom he sells 
food in a sealed package, bottle, or can furnished by the manufacturer.
4.4 The United Kingdom Position
The law relating to food was contained in the principal Food and Drugs Act of 
1955 and gradually the food laws of this country are being harmonized with those of 
the European Com m unity, whose regulations and directives bind its M ember 
S ta t e s .  ^  The Food and Drugs Act 1955 is replaced by the Food and Drugs Act of 
1984 and the new Food and Drugs Act 1984, section 1 states; "no person shall add 
any substance to food, use substances as an ingredient in the preparation of food, 
abstract any constituent from food, or subject food to any other process or treatment 
so as to render the food injurious to health with intent that the food shall be sold for 
human consumption." This provision is intended to prevent the adulteration of food 
which is an offence against section 1 [4]. It is also an offence to sell for human 
consumption, or to offer or expose for sale or to advertise any such adulterated food.
These offences are offences of strict liability so that proof of mens rea is not 
necessary to justify conviction of the offence. All that must be proved is that the tood 
was in the condition specified in section 1 and that there was an intention that the 
food be sold for human consumption.
Knowledge that the food was injurious to health is not necessary.
It is worth noting the case of Quality Dairies Ltd v. Pedly.^  The dairy was 
convicted of an offence against article 26 of the Milk and Dairies Regulations, 1949 
made under the Food and Drugs Act 1938, being milk distributors who failed to 
ensure that a milk bottle was in a state of thorough cleanliness immediately before
49- Clay's. Handbook o f  Environmental H ealth.[5th Ed], London H. L., Lewis & Co. Ltd. 1981, p. 625.
50~ Quality Dairies [York] Ltd V. Pedly f 195211 Q. B. 275.
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use by them, as dirt was found on the inside of the bottle.
The regulations were made to ensure, so far as possible, that milk delivered to 
the consum er should be as clean as possible and under this particular regulation an 
obligation is put, inter alia, on distributor to ensure the thorough cleanliness of 
all vessels used in the preparation in the milk before sale, including of course, the 
bottle in which the milk is delivered.
On the part of seller there need be no guilty knowledge [or mens rea]. This is an 
exception to the doctrine o f criminal law that proof of mens rea is necessary to 
establish an offence. Such exceptions occur where the legislature has thought it so 
important to forbid something to be done ; and if it is done the offender is liable to a 
penalty whether he had mens rea [intention] or not and whether or not he intended to 
commit a breach of the law.
In Pearks Gunston and Tee Ltd v. W ard .51 the appellant was charged under 
section 6 o f the Sale o f Food and Drugs Act 1875 as having sold, to the prejudice of 
the purchaser, butter which was not of the nature, substance, and quality o f the 
article demanded, the same having water added thereto to the extent beyond the usual 
limit o f 16% natural to the butter.
It is sufficient to establish the offence to prove the purchaser did not receive 
what he asked for or what he had a right to expect. For example someone who buys a 
rum and butter toffee is entitled to expect that any fat in the toffee is a butter fat: 
Rilev Bros. THalifaxl Ltd v. Hallimond 119271.52
The appellant who manufactured an article of Riley's Rum and Butter Toffee 
supplied it to a confectioner with a warranty and on analysis it was realized it 
contained rum  and butter and coconut fat. A summons was taken out against the 
confectioner for selling to the prejudice of the purchaser an article not of the nature, 
substance and quality demanded by the purchaser.
Pearks Gunston and Tee Ltd v. Ward. [ 190212 K. B. 1.
52- R iley  Bros. rHalifaxl Ltd v. Hallimond [1927], 44 T. L. R, p. 238.
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The m anufacturers, the present appellants, then took responsibility for they had 
supplied it with a warranty, and the proceedings were then substituted against them 
for giving a false warranty.
W here food is sold contain ing some foreign body there m ay also be 
contravention of section 2. A piece of metal in a chocolate cream bun and a piece of 
string in a loaf would seem to come within this provision. In the case of Turner and 
Son Ltd v. O w en.53 a chocolate cream bun bought from the appellants' shop was 
found to contain a small piece of metal which, a child, while eating the bun, got in to 
his mouth. [On the ground of section 9 of the Food and Drugs Act 1938 which states 
unsound in the sense that it was putrid or unwholesome, and therefore, although the 
presence o f the piece of metal might lead to complaints it was convincing to the court 
that the bun for human consumption came within the meaning of section 9.) And on 
this basis appeal was accepted.
The argum ent of the appellant was that there was no evidence that the bun was 
unfit fo r hum an consum ption, the bun itse lf being perfectly  sound and 
uncontaminated, although that it contained a small piece of metal.
But this argum ent could be countered by section 2 of the Act in which three 
distinct offences are contemplated namely, that the food is either a] not of the nature 
or b] not of the substance or, c] not of the quality demanded by the purchaser. On the 
other hand, even if the appellant's argument was evidence of the fitness of the bun 
for hum an consum ption, by analogy it is doubtful if a prudent person would 
consider a piece o f metal likely to be safe if consumed.
In a similar case concerning the sale of a loaf containing a piece of string, it was 
contended on behalf of the defendants that the evidence did not support a conviction 
under section 9 of the Food and Drugs Act 1938. Apart from the string, the loaf in
53- J. M iller Ltd. v. Batlcrsea Borough Council! 1 95611 Q. B. 43; Turner and Son Ltd v. Owen [1956)1 Q. B. 
at page 48
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itself was not unfit for human consumption. That section it was argued was directed 
against unsound food and that section 9 should be read in conjunction with section 10 
and referred to unsound food or meat permeated [defused] with unsoundness or 
inherently unsound. The loaf in the present case was not unsound, and consequently 
the conviction was quashed as in J. M iller Ltd. v. Battersea Borough Council 
[antel.54 In this case also one could disagree with the conclusion, since the food was 
not o f the nature, substance, or quality, demanded because it has something in it 
which it ought not to have. To say that it was not injurious to human consumption is 
unreasonable.
The presence o f black beetle in can of strawberries, in Greater M anchester 
Council v. Lockwood Foods [1979]55 was held to be an offence against section 2
in.56
The m anufacturers gave evidence as to their m ethods o f collection and 
preparation o f strawberries. The justice held that they had used all reasonable care 
and skill, establishing a defence under section 3 [3] of the Act 1955. The presence of 
the beetle was an unavoidable consequence in the process of collection or
preparation, and thus the action was dismissed.
57In Smedlevs Ltd v. Bread [1974], the appellants supplied a tin of peas which 
was found to contain a caterpillar.
They raised the defence of unavoidable consequences. The House of Lords 
decided that this defence was not established proving that all reasonable care and 
diligence was taken by the appellants. It was the failure of the appellant s visual 
inspectors to detect and remove the caterpillar when the peas had been on the 
conveyor belt in the cannery. As it was not unavoidable that it should have escaped
54- J. M iller Ltd. v. Batlersca Borough Council[1956]l Q. B. 43.
55- Greater M anchester Council v. Loockwood Foods[19791 Crim. L. R. 593.
56- O f T he Food and Drugs Act 1955.
57- Sm cdlev Ltd. v. B rcadl 19741 A. C. 839.
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detection no defence was established. This case was followed in Greater Manchester 
Council v. Lockwood Ltd 58
W ith regard to false labelling or advertisement of food, section 6 of the Food 
and Drugs Act 1955 prohibits the false labelling or advertising of food for human 
consumption. A person who sells food to which is attached a label falsely describing 
the food, which is likely to mislead as to its nature, substance or quality, commits an 
offence. In this situation it is necessary to prove that an ordinary man would be 
misled by the label.
In Concentrated Foods Ltd v. Champ [19441.59 it was held that it is not of 
importance to prove that a specific person has been misled. It would be a defence 
when a defendant proves that he/she did not know and could not with reasonable 
knowledge have ascertained that the label was of such character.
It is also an offence to publish an advertisement which misleads {section 6 [2]}. 
In proceeding against the m anufacturer, producer or im porter of the food the 
burden is on the defendant to prove that he did not publish and was not a party to the 
publication o f the advertisement. It is a defence for the defendant to prove either [ 11 
that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained that 
the advertisement was false or misleading or [2] that he is a person whose business it 
is to publish advertisements received in the ordinary course of business.
Offering, selling, exposing, or consigning unfit food for human consumption 
are offences under section 8 of the 1955 Act. A consignor may plead as defence that 
he gave notice to the person to whom he consigned the food that it was not intended 
for human consumption [s. 8 [3]]. It is also a defence to prove that at the time of 
dispatch the food was fit for human consumption or that he/she was not able with 
reasonable diligence to have ascertained that it was unfit.
58- Greater M anchester Council v. Lockwood Foods! 19791 Crim. L. R. 593.
5 9 - C on cen tra ted  Foods Ltd v. Chamrf 19441 K. B.342.
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The above enactment alone would not fulfill all that the law requires unless a 
vigilant body scrutinises implementation. Thus, an authorized officer or concerned 
organization may at all reasonable times examine food intended for human 
consumption. And in the course o f inspection if it seems unfit for consumption 
he/she may take the necessary action to prevent it from being consumed or bring it 
before a justice of the peace to get an order of condemnation [s. 9.j But if the justice 
refuses to condemn food which has been seized the organization in charge of the 
inspector is liable to compensate the owner for any depreciation in its value resulting 
from its seizure and removal [s. 9 [4]].
If the M edical O fficer o f Health o f a district has reasonable ground for 
suspecting that any food, a sample of which has been procured under the Act, is 
likely to cause food poisoning he may give notice that the food is not to be used for 
human consumption s. 27. The notice also prohibits the removal of the food except to 
a place specified by the notice. Failure to comply with the notice is an offence. 
Prosecution under the Food and Drugs Act 1955 or under regulations made 
thereunder may be instituted on behalf of the local authority either in its own name 
or in the name of the authorized officer.
In enforcing the law there are two particular statutory defences to proceedings 
by an officer under the Act. Under section 113 a defendant can plead that the offence 
happened because of another person's default. Section 115 enables a defendant to 
plead warranty.
A person against whom proceedings are in progress is entitled to have any 
person, to whose act or default he/she alleges the contravention was due, brought 
before the court in the proceedings. If after the contravention has been proved, and 
the original defendant proves that the contravention was due to the act or default of 
the other person, that other person may be convicted. If the original defendant also 
proves that he/she used all reasonable care to ensure that the provisions in question
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were complied with he/she is to be acquitted, [s. 113.] This procedure can apply to a 
chain o f transactions as in Ferm entation Products v. British Italian Trading Co. 
Ltd60 where information was laid against a grocer who in turn laid information 
against the middleman who had laid information against the supplier. The authority 
can proceed directly against the person responsible [s.l 13 [3].
It is necessary to prove that due diligence was used in order to justify  an 
acquittal. Otherwise both parties may be convicted. "Due diligence" is a question of 
fact, not law. An employer may be convicted under the Act despite his/her lack of 
knowledge o f his servant's wrongdoing. For example, in Pearks Gunston and Tee 
Ltd v. W ard^  A milk distributor was held liable for an offence under the Milk 
and Dairies Regulations even though the milk was handled at all stages by sub 
contractor.
In proceedings in respect o f an offence under the Act or regulations, being an 
offence consisting of selling or offering, exposing or advertising for sale, or having 
possession for the purpose of sale of any article or substance, the defence of 
warranty may be pleaded, [s. 115]. To establish this defence the defendant must 
prove [1] that he/she purchased that article or substance under the name or 
description under which he/she sold or dealt with it and with a written warranty to 
that effect; [2] that he/she had no reason to believe at the time of the offence that it 
was otherwise; and [3] that it was in the same state as when he/she purchased it.
A warranty must form a part of contract of sale in order to provide a detence. 
By virtue of subsection 115[5] a name or description entered in an invoice is deemed 
to be a written warranty that the article or substances can be sold or otherwise dealt 
with without contravening the Act. In a prosecution for the sale of chicken unfit for 
human consumption the defence of warranty was raised on the basis that the invoice
60- Fermentation Products v. British Italian Trading C o. Ltd. [ 1942]2 K. B. 145.
61- Pearks Gunston and Tee Ltd v. Ward! 190212 K. B. lQ uality Dairies [York] Ltd. v. Peadley [ 1952] 1 K. B. 
275.
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described the chicken as "Saxon Chix", a name of the highest reputation. This was 
held to satisfy section 115.6^ A reference to a brand name in an invoice may 
amount to acceptable warranty whereby an article can lawfully be sold, for the 
purposes of providing a defence under section 115 of the Food and Drugs Act 1955.
In this case the company sold a frozen chicken which was unfit for human 
consumption. They had bought it under an invoice in which it was described as a well 
known and highly regarded brand. When charged under section 8 [ 1 ] of the Act, the 
company raised a defence under s. 115 [1], on the basis that the brand name in the 
invoice amounted to a warranty that the article was one which could lawfully be sold, 
by virtue o f s. 115 [5]. The justices dismissed this. On appeal by the prosecutor, it 
was held, dismissing the appeal, that s. 115 [5] was not limited to cases where the 
offence related to the name or description of an article and the use of a brand name in 
an invoice could amount to a such warranty.
The article or substance remains in the same state for the purpose of s. 115, 
despite deterioration, unless the deterioration is so great that it changes the identity
of the article or substance.63
In W alker v. Baxter's Butchers^4 the defendant owners of a food shop bought a 
frozen pastry which they put into their freezer. After eleven days the pastry had
been put on a shelf to thaw and was sold to customer. But it was found to be mouldy. 
It was nevertheless held to be in the same state as when received from the supplier. 
The pastry had changed by natural deterioration but there was no evidence that the 
freezing, and thawing had affected its state.
62- R ochdale M etropolitan Council v. F. M. C[Meat] [1980] W. L. R. 461.
63- Watford Corporation v. M avpole L td [ 197011 Q. B. 573
64- W alker v. Baxter's Butchers [1977]76 L. G. R. 183
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4.5. W ater Supply Protection
W ater is o f course essential to life, and therefore, it should be free from health 
hazards. Hollis, in his address to American Public Health Association. Said:
"The concept o f  environm ental health rests on the essential o f existence man's need for and 
m an's use o f  air, water, food, and shelter. The protective living o f  his foundation is sanitation. It
is the one health necessity  that is universal. The problem s o f  sanitation are com m on to all 
peop les. D ifference am ong areas are not differences in com plexity ..."65
W ater in the distribution system must, therefore, be free from pathogenic 
bacteria and other harmful pollution. The fact that there are few instances where 
serious problem s have occurred speaks volumes for the water industry. But the 
possibility of pathogenic bacteria is not the only hazard confronting the public or the 
purveyor. There are also property damage claims due to accumulated silt damage to
the mains by flood due to burst pipes, and the problems due to pressure fluctuations. 
M unshaw Color Service Ltd. v. the City of Vancouver in British Colombia.
C a n a d a .66 is an interesting example of the type of problem s that may occur.
Munshaw Color Service Ltd. operated a photographic film processing establishment.
They were aware that the city water mains contained deposits of silt and the water
entering their plant was often turbid. To safeguard their process they installed
cartridge filters to prevent suspended particulate m atter from entering their
processing tanks. At the time the city of of Vancouver was using a fire hydrant to
'flush and drag' a sewer pipe. The heavy draw-off from the water main distributed
and soiled the deposited silts. Some of the silt entered Munshaw s process tanks and
ruined batches of film in the process of being developed. There was no explanation
65- B y Peter C. G .Isaacpublic Health Engineering, London, Spon [1953], P. 2.
66- Published in the Canadian Section o f the American Water Works, Association-W oter Works Information 
Exchange, V ol. 10, [1], January 1960, P. 1.
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as to why their own filter system had failed.
The Chief Justice ruled that the plaintiffs damages of $3,694.87 and their cost 
against the defendant- the City of Vancouver-were justified on the grounds of res 
ipsa loquiter, w hich means that thing speaks for itself, a phrase often used in 
accident cases where the evidence of negligence on the behalf of the defendant is 
obvious.
Fortunately for the W ater Works Industry, the City of Vancouver appealed, the 
judge reversed the form er ruling, allowed the appeal and dismissed the action as 
follows.
"...the [previous] learned ch ief judge held that the city was negligent in not warning the 
pla in tiff that there m ight be an excessive  amount o f  sedim ent in the water resulting from the use 
o f  the hydrant. But if  I am right in thinking that neither the plaintiff nor the city has any reason to 
foresee that the use o f  the hydrant would cause the un precedented amount o f  sedim ent that 
descended  upon the plaintiff, then there was no occasion either for the city to g ive  the warning or 
for the p laintiff, if  it received one, to do more than to rely upon its filters to take care o f the 
sed im ent as it had done in the past. N o warning o f  the proposed operation would have put the 
plaintiff on guard against the unexpected quantity o f silt, so the damage would still have 
occurred.
fn
I w ould  allow  the appeal and dism iss the action.
T he case  w as not taken to the Supreme Court o f  Canada, and the court confirm ed the 
decision  o f  the Provincial Appeal Court and dism issed the action against the c ity .68
Had the first judgm ent been sustained there would have been a precedent which 
could have resulted in serious consequences for the water supply industry. All 
distribution systems have some deposits in the water mains. One of the arguments in 
favour o f the first judgm ent in Munshaw v. City of Vancouver was that the city 
should have warned the film processing company that it was flushing the mains and 
increased turbidity was to be expected. But on the other hand what about fire? There 
is no way that the service of the fire brigade can be withheld until the surrounding
67-" Appeal - V ancouver Dam age action." Refem ce to above vol. 10, p.22 [3J.
68- "Appeal- V ancouver Dam age Action. "Reference to above vol. 10, p. [22].
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inhabitants are informed that the high rate of water usage is likely to stir up the silt 
deposited in the mains and cause an increase in turbidity. In such circumstances it 
would be sensible to assume that it is the consumer's responsibility to take whatever 
safeguard he believes is important to protect his own property against excessive 
turbidity because when hydrants are operated excessive draw-offs occur. Dissolved 
solids, liquids, and other forms of contamination are more difficult to guard against 
than turbidity. If a water main is inadvertently cross-connected to a source of 
contamination, the water purveyor who owns and operates the system is responsible 
to his public to supply them with "potable" water. If for any reason the water 
supplied to the public is not potable, then the purveyor may become liable for any 
injuries that may happen. The water may be contaminated from a cross-connection 
or from  other people's negligence, and through no negligence on the part of the 
purveyor; nevertheless he is subject to liability.
A water purveyor responsible for the supply of safe and wholesome water to the 
public is in an extremely difficult legal position. He is able to control the water 
quality through treatment plant in the distribution systems, but from there on, he has 
very little control, since he depends on the plumbing system and plumbing inspectors 
who must ascertain that the system is adequate.
However, the sources of contaminated water are most difficult to locate, and in 
many cases, the suggestion that bacteria and viruses may have entered a water supply 
system  is based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, whenever typhoid or 
cholera epidemics occurred, the water supply was automatically blamed and the real 
source o f contam ination may have been overlooked. Nevertheless, the water 
purveyor must be aware of his obligation to the public he serves, and be aware of the 
hazards, especially in the case of water to be used for domestic purposes, that is for 
drinking, washing, cooking and sanitary purposes.
The meaning of domestic purposes will be a question of fact in each case, and
8 2
there are many judicial decisions on the meaning of the expression.
Lord Adverstone C. J. said that "the domestic purpose includes the use of water 
for the ordinary purposes o f domestic life by the inmates of the house": Pidgeon v. 
Great Yarm outh W aterworks Co.69 In Barnard Castle Urban District Council v. 
W ilso n 70 Rom er L. J. said that "regard must be had to the ordinary habits of 
domestic life and to what can reasonably be considered a domestic purpose."71
In M etropolitan W ater Board v. Averv72 water supplied to a licensee of a 
public house where luncheons were served was used for cooking the food and 
washing up the plates and dishes. The House of Lords had to decide whether this was 
use o f water for domestic purpose or whether the water was supplied for a trade, 
manufacture or business. In holding that such use was domestic Lord Atkinson said, 
"I take it that water supplied for domestic purposes would mean water supplied to 
testify or help to testify the needs, or perform or help in performing the services, 
which according to the ordinary habits of civilized life, and commonly satisfied and 
performed in people's homes, as distinguished from these needs and services which 
are satisfied or perform ed out side those homes, and are connected with, nor 
incidents to, the occupation of them."Cooking and washing clearly fall within this 
proposition. W hat m atters is whether the use o f the water is in its nature 
dom estic."73
Statute requires that water supplied for domestic purposes be wholesome | water 
Act 1945, Sched.3,s.31]. The earlier law required the supply to be pure and 
wholesome but in this context the two words seem to be synonymous. The standard 
required would not seem to be altered by the omission of the word pure.
Pidjieon v. Great Yarmouth waterworks Co. [1902J1K. B. p. 310.
70- Barnard Castle Urban District Council v. W ilson[1902]2 Chanc. Div. 746
71- ibid at p. 756.
72- M etropolitan Water Board v. Avery [1914] A.C. 118.
73- ibid at p. 127-8.
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The meaning o f pure water was considered by the Privy Council in Attorney 
General for New Zealand v. Lower Hutt citv Corporation.7^ It was alleged that the 
addition o f sodium silicofluoride by the corporation to the public water supply was a 
breach o f its duty to supply pure water. The addition brought the content of fluoride 
in the water supply up to one part in a million. It was found as a fact that the 
absorbtion of fluoride had no deleterious or toxic effects on the human body. 
W hether the corporation was entitled to add the fluoride depended upon the meaning 
of "pure water." It was not suggested that "pure water" meant pure H 20  distilled of 
other ingredients. The Privy Council held that "an Act empowering local authorities 
to supply 'pure water' should receive a fair, large and liberal construction...as a 
m atter o f com m on sense there is but little difference for the relative purpose 
between the two objectives 'pure' and 'wholesom e'... it is an unnecessary restrictive 
construction to hold that because the supply of water was pure that there is no power 
to add to its constituents merely to provide medicated pure water i.e. water to which 
an addition is made solely for the health of the consumers. The water of the Lower 
Hutt is no doubt pure in its natural state, but it is very deficient in one of the natural 
constituents normally to be found in water in most parts of the world. The addition 
of fluoride adds no impurity and the water remains not only water but pure water, 
and it becom es greatly improved and still natural water containing no foreign 
elements."75 The Privy Council also stated that in order to supply 'pure water' the 
authority m ust be empowered to add to the water substances to counteract toxic 
bacilli. In addition there must be power to take the necessary steps by the addition or 
extraction o f constituents, to prevent cloudiness or discolouration and to make it 
more acceptable and potable. It seems therefore, that deficiencies in such a natural 
constituent as fluoride can be made up without affecting the purity of the water. 
Similarly substances can be added to deal with the harmful or unpleasant aspects ol
74- Attorney General for N ew  Zealand v. I -nwer Hutt citv Corporation[ 1966] A. C. 1469.
75- ibid at p. 1484.
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the water in its natural state. It is suggested that this is the limit of a water authority's 
powers in this respect. To add a substance to water which would not normally be 
present therein, and which was simply a method of ensuring that the consumers 
absorbed such a substance, would contravene the statute.76
The statutory duty of the authorities to supply wholesome water and the 
consequences o f a breach of that duty have been considered in several cases. In 
M ilnes v. Huddersfield Corporation77 the corporation was under a duty to provide 
and keep in the pipes it provided " a supply of pure and wholesome water sufficient 
for the domestic use' of the inhabitants. The water in the main itself was pure and 
wholesome. The supply pipe leading to the plaintiffs house was made of lead [as 
required by the bye-laws] and the composition of the water was such that it became 
contam inated by the lead. The plaintiff brought an action for damages for injury to 
his health caused by the consumption of the water. The action failed because it was 
based entirely on the alleged breach of the corporation's statutory duty."78 As a 
m atter o f construction the House of Lords held that the duty was to supply pure 
water in the mains at a point just before it entered the pipes supplying the plaintiffs 
premises. Had the action been based upon the defendant corporation's duty to take 
reasonable care and skill in supplying water then the result may have been different.
In Barnes v. IrwellVallev Water Board,79 on the premises occupied by the 
plaintiff water was supplied through a length of old lead piping. Beyond that the 
pipes had been recently renewed. The water supplied was plumbo-solvent. In other 
words it was of so soft a nature that, passing over lead, it was liable to absorb lead 
and become poisonous. The W ater Board were fully aware of the plumbo-solvent 
nature o f the water which they were supplying and also that it might poison drinkers.
76-ibid at p 1483.
77- M ilnes v. Huddersfield corporation[ 1886] 11 App. Case. 511
78- ibid at p. 516.
79- Barnes v. Irwell V aliev Water Board [ 1939] 1 K. B. 21.
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The plaintiff alleged , firstly, that there had been a breach of the statutory duty to 
supply pure and wholesome water, and secondly, that there had been a failure of duty 
at common law, constituting negligence.
The court was bound by the House of Lords decision in Milnes v. Huddersfield 
corporation^  that there was no breach of statutory duty. The duty of the Board 
related to the supply of water in pipes laid by them. Therefore, the question was 
whether there had been a breach of the common law duty of care owed to the 
plaintiffs. W as there a duty on the part of the authority to exercise reasonable care 
that the water, when it reached the point of consumption in the plaintiffs premises, 
was reasonably fit for use? Dependence was put on the decision of the House of 
Lords in Donoghue v. Stevenson.**1 where Lord Atkin made the following 
observations on the duty of care in relation of liability to negligence: "you must take 
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would 
be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer is 
likely to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
to be reasonably to have them in contemplation as being as affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are caused in Question." ^
By applying this, it thought that the supplying authority understood the dangers 
of the water passing through lead piping. They failed to warn the plaintiffs of the 
dangers. Slesser L. J. said that, "They knew that people were being poisoned by 
water, and they knew that there was a method of correcting that poison, which they 
failed to use. There is no doubt in my mind that they failed to take reasonable care to 
avoid acts or om issions which they could reasonably foresee would be likely to 
injure the consum ers who had lead pipes, and moreover, they failed to warn the
80- M ilnes v. H uddersfield corporation Supra, cit.
81~ D onoghue v. Stevenson [1932JA. C. 562.
82- ibid p. 578-9.
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plaintiffs. Furthermore, there was in law the neighbour relationship between 
the board and the plaintiffs, they being "persons thus closely and directly affected by 
the act o f the water authority ."84 The W ater Board was therefore, liable for 
damages for breach of common law duty. Purely to fulfill the limited statutory duty 
did not bring the common law duties to an end.
The statutory duty may be more limited than the common law duty in that not 
everyone who suffers damage as a result of breach of that duty may be able to 
recover damages. The reason for this is that the duty may be owed to particular 
persons. A nother difficulty in bringing an action for breach of a statutory duty is 
that the defendant may be able to point to some remedy provided by the statute itself. 
These m atters were considered in Ready. Crovdon Corporation.85 The defendant 
corporation owned and maintained two water wells for the purpose of supplying 
water to the consum ers o f the area. The adult plaintiff was a rate payer in the 
borough. His daughter, the infant plaintiff, resided with him. As a result of drinking 
water supplied by the defendant corporation from one of its wells, the infant plaintiff 
contracted typhoid. The infant plaintiff claimed damages in respect of her illness and 
the adult plaintiff claimed special damages incurred in consequence of that illness. 
The plaintiffs based their claims upon a] breach of statutory duty and b] common law 
negligence. The corporation was under a statutory duty to provide and keep in their 
pipes "a supply of pure and wholesome water sufficient for the domestic use of the 
inhabitants o f the area...who shall be entitled to demand a supply, and shall be willing 
to pay a water rate for the same" 8^under the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 section 
35. The person entitled to demand a supply is the owner and occupier of a dwelling 
house. The adult plaintiff fell into this category so that there was a statutory duty 
owed to him. The infant plaintiff did not fall into that category and was owed no
83- Barnes v. Irwell Supra cit.at p. 41.
84- ibid at p. 43.
85- Read v. Crovdon Corporation [1938]4 All E. R. 631
86- ibid at p. 634.
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statutory duty.
Since a statute provided a remedy it was argued that for breach of duties imposed
by the W aterworks Clauses Act [fine not exceeding £10] that remedy must be an
exclusive rem edy which negatived the existence of a right of action for damages
under the statute or at common law: see Atkinson v. Newcastle and Gateshead
W aterw orks C o .87 The Judge, Stabl J., said that in deciding this question the
intention of the Act of Parliament was to be determined by ascertaining whether the
duty is owned primarily to the community and only incidentally to the individual, or
to the contrary. He said that "while there is no doubt that for breaches of some of the
statutory duties imposed by the Waterworks Clause Act the penalty is exclusive, it is
difficult to believe that the legislature intended that it should be exclusive in the case
of every breach of every duty under the Act. I find it impossible to hold ... that the
legislature intended that there should be one remedy, and one remedy only, equally
applicable to so trivial a breach as a failure to maintain certain pressure of water
behind a fire plug and to a deliberate dereliction of duty resulting in the destruction
of a large community by the supply of poisonous water." 88He held that while the
supply o f w ater for the purpose of extinguishing fire involved duties to the
community the duty to supply pure and wholesome water was owed to the individual.
Therefore, there was an actionable breach of statutory duty to the adult plaintiff who
was entitled to damages for the expenses caused to him by reasons of his daughter's
illness. These expenses included such matters as the cost of medical treatment.
The infant plaintiff could only recover if she could establish a breach of the
common law duty of care owed to her. The judge in applying the principle of 
negligence to the case said, "Wholly apart from statute and irrespective of whether 
or not it imposed any duties, or the scope of the duties, or of the class of persons to
87- Atkinson v. N ew castle and Gateshead W aterw ork£o. [ 1877]2 Ex. D. 441.
88- ibid p. 445.
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whom the duties were owed, if the corporation supplied water for drinking purposes 
to Mr. Read's house which they knew would be consumed by him and his family and 
failed to exercise the demanded degree of care or skill in the course o f that 
operation, with the result that what they supplied was not drinking water but poison, 
the person injured would, in my judgm ent have a complete cause o f action at 
com m on law for the damage sustained as a result of negligence."89 The infant 
plaintiff was entitled to damages at common law for the pain and suffering which 
resulted from the defendant corporation's negligence.
4. 6 Nuisance
Legally, the precise definition of a nuisance is a difficult formation. Blackstone
,,90
said that it was "whatsoever unlawfully annoys or does change to another, and
elsew here he defined it as "any thing that w orketh."91 Sir Frederick Pollock
described a legal nuisance as "the wrong done to man by unlawfully disturbing him
in enjoym ent o f his property, or in some cases in the exercise o f a common
• u * . . 9  2  right
"Every person is absolutely bound so to conduct himself, and so to exercise what 
are regarded as his natural or personal rights, as not to interfere unnecessarily or 
unreasonably with another person in the exercise of rights common to all citizens. 
Every breach o f this obligation constitutes a nuisance. Such has always has been the
„93law; the principle has been invariable."
89- ibid p. 449.
90- 3 Rlackstone'sCommcntatories 5, 216.
91- ibid.
92- ibid.
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A nuisance therefore, may be said to be any thing which annoys, gives trouble, 
or causes distress. The term extends to every thing that endangers life or health, 
gives offense to the senses, violates the law of decency, or obstructs the reasonable 
and comfortable use of property.
The classification of nuisance may be public, private, industrial, or mixed. For 
example, a public nuisance is one that affects more than one individual or family.
A private nuisance is that which affects only one person. When a public nuisance 
also causes special and peculiar damage to an individual, it becomes a private as well 
as public nuisance and is then known as a mixed nuisance. An example would be a 
factory which emits harmful chemical fumes that disturb and endanger an entire 
neighbourhood or area and which also cause particular damages to an individual 
94residence area. However in some circumstances there is difficulty in collection 
and disposal o f industrial waste, for example, the collection removal, and disposal of
95garbage has been divided between two collection disposal authorities. ~ Under the 
Public Health Act 1936 ss. 72 & 74, there had been some difficulty in establishing the 
principles upon which to decide whether one was dealing with "house refuse" or a 
"trade refuse." Early cases decided that one must look at the character of the refuse 
in question in order to determine the issue. The result was that clinker from a hotel
96boiler and refuse from an hotel were held to be house refuse. Relatively recently 
this approach was rejected.
93- Parker and R. H. W nrthingon.The Law o f Public Health and Society Albany, Bender, 1892, p. 217.
94- ibid at p. 218..
95- The Control o f  Pollution Act 1974 s. 30.
96- see Vestry o f St Martin's v. Gordon [ 1891 ] 1 Q. B. 6; W estminister Corporation v , Gordon hotels Ltd. [ 
190612 K. B. 39 1 Lyons and Co. Ltd. v. London Corporation 1909)2 K. B. 588.
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In I ron  Trades M utual Employers Insurance Association Ltd. v. Sheffield 
Corporation [1974]l , 97 it was held that to be house refuse, the refuse must first, 
originate from a house and second, be of the kind which one would ordinarily expect 
a house to produce if occupied as such.
The nature o f waste under the Control of Pollution Act is determined according 
to its source so that the difficulties referred to in the preceding paragraph ought not 
to arise. Section 30 [3] provides that:
"a] household waste consists of waste from a private dwelling or residential 
home or from premises forming part of a university or school, other educational 
establishment, or forming part of a hospital or nursing home,
b] industrial waste consists of waste from any factory within the meaning of the 
Factories Act 1961 and any premises occupied by a body corporate established by or 
under any enactment for the purpose of carrying on, under national ownership, any 
industry or part of an industry or any undertaking, excluding waste from any mine 
or quarry; and
c] commercial waste consists of waste from premises used wholly or mainly for 
the purposes o f a trade or business or the purposes of sport recreation or 
entertainment excluding-
i] household and industrial waste,
ii] waste from any mine or quarry and waste from premises used by agriculture 
within the meaning of the Agriculture Act 1947;"
iii] w aste of any other description prescribed for the purposes o f sub­
^7- Iron Trades Mutual Em ployers Insurance Association Ltd. v. Sheffield  CorPQnUiQn [1974)1 
W . L. R. 107.
91
paragraph."
Regulations may be made providing that waste of a prescribed description shall 
or shall not be treated as household waste or industrial waste or commercial waste 
for the purposes of part II of the Act [s.30 [4]]. There is, therefore, a much more 
complicated and comprehensive definition than was found in the Public Health Act 
1936.
As described in the section, a matter which endangers the comfort of human 
health is a nuisance. As a result smoke is also deemed to be nuisance.
Prior to the passing of the Clean Air Act 1956 smoke nuisance was a statutory 
nuisance by virtue o f the Public Health Act 1936 ss. 101-106. Those sections have 
now been repealed though it is simple nuisance for the purpose of substitution the 
words o f "a nuisance to the inhabitants of the neighourhood" by " injurious, or likely 
to cause injury, to the public health or a nuisance" the Clean Air Act s. 16 has been 
amended by Local Government [ Miscllaneous Provisions] Act 1982,98 however
section 16 provides for the abatement of smoke nuisance. The section provides that 
smoke other than:
"a] smoke emitted from a chimney of a private dwelling or,
b] dark smoke emitted from a chimney of a building or chimney serving the 
furnace o f a boiler or industrial plant attached to a building or for the time being 
fixed to or installed on any land or,
c] dark smoke from industrial or trade premises within section 1 of the Clean 
Air Act 1968,"99 shall be deemed to be a statutory nuisance under the Public Health 
Act 1936 s. 91 if it is a nuisance to the inhabitant of the neighbourhood. Smoke need
98- L ocal G overnm ent [ M iscllaneous Provisions] A ct 1982 section 26.
99- Clean Air A c tl9 6 8  Cchedule I 5 [c].
9 2
not to be injurious to health in order to be a nuisance within this provision - see, 
Gaskell v. B a y lg y .^  W hat must be established is that the annoyance produced by 
the smoke materially interferes with the ordinary comfort of human existence. It is 
however, a defence to proceedings brought under this provision to show that the best 
practicable means had been employed to prevent the nuisance. The value o f this 
particular section of the Clean Air Act 1956 is in providing a summary remedy for 
dealing with smoke nuisance in circumstances where the penal positions of the Clean 
Air Acts do not apply. A garden bonfire kept burning so as to give off large 
quantities of smoke for several days could fall within this provision.
4.7 The Control o f Com m unicable Diseases
The prevention and control of disease is the first and most important duty of 
public health authorities. Other activities of health departments are, in general, 
subordinate and supplem entary to this responsibility. The pro tection  and
preservation of the public health may of course, involve various positive measures
for the prom otion of health, but in the contemplation of law this official task is
fundamentally a matter of disease control.
Communicable Diseases may be defined as diseases caused by micro-organisms 
that may be transmitted directly or indirectly from man to man or from animal to 
man. The term "infectious disease" is synonymous with "communicable disease",1^ 1 
and means any disease caused by vegetable or animal micro-organisms that is capable 
of being transmitted by infection, with or without contact.
Contagious diseases are these that are spread from person to person, or from the
loo. G askell v. B avlcv [1874] 38 J. P. 805.
101- W . Hnhsoon The Theory and Practice of Public Health [4th Ed.], Toronto 1975, p. 355.
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sick to the well, by direct or indirect contact, either by intimate personal contact with 
the patient or through contact with his secretions or with an object recently 
contaminated by him. ^
These scientific distinctions are not of great importance from the legal point of 
view, since courts often have used the various terms interchangeably, without 
materially affecting the legal principles applicable to disease control.
Among the measures applicable to the control of communicable diseases are such 
matters as proper health instruction, personal cleanliness and prophylaxis, food 
inspection and control, general sanitation, protection of water supplies, control of 
insects and the location and control of human or animal carriers and contacts.
Furtherm ore, the expression "notifiable disease" is defined in the Public Health 
Acts o f 1936 and 1961 and in the Public Health [Control of Disease] Act 1984 
includes Cholera Plagu Typhus. 103
4 .7 .1  R ep ortin g
The first requisite for proper control of communicable diseases is to notify 
accurate, first-hand information concerning the disease in question to the relevant 
health departm ent.104
Laws and regulations generally provide that reports of communicable diseases 
should be m ade immediately, or some time within 12 hours, to the local health 
officer by physicians, or when no physician is in attendance by an other person who 
has connection with the matter. The reports are usually required to be in writing or 
by telephone, telegram , or messenger. Apart from this, an oral report is also
102- W . H. Parrv.Com municable D isease [3rd Ed.], London , Toronto, 1979, p. 1.
103- J. D . F inch-Hcalth Service Law. London, Sw eet & M axw ell, 1981, p. 199pubUc Health [Control o f  
D isease] A ct 1984 section 10.-
104- For further d iscussion , see H aile T p.fo Pnhlic Health Law in the United K ingdom  with referncc K>
Ethiopian Health Law, thesis submitted in partial fulfilment o f  the requirments for the degree o f  B. Sc. in
Environmental Health, University o f  Strathclyde, Glasgow 1987. [Unpublished].
9 4
acceptable.105
Laws, ordinances, and regulations of a similar nature may be sustained by
courts. For example, in the U S A as early as 1887 the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut upheld the constitutionality of a m unicipal ordinance requiring
physicians to report cases o f com m unicable disease to the local health
d e p a rtm e n t.106 In affirming the conviction of a physician for violation of the
ordinance by failing to report a case of diphtheria, the court pointed out that this
ordinance was not invalid as class legislation, but that the burden o f reporting was
properly placed on the one class, the medical profession, which is the best qualified
107to discharge this necessary public duty.
Suspected cases of communicable diseases are frequently required to be reported 
to health authorities. However, when a physician makes such a report in good faith, 
so that a child is quarantined for specific communicable disease but actually does not
have the disease and contracts it as a matter of contact with nearby patients in the
108ward, the physician will not be liable for damages. In this circumstance Supreme 
Court of M issouri stated, "Public Policy favours that discovery and confinement of 
persons affected with contagious diseases, and we think it is not only the privilege,
but the duty of any citizen acting in good faith and on reasonable grounds to report
all suspected cases so that examination may be made without being subjected to 
liability for dam ages."109
If a physician fails to report a case or suspected case of communicable disease as 
required by law, and as a consequence of his/her failure to report, the disease spreads
to others, he/she will be liable for damages to the person afflicted or to his/her
105- H obsoon, op. cit., at p. 356.
106- State v. Warden 118871. 56 com m. 216, 14 A 801.
107- Brown v. Purdv [1886], 54 N ew  York Supr. 109, N. Y. R. 143.
1 0 8 -M e Guire v. A m v x [19271 317 M o 1061, 297 S.W. 968, 54 A. L R. 644.
109- ibid at p. 644.
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heirs, but negligence on the part of the physician in reporting must be definitely 
proved to be the very close to cause the injury.
On the other hand, reported communicable disease may not be revealed to any 
person unless otherwise a statute authorizes this, e.g. if in the protection of the public 
health requires that information be given to a school physician, or to a relevant 
public official.
In tim es o f epidem ic or the occurrence of an unusual number of cases of 
infectious disease in a locality at the same time, more strict measures may be taken by 
the health authorities than in normal times. Thus compulsory vaccination or other 
measures as required may be implemented.111
4 .7 .1.1 Notification. Similarly in the U K the obligation to notify disease 
rests on a medical practitioner. If he suspects that a patient whom he is attending is 
suffering from a notifiable disease he is required to send particulars of the patient 
and the disease to the Medical officer of Health for the district council112 When a 
person in a comm on lodging- house is suffering from any infectious disease the 
keeper o f the lodging house must immediately inform the district council.113 The 
council must then notify the area health authority.114
4.7.1.2 Prevention of the Spread of of Infection The Public Health
[Control o f Disease] Act 1984 sections 10-45 and section 39-40 of the 1961 Public
Health Act make provision for the prevention of the spread of infection in respect of 
notifiable diseases. These provisions are applied to diseases which are made
notifiable by regulations [see e.g. Public Health [Infectious Diseases] Regulations
110- Janes v. Stankof 19281. 118 oh. st 147, 160 N. E. 456.
I l l  - Water W . Holland O x fo rd  Textbook o f Public Hea]thJ4th Ed.] Toronto 1975, p.17.
112- Public Health [Control o f  Disease] Act 1984 section 11.
113- ibid s. 39 [2],
114- ibid s. 39 [3]
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1968]. The provisions mainly take the form of prohibition, enforced by the threat of 
a fine.
A person who exposes other persons to the risk of infection with a notifiable 
disease either from himself or from someonelse, or from clothing, bedding, or rags 
is liable to a fine. ^  If a person suffering from a notifiable disease carries on any 
trade, business or occupation which he cannot carry on without risk of spreading the 
disease he is liable to a fine.116
A person having care of a child shall not, after receiving notice from the medical 
officer that the child is not to be sent to school, permit the child to attend school until 
he has obtained a certificate that the child may attend without undue risk of 
comm unicating a notifiable disease to o thers.117 A person who contravenes this 
provision may be fined. The principal of any school in which any child is suffering 
from notifiable disease must, if required by the proper officer supply a list of all 
scholars in or attending the school.118
Infected articles must not be sent to any laundry, public wash-houses or cleaners 
unless they have been disinfected, or the proper precautions have been taken.119 Any 
person who contravenes this provision is liable to a fine. Where a notifiable disease 
occurs on any prem ises the local authority may make an order forbidding certain 
work on the p rem ises.1211 The work in question is making, cleaning, washing, 
altering, ornam enting, finishing or repairing of wearing apparel. If an occupier or 
contractor on whom an order has been served contravens the order he is liable to a 
fine. By virtue o f the Public Health Act 1961 s. 41 a proper officer of a local 
authority may, with a view to preventing the spread of notifiable disease, request a
115- ibid s. 17
116- ibiid s. 19.
117- ibid s. 21.
118- ibid s. 22.
119- ibid s.24.
120- ibid..
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person to discontinue his work. A person who suffers loss in complying with this 
request is entitled to be compensated by the local authority.
4.8 Vaccine Dam age
Generally it is undeniable that a large number of people have been vaccinated 
successfully, whereas, rarely, but occasionally, the vaccination may result in injury 
since the wound is subject to the same possibilities of infection that may occur in any 
wound which is negligently or improperly cared for, or the vaccine itself may cause 
harm.
Vaccination against specific diseases potentially confers great benefit on the 
community. On the other hand there is sometimes a risk to the individual.121 In 
particular the vaccine against whooping cough, seems to have been associated with 
grave brain damage in number of young children. The result in these cases was much 
and unrelieved hardship. A campaign for compensation began in 1973 with the 
initiation o f an association of parents and others who had suffered as a result of 
vaccination programmes. Eventually, it won the support of the ombudsman and the 
Pearson report.122 The outcome was the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979.123 
W ith this lim ited scope the Act accepts the principle of liability without fault- a 
liability imposed on society at large.
It enables the Secretary of State, to pay lump sums of £20,000 to or for any one 
who is or was immediately before death severely disabled by vaccination against 
whooping cough, poliomyelitis and diphtheria [among others].124
The design of the scheme was not to compensate all, but only those who suffered 
severe d isability . Severe disability is defined as at least amounting to 80%
121- R. S. D ow nie & Caiman K. C Healthv Respect Ethics in Health CaisCalman London 1987, p.198.
122- Royal C om m issionOn Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal IniuryComnd. Par. 1413.
123- Sheila A. M. M cLean [ed.kegal Issues in Medicine, A. D. M. Forte, University o f G lasgow , G ow eW Sl, 
p 72.
124- V accine Dam age Payments Actl9 7 9  ss. 1 [2], 6 [4],
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disability.125 This is difficult to prove.
4.9 A dm inistrative Control
The administrative control of communicable diseases is primarily a function of 
the state, which may delegate this responsibility to a political organization or 
subdivision o f state. It is the proper function of a government to prevent and control 
the entry of disease into the country from foreign countries, by means of supervision 
of foreign com m erce and medical inspection and denial of entry of diseased 
im m igrants.12^
4 .9 .1  Duties o f a State Health Authorities
1. to enforce and supervise the enforcement of health laws and regulations 
through out the country.
2. To prepare and issue reasonable regulations for the prevention and control of 
communicable diseases.
3. To receive and record reports of communicable disease from local health 
officials and others.
4. To investigate outbreaks of disease where necessary, and supervise local 
health measures in times of epidemics.
5. To make necessary laboratory diagnosis and studies.
6. To m anufacture and distribute serums, vaccination and prophylactics | if 
standard permits].
7. To enforce quarantine at all entry ports.
8. To distribute educational literature.
9. To cooperate with central government and local public health authorities.
125- ibid s. 1 [2].
126- Train v. B oston Disinfecting Co [1887], 144 Mass. 523, 11 N.E 9 2 9 ,5 9 ,
9 9
4.9. 2 Duties of Local or Regional Health Authorities
1. To enforce all national health laws, and regulations and all local health 
ordinances and rules.
2. To adopt necessary local regulations for the control of comm unicable 
127diseases.
8.10 O ccupational Hygiene
It m ay not be w ise  to continue placing sole reliance on experts to so lve  our occupational 
health problem s. In a sense experts got us in to the trouble we arc in by claim ing to have a 
m onopoly  on the requisite know ledge. The fact is that all too often medical experts have not been 
interested in prevention o f  occupational disease, and safety experts have not been interested in 
health. S cien tific  researchers seeking "objective truth "are em ployed principally by m anagm cnt 
and quite naturally reflect its view . And the lawyers who administer many governm ent programs 
all too often act as advocates and present biased views.
-Nicholas Ashford ^
Occupational hygiene has been defined as the science of preservation of the 
129health o f the workers. Included in its scope are such important activities and 
functions as the prevention of industrial accidents and the promotion of industrial 
safety; the prevention and control of occupational disease; the general promotion of 
personal hygiene and environmental sanitation of the workers; and the provision of 
adequate medical, surgical, hospital, nursing, nutritional, and first aid services for 
industrial employees.
These objectives of industrial hygiene are accomplished by scientific attention to 
such m atters as physical examination of workers, control of plant sanitation and 
industrial health hazards, education of employees in personal hygiene and safety, and
127- I. V. H iscock  ed.Communitv Health Organization [3d Ed], New York Common wealth Fund 1939 14.
128- N icholas A .Ashford Crises in the Workplace: Occupational Disease fttld In iUTK A Report to the National 
Affair, Occupational Safety & Health Reporter 8 [16]: 463[Septem ber 14, 1978], as quoted from Christoffel, 
op. cit., p 179.
129- R. R. Sayers and J. J. Rlnnmfip.kPnhlic Health A spects of Industrial Hygiene,!. A. M. A. Ill: 679 1938.
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the organization of industrial hygiene services consisting of physicians, nurses, 
engineers, and chemists under the supervision or stimulation of health departments 
and industrial officials. These objectives are accomplished, furthermore, by means 
of mandatory or permissive legislation enforced by responsible public authorities.
The need for industrial hygiene became evident in the early 1970s. In what is 
probably a low estimate, the U S public health service estimated there were some
390.000 new cases o f occupationally induced diseases annually, with a range of
100.000 deaths each year. Close to 2.5 million disabling work injuries, and three 
times as many serious injuries overall are estimated to have taken place in one year, 
and on-the-job deaths are estimated at 14,200 to 45,000 annually.130
At the same period in the United Kingdom a committee on health and safety at 
work was appointed under the Chairmanship of Lord Robins,131 which, when the 
comm ittee reached some fundamental conclusions, resulted in the passing of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
This has brought under a protective umbrella an estimated 800,(X)0 new entrants 
who were not covered by previous legislation.13^
A broader view of the aims and methods of occupational health services may be 
gained by historical study, and by comparing present problems with these of the 
early nineteenth century. The differences are not essentially in kind, but in scope and 
extent. This theme cannot be dealt with here exhaustively or comprehensively, given 
the range o f hazards of occupations which are described in specialised texts.
The task today as it was in the past, is the identification, assessment and control 
of hazards related to the industry. Industrial toxicology is not enough; hazards exist 
even in flour and sugar, household consumables and the air we breathe. The lungs of
130- as quoted from Christoffel, op. cit., p. 179.
131- The Rohens Com mittee Renort on Safety &  Health at WorRPublished in July 1972 [Command 5034 H. M. 
S. O .].
132- Neuman Selw vn. Law o f Health and Safety at Work London 1982, p. 4.
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a country dweller may be afflicted by fungi and spores as severely as those of the 
factory workers with isocyanates. Sea water can affect the skin as severely as chrome 
salts. Even milk may carry the hazard radio-activity, and the danger of pesticides 
extends far beyond those who manufacture them or use them, by concentrating the 
pesticides in animal tissues, so that food itself becomes a hazard. Environmental 
health, o f which occupational health forms a part, has few lim its.133
The hazard o f cancer is one that is increasingly suspected in every field of 
industry, w here the growing complexity and sophistication of m anufacturing 
processes give rise to products or even impurities in trace quantity about which 
much is unknown, especially when exposure may be brief, intermittent or long
1 74term.
The advent o f antibiotics has largely achieved the conquest, in clinical medicine, 
of bacterial infections, and attention has been increasingly focused on the more 
chronic disabling conditions such as chronic bronchitis. Much research has been 
directed to pulm onary physiology and pathology, and in this context the harmful 
effects of dusts, gases and fumes are being studied in increasing detail.
A further vast field o f occupational health hazard is provided by the plastics 
industry. The wide variety and applications of plastics throughout the industrial 
world resulted  originally from the exploitation of cheap petroleum , and the 
consequent relative cheapness of plastics compared with raw materials [ wood, 
rubber, metals, glass, and animal product] which they replaced. Even still the present 
cost of petroleum is cheapest than the raw materials it is unlikely to disregard the use 
of plastics.135
In 1974 the Health and Safety at Work Act was implemented in the U. K. and for
133- ibid.
134- A. J. E ssex, Cater Anthony Tnhn/v, ^annal o f Public Health and Cbmmunity MedjyLrd3rd Ed, [Bristol J. 
Wright] Great Britain 1979, p. 506.
135- ibid at p. 507.
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the first time the overall medical welfare of the whole working population of the 
country becam e controlled by one Act of Parliament. The Secretary o f State for 
Em ploym ent is responsible for implementing Part I of the Act which deals with 
health and safety at work, control o f dangerous substances and emissions in the 
atm osphere; Part II, the Employment Medical Advisory Service; and Part IV, 
contains a variety o f general matters, the exception being for those relating to 
agricultural operations, which are still the responsibility of the A griculture 
Ministers. Part III of the Act, which is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for 
the Environm ent, extends the power to make building regulations governing the 
structure o f buildings. So far as possible all requirements relating to the structure of 
new buildings will be made under this extended power.136
The Act covers all people at work except domestic workers in private 
employment. It is an enabling Act imposing a general duty of care on most people 
associated with work activities. The legislation includes both the protection of people 
at work and the prevention of risks to the health and safety of the general public 
which may arise from work activities.
The existing health and safety legislation listed in schedule 1 of the Act will be 
replaced by an improved and updated system of regulations, and codes of practice 
approved under the Act. The Health and Safety Commission and its executive will 
administer all these requirements except that in their application to agriculture the 
statutory requirem ent will be administered by the agriculture ministers. The Act 
contains new basic obligations on employers, the self-employed, employees and 
those manufacturing and supplying articles and substances for use at work.
Em ployers must ensure the safety of their employees at work by maintaining 
safe plant, safe systems of work, and safe premises; and also by ensuring adequate 
instruction, training and supervision. Employers must prepare written company
136- Health and Safety at Work Actl9 7 4  Part I- IV.
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safety policies and make them known. In addition, regulations may may be made 
prescribing certain circumstances in which safety representatives may be appointed 
or elected from among the employees to represent employees in consultations about 
health and safety. In prescribed circumstances the employer must establish a safety 
com m ittee if requested by the safety representatives. The aim is that employers 
should look at the conduct of their undertakings as a whole to ensure both the safety 
of their employees and also that the general public are not adversely affected by their 
activities. This same obligation is placed upon the self-employed.137
Under the 1974 Act it is not only the employing authority or employer who is 
subject to the duties and requirements imposed by the law. Employees also owe 
certain duties and their activities, too, are subject to the enforcement procedures 
provided by the Act. In particular, an employee whose job includes a specific health 
and safety responsibility which his/her employment contract imposes on him or 
which he/she has otherwise agreed to take on, must fulfill the requirements of that 
duty as well as he/she reasonably can.
Based on the principles and details of the Act, the general duty of every 
employer is to provide and maintain plant and systems of work that are, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, safe and without risks to health.
There is some force in the view that the duties which an employer owes to his 
employees to ensure their safety and health at work are based on contract. It is an 
implied term of that contract that the employer will take reasonable care to ensure 
the safety o f his employees. In Matthews v. Kuwait Bechtel Corporation13  ^ it was 
held that the common law placed an employer under duty to take all reasonable care 
for the safety of his/her servants in the course of their work; and that the plaintiff, 
having suffered injury owing to the dependents alleged breach of such duty, was 
entitled to claim damages either in tort or for breach of contract.
1 3 7 - ibid.
138- M atthews v. Kuwait Bechtel Corporationf 1959]2 Q. B. 57, [1959]2 All E R 345.
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An em ployer who fails to fulfill that duty is in breach of that contract as in 
British Aircraft corporation v. A ustin .139 Mrs. Austin terminated her employment 
since it was necessary for her to wear eye protectors during work. She was provided 
with goggles, but as she had to wear spectacles she did not find the goggles suitable. 
A com plaint was submitted to management asking for payment for special eye 
protectors fitted with Mrs. Austin's prescription lenses. But the response was that 
she had to resign. The Industrial Tribunal, applying the reasonableness test, held that 
the com pany's conduct in dealing with the p laintiffs problems involving eye 
protection was not in accordance with good industrial practice, and the company's 
appeal was dismissed.
However, from the point of view of an injured employee there is little advantage 
in suing in contract. Practically all modern cases are brought under the law of tort, 
in particular, the tort o f negligence which, since the famous case of Donoghue v. 
Stevenson consists of three general ingredients, namely, [a] there is a general 
duty to take care not to injure someone whom one might reasonably foresee would 
be injured by acts or omissions, [b] that duty is broken if a person acts in a negligent 
manner, and fc] the breach of the duty must cause injury or damage. The existence ot 
a duty-situation between employer and employee has been long recognized, and most 
of the cases turn on the second point, i.e was the employer in fact negligent?
The employer may be responsible for his own acts of negligence. Also he may be 
liable vicariously for the wrongful acts of his employees which are committed in the 
course o f their employment and cause injury to others.
There is an autom atic assumption that all breaches of statutory duties are 
actionable in civil courts. First it is important to examine the purposes and objects of 
the legislative and assess for whose benefit it was enacted. If the injured party has
139- British Aircraft corporation v. Austin. [1978] IRLR 332
140- D onoghue v. Stevenson 1932 A C 562.
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suffered the type of harm the Act was intended to cover remedy will be granted in 
respect o f breach of the statutory duty. In Groves v. I/)rd  W im borne.141 a statute 
imposed liability on a factory owner for leaving dangerous machinery unfenced. An 
unfortunate em ployee was caught, due to the unfenced machinery, resulting in 
amputation o f his arm. The claim for a breach of statutory duty succeeded, but the 
criminal penalty was irrelevant to civil liability.
The first requirement is that the plaintiff must show that he is within the class of 
persons for whose benefit the duty was imposed. This will depend entirely on the 
provision in question. Thus, there are provisions in the Factories Act 1961 which are 
designed to protect all persons who are in a factory, whether or not they are the
employees o f the occupier, and whether or not they are doing the employer's work
a  • 142or their own.
The duty at common law is owed personally by the employer to employees, and
he does not escape that duty by showing that he has delegated the work to some
143qualified person. In W ilsons and Clyde Coal Co. v. English the employer was 
forced by law to employ a colliery agent who was responsible for safety in the mine. 
Nonetheless, when an accident occurred, the employer was held liable. Thus, it can 
never be a defence for an employer to show that he has assigned the responsibility of 
securing and maintaining health and safety precautions to a safety officer or other 
person. He can delegate the performance, but not the responsibility.
Besides, the duty is owed to each employee as an individual, not to employees 
collectively. G reater precaution must be taken when dealing with young or 
inexperienced workers, and with new or untrained employees , than one might take 
with more responsible staff, for the former may require greater attention paid to 
their working methods, or may need more supervision [Byers v. Head Wrightson &
141- G roves v. Lord W im bom e [1898)2 Q. B. 402, C A.
142- Uddin v. A ssociated P o rtlan d  Gamem  M an u fac tu re  L ld l 1965)2 Q. B. 582, [1965)2 All E R 213.
143- W ilsons and Clvde Coal Go. Ltd. v. Englislj 1938] A. C. 57, [1937)3 All E R 628, H L.
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144
Co. Ltd. .1. jn Paris v. Stepnev Borough Council 145 the plaintiff was employed to
scrape away rust and other superfluous rubbish which had accumulated underneath
buses. It was not customary to provided goggles for this kind of work. However, the
plaintiff had only one good eye, and he was totally blinded when a splinter entered
his good eye. It was held that the employers were liable for damages. They should
have foreseen that there was a risk of greater injury to this employee if he was not
given adequate safety precautions, and the fact that they may not have been under a
duty to provide goggles to other employees was irrelevant.
A higher standard of care is also owed to employees whose command of the
English language is insufficient to understand or comply with safety instructions, to
ensure that as a result they do not cause injuries to themselves or to others. In James
146v. Hepw orth and Grandage Ltd the employer put up large notices urging 
employees to wear spats for their personal protection. Unknown to them one of their 
employees could not read, and when he was injured he claimed damages from his 
employer. His claim  failed. He had observed other workers wearing spats, and his 
failure to make any enquiries led the court to believe that even he had been informed 
about the contents o f the notice, he would still not have worn the spats. But with the 
growth of foreign labour in British factories, the problem is one of obvious concern, 
especially as immigrants tend to concentrate in those industries which are most likely 
to have serious safety hazards.
If it can be shown that the injury was the sole fault of the employee, the employer 
will not be liable. In Jones v. Lionite specialties [CardiffLLtd 147 a foreman became
addicted to chemical vapour from a tank. One weekend he was found dead, having 
fallen in to the tank. The employers were not liable. In BrQphy v. J C Bradfitdd
144- Rvers v. Head W riehtson & Co. LtdJ 1961]2 All E R 538, [1961J1 W L R 961.
145- Paris v. Stepnev Borough Council [1951] A. C. 367. CF, [ 1951 ] 1 All ER. 42 HL.
146- James v. Hepworth and Grandage Ltd.! 1968] 1 Q  B 94, [1967]2 All E R 829, C A.
147- Jones v. Lionite specialities [Cardiff! LtdJ 1961 ] 105 Sol Jo 1082, C A.
148- Brophv V. JC Rradfield & Co Ltdfl 95513 All E R 286, [1955J1 W L R 1148, C A.
1 0 7
a lorry driver was found dead, inside a boiler house, having been overcome by 
fumes. He had no reason to be there, and the employers had no reason to suspect his 
presence. Again, they were not liable. And In Horne v. Lee Refrigeration Ltd 149 a
tool-setter had been fully instructed on the safety precautions to be followed when 
operating a machine, but was killed when he failed to operate the safety drill. The 
employers were held not liable, even though they were in breach of their statutory 
duty to ensure secure fencing.
If the claim is based on a breach of statutory duty, the employee can not, by his 
own actions, put his employer in breach and then try to blame the employer for that 
breach. Provided the employer has done all that the statute requires him to do, i.e. 
has provided the proper equipment, given training, provided adequate supervision, 
laid down safe systems, and so on, there will come a point when the injured workman 
will only have himself to blame. In Gintv v. Belmont Building Supplies L td . ^  the 
plaintiff was working on a roof. He knew that it was in a defective state, and that he 
should notwork without boards, but the plaintiff failed to use them and fell through. 
It was held that the employers were not liable for his injuries. They had done all they 
could do, and the accident was the sole fault of the plaintiff.
As a general rule, each employer must ensure the safety of his own employees, 
and is not responsible in his capacity of an employer for the safety of employees of 
other employers. However, where a number of employees from different firms are 
employed on one job , there is a duty to co-ordinate the work in a safe manner.
4.11 G round-work for Health Legislation
The essential for successful public health work is the availability of workable,
and im plem entable health legislation. To accomplish such a goal it is of vital
4^9_ In Home v. Lee Refrigeration Ltd [1965)2 All E R 898.
150- Gintv v. Belm ont Building Supplies LtdJ 1959)1 All E R 414.
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importance that the legislation is prepared by someone familiar with public health, 
and is also a highly qualified specialist in the art of drafting b ills .151 All laws that 
are directive and lay restrictions on persons and property require special attention 
during preparation. As health legislation lies within this area, if such laws are to 
stand the test of court analysis and are to advance the endavour of the legislature, the 
laws must be drafted by men of good education, whether lawyers or not, who know 
their subject.152
4.11.1 The Task of the Legislature
The legislature is a government body which enacts broadly worded statutes,
establishing goals, policies, and ground rules and then may delegate the task of
153working out the details to administrative agencies. For example the legislature 
may determine that vaccination is a preventive measure against cholera so that in the 
interests of the public, all children in the country shall be required to be vaccinated 
prior to adm ittance to school.To achieve this a law would need to be passed. 
Therefore, up to date laws on health matters are constantly needed, either to cope 
with novel situations or to replace legislation that is outdated, insufficient, improper, 
or inadequate.154
The passage o f legislation is by definition a public affair. The legislature 
generally cannot, for example, pass a law granting a divorce to an individual, but it 
may adopt legislation regulating divorce generally throughout the country. 
Similarly, the legislature may not as a rule, pass local or special legislation with 
respect to matters already covered by general legislation, such as the creation of a 
health departm ent in a particular locality where the statutes provide for the 
establishment of local health departments throughout the country
151- Law Drafting and Sociology Seminar Report [Helsinki] 1985 p. 2.
152- W illiam  Halft.l j.pislative Drafting A New Approach. Butterworlh, London 1977, p. 91.
153- Christoffel, 0p. cit., p. 16.
154- P. Grad. Health Law Manual [2nd Ed.], The American Public Health Association INC. 1970, p. 230 .
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4.11.2 A voiding Faults Among the faults to be avoided in drafting 
health legislation are obscurity, vagueness, and ambiguity. If a law merely stated 
that, "In every school room there shall be provided a sufficient amount of fresh air," 
it would be vague and unforceable. Who is to provide the fresh air- the teacher, the 
school nurse? W hat is "a sufficient amount"? what in fact is "fresh air"? If there had 
been added to this law special words, in accordance with regulations adopted by the 
Ministry of Education or Health, it could be workable.155
Am ple and definite provisions for enforcem ent should be contained in 
legislation. Definite requirements regarding vaccination may be given in a law, but 
if absolutely no mention is made of any penalty for failure to follow them or of any 
action which can be taken, the Act would obviously be a dead letter, for nothing 
could be done about it if it were violated. As much discretion as possible should be 
given to administrative or ministerial officers to carry out the terms of any health 
legislation. All laws should provide for uniformity of operation that is, have the 
same effect in all places under the same circumstances and conditions.156
Lastly, and most important of all, the subject matter must be reasonable and 
within the scope of authority of the law making body. The vital aspect of all valid 
health legislation is its reasonableness.
4.12 Summary
This chapter has been tried to demonstrate the way in which the function of 
public health law can be defined in respect of health problems.
Public health laws may cover a wide variety of issues, some of which have been
155- L assw cll.Thc Roll o f  the Advisor Draftsman in the Formation of Code or Constituting 65 Yale L. J., 
[1955], 174.
156- P. Grad. Health Law M anual\ ? d  Ed.], The American Public Health Association INC. 1970, p. 233.
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highlighted and discussed. Law in this area is primarily statutory, showing one way 
in which the law and medicine come together under strict legislative control. In 
addition, of course, judicial interpretation of statute may play a significant part in the 
shaping o f public health law.
This part of the dissertation has attempted to identify the range and history of the 
tools available to the law in the regulation of medicine and health. The following 
chapters will consider, by using specific examples, some of these tools. Public health 
law is actually the most rigid statutory code, but in other areas, law may simply 
guide, may be permissive or may delegate extensive discretion to non-governmental 
organizations, such as the medical profession.
111
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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND THE LAW IN PRACTICING MEDICINE
C M A I P T E I  F P V E
Ethics and Law in the Conduct of Medical Practice
5.1 Professional Conduct
The term  "professional" was formerly applied only to the church, the law and 
medicine, the three learned professions. The meaning of the term is now broader as 
is apparent from the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, 'a vocation in 
which professed knowledge of some department of learning is used in its application 
to the affairs of others, or in the practice of an art founded upon it'. In modern usage 
it seems that almost all occupations that require some measure of intellectual training 
can be described as professions.1
But an organized profession requires more than the mere existence of an 
intellectual discipline. The essence of professionalism is the relationship of trust 
which exists between the practitioner and the person who receives his advice or 
services. The recipient, relying entirely on the knowledge of the practitioner must be 
able to have complete trust in his services and the impartiality of his advice. It 
follows that there m ust be an established minimum standard of knowledge for 
practitioners, and that there must be agreement amongst them about standards of 
behaviour in their professional workE This means that there must be a body which 
determines the standard of education and establishes the code of conduct and that this
1- John D . F inch , Aspects o f  Law Affcctinti the Paramedical P rofession , L ondon, F-aber &
Faber 1984, P. 24.
2- Henry A. Sigcrist, A History o f  M edicine. University Oxord Press, N ew  York 1951 p. 268.
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body m ust be representative of practitioners and be subject to their collective 
control.
5.1.2 The Ethical Base
"An ethical situation is one involving human decision, human Reperussion, and an 
evaluation of both in terms of human well-being. Tancredi has emphasized that an 
ethical act requires the measuring of human decisions and consequences against the 
essential expectations or requirements of human nature. To undertake and meet that 
measure, through the process of judgment called conscience, is to act ethically and to 
perform well. By derivation, it is to be a good person, at least in terms of what one has 
done. To decline that m easurem ent, on the other hand, or to decide against its 
im perative, is to act unethically and badly: It is to perform an evil action and, by 
derivation to be an evil or bad person, at least in terms of what one has done or failed to 
d o ."3
To adopt equality the measure of human interaction is certain to indicate, if not 
dem onstrate, the basic humanness of human action. Accordingly, human decision 
making must always be humane. It must be in keeping with the dignity of both the 
person deciding and the person or persons decided about. Failing that measure, one 
faults both himself and whoever is to experience the effects of that fault.4
5.1.3 The Relationship Between Law and Ethics
Professor A rrow 5 examines the extremes of regulation of decision making- the 
absolute right of the individual on the one hand, and government intervention on the 
other
3- L aurence R. Tancredi, Ethics o f  Health Care. W ashington National A cadem y and Scien ce, 
1974, P. 2 94 .
4- ibid at p. 62.
5- Pellegrino ED: T he Changing Metrix o f  Clinical D ecision M aking in the H ospital, Edited by BS 
G corgopou lis. O rganization Research on Health Institution. Ann Arbor, The University ol M ichigan, 
1972, pp 2 1 2 -219 .
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The law may set frameworks within which a profession must operate, but inevitably 
this fram ework will leave considerable room for discretion. Professional ethics will 
continue to develop and the framework needs, therefore, to be flexible. To be effective 
professional ethical codes will need to be expanded to include new realm s of 
responsibility. Existing ethical codes in medicine, except those that apply specifically to 
medical experimentation, are silent on many difficult matters or leave them entirely to 
the judgment of the physicians.
Law can guarantee the validity of consent by providing that certain procedures must 
be follow ed. It can penalize the professional who fails to meet the statutory 
requirem ents for valid consent. It is far more difficult to assure that the patient's 
decision and his consent to a given course of action are of high 'quality' as a human 
action; that is, they take the full dimensions of the medical encounter into account. 
Here, we are more dependent on the ethical behaviour of the physician. It becomes 
urgent for ethical codes to be more explicit about the physician's responsibility, to 
make perhaps even patient's bill of rights a reality, not a mere formal adherence to a set 
of procedures.^
In a sense, the law is the coarse adjustment that guards against the grosser 
violations of human rights; ethics is the fine adjustment that sets a higher ideal than 
the law can guarantee. Government must not become the authoritative for a code of 
ethics but only a substitute that recognizes the human frailties of professionals.
P rofessor Arrow^ sum m arizes his view thus, "These m odulations of the 
libertarian principle are central to any genuine balancing of the rights of individuals 
and society, to achieve this balance requires a creative interaction between the patient, 
the physician and society, each operating orthogonally with safeguards guaranteed by
6- P ellegrin o , T ow ards an Expanded M edical E th ics, the H ippocratic ethic revised, edited by RJ. 
Bulger. H ippocrates R evised . M edcom  Press, N ew  York. 1973, P. 133.
7- Tancredi, op. cit., p. 64.
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the inter-play of law, ethics, government, and institutional regulation. The resultant 
matrix is a complex one, and the job of defining each box in that matrix is sure to be 
lengthy, tedious, and vexing. There is no alternative to beginning examinations 
immediately before the capabilities of medicine and its technology obscure the human
o
purposes they presumably were meant to serve
5.1.4 Professional Ethics
Ethics is the science of morals, or moral philosophy. The principles, written or 
unwritten, which are accepted in any profession as the basis for proper behaviour are 
the ethics of the profession. Rules of law and rules of ethics are commonly held to 
differ because law is enforced by the state while ethical rules are only morally 
binding.9 But law and ethics are not opposites. The law has itself a basis in ethics; in 
general it reflects the moral standards of the community.
Criminal law comprises those rules of conduct which the community has decided 
must be observed on pain of a penalty. But the state does not attempt to enforce 
every rule o f social behaviour, nor does it interfere in those matters which are by 
common consent left to the consciences of individuals e.g religious observance.
5.1 .5  Professional in Health Care
As healing evolved as a separate discipline, within medicine itself organic 
changes occurred that suggested a new organizational form might be better than the 
traditional one.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a strong nation state replaced the 
loose confederacy of principalities that had previously marked most of Western 
Europe. As the nation state prospered, it took increasing responsibility for the 
social welfare of its citizens. No longer did people look to charities or the church
8- P ellegrino, op. cit., p. 133-147
9- K night Bernard, Legal A spects o f  M edical PracUce, Churchill L ivingstone, London 1972, P. 4.
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for housing, food, or pensions. The state assumed responsibility for these and other 
social services. Among the other social services, medical care became increasingly 
important. The changes in production, medicine, and the social obligations of 
the state com bined to give a new view of medical care. An ethic grew that saw 
medical care as a right, subsidized by the state if otherwise unavailable, as an 
expense that should be shared among the community at large, and as a service that 
could be organized rationally along the lines of an industrial process.This brought 
inevitable conflict with an equally important concept of the industrial society, the 
ideal of professionalism.
5.1.6 Professionalism
The development of the profession is one of the characteristics of the modern world
as the crafts were of the ancient.
According to Graubard, that "striving to be identified as a professional is one of the
m otivating factors in modern l if e ." ^  Goode states, "An industrializing society is a
12professionalising society." At times it appears that the desire to be identified as a 
professional outweighs in some aspirants the desire to practice the profession in the 
first place, and the vigorous attempts to make such disparate occupations as accounting, 
psychology, and chiropractice recognized as professions has often led to intensive 
lobbying and political campaigning.
It could be said that every one wants to be a professional but no one knows what a
IT
profession is. Experts have tried to put ropes around the concept, with varying 
degrees o f success. Flexner noted six criteria: fl] intellectual operations coupled with 
large individual responsibilities, [2J raw materials drawn from science and learning, |3]
10- Boorstin DJ. T he C olonial Experience , N .Y . 1958, P .251.
11- Graubard S. The Professions. D a e d a l u s ,  fa l l  1963, P 234.
12- B asil S. Karger, B ullough VL: The Developm ent o f  M edicine as a Profession  1963, p. 53.
13- T he Problem  o f  D efining a Profession. Ann AM Acad Polit Sex: Sci Jan 1955, p. 14.
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practical application, [4] an educationally communicable technique, [5] tendency 
towards self-organization, and [6] increasingly altruistic m otivation.14
The combination of theory with practical application is essential to professionalism 
since in addition to social status, the profession gain certain practical advantage, 
including a degree of self-regulation and higher fees, it is not surprising that many 
people consider themselves professionals who are not so regarded by the world at 
large. The definition of professionalism are not hard and fast, nor are they embodied in 
statues. There are many occupations in a kind of twilight zone, and many members of 
accepted profession do not always function as true professionals. ^  Thus, as 
Goodman points out, "From medieval times, a professional typically physician or 
lawyer, was an artist in that he dealt with individual cases, each one unique. A physician 
treats a patient, not a pathology or a syndrome. He himself is engaged as a person not 
merely a scientist." ^G o o d m an  contrasts this traditional role of the physician with 
that o f the social worker, nurse or engineer, who is not employed directly by his client, 
but instead by an organization which itself limits the professional's autonomy: It is the 
organization, not the professional, that has final responsibility.
A lthough m edicine has usually functioned as an independent profession, it is 
nowhere written that this cannot change. This was implied by H. L. Mencken when he 
wrote,
T he essen ce  o f  a professional man is that he is answerable for his professional conduct only
to his professional peers. A  physician cannot be fired by anyone, save when he has
voluntarily converted h im self into a job holder; he is secure in his livelihood so long as he
17
keeps his health, and can render service, or what they regard as service, to his patients.
14- ibid at p. 19.
15- G oodm an, P eop le  or Personnel N ew  York, Random House 1955, p. 45.
16- ibid at p. 51.
17- M encken H L Journalism  in A m erica. Prejudices A. Selection  V entage B ooks, N ew  York 
Random H ouse, 1955.
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Mencken s point is that a physician who, for example, becomes a full-time employee 
of a university health service is a "job holder" and therefore no longer a professional. 
Many physicians in full-time institutional practice would dispute this, and yet there is 
little doubt that professional independence must be comprom ised to m eet the 
requirem ents of the employer.
The progress of medicine and its aspiration to professional status do not, however, 
move it beyond the bounds of legal intervention. Such professional regulation as was 
deemed desirable or necessary was provided by law, establishing a framework but 
offering considerable discretion to the professional themselves. The creation of formal 
registration requirem ents and mechanisms for assessing competence to practice are 
central to the law's role, and to the professionalism of the practitioner. The law in this 
case offers one kind of example of the way in which medicine and law interact. In this 
case, the law is enabling, content to leave the actual and vital decisions to the 
practitioners themselves. Up to 1983 the law is to all practical purposes, contained in 
the Medical Acts of 1956, the Medical Act 1969, the Medical Act 1978 and the various 
statutory instruments made under their powers. These Acts, collectivelyknown as the as 
the M edical Acts o f 1956-1978,were repealed by, and consolidated into, a single 
statute, the Medical Act 1983.
5.7 The General M edical Council
The General Medical Council [ G M C ] which is the sole registering authority in the
United Kingdom, was established by the Medical Act 1858.18 The main purpose of
the Medical Act of 1858 was to protect the public from being imposed upon by those
• • 19without proper training and with an imperfect knowledge of medicine.
18- R osem ary S tevens, M edical Practice in M odern England, London, Yale U niversity Press, 
1966, P. 23 .
19- A . K eith M ant, T avlor's Principles and pf M edical Jurisprudence Pub. Churchll
L iv in gston , Edinburgh 1984, p. 52.
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The Council is, infact, neither a parliament for making professional laws nor a 
union for protecting professional interests. When the council was created nearly one 
hundred and thirty two years ago, the declared purpose of the legislature was not to 
promote welfare of the professional men or professional corporations- it was not to 
"put down Quackery,"or even to advance medical science. [C .P. lcode Am] The 
object in view was the interest of the public. The preamble of the Act of 1858 
consists o f two lines: W hereas it is expedient that persons requiring medical aid 
should be enabled to distinguish qualified from unqualified practitioners: Be it 
therefore enacted ..."This preamble, as will be seen, recognizes two kinds of 
practioners: the "qualified" and the unqualified." Up to that time [1858] no easily 
understood line was drawn between the two, and when the public desired to make a 
choice, they were frequently at a loss.20
The A ct set up m achinery for, as it were, hall-m arking the qualified 
practitioner, so that he might easily be recognized when his services were required. 
But the public were left free then, as they are free now, to seek medical aid from the 
unqualified practioner if they so desire. And the unqualified practioner was left free 
then, as he is free now, to practise for gain among those who choose to employ and 
pay him. He was forbidden , under penalties, to pretend that he was qualified, by 
taking a title he did not possess; he might not use the courts for the recovery of his 
charges; he could not give a valid certificate of sickness or death; and now by the 
regulations made under the Dangerous Drugs Act, He cannot prescribe certain 
dangerous drugs, like cocaine or morphine; but except for these and a few other not 
very convenient disabilities, he is untouched by the law.21
On the other hand, the qualified men as a set-off to their legal status and official 
recognition, have been subjected to a central control, educational and disciplinary.
20- Stephen J. H adfield, Law and Ethics for Doctors, London, Eyre and Spotusw oode, 1958
pp. 36 -3 7 .
21- ibid p .34.
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They obtained no monopoly of practice among the public in general.
Through all the centuries of the history of the British before 1858 there could 
hardly be identified a trained and qualified medical profession as a separate entity. In 
1858 the Act, was passed to regulate the qualifications of practitioners in medicine and 
surgery.
The Act set up the General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the 
UK. This body soon became known as the GMC, a name which was, under section 13 of 
the Medical Act 1950, officially adopted in place of the original but usefully descriptive 
title.
The Council was empowered by the Act to require information regarding courses of
study or examinations conducted by any College or Corporation and was entitled to
report any deficiencies to the Privy Council, which might suspend the rights of
22registration in respect of qualifications achieved by passing such examinations.
The A ct severely restricted the activities of non-registered practitioners and
prescribed penalties for false registration or falsely pretending to be reg iste red .^
Under the Act the Council was also charged with the publication of the British
Pharmacopoeia and amendments to it, as the Council deems necessary. Amendments
were made as required, for example, in respect of the members of the GMC nominated
by the Sovereign; and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists was added
to those bodies perm itted to nominate members of the Council. In 1956 it was
considered necessary to prepare a Bill, which subsequently became a law, in order to
consolidate the Medical Acts and to effect corrections and minor improvements. The
24
effect o f this Act was not to alter the laws governing the profession. The aim was
22- Bernard Knight Togal Aspects o f  Medical Practice, [3rd Ed.], Edinburgh, Churchll L ivingston ,
1 9 8 2 ,  PP. 18 -9 .
23- ibid at p. 53.
24- C. R. A. M a r t i n ] aw RM atu ip  in Medical Practice ,  Belfast at University Press, Pitman Medical,
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consolidate the main functions of the G. M. C. as follows:
1] To maintain the official list of medical practitioners.
2] To supervise standards of medical education.
3] To exercise discipline over the medical profession and to lay down standards of 
fitness to practice.25
The Council consists of elected members, appointed members and nominated 
m em bers, the num ber of elected members exceeding the number of appointed and 
nominated members [ s.l of the 1978 Act].
The nominated members, the majority of whom must have any registrable medical 
qualification, are nominated by the Privy Council. The electoral scheme for elected 
m em bers is made by the General Medical Council with the approval of the Privy 
Council.26
The Act provides for four constituencies, that is to say:
(a) England, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man;
(b) Wales;
(c) Scotland and
(d) Northern Ireland.
The universities and other bodies which appoint members to the General Council
are designated in an Order in Council. Persons who are fully registered, provisionally
registered or registered with limited registration are eligible for election, subject to
certain restrictions for those with limited registration. The General Council has power
to regulate medical education and to provide advice for the members of the medical
on
profession on standards of professional conduct or on medical ethics.
1973, PP- 4 -6 .
25- J. K. M ason, Forensic M edicine For Lawyers [2nd Ed.], Bristol J. Wright, London 1 9 8 1 , 
p. 324.
26- C. F. Edward, et al, Practical F om esic M edicine, Hutchinson M edical, London 1 9 7 1, p. 89.
2 7 -  S. T. H ndficld. Law and Ethics for D octo rs General Practice in the National Health S e r v ic e ,
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Apart from this the G M C  may itself initiate actions against doctors on the basis of 
information obtained usually acting only in the circumstances where an allegation is 
made. A disciplinary charge can be brought before the council against a doctor when 
the matter is considered as serious professional misconduct, bringing the profession 
into disrepute.28
"The efficacy o f the G M C'S disciplinary powers in respect of establishing 
standards o f competence and care, and safeguarding the patient, rests largely on what 
the council considers as 'serious professional misconduct.' The G M C is not ordinarily 
involved in m atter of errors of diagnosis or treatment, which give rise to action in the 
civil courts unless of serious professional m isconduct".29 Similarly it is important 
noting that in the Blue Book of the general Medical Council of 1983: 10 under neglect 
or disregard o f personal responsibilities to patients for their care and treatm ent, 
explains the position o f the G M C on errors in diagnosis and treatments, doctors' 
conduct could be reviewed in the circumstances of serious professional misconduct. (^)
5.7.1 M eaning of Serious of Professional M isconduct
The meaning of misconduct was described by the GMC Professional Conduct and 
D isciplinary Pam phlet. The expression "Serious Professional M isconduct" was 
replaced in the Medical Act 1969 the phrase "infamous conduct" in the stated in the 
Medical Act 1858. Such a phrase was stated in the judgment of Lord Justice Lopes in 
1894.
"If a m edical man in the pursuit in his profession has done som ething with regard to it which 
w ill be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren ol
Eyre & S p ottisw ood e, London 1958, P. 6.
28- M ason, op. cit., p. 325.
29- M argaret Brazier, M edicine. Patienta. and the L a w , Harmondsworth, Penguim  B ooks, 1987, p.
10 .
30- M arilynn M. Rosenthal, D ea lin g  with Medical M alpractice, Thg British and Sw edish Expricnce, 
T avistock Publication, London 1987, p. 69.
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good  repute and com petency, then it is open to the General M edical Council, if  that be 
show n, to say that he has been guilty o f  infamous conduct in a professional respect.  ^^
Later in 1930 this phrase was emphasized in Lord Justice Scrutton's judgment
that
In fam ous conduct in a professional respect means no more than serious m isconduct judged  
according to the rules, written or unwritten, governing the professional."32
In this respect the Council planned that these phrases should have similar 
importance.
Furthermore, the pamphlet categorises professional misconduct under four 
headings.
These a r e ;
[ij Neglect or disregard by doctors of their professional responsibilities to patients 
for their care and treatment;
[ii] Abuse o f professional privileges or skills;
[iii] Personal behaviour: or conduct derogatory to the reputation of the medical 
profession;
[iv] Advertising, Canvassing and related professional offences.
These areas of professional conduct and personal behaviour mentioned in the 
pamphlet are summarized as follows.
"it does not pretend to be a com plete code o f professional ethics, or to specify all criminal 
o ffen ces or form s o f  professional conduct which may lead to disciplinary action. To do this 
w ould  be im possib le, because from time to time with changing circum stances the Council s
M
attention is drawn to new  forms o f  professional misconduct.
[i] Neglect or disregard by doctor of their professional responsibilities to
31- A s quoted from G M C P r o fe s s io n a l Cnndnctand D iscipline, Great Britain, May 1977, P. 2; also  
cf. R osenthal, op. cit., p 69.
32- G M C ,  loc. cit., at p. 3.
33- ibid at p. 9.
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patients for their care and treatment;
Usually examples of such conduct are failures to visit, improper delegation of 
medical duties to unskilled persons, for instance signing a blank prescription to be 
completed by others.
[ii] Abuse of professional privileges or skills.
The 'Blue Book' covers under this heading the improper prescription or supply 
of drugs o f dependence, the improper issue of medical certificates and the unlawful 
termination of pregnancy, and circumstances where doctors bring improper 
influence upon a patient to generate income.
M oreover, there are two topics to which extended treatment is given probably 
because they can and do cause particular concern to doctors who may find 
themselves in a dilemma. These are the topics of professional confidence, and an 
emotional or sexual relationship with a patient or a member of a patient's family.
Further advice is given in this pamphlet on the principles which should govern 
the confidentiality o f information to patient.
”[a] It is doctor's duty [except as below] strictly to observe the rule o f  professional sccrccy  
by refraining from d isclosing voluntarily to any third party information which he has 
learned directly or indirectly in his professional relationship with the patient. The death ol 
the patient does not absolve the doctor from the obligation to maintain sccrccy.
[b] There are som e exceptions to this principle: if  the doctor is in doubt before making any 
such exception in disclosing in formation he should seek advice . . . " ^
[iii] Personal behaviour: conduct derogatory to the reputation of the medical 
profession
D ishonesty , abuse abuse of alcohol or drugs, and acts o f an indecent or 
disreputable kind, usually invite the the attention of the GMC.
[iv] Advertising, Canvassing and related professional offences
It is apparent that canvassing or the depreciation by a doctor of the skill of
34- ibid at p. 16.
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another is improper, and the pamphlet describes as such capable of leading to serious 
misconduct. This also covers making improper arrangements, such as the transfer of 
the National Health Service patient without following the proper procedure, or the 
issue of N H S prescription for drugs ordered for patient by another practitioner 
who is treating him privately. On this point extensive guidelines are given in the 
pamphlet.
5.7.2 The Powers of the Disciplinary Committee
If a doctor has been found guilty of a crime or is judged to have been guilty of 
serious professional misconduct, the disciplinary committee has to decide on one of 
the following options.
[ 1 ] To admonish the doctor and conclude the case.
[2] To postpone judgment.
[3] To direct that the doctor's registration should be suspended for a period not 
exceeding 12 months.
[4] To direct erasure.
[5] On giving a direction for erasure or suspension, to order that registration be 
suspended forthwith.
But the only statutory control over the exercise of these powers is that the last
Order can only be made if such Order is necessary for the protection of the members
35
of the public or would be in the best interests of the doctor.
5.7.3 The Register and Registration
T he Act o f 1956, shall continue as provided by the Act of 1983 section 1.
A c c o r d i n g l y  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  r e g is t r a t io n  a n d  th e  m a in t e n a n c e  o f  r e g i s t e r s  a r e  
d e a l t  w i t h i n  t h e  M e d i c a l  A c t  o f  1983 s s .  30-34 a n d  th e  r e g u l a t i o n s  m a d e
35- ibid at p. 6.
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thereunder.36
The main register kept under the 1983 Act is known as the register of medical 
practitioners. It comprises the Principal List, and the Overseas List.
The M edical Register, which must be published each year contains in 
alphabetical order, the names and addresses and registered qualifications of all 
persons fully or provisionally registered in the Principal List as at January 1 of the 
year of publication.
Fully or provisionally  registered practitioners who reside outside United 
Kingdom may apply to have their names transferred to the Overseas List.37
A person who holds a qualification, recognized by the G M C ,  granted in a 
Commonwealth or foreign country and, who satisfies the requirements as to good 
character, professional experience and proficiency in English is also entitled to be 
fully registered.
"In any enactm ent the expression "legally qualified practitioner"  or"duly 
qualified medical practitioner” or any expression implying a person recognized by 
law as a m edical practitioner or members of the medical profession means a fully 
registered person.
Any person who wilfully and falsely pretends to be or takes or uses the name or 
title o f physician, doctor of medicine, licentiate in medicine and surgery, bachelor ot 
medicine, surgeon, general practitioner or apothecarcy, or any name, title, addition 
or description im plying that he is registered under any provision of the 1956 
Medical A ct,3  ^ in the Act prejudices or in any way affects, the lawful occupation, 
trade or business of chemists druggist, or of dentists, so far as they extend to selling, 
compounding and dispensing of medicines shall be liable on summary convection to
a fine not exceeding £500".39
36- M artin, op. cit., P. 6.
37- ibid at p. 7.
38- The M edical Ac 1 1956 s. 31.
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5.7.4 Provisional Registration
A person who holds a qualification which entitles him to be registered but has not 
com pleted the requirem ents as to experience is entitled to be provisionally 
registered. W hile he is completing these requirements he is deemed to be fully 
registered so far as is necessary to enable him to be engaged in employment in a 
resident medical capacity in one or more approved hospitals or institutions, but no 
further.
The effect is that he may issue prescriptions for controlled drugs or for 
prescription -only medicinal products only if required to do so as part of his duties in 
that medical post. He may not order or prescribe such drugs or medicinal products in 
any other circumstances, e.g. for his own use or his own private patients.40
5.7.5 Lim ited Registration
There is also provision in the Medical Act 1978 (s.22-24) for the limited
registration of practitioners having "acceptable overseas qualifications," that is 
qualifications granted outside the U K which are accepted by the General Council as 
furnishing a sufficient guarantee of possession of the knowledge and skill required 
for the practice o f medicine under the supervision of a fully registered medical 
practitioner.41
5 .7 .6  Professional Conduct and Fitness to Practice
The function of the council in respect of professional conduct and fitness to 
practice are performed by three committees known as:
{1) The Professional Conduct Committee,
39- Martin, op. cit., P. 101.
4 0 - ibid.
41- Martin, op. cit., p 19.
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(2) The Health Committee,
(3) The Prelim inary Proceedings Com m ittee.
These com m ittees are constituted as provided by the General Council by rules 
made under the M edical Act 1983. If any fully registered person has been convicted 
of a crim inal offence or judged by the Professional Conduct Com m ittee to have been 
guilty o f serious professional m isconduct, the com m ittee may direct that his nam e be 
erased from  the reg ister or that his registration shall be suspended for a specified 
period not exceeding twelve m onths or that his registration shall be conditional on 
his com pliance w ith requirem ents im posed by the C om m ittee for protection o f 
members o f the public or in his interests.42
W here the fitness to practice o f a fully registered person is judged  by the Health 
Committee to be seriously im paired by reason o f his physical or m ental condition, 
the Com m ittee m ay direct, if  they think fit, that his registration shall be suspended 
for a specified period not exceeding twelve m onths or that his registration shall be 
conditional on his com pliance with such requirements as the com m ittee may think fit 
to impose for protection o f m em bers o f the public or in his own interests.43
"Any period o f suspension im posed by the Professional Conduct Com m ittee or 
the H ealth C om m ittee m ay be further extended by a subsequent direction o f that 
Com m ittee. T he p rac titioner 's  reg istra tion  m ay be suspended forthw ith  if  the 
Professional C onduct C om m ittee or the H ealth Com m ittee is satisfied  that it is 
necessary to do so for the protection o f members o f the public or in the best interests 
of the practitioner. The person concerned is not then perm itted to practice during the 
time allowed for an appeal to be made or whilst any such appeal is being disposed of. 
Appeals lie to the Judicial Com m ittee o f the Privy Council but no appeal shall lie 
against the decision o f the H ealth  Com m ittee, except on a question o f a law .44
42- K night, op . c it., at p. 24 .
43- F inch , op . c it ., p. 38 .
44- E . R en to u l & H . S m ith  fed s], M ed ica l Jurisprudence and T o x ic o lo g y  [12 th  E d .] , P u b lish er
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During the period o f suspension, the practitioner's nam e is not rem oved from  the 
Register but he is treated as not being registered.
"The Prelim inary Proceeding Com m ittee was established by the 1978 A ct . Its 
functions are dealt with s. 42 o f the 1983 M edical Act.
The Prelim inary Proceeding Com m ittee has the duty o f deciding w hether any 
case referred  to them  for consideration ought to be referred  for inquiry to the 
professional conduct com m ittee or the health  com m ittee. In giving a direction 
designating the com m ittee which is to inquire in to the case, the P re lim inary  
Proceedings C om m ittee m ay m ake an order o f interim  suspension o r conditional 
registration in respect o f the practitioner concerned. The period specified in such an 
order shall not exceed two m onths , and the Professional Conduct Com m ittee or the 
Health Com m ittee as appropriate m ay revoke the order."45
5.7 .7  W hat C on stitu tes Serious Professional M isconduct
Every substantial crim e com m itted by a practitioner is reported to the G M C .  
which then decides if  the offence is such that it affects the position o f the practitioner 
in his profession. The com m ittee is bound by the verdict o f the crim inal court and 
can not hear evidence to the contrary.
The com m ittee also act upon any com plaint m ade about the conduct o f a doctor. 
An appeal from  the findings o f the com m ittee lies to the jud icial com m ittee o f the 
Privy Council. The nature o f the jurisdiction o f the judicial com m ittee o f the privy 
council has been well defined by Lord H ailsham  in the case o f Libm an v. G M C 46 
The offences w hich brought the case before the jud icial com m ittee o f the G M C  
were not fully reported.
Churchill L iv in g sto n e , L ond on  1 9 6 6 , P. 7.
45- [P F C  B ay liss], T he law  R elating to H ealth Care P ro fe ss io n s , printed in G reat B rita in , B id d le s  
Ltd., G u ild ford , Surrey 1 9 8 7 , p. 9 7 .
46- L ibm an v . G eneral M ed ica l C ou ncil rPrivv C ou ncill [1 9 7 2 ]2  W .L .R . 2 72 .
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A ssociations with unqualified persons p racticing  m edicine is unprofessional 
conduct in that it destroys the whole basis o f m aintaining the standard o f m edical 
practice by professional registration.
A dvertis ing  o r cam paign ing  fo r pa tien ts , seem s to be p roh ib ited . W hen 
considering a publication the com m ittee are entitled to consider whether the desire to 
give in form ation  cou ld  have been achieved w ithout d irecting  atten tion  to the 
personal abilities o f the author. In a recent case Faridian v. G M C 47 a doctor who 
had a substantial financial interest in an abortion clinic was held  to be guilty  o f 
infamous conduct by the disciplinary com m ittee in relation to his association with the 
clinic and its activities in offering doctors a substantial financial rew ard for sending 
patien ts to the c lin ic  and fo r an advertisem ent that appeared  on a telev ision  
program m e, and in 'The Sun' new spaper, where it was claim ed that the clinic was 
served by a H arley Street Surgeon. An appeal was made to the Judicial Com m ittee o f 
the Privy Council, who allowed the appeal on the grounds that there was no evidence 
at the earlie r hearing that the doctor knew  or had reason to suspect that the acts 
would be perform ed by these running the company which m anaged the clinic.
In som e cases, to solve the problem  o f children or m entally handicapped patients 
is difficult. The age at which a child is able to be independent o f the control o f the 
parent seem s to be continually  reduced. In one controversial decision, G M C v .  
B row ne.4** a doctor had inform ed a parent o f a 16 year-old girl that she had been 
p rescribed  con tracep tives and the docto r was found not gu ilty  o f professional 
m isconduct, in m aking this disclosure. W hen he took what he believed to be the best 
course in pro tecting  the patien t, the doctor's duty to his patien t w as apparently  
forem ost in his mind. This case m ight or m ight not be follow ed today depending on 
w hether or not the doctor had follow ed the guidelines elucidated out in G illick v.
47- Faridian v . G M C  [Privy C ounci 11 A ll E . L . R . 1 970 /1 , p. 144
48- G . M . C. v. B row n e [1971] tim es 6  & 8 M arch E ditorial C om m ent [1971] 121 N  L J 2 1 4 .
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W est Norfolk & W isbeck Area Health A uthority .49 in the House o f Lords.
By law there is an obligation on doctors to notify the nam es o f patients suffering 
from certain  infectious diseases which m ust be notified  to the health and safety 
executive.50 Provision also exists fo r the notification o f the addicted  to certain  
drugs to the C hief M edical O fficer o f H ea lth .51 The im portant point is that, in all 
these cases, the recipient o f this inform ation has a right to know.
P sy ch ia tris ts  are m ost like ly  to be in possession  o f specially  sensitive  
inform ation , but n o tw ith s tan d in g  th e ir position  in re la tio n  to co n fid en tia l 
inform ation they are not different from  o f any other doctor.52
The question has arisen recently, however, as to the duty to warn third parties of 
anything which m ight happen to his patient. This issue arose in U S A in the debatable 
case o f T araso ff  v. R egents o f  the U niversity  o f C a lifo rn ia .53 in w hich a 
psychotherapist was held liable in negligence for failure to warn a potential victim  of 
hom icide o f her situation. The decision brings in sensitive questions o f the problem s 
surrounding the dangerousness o f psychiatric predictions.
A patient w ho has a contractual relationship with his doctor, w hich is not the 
normal relationship  in the N H  S, m ay raise an action for breach o f contract if  the 
doctor w rongfully discloses confidential inform ation.54 In the absence o f contract, 
an action may be brought based on negligence or on the equitable rem edy provided 
by the law for breaches o f confidence in other areas o f activity, such as the disclosure
49- G illick  v . W est N orfo lk  & W isbeck  Area H ealth Authority \  198513 A ll E R 4 0 2  [H. L.]
50- P u b lic  H ealth  [C ontrol o f  d isea se ] A c t 1984 s. 10; "Under the H ealth  and S a fe ty  at W ork A ct  
1974; N H S  [Scotland] A c t 1 9 7 2  s .53 . R eporting  o f  Injuries, D ise a se  and  D an g ero u s O ccu ra n ces  
R egulations 1985  [SI 1 9 8 5 /2 0 2 3 ].
51- M isu se  o f  D rugs [N otification  o f  and Supply to A ddictsl R egulations 1973 [SI 1 973 /799],
52- B lack S and C h o d o ff P  [eds] P sychiatric  E th ics O xford U n iversity  P ress, O xford  [1 9 8 1 ].
53- [1976] 551 p. 2n 334 .
54- [1973] 2 4  N IL Q  19.
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of a trade secret. An example o f a negligence based action is the New Zealand case of 
Furniss v. F itch e tt55 in w hich liability  was im posed on a docto r for allow ing 
circulation o f a report which was produced in circum stances which caused severe 
shock to the patient.
The protection o f the patient in Britain is in fact, ill-founded in law. The m ajor 
constraint on the doctor lies in the pow er o f G M C, which takes a particularly strong 
view o f professional secrecy. In effect the doctor who breaches confidentiality  for 
any reason m ust consider w hether he w ould be able to justify  his action in front o f 
his professional peers.56
5.8 Sum m ary
To sum up what has been written with regard to the disciplinary procedure of the 
council, it seem s clear, first, that the council does not itself initiate proceedings, does 
not em ploy detective m ethods, and it does not itse lf act as p rosecu to r against 
registered practitioners. It is a statutory court o f justice, and takes action only in 
cases o f crim inal conviction, o r o f judicial censure, officially brought to its notice, 
or in cases o f form al com plaints, supported by prima facie evidence, brought by a 
responsible person or body .
Secondly, its judicial procedure is based as nearly as m ay be on that obtaining in 
the law courts, encom passing the right to be heard and rights o f appeal.
H ow ever, the results are no longer satisfactory from  the profession's or from  the 
public's point o f view . It has been suggested, for exam ple, that the council could be 
far m ore effective in m aintaining professional discipline if  it initiated action on its 
own a c c o u n t.^
55- [1958] N Z L R  39 6 ,
56- S ee  Jacob JM , C on fid en tia lity  the D angers o f  anv T h in g  W eaker than the M ed ica l E th ic  [1982]8  
J. M ed . E th ics 18.
57- M arilynn  M . R o seen th a l, D e a lin g  w ith  M ed ica l M alpractice . T a v isto ck  p u b lica tio n s , L ond on
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But, if this so, it m ight be difficult to keep profession regulation in its hands, to 
keep governm ent in terference at a m inim um  distance, and to ensure unbiased 
judgment. However, it seems that many would feel that if the GM C were prepared to 
initiate proceedings, it w ould prove an effective check to the less d iscip lined  
m em bers o f the profession. In effect every m em ber o f the m edical profession is in a 
position o f trust to observe, and if  possible to see that he/her fellow s observe,the 
accepted p rincip le  o f the profession . A nd this should be done as a p rac tica l 
realization  o f  the im portan t and d ign ified  position  that m ust be held  by the 
profession in the interests o f the public. The esteem  in which the profession as a 
whole is held m ust depend, ultimately, upon the conduct o f its members.
5 .9  T he D ental P rofession
The General Dental Council
The practice o f dentistry  is controlled by the D entists A ct 1957 through the 
G eneral C ouncil, w hose constitu tion  and functions in resp ec t o f  education , 
registration and discipline are sim ilar to those o f the General M edical Council.
The practice o f dentistry  (s. 33) is deem ed to include the perform ance o f any 
such operation and the giving o f such treatm ent, advice or attendance as is usually 
perform ed or given by a dentist, and any person who perform s any operation or 
gives treatm ent advice or attendance on o r to any person as preparatory to for the 
provision o f  dentures, artificial teeth or other dental appliances is deem ed to have 
practiced dentistry w ithin the m eaning o f the A ct.58
5.9 .1  T he D entist R egister
The D entist R egister  is required to be published each year (s. 20). It is kept 
by the reg istrar appointed by the General Dental Council in the m anner prescribed
1987 , p. 2 3 2 .
58- S ee  D entists A ct 1957 [s. 33].
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by the C ouncil's  regu la tions { s. 16 }. The reg is te r con tains three separate  
alphabetical lists.
{a} persons en titled  to be reg istered  as graduates o r licen tiates o f a dental 
authority
{b} the com m onwealth list, o f  persons entitled to be registered as holding some 
common wealth diplom a.
{c} foreign persons entitled to be registered as holding some foreign diplom a.
The nam es o f  all dentists who are entitled to practice are, therefore, included in 
the published reg ister and there is no provisional registration as is the case with 
m edical profession. It is not law ful for a tem porarily registered dentist to practice 
except as indicated in the register.
N am es can be erased from  the register o f infam ous or disgraceful conduct in a 
p ro fessional respec t. T here  is a P re lim inary  P roceed ings C om m ittee  and a 
D isciplinary com m ittee.59
The discip linary  procedure closely resem bles that o f the m edical profession 
except that there is no provision for suspension o f registration.
5 .1 0  O p tic ia n s
The O pticians Act 1958 is the statute which regulates the practice o f opticians 
and the conduct o f corporate bodies in business as opticians.
5 .10 .1  G eneral O ptical C ouncil
The G eneral O ptical Council, established under the Act {1 .s.} has the general 
function o f  prom oting high standards o f professional education and professional 
conduct am ong opticians. Its m em bers include elected representatives o f ophthalm ic 
opticians and dispensing opticians, together with m edical practitioners nom inated by
59- ibid [s. 16].
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the Faculty o f O phthalm ologists and persons nom inated by the Privy Council and the 
examining bodies.60
5.10 .2  R egisters o f O pticians
The council is requ ired  to m aintain  separate reg isters {s.2} o f d ispensing  
opticians; ophthalm ic opticians engaged in the testing o f sight and the fitting and 
supply o f optical appliances; and ophthalmic opticians engaged in the testing o f sight 
only. Those persons entitled to be included in any o f the health service ophthalm ic 
lists at the tim e o f establishm ent o f the General Optical Council were entitled to be 
registered, as also were o ther persons who, at that tim e, satisfied the council as to 
their qualifications. Subsequently, only applicants holding qualifications approved 
or recognized by the Council m ay be accepted for inclusion in the appropriate  
reg ister.61
The register m ust be published by the C ouncil{ s.8}. The council is also required 
to m aintain and publish lists o f corporate bodies carrying on business as ophthalm ic 
opticians or carrying on businesses as dispensing opticians (s.4}.62
5 .10 .3  O ffences under O pticians Act 1958
Subject to certa in  excep tions, it is unlaw ful fo r any person  w ho is not a 
registered m edical practitioner or registered ophthalm ic optician to test the sight of 
another person (20}. It is also unlaw ful to sell any optical appliances; that is, an 
appliance designed to correct, rem edy or relieve a defect o f sight, unless the sale is 
effected by, or under the supervision of, a reg istered  m edical p ractitioner, or a 
registered optician (s.21). This does not apply to certain types o f sales, e g. sales to 
an optician or to m edical practitioners, hospital, or governm ent departm ents; and it 
is a defence to prove that an appliance was sold as an antique.
60- S ee  O pticians A ct 1958 [s. 1].
61- ibid [s.3].
62- ibid [s. 4 ].
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It is an offence for any person o r body corporate to use any o f the titles 
ophthalmic optician, dispensing optician, registered optician o r ancillary optician if 
that person is not registered or , in the case a body corporate, enrolled. It is also an 
offence to use any nam e, title addition or description falsely im plying registration or 
enrollm ent (s. 22 ).64
5.11 T he W orld M edical A ssociation
A  d o c t o r  o w e s  to  h i s  p a t i e n t  a b s o l u t e  s e c r e c y  o n  a l l  w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  c o n f i d e d  to  h i m  o r  w h i c h  
h e  k n o w s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  e n t r u s t e d  to  h im .  ^
It m ay be useful also to not briefly the interest which three bodies, the W orld 
M edical A ssociation,the British M edical Association and the Protection or D efence 
Organizations have in m atters ethical.
The W orld M edical A ssociation, shortly after its form ation in 1947, prom pted to 
a large extent by the fact that a not insignificant num ber o f doctors in G erm any had 
prostituted their profession to the whim s o f a potential m aniac, drew  up a m odern 
version o f  the H ippocra tic  Oath- the declaration  o f G eneva. There w ould  be 
throughout the w orld one class o f men and w om en whose ideals o f service would 
rem ain above any consideration o f race, religion, colour or creed, as stated in the 
declaration.66
5 .12  T he B ritish  M edical A ssocia tion :-
I t  i s  a  p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s  o b l i g a t i o n  to  o b s e r v e  t h e  r u l e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s e c r e c y  b y  
r e f r a i n i n g  f r o m  d i s c l o s i n g  v o l u n t a r i l y  w i t h o u t  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  p a t i e n t  [  s a v e  w i t h  
s t a t u t o r y  s a n c t i o n  ]  to  a n y  t h i r d  p a r t y  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  h e  h a s  l e a t n t  i n  h i s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  p a t i e n t .  T h e  c o m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  m o d e r n  l i f e  s o m e t i m e s  c r e a t e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  t h e  d o c t o r  i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  a n d  o n  c e r t a i n  o c c a s i o n s  i t  
m a y  b e  n e c e s s a r y  to  a c q u i e s c e  in  s o m e  m o d i f i c a t i o n .  A l w a y s ,  h o w e v e r  t h e  o v e r r i d i n g
63- ib id  [s.21 ].
64- ibid [s. 22].
65- International C od e o f  M ed ica l E th ics, W orld  M ed ica l A sso c ia tio n , 1959.
66- J. L . T ay lor, T h e D octor  and the L aw . [2nd E d.], L ondon, Pitm an 1982 , p. 153.
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c o n s i d e r a t i o n  m u s t  b e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  l i n e  o f  c o n d u c t  t h a t  w i l l  b e n e f i t  t h e  p a t i e n t ,  o r  p r o t e c t  
h i s  i n t e r e s t s
The interest o f the BM A is a wide one and includes all ethical problem s arising in 
respect o f m em bers o f the A ssociation. It will also act w hen any o f  the doctors 
concerned is a m em ber, provided that the other or others agree to accept the findings 
of the ethical committee.
The BM A being a voluntary association with the inevitable strengths and weaknesses 
o f such bodies can not o f course take any measures against a doctor com parable to those 
within the pow er o f the GMC.
The m ost serious steps open to the BM A are to expel a doctor from  m em bership and 
to publicize am ong the profession its condem nation o f his actions. B ecause o f this 
relative im potency, it is in some circles fashionable to decry the BM A and to consider 
its ethical m achinery as being without value. This view  is thought to be based on a 
m isconception o f the whole purpose o f ethical m achinery.68
5 .12 A m erican  M edical A ssociation
A  p h y s i c i a n  m a y  n o t  r e v e a l  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  e n t r u s t e d  to  h i m  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  m e d i c a l  
a t t e n d a n c e ,  o r  t h e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  h e  m a y  o b s e r v e  i n  th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  h i s  p a t i e n t s ,  u n l e s s  h e  i s  
r e q u i r e d  to  d o  s o  b y  l a w  o r  u n l e s s  i t  b e c o m e s  n e c e s s a r y  in order to  p r o t e c t  t h e  w e l f a r e  o f  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y . 6 9
In fact the m ajor codes o f m edical ethics differ rem arkably in the qualification 
placed on th is p rincip le .T he H ippocratic  Oath specifically  includes inform ation 
acquired not in connection with professional practice. The A M A  code lim its the 
principle to confidences disclosed in the course o f m edical practice. The AM A code 
indicates three specific conditions where exceptions are made; w hen requ ired  by 
law, w hen necessary to protect the welfare o f the individual, and when necessary to
67- B ritish  M ed ica l A sso c t io n . L ond on  1959.
68- ibid B M A .
6 9- A m erican  M ed ica l A sso c ia tio n , P rincip les o f  M ed ical E th ics, 1971.
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protect the welfare o f society, whereas the BM A code clearly allows for the statutory 
requirem ents to break confidence. There is no m ention in the BM A principle o f 
violations to protect society, as there is in the AM A position. W ith these am biguities 
in the codes, the individual physician is hard pressed to sort out their im plications 
and decide what to do.70
5.13 The M edical D efence O rganization. The M edical D efence U nion was 
founded in 1885 for the benefit, defence , and protection o f m em bers with ethical and 
legal problem s arising from  practice. It is governed and m anaged by doctors and 
dentists in the U K. It is the oldest and largest association o f its type in the world. It is 
neither an insurance com pany nor a trade union. It is non-political and non-profit 
m aking.71
In addition, in the U nited Kingdom , there are two other defence organizations, with 
sim ilar constitutions, purpose and functions, these are the M edical and D ental Defence 
Union o f Scotland and the M edical Protection Society.
The defence societies w ere form ed under the Com pany A ct 1948 as com panies 
lim ited by guarantee, w ithout having shares. Their purposes are as follows:
1. To protect support, and safeguard the discipline and interest o f m edical and dental 
practitioners in the U K as well as in other parts o f the world.
2. To give advice to m em bers o f the society on any questions involv ing  their 
profession which arise.
3. To effect and obtain insurance and reinsurance, and to adopt necessary measures.
4. To assist in case o f alleged malpractice against m em ber o f the society.
5. To conduct arbitration for settling disputes and difficulties betw een m em bers of 
the society or betw een m em bers and non-members.
70- R . M . V ea tch , Case S tu d ies in M ed ica l E th ics. L o n d o n , H arvard U n iv ers ity  P ress , 1 9 7 7 , p. 
117,.
71- T he M ed ica l D e fen ce  U nion., L ondon M D U  1985 Preface.
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6. To consider, originate and support im provem ents and decisions in the law by 
proceedings, and to m aintain the in terest o f the society  o r its m em bers from  any 
position..
7. To possess, purchase, m ortgage and sell land etc. for the benefit o f the society.
8. The incom e o f the society shall be allocated for the prom otion o f the goal o f the 
society.
9. To support from  its fund any charitable organization or scientific institu tion 
which will benefit the profession or the society.
10. W here o f advantage to society, to establish, promote, and to subscribe to become
a m em ber o f any other com pany, association or body having objects sim ilar to the aim 
72of the society.
The defence organisations can provide assistance in three main situations:
1. "D octor's advice m ay be all that is required , but w here tw o doctors are in 
conflict they w ill often be prepared to accept suggestions that the points at issue be 
considered by one or m ore m em bers o f the professional secretariat o f their society to 
achieve settlement.
2. W hen m ore involved m atters are concerned especially  when legal points are 
involved, the protection society m ay be prepared to arrange arbitration provided that 
all parties to the dispute agree to accept the arbitrator's decision as final and binding.
3. F o rtuna te ly , in frequen tly  in eth ical m atters, a p ro tection  society  m ay be
prepared to support its m em bers by undertaking legal proceedings."73
The m ost fortunate go through the whole o f their professional life w ithout finding
any difficulty. H ow ever, to be on the safe side given the com plex relationship  o f the
doctor with the law, it is essential for doctor to jo in  one o f the defence associations in
72- J. L eah y  T aylor, M ed ica l M alpractice. G reat Britain, B risto l, John W right, 1 9 8 0 , p . l  14.
73- T aylor, op . cit. at p. 155.
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the U K, on the day o f registration.
W henever a problem  arises at first instance it is strongly advisable that the secretary 
o f the organization should be inform ed form ally and im m ediately. Long experience 
and docum entation show that where the doctor attem pts to deal with serious problem s 
by him self, it m ay seriously  ham per the handling o f the case by the defence 
organization and ruin the chances o f obtaining a satisfactory resu lt.74
A practitioner likely to face a problem atic situation should not take further action- 
for exam ple, advise abortion w ithout consultation with a senior qualified practitioner 
or even his m edical defence organization, since consent by the patient is no defence 
unless the clinical indication for the abortion is absolutely necessary.75
5.14 T he P rin cip le  o f C on fidentia lity
To date, this discussion has shown the way in which law controls the w idest aspects 
o f professional practice, but leaves ultim ate determ ination o f principles and standards 
to the duly constituted professional group. The significance o f professional rather than 
legal inpu t is m ost clearly  dem onstrated  by the p rofessional's com m itm ent to the 
principle o f confidentiality.
Confidentiality, w ith its two elem ents o f trust and secrecy, lies at the very root o f the
treatm ent relationship . As such it is a fundam ental m axim  o f m edical practice that
doctors shall regard  them selves as generally required  to m aintain silence regarding
what has been confided in the course o f medical consultation.
C onfidentiality  provided little problem  in the days o f the sim ple relationship  of
patient and doctor, a system  that lasted until the tw entieth century. The doctrine of
confidentiality  is equally  fundam ental to param edical practice, though its particular
dictates are apt to vary according to the relationship o f the param edical practitioners
76both to the m edical profession and to the patient or client.
74- H a d fie ld  op . cit. p. 2 0 3 .
75- ib id  at p . 194.
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Basically the principle o f confidentiality appears to be for the benefit o f the patient. 
But in the secondary stage it may also be o f frequent assistance to practitioners. Just as 
in the case o f consent to treatm ent, so too in the case o f confidentiality o f inform ation, 
patient self-determ ination should be fundamental, but when it comes to considering the 
question o f confidentiality , is self determ ination better for every one? The answ er is 
certainly not. To som e extent self determ ination is a guiding principle, in m any others 
it fares no better than it does in the case of consent to treatment.
If, in particu lar confidentiality, is to be based on the best interests o f  patient, then 
other factors may rank with equal significance alongside the principle when it com es to 
considering what is really best for the patient. Indeed the B M A H andbook of M edical 
Ethics 1981 guidelines list disclosure in the interests o f  the patien t as a ju stifiab le  
exception. They indicate that there are a num ber o f possible exceptions:
1- If the patient gives consent
2- If  the docto r th inks it undesirab le on m edical grounds to seek the patient's 
consent, inform ation m ay sometimes be given in confidence to a close relative or some 
one in sim ilar relationship to the patient.
3 - To satisfy specific statutory requirem ent such as notifying infectious disease.
4 - For the purpose o f m edical research, when approved by a local Research Ethical 
com m ittee, or in the case National Cancer Registry by the Chairm an o f the B M A'S 
Central Ethical Com m ittee or his nominee,
7 75 - W hen the inform ation is required by due legal process . 1
T hese now  fo llow s a b rie f consideration  the very nature o f the obligation  o f 
confiden tia lity , and the concept o f the obligation  itse lf, apart from  the p ractical
7 6 - M ish a p  or M a lp ra c tic e ? P u b lish ed  for  T he M ed ica l D e fe n c e  U n io n , L o n d o n , B la c k w e ll  
S c icn tfic  P ublish ers 1985 , p. 2 1 7 .
7 7 - C lif fo r d  H a w k in s , H a n d b o o k  o f  M ed ica l E t h ic s . L o n d on : B r itish  M ed ic a l A s so c ia t io n ,  
U n iv ersity  P ress, C am b ridge 1981 p. 4 8 .
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incidents and stated exceptions.
The obligation is the bond o f protection o f confidentiality  betw een the patient 
and those providing m edical care, which is extremely im portant to the success of that 
care. C onfidentiality m ay have its origin in the prim itive belief that one who had 
some intim ate know ledge o f another possessed a supernatural pow er over h im .78
W hatever the connection with this, there is evidence that the obligation created 
originally by the H ippocatic Oath was a professional obligation, in keeping with a 
time when the practice o f m edicine was an esoteric art. It is still in part a professional 
obligation, but for different reasons.
The m ost popular conception o f confidentiality is that it results from , and creates, 
ethical bonds; therefore, it is a significant concern o f m edical ethics.79
A s seen above the practice o f m edicine is in society 's interest and the "doctor's 
overrid ing  duty  to society" is incorporated  in it. In add ition , there  are legal 
obligations by which social or ethical obligations are transform ed by operation o f the 
legal process, open by a judge 's  interpretation. There is also a further, and som ew hat 
abnorm al, category  o f obligation which consists o f a general duty to act, reveal or 
w ithhold in w hichever m anner best serves the treatm ent o f the particular patient whose 
dealings w ith the m edical profession  are in issue. If the m edical p rac titioner 's  
obligation o f confidentiality is to rem ain in recognizable form , the doctor's overriding 
duty to society m ust certainly be tem pered by an equally com prehensive view  o f the 
overall interest o f the patient.
A m ore detailed exam ination o f the categories o f exception m ay be useful.
1. is o f self-evident scope. The patient's consent to disclosure is sufficient to justify
it.
78- R obert D . M iller , P rob lem s in H ospital L aw  [ 4 ^  E d.], A n A spen  Publication  R o ck v ille ,
M aryland 1 9 83 , p. 2 7 8 .
79- B ernard B enjam in , M ed ical R ecords [2nd. E d.], L ondon, W illiam  H einenann M ed ica l B o o k s  
Ltd. 1 9 80 , p . 188.
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2. covers, for exam ple, a case where the patient would be tem pted to com m it suicide 
if he were m ade aware o f the true nature o f his illness; it may be proper here to disclose 
the position to a close relative or som eone in sim ilar relationship, who is o f course a 
third party, so far as the doctor/patient relationship is concerned.
3. it could be said that the duty to society is considered to be overriding. It is not a 
dependent issue, but depends on a balance o f interests. In achieving such a balance, the 
in terests o f  the ind iv idual patient, including  as but one e lem en t his in te rest in 
confidentiality, will be bound to weigh heavily, even if  heavier interests tip the scales 
at the end o f the day. For instance, the patient's consent to disclosure m ay properly be 
sought; and there m ay be circum stances where sensible persuasion m ay be justified  in 
order to encourage the patient w illingly to disclose his illness. W hen persuasion fails, 
disclosure to appropriate authorities could be justifiable either by an appeal to the best 
in terests o f the patient, or to the public w ho m ight be endangered  by the patient's 
condition. For exam ple, at present the very serious problem  of the acquired im m une 
deficiency syndrom e [AIDS] is a significant problem  o f this type. On the o ther hand, 
disclosure in the public interest may be problem atic in the testing program m e for the 
virus and m ay frustrates the carrier, leading him to spread the disease indiscrim inately.
4. Is o f narrow  scope and again self-explanatory. The scientific investigator has 
responsibility  fo r not im properly releasing inform ation pertain ing to subjects in his 
study. This responsibility  includes not only inform ation protected by law, which often 
does not apply to all subjects, but also inform ation that affects the privacy and dignity 
o f his subjects. W hen there is a likelihood that another m ay obtain access to such 
inform ation  derived  from  the research, the M edical R esearch C ouncil has issued 
guidelines. These guidelines are:
[I] All such inform ation should be confidential and com m unicated only to m edical 
research  w orkers engaged  in investigation  in the in terests o f the health  o f  the
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com m unity and only  if, in the opinion o f the m edical p rac titioner ho ld ing  that 
inform ation such com m unication will not harm  the patient.
[II] Because m edical practitioners in the m edical register are accountable for their 
behaviour, access by non-m edically  qualified research staff should be allow ed only 
when they are working with a m edically qualified worker, who can take responsibility 
for confidentiality. [If no such m edically qualified person exists, approval should be 
obtained from  a standing com m ittee on the use o f m edical inform ation for research 
which the M RC has set up].
[III] If the personal collaboration o f the patient is needed, he or she should have the 
right o f refusal.
[IV] The resu lt o f  research  should never be p resen ted  in such a way that an 
individual patient can be identified.
The M RC respect w hat is true o f all access to inform ation w hether for research or 
not "the overriding consideration m ust always be that no harm  or distress will come for 
the individual and his fam ily, and that the doctor-patient relationship will in no way be
• j „ 8 0im paired
5 This can be divided in to two categories [a] cases where disclosure is required by 
Statute and [b] cases where disclosure is required by com m on law. an exam ple o f [a] is 
according to the requirem ents o f the H ealth Services and Public H ealth  [Control o f 
disease] Act 1984; Public Health [Infectious disease] Regulations 1985/434 as regards 
notifiable diseases; and [b] as provided by the rule that com m unication betw een doctor 
and patien t is professionally  privileged; the confirm ation o f this priv ilege is to be 
obtained through the consent o f the patient to pass the information in question since the 
privilege is that o f the patient and not that o f the doctor.
L aw yers en joy  a p riv ilege  in jud ic ia l proceedings in rela tion  to w ithho ld ing
80- M ed ica l R esearch  ’R esp o n sib ility  in the use M edical Inform ation for R esea rch .' Bri. M ed . J. 1:
[1973] ,2 1 3 -2 1 6 .
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evidence. In a court o f law, however, a doctor m ust give his guidance just like any one
else. If  there is any assum ption o f breach o f confidence at all, at this stage, the only
privileged m em ber o f the court is the judge, to the extent that if convinced, he may
81limit the availability o f certain evidence to the public forum.
The principles enunciated in the case o f D v. N. S. P. C. C .8 2  are likely to apply,
although this case did not concern medical practitioners.
S im ilar form ulations can be found in the 1973 and 1975 D eclarations o f the W orld
M edical A ssociation.83 The British D epartm ent o f Health and Social Security [now the
D epartm ent o f Health] issued a circular o f guidance on the m atter, in which it stated
that it is a doctor's duty strictly to observe the rule o f professional secrecy. . . ," but
th a t " there are some exceptions to the principle. Reliance upon the validity  o f a 
"rule with exceptions" is professed by several groups other than doctors. For example
85the Royal C ollege o f N ursing o f the U. K. defines the relationship betw een a nurse 
and her patient as a "fiduciary relationship", a relationship o f trust. One element o f this 
trust is th a t " a nurse shall not disclose w ithout the consent o f the patient, inform ation 
w hich is ob tained  in the course o f professional relationship  w ith the patient". The 
guidelines go on to say, however, that a nurse m ay be relieved from  the obligation by 
some 'law ful excuse'. There are m any other ethical statem ents which follow  this same 
pattern , for exam ple, in relation to P sych ia trists ,86 and there issued by the G eneral 
M edical Council.87
81- B razier, op . cit. at p. 4 3 .
82‘ D . v. N SPC C  [1978] A C  171
83- D eclaration o f  H elsink i [R evised  1975].
84- D H S S  [U K ], Circular H SC , 2 0 3  1975.
85- G u id lin es on C on fid en tia lity  in N u rsin g , R C N , U K . L ondon 1980.
86- W o rk in g  Party o f  R o y a l C o lle g e  o f  P sych ia trists , 'C o n fid en tia lity ' a R eport o f  co u n c il: R. C. 
P sych iatrists . L ond on  1977.
87- G eneral M ed ica l C ou ncil [UK ] P rofessional C onduct and D isc ip lin e: F itn ess to P ractice  G M  C. 
L on d on  1981 .
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B riefly  to consider the very nature o f the obligation o f  confiden tia lity  and the
concept o f obligation, an obligation signifies a bond or tie. Thus, the obligation created
originally by the oldest code o f medical ethics is well known to m edical and lay persons
alike, the Hippocratic Oath. Though now some 25 centuries old, its basic tenets rem ain 
88valid as ever. H ow ever the Oath has been amended in its m odern coun ter part, the 
Declaration o f G eneva [or Sydney] and it is accepted as a good starting point because it 
represents the roots which sustain the intraprofessional code o f conduct; and this is in 
practice, the patien t's  m ain  safeguard  o f w hat is generally  considered  to be his 
right.89
Professional secrecy is accepted as the principle that the patient, in confiding in the
m edical p rac titioner, can expect the confidence to be su sta in ed .90 L egally , the
doctrine o f m edical confidentiality is founded on the law o f contract or in com m on law.
In fact there is very little legal support for the doctrine o f strict confidence betw een
patient and doctor. In any even, there is no specific law o f privacy as such in the U. 
91K. As M cLean & M aher note:
The legal issues em bodied in that relationship are confidentiality. The rationale for 
such confidentiality  is m erely respect for the doctor ra ther than the patient, and the 
general patient-physician confidentialities as m uch as m oral principles, and as the for 
the law  concerned, the legal basis for preventing  the d isclosure  for unauthorized  
disclosure is not strong in legal system like the British . Exceptions to the principle o f 
confidentiality occur where the inform ation is required to be divulged by due process 
of law. O r at least, this is a case where, by definition, a legal justification for breach of 
confidence is provided even if some m ight in certain cases say that the legal obligation
88- K night, op . cit. at p. 1.
89- M ason  and M cC all Sm ith , L aw  and M edical Ethics [2nd E d.] L ondon, Butterw orths 1987 ,
p. 121.
90- M ason , op . cit. at p . 330 .
91- M cL ean  A . M . S h eila  & M aher, M ed icn e . M oral and the L aw  , E ngland, G ow er 1985 , p. 187.
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to d isc lose  by no m eans concludes the question o f e th ical ju s tifica tio n  o f such 
disclosure. For exam ple, in Hunter v. M ann .92 a m edical practitioner treated a man. 
The m an asked doctor Hunter to visit his girl friend who said that she had been in a car 
accident. The doctor advised them  both to inform  the police but did not ask their 
consent to d isclose their identity  if  asked to do so. W eeks later a po lice  o fficer 
requested him  to divulge the nam e and address o f either or both o f the patients, or to 
give inform ation that w ould lead to their identification. The facts were that a stolen car 
had been involved in accident, the driver and passenger having runaw ay im m ediately 
after wards; it was alleged that the driver was guilty o f dangerous driving. The doctor 
refused both at the tim e and later in writing, to divulge this inform ation on the grounds 
that this would be a breach o f professional confidence.
H e was prosecuted under section 168 [2] [b] o f the Road Safety Act 1972 which states 
" . . .  any other person . . . shall if  required . . . give any inform ation which is in his 
pow er to give and m ay lead to the identification o f the driver." To sum up, this was not 
a case o f  a jud icial order to divulge, sim ply o f a statutory requirem ent, the breach of 
which attracted a fine, and Dr. H unter was accordingly fined £5. But during the court 
proceedings he was not called up on to disclose the inform ation sought by the police. It 
cost him  but, but his ethics rem ained intact. The incredible fine can alm ost be seen, not 
as a crim inal penalty, but as a tax on principle.
One further issue o f protection o f confidentiality  should be m entioned. In D. v.. 
National Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children TNSPCCl.93 a neighbour 
suspected a child had been abused and reported this to the NSPCC. The plain tiff sought 
to com pel the N SPC C  to disclose who had m istakenly accused her o f child abuse. The 
court refused  to m ake the order, because the public in terest was served by people 
feeling free to approach authorities about young children. G ranting such an order
92- H unter v. M ann [1974] 1 Q  B . 2 6 7 , 772.
93- D . v. N S P C C . Supra cit. at p. 171.
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would be an obstacle to the freedom  to report when they suspected child abuse.
A general ru le can be draw n from  this, though it does not involve a doctor. 
N eighbours owed no duty o f confidentiality  to anybody but if  the law  recognized it 
then the law would not challenge the confidentiality o f those who had a right to know.
In an additional exam ple, the House o f Lords m ade it clear that the doctor is not 
com m itting a crim inal offence if  the provision o f contraceptives to young girls 
without parental consent is based on clinical judgment. This was set out in the case o f
G illick v. \ y est N orfolk and W isbech A H A .94 The prim ary concern in this case 
was that statistics on the num ber o f births and induced abortion am ong girls under
the age o f 16 led the DHSS to conclude that contraceptive services should be m ade 
more readily available to that age group. The essence of the DHSS advice was that the 
decision to provide contraception to a girl under 16 was one for the doctor. He m ight 
law fully treat and prescribe for the girl w ithout contacting her parents, but not 
without the agreem ent o f the girl. V ictoria G illick, the m other o f four daughters 
under 16, w rote to her local health authority seeking an assurance that none o f her 
daughters w ould be given contraceptive or abortion advice or treatm ent w ithout her 
prior know ledge and consent until they were 16.
M rs. G illick 's argum ent was based on the assum ption that the com m on law had 
never perm itted m edical treatm ent o f children under 16 in the absence o f  parental 
consent. In relation to contraception specifically, it was also arged that as it is a 
crime for a m an to have sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, providing her with 
contraception am ounts to the crim e o f causing or encourag ing  illegal sexual 
intercourse. Eventually the DHSS appealed to the House o f Lords and the H. L. held 
that the original advice circulated by the DHSS was lawful and that a child under 16 
could in certain  circum stances give a valid consent to contraception  o r abortion
94- G illick  v . W est N orfo lk  & W isbech  A H A  [498513 A ll E. R. 4 0 2  H L.
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treatm ent w ithout parental know ledge or agreement.
This decision has been welcomed by the m edical profession notw ithstanding that 
the GM C has not changed its guidelines issued before the House o f Lords decision.
5.15 A ccess to M edical R ecords
The m edical record is at the core o f the doctor-patient relationship. It usually 
contains personal, sensitive inform ation and any unauthorised d isclosure  by the 
doctor has legal and professional consequences.
The A dm inistration o f Justice A ct 1970 s .32 {replaced by s.33[5] o f the 
Suprem e C ourt A ct 1981} provides that after proceeding have com m enced, any 
parties thereto m ay apply for a court order com pelling a person who is not a party to 
the proceedings to disclose and produce docum ents to the applicant, s. 31 contains 
sim ilar provisions in favour o f a potential p lain tiff against a potential party to the 
proceedings i.e before it is known whether proceedings can or will com m ence. Each 
section provides that the discovery is made to the applicant.
The m edical profession was uneasy about this developm ent as it could have a 
serious effect on the privacy o f clinical records o f individual patients; it m ight 
encourage "fishing expeditions" whereby parents m ight try to seek inform ation for 
the purpose o f pursuing unjustifiable claim s and it could be distressing for the patient 
to see his own re c o rd .^
In M cLvor v. Southern H ealth .96 it was held that the applicant and his/her legal 
advisers have rights o f access records. And if  there is a m atter in them  w hich it 
would be better for the applicant him self not to know {which could only arise where 
he was the patient concerned), his legal adviser would no doubt take precautions to 
prevent the inform ation becom ing known to his client.
95- M L R  1979  P. 88.
96- M cL vor v . Southern H ealth  A uthority [1978J2 W L R .757 .
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Lord D enning had previously developed the argum ents for lim iting disclosure
only to medical a d v is e rs .^  These argum ents were that:
1] m edical notes and records are very difficult for laym en to understand and
they may easily be m isinterpreted.
2] notes and records m ay refer to actual or possible diagnosis w hich could 
greatly disturb the patient if known to him, such as giving him  six m onths to live or 
indicating a suspected m alignant tumour.
A fu rther argum ent for restric ted  d isclosure  is that records and notes m ay 
contain sta tem ents m ade by the patien t h im self or by re la tives w hich m ay be 
em barrassing and distressing if  m ade known.
The decision o f the House of Lords on a seemingly narrow point does raise wider 
issues. W here access to m edical records is provided to applicants o ther than the 
patient, the issue is one o f protecting the privacy o f the patient as far as is possible. 
The H ouse o f  Lords, has confirm ed that only "relevant inform ation" in the records 
need to be disclosed and also that the seal o f confidentiality follows the inform ation 
into the hands o f the disclosee, save for purposes connected with the proceedings.
W hen the applicant is seeking to gain access to his own m edical record, the 
question arises w hether, quite apart from  jud ic ia l proceedings, a patien t has or 
should have a general legal right to see his own m edical record. The confidentiality 
between doctor and patient is the privilege of the patient not that o f the doctor, and so 
if the patient sees fit to waive it, it is not open for the doctor to refuse to disclose the 
inform ation to a third party , but what o f the patient? It is assum ed that since the 
property in the records is vested in the health authorities, there is no com m on law 
right for the patient to recover/to see his own record.
M edical confidentiality has becom e increasingly diluted by the developm ent o f 
the principle o f "extended confidence": m edical records may be seen not only by the
97- D a v id so n  v. L lo v d  A ircraft S erv ices [1974]3  A ll ER 1.
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patient's doctors but also by the health care team , secretaries, adm inistrators, etc. 
W hatever lim its are placed on the boundaries o f extended confidence, it is ironic that 
amongst the interested parties it is only the patient h im self w ho is regarded as in 
competent to see his own confidential record.
In M cL vor,98 Lord D iplock was prepared to accept that even a legal adviser 
could take precautions to prevent m edical information becoming know n to his client. 
This issue does present doctors with m ost d ifficult m oral problem s. But does that 
mean that in law a person should be denied inform ation about h im self from  his own 
medical adviser when he expressly requests it?
The law  grants parties in law suits access through subsequent and o ther 
mechanisms to discover evidence. Also in the case of com m unicable diseases the law 
requires health  care  p roviders to report a variety  o f patien t conditions to law 
enforcem ent or public health authorities. By law, health care providers m ust provide 
certain persons access to m edical information if  they request the inform ation.99
Thus, the p roper usage o f m edical records has up to date been protected  and 
guided m ore by traditional and inform al conventions than by statutory o r regulatory 
instrum ents. The problem  was seen as one for the m edical profession, which was 
trusted to use its discretion in a responsible m anner. In general this trust has been 
well justified.
The five100 m ain elem ents which supports legal and regulatory fram e w orks are 
not too in trusive, and it has been brought in to p lay only in very exceptional 
circum stances. It has p layed no direct part in the great m ajority o f decisions about 
the release and usage medical records beyond the im m ediate confines o f the doctor- 
patient transaction.
96- M cL vor v . Southern H ealth A uthority supra cit. at p. 62 5 .
99- Suprem e C ourt A ct 1981 ss. 3 3 -35; cf. Sm ith, op. cit. PP- 1 3 3 -134 .
100- H aw kins, op . c i t . . p. 58-
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C M A P T I E M  
M edico-legal Problems
6.1 M edical N egligence
This chapter will focus on a species o f legal liability to which physicians are subject 
which is referred to conventionally  as liability for m alpractice. This type o f liability is 
becom ing increasingly  significant in m odem  tim es, since the num ber o f m alpractice 
suits brought against physicians has been on the increase over the past fifty y ea rs .1
The w ord "m alpractice"is a general term  and is used to describe m isconduct o f a 
physician towards his patient which results in the liability o f the physician for dam ages. 
The term  has no specific legal m eaning but is used m ost com m only to describe the type 
of w rongful conduct referred  to herein as "negligence."2 And these term s can be used 
interchangably.^
6.1 .2  D efin ition  o f N egligence
Negligence in a legal sense is the breach of a duty owed by one person to some other 
person to exercise care or skill or both. A pplied to the practice o f m edicine this m eans 
that a doctor, when treating a patient m ust bring to his task a reasonable degree o f skill
and know ledge, and he m ust exercise a reasonable degree o f care. 4 A doctor is not 
liable under the law  o f negligence m erely because som eone else with greater skill and 
know ledge w ould  have prescribed  d ifferen t treatm ent or w ould have operated  or 
diagnosed in some o ther way. He is only liable if  he h im self has failed to exercise that
1- S h eila  A . M . M cL ean, r i9 8 7 1 Ihform ation D isclosure. C onsent to M edical Treatm ent and the Law" PhD  
thesis, Facultjof Law and Financial Studies U niversity o f  G lasgow  U .K ., p. 137.
2- B . K night, L ega l A sp ects  o f  M ed ical Practice [3rd E d], E dinburgh, C hurchll L ivingston^ 1982 ,
P. 4 8 .
3- G . J. A nnas, T he R ight o f  D octors. N urses and A llied  H ealth P ro fessio n a ls , B allinger  
P ublish ing C o. C am bridge, M assachusettes 1981 , p. 2 43 .
4- M ason K . J. and M cC all Sm ith R. A ., I^ w  and M edical Ethics [2nd E d .], B utterw orth, L ondon  
1987, p. 169.
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standard o f skill and care which could reasonably be expected o f a norm al prudent 
practitioner o f the sam e experience and status w orking under sim ilar conditions. A 
doctor should not, how ever, excep t in em ergency, undertake trea tm ent requ iring  
particular skill unless he is fitted for it, and it is his duty to know w hether he is so fitted
or not. 5A specialist clearly professes a higher degree o f skill and know ledge than a 
practitioner who does not claim  any special training or ability, and accordingly a higher 
standard o f skill and know ledge is expected  o f a person holding h im self out as a 
specialist w hether in fact he possess it o r not. W here there are special circum stances 
which increase the risk attendant on some act, or some operation is by its nature likely to 
cause in jury  unless special p recau tions are taken, the degree o f  care  requ ired  is
p roportionately  h ig h er.6 B ut a docto r is not liab le if, ow ing  to pecu liarity  or 
variation in the patient's constitution, which the doctor was not negligent in failing  to 
discover, the treatm ent which he prescribes proves to be injurious. Failure to exercise 
the required standard o f skill and care will in law am ount to negligence, and render the 
docto r liab le  fo r any dam age o r loss suffered by the pa tien t w hich is d irec tly  
attributable to such failure. To be actionable, how ever, the negligence com plained of 
m ust have caused dam age. It is not sufficient for the p lain tiff m erely to show that the 
defendant w as negligent; he m ust also prove that the loss in respect o f which he seeks to 
recover dam ages flows directly from  that negligence.
T he doctor's liability  for negligence arises out o f  tort or delict that is to say the 
breach o f a duty, p rim arily  fixed by law, requiring him  to exercise skill and care. 
W hen, as will sometim es be the case, a contractual relationship exists between the doctor 
and his patient, there arises an im plied agreem ent on the part o f the doctor that he will 
exercise a reasonable degree o f care and skill in his treatm ent. I f  in such a case a 
physician does not possess the required degree o f  know ledge or fails to exercise the 
required  degree o f skill and care necessary to diagnose and treat the illness o f his
5* S h eila  M cL ean  and G erry M aher, M ed ic ine . M oral, and the L a w , G ow er, A ld ersh ot 1 9 8 5 , PP.
156-7.
6- Supra c it. note 1 ,S h eila  p. 178.
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patient, he breaches the legal duty described below.
As a response to m ounting external pressure, the GM C is taking on m ore cases of 
"Negligence" or d isregard o f personal responsibility to patients. This is the closest the
7
GMC com es to looking at what is called malpractice in the USA.
6.1 .3  M eaning o f N egligence
In the contem porary general understanding o f negligence, the characteristics are:
[1] a state o f m ind which is opposed to intention;
[2] carelessness o f conduct, and
[3] the breach o f a duty to take care imposed by comm on or statute law.
All o f the above are applied in various situations, and none o f them  om it the other's 
meaning.
Negligence as a state o f m ind N egligence as a state o f m ind is the reverse of 
intention. An act is intentional when it is purposeful and an act is negligent w hen it is
g
done with the desire o f unlaw ful action. An act is negligent when it is done, not with 
the desire  o f  p roducing  a particu lar resu lt, but actually  produces that resu lt by 
carelessness or indifference.
Negligence as careless conduct:- Negligence is often used in the sense o f careless 
conduct w ithout reference to any duty to take care. The use o f the term  in this sense has 
introduced some confusion into the subject, and has tended to obscure the true m eaning 
of negligence.
W hen there is a duty to take care, the standard o f care frequently  is that o f the 
reasonable m an, although this is not alw ays so, and consequently , failure  to take 
reasonable care and negligence are some times used as synonym ous term s regardless o f 
whether or not there is any duty. In this sense negligence is the om ission to do something 
which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
7- M arilynn M . R oseenth al, D ea lin g  w ith M edical M alpractice, T avistock  P ub lications, L ondon  
1987, p. 123.
8- Im perial C h em ica l Industries Ltd. v. S h atw ell [1965] A .C . p. 6 5 6 , se e  Lord R eid s reference at 
p. 6 7 2 .
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conduct o f  hum an affairs, w ould do, o r doing som ething w hich a p ruden t and 
reasonable m an w ould not do.^ The expected level o f professional skill was stated in 
the Court's observations in 1898 case o f Pike v. Hon singer.
A  p h ysician  and surgeon, by taking charge o f  a case, im plied ly represents that h e  p o ssess , and the law  
p laces upon him  the duty o f  p ossessin g , that reasonable degree o f  learning and skill that is ordinarily  
p o ssessed  by physicians and surgeons in the loca lity  where he practices, and w hich  is ordinarily regarded  
by those conversant w ith the em ploym ent as necessary to qualify him  to engage in the business o f  practising  
m ed icine and surgery. U pon consenting to treat a patient it becom es his duty to use reasonable care and 
d iligen ce  in the exerc ise  o f  his sk ill and the application o f  his learning to accom plish  the purpose for w hich  
he w as em p loyed . H e is under the further ob ligation  to use his best judgm ent in exercising his sk ill and 
applying h is know led ge. T he law  holds him  liable for an injury to his patient resulting from want o f  the 
requisite k n ow led ge and sk ill, or the om ission  to exercise reasonable care, or the failure to use h is best 
judgm ent. The rule in relation to learning and sk ill does not require the surgeon to p o ssess that 
extraordinary learning and sk ill w hich belong only to a few  m en o f  rare-endow m ents, but such as is 
p o ssessed  by the average num ber o f  the m edical profession  in good  standing. Still he is bound to keep  
abreast o f  the tim es, and a departure from approved m ethods in general use, if  it injures the patient, w ill 
render him  liab le, h ow ever good  his intentions m ay have been. T he rule o f  reasonable care and d iligen ce  
d oes not require the exerc ise  o f  the h ighest p ossib le  degree o f  care; and to render a physician  and surgeon  
liab le, it is  not enough  that there has been  a less degree o f  care than som e other m edical m an m ight have  
show n, or less  than even  he h im self m ight have bestow ed, but there m ust be a want o f  ordinary and 
reasonable care, leading to a bad result. This includes not on ly the d iagnosis and treatment, but also the 
giv in g  o f  proper instructions to his patient in relation to conduct, exercise  and the use o f  the injured lim b.
T he rule requiring him  to u se  his best judgm ent does not hold him  liab le for a m ere error o f  judgm ent, 
provided  he d oes what he thinks is best after careful exam ination. His im plied  engagem ent w ith his patient 
d oes not guarantee a good  result, but he prom ises by im plication to use the sk ill and learning o f  the average  
p hysician , to exerc ise  reasonable care and to exert h is best judgm ent in the effort to bring about a good
i 10resu lt.
T his s ta tem en t m akes it c lear that the p rofessional standard  is w id er than 
carelessness.
N egligence as breach o f a duty to take c a re :- If a physician does not possess the 
required degree o f know ledge or fails to exercise the required degree o f skill and care 
necessary to diagnose and treat the illness o f his patient, he breaches the legal duty to
9- M argaret B razier, M ed ic in e . P atients and the L aw . H arm ondsw orth, Penguin B o o k s, 1987, 
p. 71 .
10- 155 N .Y . 2 0 1 , 4 9  N .E . 7 6 0 , 7 6 2  [1 8 9 8 ]. A s  quoted from  T om  Health and T he Law . A  H andbook  
for H ealth P rofession a ls N ew  York, Free Press, A  D iv ision  o f  M acm illan Inc. C ollier M acm illan  Publisher,
1982. n. 309.
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take care, im posed by comm on or statute law .11
Such failure or breach o f duty is said to constitute " negligence" and the physician is 
said to be "negligent." This is an accepted use o f these words and is the sense in which 
they will be used in the fo llow ing sections. From  tim e to tim e the term s "negligence 
lawsuit" or "negligence action," are used to describe the entire cause o f action.
It should be understood at the outset that "negligence" as the term  is used in law is 
not necessarily synonymous with "carelessness." Carelessness may constitute negligence 
in a given case, but not all negligence involves carelessness. A physician who lacks the 
required degree o f know ledge or skill m ay be as careful as he can be, but his conduct 
will constitute negligence in the legal sense if  in fact he fails to m eet the m inim um  legal 
standard o f his deficiencies. It is com m on for non-law yers to confuse negligence and 
carelessness and for this reason the distinction is stressed here. A clear grasp o f this 
aspect o f the concept o f negligence is helpful in understanding the holdings o f the courts 
in the specific areas o f negligence.
Thus, in the course o f m edical treatm ent a patient who has been injured by m edical 
negligence in a way which is recognized by the law to lead to an award o f compensation, 
must show a] the defendant owed a duty o f care to the patient, b] the defendant was in 
breach o f that duty, c] the p lain tiff suffered dam ages as a result. As Lord W right has 
pointed out:
'... m ere seq u en ce  o f  cause  and e ffec t is not enough in law  to constitute a cause o f  action  in 
n eg lig en ce , w h ich  is a co m p lex  concept, in vo lv in g  a duty as betw een  the parties to take ca re>as 
w e ll a s a  breach o f  that duty and resulting dam age. 12
This m eans that generally in every negligence suit the p lain tiff bears the burden o f 
dem onstrating all o f  the elem ents outlined. This need not, as in crim inal prosecutions,
11- C lifford  H aw k in s, M ishap  or M alp ractice? P ublished for T he M edical D e fen ce  U n ion ,
B la ck w ell S c ien tif ic  P ub lica tion s, O xford , L ondon 1985 , p. 168.
12- G rant v . A ustralian K nitting M ills Ltd [1936] A . 8 5 ,1 0 1 ,  for further d iscu ssio n , sec  M cL ean  S.
A. M . N e g lig e n c e  - A  D agger  at the D o c to r s  Back? in C .P. R ob son  and P. W atchm an [eds] Justice,
Lord D en n in g  and the C on stitu tion , G ow er, A ldershot 1981 , p. 100.
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be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but simply by preponderance o f the evidence. But if 
the defendant can overcom e this preponderance on any one elem nt the fact that the other 
elements have been satisfied will not matter; the plaintiff will lose.
6.1.4 G eneral N ature o f P h ysic ian ’s D uty to Patient
U nless a special contract has been made by the physician with the patient to effect a
cure, the law does not impose any absolute obligation on the physician to cure or even to
improve the patient's condition. 13The law does create a broad standard o f expected
conduct, how ever, and im poses the duty o f conform ing  to that standard  on any
physician who undertakes to diagnose and treat a patient's illness. The general nature of
this duty is well established. It is the obligation o f the physician to use 'reasonable care"
in all that he does or om its to do with respect to the patient. The usual description o f the
14duty is contained in the case o f Bolam  v. Friem  H. M. C .
T h e  test is  the standard o f  the ordinary sk illed  m an ex ercisin g  and p ro fessin g  to  have that 
sp ecia l sk ill. A  m an need  not p o ssess  the h ighest expert skill; it is w e ll established law  that it is 
su ffic ien t i f  he ex er c ise s  the ordinary sk ill o f  the an ordinary com petent m an ex erc isin g  that 
particu lar art.15
This is the generally accepted legal standard o f reasonable care for the m edical man. 
Like m ost legal ru les, the standard is stated in broad term s and acquires specific 
significance only in the light of its application in particular cases.
Several prelim inary observations m ay be m ade. It should be noted that this legal 
standard is re la ted  d irec tly  to curren t m edical practices and the ex isting  state o f 
knowledge o f the m edical profession. This m eans that the content changes from  time to 
time. C onduct, m ethods and procedures which constituted reasonable care in the past, 
even the recent past, m ay not m eet the legal standard at the present time. Today 's legal 
responsibilities o f the physician are based on today's enlightm ent and experience In 
effect o f the law  requires the physician to keep abreast o f  m odern know ledge and
13- K night, op . c it ., p . 4 9 .
14- B razier, op . c it ., p. 7 1 . c f. [ 1957] 1 W L R  5 8 2 , 5 8 6 ,1 1 8 .
15- B razier, op . c it., p.71
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developm ent in the m edical field and related areas o f learning.
A nother aspect of this legal standard which deserves attention is that at any given 
time it m ay vary from  place to place. ^ I t  is not uniform  throughout the country 
unless the physician adjusted his know ledge to cope with what is available in every 
day perform ance.
This m eans that the standard o f conduct applicable to a physician practising in a 
large city w ith adequate hospital facilities and technical equipm ent m ay be higher than 
that app licab le  to physicians practic ing  in a rem ote rural o r m ountain  area where 
hospital facilities and technical equipm ent are not available. Som etim es a court has to 
decide w hat constitu tes a "sim ilar locality" for the purpose o f applying this legal 
standard.
It sould also be m entioned that the duty set forth in the foregoing legal standard is 
owed by the physician to the patient regardless o f whether the patient is a charity case or 
paying patient. The law m akes no distinction in this respect. If the physician undertakes 
to diagnose a patient's illness or to treat him, the duty to m eet the legal standard arises 
whether the physician does so for a fee o r out o f the goodness o f his heart. A physician 
who responds to a call in a theatre o r w ho stops at the roadside to help an accident 
victim , carries the same burden o f duty as if  he had been expressly hired by the one 
whom  he is trea ting .17
6.1 .5  P roo f o f  N egligence
Since juries have been exem pted from  m edical cases where the contents are too 
technical to be understood by the laym an, so the outcom e m ay lead to bias and 
unfruitful resu lt, but a p la in tiff or defendant has the righ t to be tried  by ju ry  in 
defam ation cases. Juries still operate in Northern Ireland. E ire [Republic o f Ireland] 
Canada and in the U S A .1**
T urning  from  specific exam ples o f negligence on the part o f physicians, one
16- B razier, op . c it ., p .7 5 .
17- M cL ean, o p . c it .,  p. 163.
18- H aw kin , op . c it ., p .166.
1 58
should approach the crucial question o f how negligence is proved in court. This is
perhaps the m ost im portant aspect o f m odern m alpractice law. Recent developm ents
in this area have trem endous adverse poten tiality  for the m edical profession . In
order to understand all the im plications o f these developm ents, it is necessary to
explore some procedural phases o f the m alpractice law su it.19
The question w hether a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a
patient's illness is usually treated in the courts as a "question o f fact." It is ordinarily
the m ost ho tly  con tested  issue in a m alpractice case. Not uncom m only there is
diam etrically opposed testim ony from  witnesses from  the two sides as to what was
said and w hat was done and as to w hat events actually  took place. The parties
them selves often relate highly divergent accounts as to the occurrences involved. In
addition there is alm ost always a sharp dispute as to the ultimate factual conclusion to
be draw n from  the testim ony, nam ely whether the physician breached his duty, that
is, w hether he was negligent.20
The burden o f proving that the physician was negligent rests upon the plaintiff. It is
he who bringing the suit, who is asserting the claim , who is asking the court to shift the
loss from  his shoulders to those o f the physician.21 The law, therefore, requires that he
establish the legal basis for such relief. To sustain this burden, he m ust prove the alleged
negligence by a preponderance o f the credible evidence.
It is not m erely the num ber o f the witnesses or docum ents on one side as against the
num ber on the other. It is rather a m atter o f the quality and persuasive character o f the
evidence, and this factor is som ething that the judge m ust evaluate on the basis o f their
general experience and know ledge o f hum an affairs and hum an nature. O bviously, the
outcom e o f  any such process in a particular case is unpredictable22 In the m ajority o f
J. K. M ason , F orensic  M ed ic in e  for L aw yers [2nd E d .], B utterw orths L ond on  1983 , 33 7 . G .
J. A n nas, op . c it., p. 2 4 3 .
20- T ony  W eir, A  C ase  B o o k  on T ort. [4th E d .], S w eet and M axw ell, L ondon 1 9 79 , p. 194.
21- C hairm an Lord P earson , R o v a l C om m iss ion  On C iv il L iab ility  and C om p en sation  for P ersonal
Injury. C om m an d 7 0 5 4  1 /1 9 7 7 , P .2 0 p a ra . 57 .
22- ib id  p. 154.
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lawsuits a reasonable person can honestly differ as to which w itnesses are telling the 
truth, what weight is to be attached to their testim ony and what conclusions of fact are to 
be d raw n.23
There are two requirem ents which must be m et before a judge m ay direct a verdict. 
It m ust appear that [a] there is no substantial dispute in the evidence as to what events 
actually took place, and [b] the factual conclusion to be drawn from  such evidence [i.e, 
the conclusion as to w hether the physician was or was not negligent] is so clear and 
obvious that reasonable m inds could not differ upon it.
In m alpractice cases, a directed verdict for the plain tiff is rare. A directed verdict 
for the defendant is not uncom m on. Such a direction is given for the defendant where 
the evidence o f  negligence is uncertain or slight, o r w here there is no ev idence o f 
negligence at all.
Therefore, m edicine is at a disadvantage when com pared with other professions. If 
a law yer carelessly  gives an erroneous opinion or accountant w rites an erroneous 
report, m any people besides the client m ay see and act upon it. A very com m on example 
in everyday life is that o f a man who buys a house on the strength o f a surveyor's report 
obtained by the build ing society, which is granting a m ortgage. H ow ever gross the 
negligence m ay be the buyer, since he is not the surveyor's client, has no righ t o f 
redress. W ith a doctor it is otherw ise because, w hether or not the patient is the person 
who retains his services, he is brought into direct contact with him, indeed the consent 
which in law prevents the doctor's action from amounting to a civil assault is conditional 
upon the doctor exercising proper skill and care .24
U nder negligence principles an individual is not necessarily liable for causing harm 
to another. The driver in an autom obile accident for exam ple, is not necessarily liable 
for the dam age caused. He is only liable where he was travelling too fast or with a lack 
of cau tion  o r som ehow  acting negligently ; not for a true accident. S im ilarly , a 
physician, as later sections will dem onstrate, is not necessarily liable for a poor quality
23- op. c it., p. 155.
24- K night, op. c it., p. 4 8 .
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outcom e in delivering m edical care. But he is liable where the conduct is determ ined to 
be m alpractice, i.e. the negligent delivery o f professional services. Indeed the essence o f 
the law o f negligence is determ ining w hether in the circum stances o f the case the harm 
caused  w as a resu lt o f un reasonab le  o r neg ligen t conduct. O nly  under such 
circum stances is liability for damage legally recognized.
U nderstandably , this has proved a com plicated and difficult task for the courts. 
O ver the years, literally  thousands o f cases alleging negligence have been contested, 
requiring the jud ic ia l system  to adjudicate liability  in an alm ost endless variety  of 
situations.25
In a given case therefore, a court may be asked to define and apply the com m on law
principles o f negligence by synthesizing the opinions in dozens o f previous cases. In
other cases, at the other extrem e, the court m ay be forced to define the principles that
are app licab le  to a w holly  unique situation  w hich has never been  p rev iously
considered .26 To do so, the court will in theory 'read' and interpret the com m on law of
its own jurisdiction- m ost negligence cases involve strictly one nation's law although, in
fact, the court can choose [or ignore] interpretations o f the com m on law enunciated in
the decisions o f other jurisdictions, a judicial art that com plicates both judicial decision
m aking and the predictability o f future decisions.
M edical negligence is a com plicated  subject and the liability  o f the docto r w ill
27always depend upon the circum stances. M edical negligence is no different in law 
from any other type o f negligence, apart from  the fact that the courts arguably adopt a 
m ore a sym pathetic  and len ien t view  tow ards the docto r than to o ther types o f 
d e fen d an t.^
A doctor m ay also be held in breach o f contract, if  his professional behaviour falls 
short o f the requirem ents o f any contract between him  and the patient
25- P. B v m e . M ed ic in e  in C ontem porary S o c ie ty : K ing's C o lleg e  S tu dies 198 6 -7 , L ondon 1987 , p. 52.
26- ibid p. 131.
27- ibid 52.
2 8 -Knight op. cit., p. 48.
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A person seeking com pensation for negligence o f any kind m ust prove:
1. that the defendant [doctor] owed a duty of care to the plaintiff [patient]
2. that the defendant was in breach o f that duty
3. that the plaintiff suffered dam age as a result. Negligence is the breach o f the duty 
owed by a doctor to his patient to exercise reasonable care and/or skill,- these rules are 
applicable to other allegations of negligence also .2^
There is no doubt that a duty o f care in this legal sense exists as betw een doctors, 
allied professionals and their patients. 30If the law is to award dam ages to som eone who 
is harm ed, that harm  m ust be proved to have resulted from  a breach o f that legal duty, 
otherwise the law does not impose liability because an accident happens.
To put it in another way, it is not every accident or mishap which will result in legal 
liability for a person doing or om itting to do som ething, even if  injury or harm  ensues. 
An action for dam ages against som eone alleged to have been responsible for an injury 
requires p roof o f the breach o f legal duty.
Som e duties are im posed by statute, but the majority o f duties relevant to the law  of 
negligence ow e their origin and developm ent to the com m on law rule estab lished  
through decided cases.31
6.1 .4  T he P ossib le  N ature o f L iability
T he legal re la tionsh ip  betw een physician  and patien t has been  described
differently  over the centuries since H ippocrates. O riginally, at com m on law , the
m edical profession w as a com m on calling like so m any others, e. g. apothecary ,
innkeeper, and com m on carriers. This m eans that when a doctor practiced m edicine
he was legally bound to show a certain degree of skill in his calling, and if he did not
show this degree o f  skill he w as liable to an action for trespass on the case for 
3 2negligence. H e could, therefore, be sued in tort if  he did not com e up to the
29- M cL ean  and  M aher, op . c it., p. P. 154.
30- E dgar v. L am on t [1914] S. C. 177.
31- J. L. T ay lor, T h e D octor  and the L a w . L ondon, Pitm an 1970 , 105.
32- H . W . S c o tt, P ro fe ssio n a l L ia b ility  P rob lem  in the U n ited  States [1 9 7 7 ] 1 T he M ed ica l Jnl. o f
A netrQliQ f \Q
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standard im posed by the law .W hen the profession o f m edicine began to acquire a
33more defin ite  organization, and with the additional developm ent o f the law  of
contract, the liability of such persons seemed no longer to be founded on tort, but to
34follow from  the contract which they had made.
Thus, it was soon held that the patient’s subm ission to treatm ent was sufficient
point according to adopted principle for the physician 's services. M any term s o f the
contract w ere im plied by the law, e. g. that the doctor possessed and w ould use due
care and skill. The past century and a half has again been dom inated by the tort o f
35negligence, and the behaviour in question is judged  by negligence principles.
Thus, fo r nearly  a century  m ost actions against physicians have been based on 
negligence rather than any other ground. Today the nature o f the civ il liability  of 
physicians is e ither con tractual or tortious, m ostly  based on negligence w here 
negligence has not yet been superseded by a stricter form  o f liab ility  as in certain  
legal developm ents in the United States.36
6.1 .5  T he G rounds for the Physician  L iab ility
M edical decisions can involve risks, and if  anything goes wrong, the patient may die 
or be perm anently  disabled. Im pairm ent or death o f a person from  a physical or m ental 
condition arising in the course o f the physician’s m edical care m ay lead to a civil 
liability. As to the grounds or origins o f the physician 's civil liability  a line m ay be 
drawn between dam age caused by m edical treatm ent not according to the lex artis  and, 
therefore, not according to the skill o f the profession [m alpractice], on the one side, 
and dam age arising in the course o f m edical treatm ent w ithout the patient's inform ed  
consent, on the o th er.37
33- Girard v . R o y a l C olm bian  H ospital [1976J66  D . L. R. 3rd. 6 7 6  [B. C. S . C .].
34- S later  v . B aker 1 9 6 7 /2  W ils  . 3 5 9 , 9 5 , E R. 8 6 0 , W ils  m ean s W ilso n s  K in g's B en ch  R eports  
[9 5 E R ] 174 2 -7 4 .
35- C. R . A . M artin, L aw  R elatin g  to M edical P ra ctic . [2nd Ed.] Pitm an M ed ica l, B e lfa st 1979 ,
P. 27 4 .
36- J. E. M ald on n ad o , 'Strict L iab ility  and Inform ed C onsent' 9  A kron L. R e v . 6 0 9  [1976].
37- D . G ie se n , C iv il  L ia b ility  o f  P h y sic ia n  w ith  R egard  to N e w  M eth o d s o f  T rea tm en t and
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6.2 Illu stration s o f M alpractice
1. Physicians may owe to their patients a duty in contract as well as in tort. It is 
expected o f such a professional m an that he should show a fair, reasonable and a 
com petent degree o f skill.38 Skill is that special com petence which is not part o f the 
ordinary equipm ent o f the reasonable man - that excellent but odious character- but 
the result o f  aptitude developed by special training and experience. In other words, 
those who undertake a task calling for special skill m ust not only exercise reasonable 
care but m ust m easure up to the standard o f proficiency that can be expected from  
persons o f that p rofession .39
If a physician or surgeon holds him self out as a specialist a higher degree o f skill 
is requ ired  o f him  than one w ho does not profess to be so qualified  by special 
training and ability. Failure to display this skill and care, so that wrong treatm ent is 
given o r proper treatm ent is om itted, constitutes negligence. U nskillful treatm ent 
may be found either in carrying out some treatm ent or in om itting it. The carrying 
out o f treatm ent can be malpractice if  it is done w ithout the proper and reasonable 
standard o f skill, care, and com petence o f the m edical profession. The om ission o f 
som e treatm ent m ay be m alpractice  if  the treatm ent ought to have taken place 
according to the proper and reasonable standards o f the profession.40
Thus, m edical treatm ent or an operation m ay only be carried out on the grounds 
of m edical d iagnosis. The patient can at the tim e of d iagnosis dem and that the 
physician m akes use o f all those sources o f knowledge at his disposal the application 
o f w hich is possib le, bearing in m ind the state o f m edical science and the m eans 
available41 and that they expose the patient to no serious new  danger. The patient 
can likewise dem and that the physician applies the m ost m odern m eans available and
E xperim ents [1 9 7 6 ] 25  I .C .L .O . 180.
38- R v. B atem an \ 1925194 L .J .K .B .7 9 1 .
39- M ahon v . O sborne [1 9 3 9 ]2  K. B . 14.
4 0 - R . J. Schm idm an , 'The L ega l M alpractice D ilam a' 4 5  U n iv . C in. L. R ev . 541 [1 9 7 6 ].
41- W hiteford  v. H unter [1950] C. L. C. 68 4
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that he takes into consideration all, even rem ote, possibilities of damage.
If, as a resu lt o f  inadequate  specialist know ledge in a particu lar fie ld  o f 
knowledge, a practitioner feels unable to diagnose he m ust then refrain from  treating 
the patient h im self and either him self consult a specialist o r put pressure  on the 
patient to go to a specialist or hospital for treatm ent.42
The rule for all skilled professions, including the m edical profession, is clearly 
stated in an im portant Canadian decision. That is: "if your position im plies skill you 
must use it; i f  you do not have that skill, or if  having that skill you nevertheless 
perform  your w ork negligently, you are liable, for a person holding him self out to 
do certain  w ork im pliedly w arrants that he possesses the com petence to perform  
it.-43
It is o f course not possible to give any universal answ er to the question o f  how 
m uch tim e a physician should spend considering a doubtful diagnosis in order to 
arrive at a clear conclusion. If  the illness presents am biguous characteristics, if 
necessary through study o f the relevant literature or else in some other way, e.g. by 
seeking a second opinion, he must provide an explanation o f its possible origins and 
of the m ethod o f investigation to be applied. In the United States the duty placed on 
the physician to exercise care in all that he does has been extended to include a duty to 
warn third parties o f a serious danger from  a patient under treatm ent.44
H ow  thorough the ensuing inform ation m ust be on the possible dangers o f the 
treatm ent o r operation  is really  governed, even in such treatm ents or operations 
where the aim  is diagnostic, by the physician who, bearing in m ind his obligations, 
then form s a ju d g m en t in each individual case. C orrespondingly  the judge w ill 
examine the case only on the basis o f the circumstances at the time of the treatm ent or
42- V ail v. M ac D on ald  [1976J66  D . L. R. 3rd 530 .
43- G ray v . L a fle c h c  [ 19 50] 1 D .L .R . 3 3 7 .[M a n  K .B .] I f a doctor  h o ld s h im se lf  ou t as a sp ec ia lis t  a 
higher d egree  o f  sk ill is  required o f  him  than o f  o n e  w h o  d o es  not p ro fess  to b e  so  q u a lified  by sp ecia l 
training and  ab ility .
44- A lan  A . S to n e . 'T he T a ra so ff D e c is io n s , Su ing  P sychotherap ists to Safeguard  S oc iety ' 9 0  H arv-L . 
Rgv. 35 8  [1976J77.
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operation. According to law one m ust however, still take into consideration the fact 
that every treatm ent or operating risk to which a patient is asked to subm it needs to 
be ju stified  by the benefits w hich it is hoped this treatm ent o r opera tion  w ill 
b ring .45
In some cases, where there is only a rem ote possibility o f injury no precautions 
need be taken but one m ust guard against reasonable possib ilities, no t fantastic 
possibilities. H ow ever, this m eans no m ore than that if the risk is very slight indeed 
the physician m ay have behaved reasonably though he did nothing to prevent the 
harm .46
If his act was one for which there was in any case no justification he m ay still be
liable so long only as the risk o f dam age to the patient is not such that a reasonable
man w ould brush it aside as far-fetched. Theoretically at least, in every case where a
duty o f care exists the courts m ust consider whether the risk was sufficiently great to
require o f the physician  m ore than he has actually  done.47 But it is all the more
necessary to m ention even the m ore rem ote risks o f com plication in a case where
confident expectations o f cure or perhaps complete recovery cannot be justified , and
justified to the patient's satisfaction. For this reason particularly exacting dem ands
must be m ade on the inform ation given about risks in operations which, rather than
directly  serv ing  to  cure the illness, m erely further the d iagnosis, and thus the
medical understanding o f the illness and its therapy 48
The decisive question o f what standard o f skill and care is to be applied m ust be
answered according to the knowledge o f medical science at the time o f the treatm ent.
It is notable that in m ost professions each generation convicts its p redecessors o f
ignorance and that there is a steady rise in the standard  o f  com petence. The
physician fo r instance m ust exercise such skill as accords with the standards o f
45- L lo v d s B ank Ltd v. R a ilw a y  E x ecu tiv e  [1952] 1 A ll E .R . 1248 , at p. 1253 per D en n in g  L.J.
46- L loyd s B ank, supra cit.
47- H ucks v. C o le  [1968] 118 N e w  L J  4 6 9  [per Lord D enn ing M. R .].
48- M arshall v . L in d sev  C on n tv  C o u n cil. [ 193511 K. B . 5 4 0  that a defendan t charged  w ith  n e g lig e n c e  
can clear h im se lf  i f  he sh o w s that he acted  in accordance w ith the general and approved practice.
1 6 6
reasonably com petent medical men at the tim e49 and, if he actually has or claim s to 
have greater than average knowledge o f any treatm ent, operation and inherent risks, 
he may be obliged to take m ore than average precautions, but certainly he is not an 
insurer against every accidental s lip .50
H e m ust keep h im self reasonably  up to date and cannot ju s t obstinately  and 
pigheadedly carry on with the same old technique if it has been proved to be contrary 
to what is really substantially the whole o f inform ed m edical opinion.51 Physicians 
are required then, to exercise that degree o f care and skill expected o f a reasonably 
com petent p rac titio n er in his specia lty  acting  in the sam e w ay or s im ila r 
circum stance.52
On the o ther hand he is not negligent if  he acts in accordance w ith a practice 
accepted at the tim e as proper by a reasonable body o f m edical opinion skilled in the 
particular form  o f treatm ent even though there is a com petent body o f professional 
opinion which m ight adopt a different technique.53 A defendant physician charged
with negligence can- then at least prim a facie  -clear him self if  he shows that he acted 
in accordance w ith general and approved  practice. The physic ian 's  action o f 
yesterday is not judged  in the light o f what no one knew  until to d ay .54 An exam ple 
of this c ircum stances m ay be found in the E nglish case of  Roe v. M inistry  o f 
Health.55
49- B o lam  v. F riem  H o s. M an agem en t C om m ittee  1958/1  W .L .R . 582; [1957J2  A ll E .R . 118; R o e  v. 
M inistry o f  H ealth [1 9 5 4 ] 2 Q .B . 66 .
50- H o lm es et a l. v . B oard o f  H osp ita l T rustees o f  C ity o f  L ond on  et a l . [1 9 7 8 ]8 1  D .L .R . 3rd. p . 6 7 , a 
doctor is n o t insurer, K apar v . M arshall [1978J85  D .L .R .3rd  56 6 .
51- B olam  v. F riem  H os. M anagem ent C om m ittee  supra cit.
52- B olam  v. F riem  H os. M anagem en t C om m ittee  supra cit.
53- Hunter v. H anley  [1955] S. C. 20 0 .
54- Scott. 'Personal L ia b ility  P rob lem  in the U .S ' lo c . cit.
55' R oe  v. M in istry o f  H ealth supra cit.
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6.3 T he D uty o f R easonable Care  
H ospital N egligence:
Tw o patients in hospital were operated on on the same day. 56Both operations 
were o f a m inor character and in each case a spinal anaesthetic, nam ely nupercaine, 
was injected by means o f lum bar puncture by a specialist anaesthetist assisted by the 
theatre s ta ff o f the hospital. The nupercaine had been contained in sealed glass 
am poules w hich had been stored in a solution o f phenol. A fter the operations both 
patients developed severe sym ptom s o f spastic paraplegia resu lting  in perm anent 
paralysis from  the w aist down.
In an action for dam ages for personal injuries against the M inistry o f Health as a 
successor in title to the trustees o f the hospital, and against the anaesthetist, the 
plain tiffs relied  on the docto r o f res ipsa loquitur [the thing speaks for itself]- 
inasm uch as the injuries which they had sustained did not norm ally follow  a spinal 
anaesthetic properly adm inistered.57
H eld, "[1] that w here an object or operation is under the control o f two persons 
not in law  responsible for the acts o f each other, the doctrine o f res ipsa loquitor 
cannot apply to e ither person since the res, if  it speaks o f negligence, it does not 
speak o f negligence against either person individually.
Held, [2] that the hospital, although responsible in law to the plaintiffs for the acts 
for their em ployees, the theatre staff, was not so responsible fo r the acts o f  the 
anaesthetist w here the specialist was in a position com parable with that o f a visiting 
surgeon or physician for whose acts a hospital does not assume responsibility in law.
Held, [3] that the plaintiffs' claims failed against both defendants, since [a] the
hospital had discharged its duty by supplying a com petent anaesthetist and a trained
theatre staff; and [b] it had been established by the evidence that the p lain tiffs '
injuries w ere in fact caused by the injection o f nupercaine contam inated by phenol
which could have occured by percolation through "invisible cracks" or m olecular
56" ibid p .66 .
57- id.
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flaws in the glass am poules containing the nupercaine, since there were no positive 
proved facts from  which a legitim ate inference could be drawn as to the am ount o f 
phenol which had in fact percolated in to the am poules."58
In those circum stances neither the anaesthetist nor the theatre staff could  be 
guilty o f negligence in law in failing to apply a differential colour test which m ight 
have disclosed a risk which, in com m on with m any other anaesthetists, he did not 
appreciate as a possibility.
The judge passed  his judgm ent, stating.... "on the standard o f a reasonably  
com petent anaesthetist in 1947, he cannot be blamed for so acting. It would be quite 
wrong to find Dr. G raham  guilty o f negligence in law for not adopting a technique 
which m ight have disclosed the presence o f a risk which he in com m on with m any 
other com petent anaesthetists did not appreciate as a possiblity."59
"Furtherm ore, the conclusion that it is not possible by legitim ate inference from  
proved facts to say that the quantity o f phenol in fact introduced can only have com e 
in by invisible cracks, it would be wrong to find that the cracks, if  any through which 
the phenol percolated  were caused by negligence on the part o f the theatre staff. 
None o f the experim ents as to form ation o f cracks in am poules w hether visib le or 
invisible lead to the conclusion that invisible cracks m ust be caused by, or can only 
reasonably be attributed to, rough handling by the theatre staff."60
In the result therefore, the plaintiffs' claim s failed both against the hospital and 
Dr. G raham , and when delivering his judgm ent Lord Justice D enning 's im portant 
statement o f legal policy and principle on medical issues said:
"It is  so  easy to be w ise  after the event and to condem n as n eg ligen ce  that w hich  w as only  
m isadventure. W e ought alw ays to be on our guard against it, especia lly  in cases against hosp ita ls and 
doctors. M edica l sc ien ce  has confered great benefits on mankind, but these benefits are attended by  
unavoidable risks. Every surgical operation is attended by risks. W e can not take the benefits w ithout taking 
the risks. Every advance in techniques is also attended by risks. D octors lik e the rest o f  us have to learn by 
experience; and exp erien ce often teaches in a hard way.*0
58- ibid 6 7 .
59- ibid p . 93 .
6 0 -id.
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H ow ever it is worth noting that to the judgm ent, Lord M cIntosh had published a 
specialist book on this subject. Had that "Medical Literature" book been to hand in 1947, 
the anaesthetist might well have found him self a different position, that is to say that it 
follows that the defence in R oe 's case would not now necessarily be likely to succeed.
6.4 G eneral T ort L iability  P rinciples
A tort is a wrongful act that is not based on a violation o f contract. Tort liability 
is alm ost alw ays based on fault; that is, som ething was done wrongly or som ething 
that should have been done was not. This act or om ission can be intentional o r can 
result from  negligence. There are some exceptions to the requirem ent o f fault where 
there is strict liability for all consequences o f certain activities regardless o f fault.62
6.4 .1  In ten tional T orts
Intentional tort includes assault and battery, defam ation, false im prisonm ent, 
invasion o f privacy and the intentional infliction o f em otional distress.63
6 .4 .2  A ssau lt and battery
An assault is an action that puts someone in apprehension o f being touched in a 
m anner that is insulting o r physically injurious without law ful authority or consent. 
Assault or battery can occur in other circum stances, such as in attem pts to detain 
patients who are com petent and oriented without lawful authority .64
6.4 .3  D efam ation
D efam atio n  is w rong fu l in ju ry  to ano ther pe rso n 's  rep u ta tio n . W ritten  
defam ation is called  libe l  and spoken defam ation is called slander. A cla im  o f 
defam ation can arise from  inappropriate release o f inaccurate m edical records or 
from untruthful statem ents about other m em bers o f the staff.65
61- R o e  v . M inistry o f  H ealth supra cit.
62- J. D . F inch , H ealth S erv ice  L a w . L ondon, S w eet & M axw ell 1981, p. 79 .
63- M artin, op . cit. at p .337 .
64- ib id  at p. 3 3 3 .
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6 .4 .4  N egligen t T ort
The m ost frequent basis for liability o f health professionals and hospitals is the 
negligent tort. H ow ever, negligence by itse lf is not enough to establish  liability. 
There m ust be an injury caused by the negligence. Everyone m akes negligent errors, 
and often no in jury  is caused. There are four elem ents that m ust be proven to 
establish liability for negligent to rts:66
These are:
1. "It m ust be shown that the defendant ow ed the p lain tiff a duty to act in a 
particular way.
2. The plain tiff m ust prove that the defendant fa iled  to leve up to the duty ow ed 
the plaintiff.
3. It m ust be show n that the p la in tiff  has suffered rea l harm, o f  a type 
recognisable.
4. the p la in tiff m ust dem onstrate that the defendant's breach o f duty was the 
actual cause o f the harm suffered by the plaintiff."67
These principles o f negligence are basic elements to m alpractice suit.
Furtherm ore, em ployers can be liable for the consequence o f their em ployees' 
job- related acts w hether or not the em ployer is at fault. This legal doctrine is called 
respondeat superior, which means "let the m aster answer." U nder this doctrine, the 
em ployer can be liable for any consequence o f an em ployee’s activities within the 
course o f em ploym ent for which the em ployee could be liable. The em ployer need 
not have done any thing wrong. Thus, for example, if  a nurse em ployed by a hospital 
injures a patient by giving the wrong medication, the hospital can be liable even if the 
nurse w as p ro p erly  se lec ted , p roperly  tra ined , and p roperly  assigned  the 
responsibility .68
65- J. L . T aylor, T he D octor  and T he L a w , L ondon, P itm an B o o k s Ltd. 1982 , 101.
66 - ibid atp  117.
67- T om  C hristoffel, H ealth and T he Law A Handbook for Health P rofessionalsN ew  Y ork, free press, A  D iv ision  
o f M acm illan  Inc. C ollier  M acm illan  Publisher 1982, P. 308.
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The supervisor is not the em ployer. Since the supervisor is an em ployee, this 
doctrine does not im pose liability on the superior. Supervisors are liable only for the 
consequences o f their own acts or om issions. O f course the em ployer can also be 
liable for those acts or om issions under the doctrine.
"The liability o f the em ployer under the doctrine 'respondeat superior' is for the 
benefit o f the person w ho is injured, not for the benefit o f the em ployee." 69 The 
liability o f the em ployer does not mean that the employer m ust provide the employee 
with liability  protection. It m eans that the person who is injured can sue either the 
em ployee or the em ployer or both.
It has already been noted that a num ber o f factors must be established if  an action 
in negligence is to succeed, namely the existence of a duty o f care, breach o f that duty 
and the relationship between the breach and the subsequent harm [that is, the elem ent 
of causation]. These m erit further consideration.
W hen a claim  is m ade, the first elem ent that m ust be proved is duty. D uty has 
two aspects. F irst it m ust be proved that a duty was ow ed to the person harm ed. 
Second, the scope of that duty must be established.70
In general the com m on law does not im pose a duty on individuals to com e to the 
rescue o f  persons fo r w hom  they have no other responsib ility . For exam ple, an 
individual w alking dow n the street has no legal obligation to com e to the aid o f a 
heart attack v ictim - unless 1] the victim  is the ind iv idual's dependent; 2] the 
individual contributed to cause o f the heart attack ; 3] the individual owns or operates 
the p rem ises w here the attack occurred; or 4] the ind iv idual has a contractual 
obligation to com e to the person's aid, for example, by being on duty as a m em ber o f 
a public em ergency  care team . In m ost situations involving a hospital's potential 
liability, it is not difficult to establish a duty based on the adm ission o f the patient to 
the hospital. Som etim es however, there may be a question concerning w hether there
68- M ason  and M cC all Sm ith , op . c it . . , p. 164.
69- ib id  p. 164.
70- M a son , op. c it., 33 7 .
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was a duty to a patient who sought care but was not adm itted. In cases w here a 
relationship is betw een an individual doctor and patient, the duty arises on agreement 
to treat, irrespective o f w ho sum m onedthe doctor.71
A fter the existence o f a duty is established, the second aspect, the scope o f the 
duty, m ust be established. This is sometimes is called the obligation to conform  to the 
standard o f  care. The standard  o f  care fo r hospita ls is usually  the degree o f 
reasonable care the patient's apparent condition requires.
E arly  cases sought to distinguish  betw een a contract o f serv ice, for w hose 
negligence the authority was vicariously responsible, and honorary staff em ployed 
under contracts for services, for w hom  they w ere not. A discussion o f the cases 
illustrates how, from  this artificial position, hospital au thorities w ere gradually  
assim ilated  into the m ain body o f law , in the eyes o f w hich they are ju s t as 
responsib le  for the negligence o f their staff, w hole or part tim e, as any o ther 
em ployer.
The p rin c ip le  o f  exem p ting  hosp ita l from  liab ility  fo r the p ro fessiona l 
negligence o f m edical staff was applied in E vans v. L iverpoo l C o rp o ra tio n .72 
where a patient, d ischarged from  an isolation hospital w hile still infectious, had 
infected o ther m em bers o f his fam ily. It was held that the p laintiff, the patient's 
father, was not entitled to recover. The hospital authority's legal obligation extended 
only to the provision o f reasonably skilled and competent staff and not to liability for 
the negligence o f such staff. The principle was again applied in H illver v. G overnors 
of St. B artholom ew ’s H osp ita l.73 In this case the court ru led  that the governors 
were not liable fo r a bum  sustained from  a hot w ater container in the operating 
theatre. The governors undertook that the patient should be treated 'only by experts, 
whether surgeons, physicians, or nurses o f whose professional com petence they had 
taken reasonable care to assure them selves.'74 They were not liable for physicians,
71- Ed^ar v . L a m o n t. supra cit.
72- E van s v . L iv erp o o l C orporation . [1906] 1 K. B . 160.
73- H illv er  v. G overnors o f  St. B artholom ew 's H ospital. [1 9 0 9 ]2  K. B . 820 .
74- ibid at p. 8 80 .
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surgeons, or anaesthetists w hether em ployed by the hospital or not. N urses and
others, w ithin the sphere o f their adm inistrative and m inisterial duties, were servants
of the hospital authority, but for the purposes o f an operation they were servants of
75the surgeon, insofar as they were under his orders.
6.4 .5  The Scope o f the Duty o f Care
W hether or not there is an organisation or institution which m ight share liability 
because o f its relationship to the doctor, the extent o f any duty o f care can be 
illustratedby  reference  to the responsib ilities o f the ind iv idual doctor. Indeed 
identifyingthe scope o f the doctor's duties to his patient, in concrete term s, can be 
very difficult, and m ay not satisfy the patient's expectations. An exam ple m ay be 
found in the case o f Craw ford v. Board o f Governors o f Charing Cross H osp ita l.76
In this case, a patient developed brachial palsy during a blood transfusion.lt was 
alleged that an anaesthetist was negligent, and that he had failed to read an article in 
'The L ancet' som e six m onths previously , w hich pointed to the dangers o f the 
procedure used. The p lain tiff was adm itted to the hospital for a bladder operation 
which required the p laintiff to be placed on an operating table in a position whereby 
the table was so inclined that the p la in tiffs  head and shoulders w ere p laced in a 
position lower than his pelvis. H is left arm was extended at right angles to his body 
and secured in that position so that a blood transfusion could be given during the 
operation. A fter the operation it was found that the arm  which had been so extended 
was partially  paralysed. It was allegedthat the physician should have read the article 
and therefore avoidedthe harm.
The question is really whether one article in ,The Lancet' is enough to change an 
orthodox practice. O f course it is undeniable that the physician should keep him self 
up to date regard ing  m atters relevant to his profession. He m ight be expected to 
follow  the professional journals, though sim ilarly he cannot be supposed to read
75- M artin, op . c it .., p. 3 8 0 .
76- C raw ford v . B oard o f  G overnors o f  Charing C ross H osp ita l, 'The T im es' 8 D ecem b er , 1953  [C A j.
1 74
every thing concerning his profession.
The anaesthetist against w hom  negligence was being alleged had not read the 
article in question. The Court o f Appeal finally was in favour o f the anaesthetist, 
Lord Denning stated that:
It w ou ld  I think, be putting too high a burden on a m edical man to say that he has to read every  
article appearing in the current m edical press; and it w ould  be quite w rong to suggest that a m edical man is 
n eg ligen t because he d oes not at on ce  put into operation the suggestions w hich  som e contributor or other 
m ight m ake in a m edical journal. T he tim e m ay com e in a particular case w hen a new  recom m endation  m ay
be so w ell proved and so w ell know n, and so w ell accepted that it should be adopted, but that w as not so in
I T  this case.
The claim  failed, therefore, as failure to read one recent article was not negligent. 
An appropriate declaration o f the norm  is to be found in a recent statute, the Congenital 
Disabilities [ Civil Liability] Act 1976.
" The defendant is not answerable for any thing he did or om itted to do when acting 
in a responsible professional capacity in treating or advising the patient, if  he took 
reasonab le  care having  due regard  to the p rofessional opinion applicable  to the 
particular class o f case, but this does not m ean that he is answ erable only because he 
departed from  accepted opinion." [s. 1 {5}].
One o f the m ost im portant recent cases on m edical negligence is the W hitehouse v. 
Jordan.78 This was a claim  against an obstetrician. A fter the m other had been in labour 
for 22 hours the defendant decided to carry out a test to ascertain w hether forceps could 
assist the delivery. He allegedly pulled too long and too hard up to six tim es w ith the 
forceps, and then fearing  for the safety o f the m other and child  he carried  out a 
caesarean section quickly and com petently, though the baby was born with severe brain 
damage because o f the use o f forceps. The baby's head had becom e w edged or stuck in 
the birth canal because o f the use o f the forceps and forceps were required  to m ove it. 
The judge at the original trial found the obstetrician negligent and awarded dam ages of
£100,000 accord ingly .79
77. id.
78- W hitehouse  v . Jordan [1980] 1 A ll ER . 650 .
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The C ourt o f A ppeal reversed the decision by a m ajority  o f tw o to one . Lord 
Denning decided on the evidence that the dam age was," one o f those unfortunate things 
which happen in the best hospitals despite all care. The law has to allow for errors o f 
judgm ent, if  indeed there was one here," else there w ould be a danger in all cases of 
p rofessional m en o f their being m ade liable w henever som ething w ent w rong." If 
medical m en are to be found liable whenever they do not effect a cure- or w henever any 
thing untow ard happens it w ould be a great disservice not only to the profession itself 
but to society at large." 80 His Lordship referred to the frequent m edical m alpractice 
cases in A m erica and the enorm ous sums o f m oney awarded there by juries with every 
sym pathy for the patien t and none for the doctor. The resu lt is that "experienced 
practitioners refuse to treat patients for fear o f being accused o f  negligence, in the 
interests o f all we m ust avoid such consequences. The courts m ust say firm ly that in a 
professional m an, an error o f judgem ent is not negligent." 81 In the event, the H ouse o f 
Lords agreed that on a proper view all the evidence pointed to com petent judgem ent and 
indeed to first class m edical care.82
But they severely criticised the reasoning o f the m ajority o f the Court o f Appeal. In 
particular, they stressed their strong disagreem ent with any suggestion that the concept 
of "error o f judgm ent" was a separate category which could not am ount to negligence.
T heir Lordships' decision is o f general im portance because it confirm s the Bolam  
test and thus em phasises that a doctor has the sam e duty o f care as any other 
professionally skilled person.
In refusing com pensation in the court o f Appeal Lord Denning drew  attention to the 
risks o f defensive m edicine. It is doubtful however, w hether the com parison betw een 
British and Am erican practice is a valid one.
79- W h iteh o u se  v . Jordan, at p. 6 5 2 .
80- ibid at p . 6 5 8 .
81- id.
82- ib id  p .6 6 6 .
83- B o la m  v. F riem  H . M . C .. supra cit.
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In A m erica dam ages are assessed by juries rather than by judges, as occasionally, 
though rarely, in Britain. Juries are m uch m ore sym pathetic to the in jured and have 
equally little regard either for the rules o f law in hard cases or the conventional scales of 
awards. They know  how ever that the aw ard m ust be increased  to m eet the injured 
party 's law yer's fees. Quite contrary to British practice, these are assessed in A m erica 
on a contingency basis. There m ay be nothing to pay if the claim  is lost, but perhaps a 
third or m ore o f the takings if  it is won.
But even if  we accept im m ediatly the profound distinction betw een negligence and 
m isadventure [which from  the division o f opinion was evidently not com pletely clear in 
W hitehousel we m ust recognize that while the distinction benefits the m edical profession 
it achieves nothing w hatever for the injured innocent victim s o f such m isadventure.84
W hile in the m ajority o f cases the p laitiff m ust prove negligence and the doctor is 
not called on to prove his innocence, there m ay be som e situations w here the burden 
shifts to the doctor. There is a general ru le o f the law  o f  negligence that w here the 
defendant is in com plete control o f the relevant events, and an accident happens which 
does not norm ally  happen if  p roper care is taken, then the accident itse lf affords 
reasonable evidence o f negligence. The defendant will be held liable unless he can 
advance an explanation o f the accident consistent with the exercise o f p roper care by 
h im 85
In addition, there are certain circum stances in which the plain tiff receives assistance 
in fastening liability on the defendant for a negligent act. This is when the ru le o f res 
ipsa loquitur [the thing speaks for itself] applies.
The burden o f p roof in an action for dam ages for negligence rests prim arily  on the 
plaintiff. If  he fails to satisfy the court by evidence that the defendant was negligent and 
that the in ju ry  o r loss fo r w hich he claim s dam ages w as a d irec t resu lt o f  that 
negligence, the p la in tiffs  claim  will fail.
An exception to the general rule that the onus o f proof o f the alleged negligence falls
84- W h iteh o u se  v. Jordan, dupra c it .
85- Supra n ote  9 , M argaret a tp .7 0 . S e e  Barnett v. C helsea & K ensington H M  C [1969] 1 Q . B . 4 28 .
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upon the p lain tiff occurs how ever when the facts established are such that the proper 
and natural inference to be drawn therefrom  is that the injury or loss com plained o f was 
caused by the defendant's negligence and no reasonable alternative explanation can be 
given. To these cases the legal maxim  res ipsa loquitur applies.
In cases where this doctrine is applicable, a presum ption of fault is raised against the 
defendant who, to succeed in his defence, m ust show that the act com plained o f could 
reasonably happen w ithout negligence on his part. In other w ords, the onus o f p roof 
shifts from  the p lain tiff to prove positively that the defendant was negligent, to the 
defendant to dem onstrate that some other equally likely cause outside his control was 
responsible for the dam age suffered by the p lain tiff.86 The application o f  the doctrine 
res ipsa loquitur is well illustrated by the case o f Cassidv v. M inistry o f H ealth .87 The 
plain tiff w as operated upon for D upuytren's contracture o f the third and fourth fingers 
of his left hand. A fter the operation the patient's left hand and forearm  w ere bandaged 
to a splint w hich w as kep t in p lace fo r 14 days. D uring  th is period  the patien t 
com plained o f pain in his hands but apart from  the adm inistration o f sedatives no other 
action was taken.
W hen the bandage was rem oved it was discovered that all four fingers o f the patients 
hand were stiff and that the hand was to all intents and purposes useless. The M inistry 
denied negligence and liability for the surgeon under whose care the patient had been. In 
the court o f  first instance, judgm ent was given for the M inistry on the ground that the 
patient had failed  to establish negligence on the part o f the surgeon or o f any other 
m em ber o f the hospital staff.
The patient appealed.The court o f appeal held that the m ere p roof o f the facts 
would cause a reasonable laym an to draw  the inference that the injury could have 
been caused only by want o f care on the part o f the hospital staff and that it was 
sufficient to call for an explanation from  the defendant. All the judges agreed that 
res ipa loquitur applied and as a result the appeal was successful and the plaintiff was
86- M ason  & M cC all Sm ith , op. c it., p. 176.
81- C assidv  v. M in istry o f  H ealth 1951 K .B . 346.
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awarded dam ages.
Lord D enning s a id ," If the p laintiff had to prove that some particular doctor or 
nurse was negligent, he w ould not be able to do it. B ut he w as not put to that 
im possible task."88
In certain circum stances, negligence as defined above is self evident e.g. there
has clearly been negligence if  a pair o f forceps is left in the abdom en and the patient
is thereby subjected to a second operation. The doctrine o f res ipsa loquitur m ight
then operate and it w ould be for the doctor to prove that he was not responsible or to
dem onstrate extenuating fac to rs.89
D enning L J expressed the view o f the plaintiff. "I went into hospital to be cured of
two stiff fingers. I have com e out with four stiff fingers and one hand is useless. That
90would not have happened if due care had been used. Explain it if  you can."
O ther exam ples o f the application o f the doctrine are to be found in these generally 
known as the swab cases. In the locus classicus on this point, the decision in M ahon v. 
Osborne91 a swab was left inside the patient, and the surgeon was sued. The m easure of 
the responsib ility  o f the professional m an with special reference to the surgeon was 
clearly stated by Lord Goddard who said:
"The surgeon is in com m and o f the operation, so it is for him  to decide what 
instruments, swabs and the like are to be used, and it is he who uses them. The patient, or 
if he dies, his representatives, can know nothing about the m atter. There can be no 
possible question that the swabs or instrum ents are ordinarily left in the patient’s body. 
If therefore, a sw ab is left in, it seem s clear that the surgeon is called  upon for an 
explanation. That is, he is called upon to show, not necessarily why he m issed it, but that
QOhe exercised due care to prevent its being left there.
This w ould lead the court to expect the surgeon to show a degree o f skill which
92- ibid at p 365 .
89- M ahon v . O sborne [1 9 3 9 ]2  K. B . 14, 50.
90- C assid y , supra c it. at 36 5 .
91- supra cit.
92- ibid p. 365.
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would be shown by the reasonably com petent professional man.
In the case o f U rrv v. B ie re r93 a pack was left in a patient's abdom en after an 
operation. It w as adm itted that there was an error in the counting o f the swabs on the 
part o f the theatre sister. It was adm itted that the surgeon was entitled to rely on the 
sister's count o f  the swabs, but the judge found that it was not in accordance with any 
proved practice. He held that they were both equally responsible for the pack being left 
in the body.
T he surgeon appealed although no convincing reason appeared. The court o f appeal
considered a surgeon w ho discarded such safeguards placed an additional burden upon
him self to take precautions, in o ther respects to ensurethat all packsw ere rem oved. 
94Urrv v. B ierer indicated that a surgeon's duty to ensure that no swabs had been left
was independent o f a nurse's duty o f counting. He m ust enquire " by direct question to
the person concerned"95 in the counting, whose answer m ust satisfy him  that no swabs,
packs, dressings, instrum ents, etc. have been left behind, and he m ust satisfy the court
96that he obtained that assurance. In Jam es v. Dunlop the court appeared to accept that 
it was the surgeon's duty to search by feeling, i.e. by touch, within the body cavity, but 
Lord G oddard, in M ahon v. O sborne.97 did not consider a general rule was being laid 
down. L ord G oddard also considered the question and answ er essential. "If he [i.e. the
surgeon] om itted to ask the nurse if  the count was r ig h t  he would be om itting a very
necessary p r e c a u t i o n . I n  U rrv v. B ie re r. per Pearson J., "the sister's count is a 
secondary thing, a check on the adequacy o f som ething the surgeon had already 
done"99
"Swab Case" principles apply equally to any foreign body which som eone has failed
93‘ T he T im es, 15 Jan, 1955 [CA ].
94 -id.
99- id.
96- [1931] Bri. M ed . J. i 73 0 .
97‘ M ahon v. O sborne, supra cit.
98- ib id  at p. 5 3 5 .
99- id.
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to rem ove, such as throat packs, forceps, and, under som e circum stances, buried
sutures. In a dentistry case a pack obstructed respiration causing the death o f the patient
by asphyxia and the defendant was held to have been negligent in using a throat pack
which was too short.100
N egligence also has been defined  by M cN air J. in B olam  v. F riern  H ospital
M anagem ent C om m ittee .101 This case is fundam ental to the issues o f both negligence
and consent. This was an action where the p laintiff failed in a claim  for dam ages for
injury in the course o f an operation. He alleged the injuries were due to negligence, and
also alleged negligent failure to warn him  o f the risk o f injury. M cN air, J., in his
sum m ing up took substantially  the sam e line as the court o f Appeal in C raw ford  v.
1 0 9Board o f G overnors o f Charing Cross H ospital. In  Bolam the plaintiff was suffering 
from m ental illness and was advised to undergo electro-convulsive therapy. He signed a 
consent form  but w as not w arned about the risk o f fracture which could be involved in 
such a treatm ent w hen no relaxant drugs were used. The treatm ent, which was given in 
1954, resulted  in disastrous consequences for plaintiff. The electro-convolsive therapy 
proceeded w ithout the use o f relaxant drugs., and he sustained severe injuries to his hips 
and pelvis.
The p lain tiffs action for damages against the hospital and the m edical staff in charge 
of his treatm ent was unsuccessful. In giving judgm ent Mr. Justice M cN air explained the 
legal position o f the practitioner who adopts one practice, approved by other com petent 
p rofessionals.103
A  doctor is not gu ilty  o f  n eg lig en ce  i f  he has acted in accordance w ith practice accepted  as
proper b y  a resp o n sib le  b od y  o f  m ed ica l m en sk illed  in that particular art putting it the other
w a y  round, a m an is n o t n eg ligen t, i f  he is acting in accordance w ith  such a practice, m erely  
b eca u se  there is a b od y  o f  op in ion  w h o w ou ld  take a contrary v iew . A t the sam e tim e that d o es  
not m ean  that a m ed ica l m an can obstinately and p igheaded ly  carry on w ith  so m e  o ld  technique if  
it had been  proved  to  b e  contrary to w hat is really  substantially  the w h o le  in form ed m ed ica l 
o p in io n .104
100- G am er v . M o rr e ll. 'The T im e s’ 31 O ctober 1953.
101 - B olam  v. F riem  H ospital M anagem ent C om m ittee , supra cit.
102- supra c it. at p. 118.
103- supra cit. at pp. 118 & 121.
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To sum up, The risk was known to doctor, he did not tell the patient who alleged 
the failure to warn him  o f the risk  was negligent, but the am ount o f inform ation 
given to the patient accorded with accepted m edical practice. In any event, he would 
only have succeeded if  he could have further proved that had he been given better 
inform ation he w ould have refused his consent for treatm ent.105
This dicsussion has pointed to the various tests required  by law  and w hat a 
plain tiff has to prove in order to succeed in an action in negligence. He m ust show 
that the doctor or w hoever is alleged to be at fault is not acting with ordinary care as 
a skilled p rac titioner should. It is, how ever, not alw ays easy for a p la in tiff  to 
establish negligence. A lthough establishing the existence o f a duty is staightforward, 
actually pinning dow n the constituent elem ents o f the duty is m ore d ifficu lt. In 
addition, how ever, and even assum ing these two elem ents can be sa tis fa c to rily  
proved, there rem ains the final factor- that is, establishing the link betw een the 
breach o f duty and harm  attributable to it.
6.4 .6  C ausation
A condition m ay be factually caused by an act but legal causation may be defeated 
by other considerations, such as rem oteness or foreseeability .106
To say that an act is the legal issue o f an event is in effect to state that the actor 
should be held legally responsible for a specific outcome. An act may be identified as 
a cause if  it im presses the court as being significant in the sequence o f events,but on 
the other hand it m ay be considered causally irrelevant if  it is set against the event in 
question .107 A n im portant causation argum ent has been seen in the Scottish case o f 
M cGhee v N ational Coal B o a rd 108 in which it was held that a defender was liable
104- supra c it. at p . 121.
105- Supra c it  M argarete p. 58 . note  88 58  G . B . 1987 .
106- F . N . H o n o re , A  C au sation  and R em o ten ess o f  D am a g e  in the In ternational E n c y c lo p a ed ia  o f  
C om parative L aw  [1 9 8 3 ] O xford  V o l. X I chapter 7.
107- R . v . C rim inal Injuries C om p en sation  Board. [19 7 3 ]3  A ll E .R  808 .
108- [1 9 7 3 ]3  A ll E. R. 1 0 08 , [1973]1  W . L. R . 1.
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for neg ligence to the pursuer if  the defender's breach o f duty had caused , or 
m aterially  con tribu ted  to, the pursuer's suffering. The sufferer was a long tim e 
employed man, and as a routine duty he was sent to empty pipe kilns at a brickworks, 
but the w orking  cond itions w ere very hot and dusty. A fter three days he had 
developed irritation o f his skin, and again after two subsequent days he was found to 
have contracted derm atitis .
In an action against his employers for dam ages on the ground o f breach o f their 
common law duty it was admitted that his w ork in the brick kilns was contributory 
to the derm atitis. The breach alleged was the failure to provide reasonable  and 
adequate w ashing facilities, and it w as p leaded that had they provided  them  the 
workm an w ould not have contracted the disease. The em ployers adm itted the breach 
of duty but argued that it was not proved that it had caused the condition in question .
How ever, it was certified by m edical evidence that the derm atitis was caused by 
repeated m inute abrasions o f the outer horny layer o f the skin fo llow ed by som e 
injury to the underlying cells, though the exact nature o f it was not scientifically  
known. If a m an sw eated profusely for a considerable tim e the ou ter layer o f his 
skin was softened and easily injured. Then, the effect o f the abrasion was cumulative, 
so w ashing was the only practicable way o f rem oving the danger.
H aving analysed the full argum ent on the point, the judge affirm ed the appeal 
that possibly the defender m aterially contributed the risk o f contracting the disease, 
and the breach contributed to the cause o f the disease.
In respect o f  foreseeable  causation, fo llow ing the decision o f the H ouse, o f 
Lords, in the case o f  H ughes v. Lord A dvocate109 an appeal from  Scotland, the 
defendant need not be proved by the p laintiff to have been able to foresee the exact 
combination and sequence o f events which led up to the damage o f which the plaintiff 
complains.
It was in E dinburgh that a m anhole was opened for underground telephone
H ugh es v. Lord A d vocate  f 19631 L aw  R eport A ppeal C ases p 841 .
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m aintainance purpose. In the evening the m anhole was left unattended but covered 
with tents and surrounded by warning paraffin lamps. An 8 year old boy took one o f 
the lam ps and started playing pointing it tow ards the m anhole in the tent which 
resulted in an explosion causing him to fall into the hole and be severely burned. It 
was held that the w orkers were in breach o f a duty o f care in leaving the hole 
unguarded ,110 since the lam p was a foreseeable  source o f danger. T hus, the 
defendants were liable to com pensate the plaintiff.
The application o f the principle, that dam age need not generally be foreseeable, 
for exam ple in the decision in Trem ain v. P ik e .111 is unclear. In this case herdsm an 
contracted W iel's disease [leptospirosis]] which is transm itted by rat's urine.
T he p la in tiff  sued sta ting  that he w as in fec ted  by using or w ash ing  in 
contam inated water or handling bales o f hay, due to the defendant's negligence in not 
keeping the farm  free from  rat infestation by not taking the necessary m easures.
H ow ever, the p la in tiffs  claim  failed, because the defendants were not negligent 
as to foreseeable risk o f rat bites or food contam ination. Even if he m ight have been 
exposed to risk, the defendants were still im m une from  liability since the posibility 
of contracting  W iel's disease w as a rem ote one which could not reasonably  be 
foreseen. This case seem s contrary to the decision in H ughes. Thus, it can be seen 
that establishing causation is equally not always straightforw ard, and the attitude o f 
the courts is not alw ays consistent. A lthough in some cases, for exam ple where res 
ipsa loquitur applies, the harm  is obvious and clearily linked to the breach o f duty, in 
others this m ay not be so.
A ssum ing, how ever, that all the relevant factors can be show n, w hat is the 
intended outcom e? The answer, o f course, is the provision o f com pensation.
6.4 .7  D am ages
The basic aim  o f a dam ages award for personal injury at full scale com pensation 
is to p lace the person  in the position he w ould have been in but fo r the harm
110- supra cit. at p. 8 37 .
1 1 1 .  riQ A Q ll  W  T R  P  1SSA- 1 1 1  C I • r iQ A Q Il  All  P  R 1 1 0 1
1 8 4
112com plained of. For general dam ages the court follows the tortious act. For the
purpose o f this part the main dam ages of m edical interest are m edical expenses, pain,
suffering and loss o f amenity.
In respect o f pain and suffering, a dam ages aw ard m ight be effective for the
dam age already acquired and likely to happen in the future, provided  that the
113duration o f the pain is considered. For exam ple the distinct nature o f dam ages
114for loss o f am enties has been seen in the case o f W ise v. Kave w here a twenty 
year old w om an had been injured in a m otor car accident. The sufferer had been 
unconscious for three and half years under hospital care and there was no hope o f 
recovery, due to adm itted negligence. The trial judge Finnem ore J. aw arded her a 
total o f £17,400 general dam ages, m ade up as follows: £15,000 for general dam ages 
other than loss o f future earnings and loss o f o f expectation o f life; £2,000 for loss of 
future earnings [reduced by the £500 which w ould have been earned  during  the 
norm al span o f her life, in accordance w ith the ru le  laid  dow n in O liver v. 
Ashman.115! In this case the p laintiff was a boy o f twenty m onths at the tim e o f the 
accident. H e suffered a head injury which left him  a low-grade m ental defective and 
he w ould probably never be able to speak. Any education could only be o f a very 
lim ited character as he suffered severe traum atic epilepsy. He w ould be in need o f 
constant care and m edical supervision throughout his life, even to guard him  from  
com m on dangers. H is parents would have to em ploy a nanny for three or four years. 
In a few years tim e he would probably have to leave home and go to an institution for 
m ental defectives or backw ard children. He m ight go at first to the R udolf S teiner 
school, and would then probably go to a state institution, where he w ould rem ain for
the rest o f  his life except for visits hom e. D uring such v isits his parents m ight
require extra help in home.
112- D ia s  R .W . and M arkesin is B .D ., Tort L a w . O xford  U n iversity  P ress 1 9 84 , p. 388 .
113- M cG regor H . D am ages [14th Ed.] S w eet and M axw ell L ondon, 1980 , p. 831 .
114- W ise  v. K ave [1962] 1 Q . B .6 3 8  [C. A .] [1962] 1 A 11E .R .257.
115- [1 9 6 2 ]2  Q . B . 2 1 0  [C. A .].
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Any suffering w hich the child  m ight feel was purely m om entary. T here was 
some evidence that the child was beginning to realize he was different from  others.
Ignoring  the loss o f expectation  o f life, Lord Parker CJ. aw arded £11 ,000  
general dam ages. The court o f Appeal dism issed the p la in tiffs  appeal against this 
award.
If  the decision in O liver that no recovery is allowed prevails then the estate could 
not recover. In this case, H olroyd Pearce L  J said that there was no distinction  
betw een dam ages fo r loss o f expectation o f life aw arded to a living p lain tiff and 
those awarded to the executors o f a dead man.
How ever, in a som ew hat tangential manner, for the near two decades, the Court 
o f A ppeal’s decision in O liver v. A shm an ru led  the day. If  a liv ing  p la in tif fs  
dam ages for loss o f earnings capacity  are to be based upon his post-in ju ry  life 
expectancy, prospective earnings represent a loss for which the deceased could not 
h im self have cla im ed had he lived. H ow ever, O liver v. A shm an w as finally  
overruled by the H ouse o f Lords in Pickett v. British Rail E ngineering .1 This led 
to the unfortunate but inexorable conclusion, soon accepted by the House o f Lords in 
Gam mell v. W ilson . 1 ^  that the estate now could claim  in respect o f prospective 
earnings accord ing  to the circum stances. It seem s that the proportion could be 
greater than  the percen tage  used for calcu lating  dependency  under the Fatal 
Accidents Act o f 1976, by reason o f being the fund out of which their support w ould 
have com e. H ow ever, eventually this difficulty was rem oved by section 4 o f the 
Adm inistration o f Justice Act 1982. This would mean that the legislature has sensibly 
seen to it that this right is not to survive for the benefit o f the claim ant is estate upon 
his or her death. H 8
In W ise v. K ave119 Sellers L  J. said that the conventional figure m ay w ell be
116‘ P ickett v . B ritish  R a il E ng in eerin g  [1980] A . C. 136.
G am m ell v. W ilso n . [1982] A . C. 27.
1 1 8 -L a w  R eform  [M isce lla n eo u s P rov ision s] A ct 1 9 3 4 , s . l  [1 A ], in serted by the A d m in istra tion
Justice A ct 1982 , s. 4  [1].
119- W ise  v. K a v e . supra cit.
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equally applied in respect o f a claim  by a person still living or by the representative
of a person w ho had died. At the same tim e both H olroyd Pearce and Seller JJ
120adopted the view , appearing  a few years earlier in P a rie s  v. Sm ith. that in 
appropriate cases the p lain tiff can obtain substantial dam ages for the constant pain 
and disappointm ent o f know ing that his life has been shortened. This approach has 
im plied support from  L. D ew in's rem arks in W est v. S hephard .121 where the forty 
one year old p lain tiff was knocked down by a m otor lorry and sustained severe head 
injuries resulting in cerebral atrophy and paralysis o f all four limbs.
In the action for dam ages the trial judge aw arded in ter alia £500 dam ages for 
loss o f expectation o f life and £17,500 general dam ages. In com ing to the figure o f 
£17,500 general dam ages he referred to the award o f £15,000 in W ise v. K av e .122 
pointing out that the presen t p la in tif fs  state was w orse due to hav ing  som e 
know ledge o f her condition. M oreover, the judge considered  that she m ight die 
within five years. This decision was upheld by the court o f Appeal since there was no 
error in the trial judge's assessm ent.
123In the case o f Benham  v. Gambling the House o f Lords had to consider what 
was the proper m easure o f dam ages for loss o f expectation o f life for a boy o f two 
and a half years age who was killed instantaneously in a road accident. It was held 
that dam ages under this heading do not depend on the length o f years which are lost, 
nor on financial or social prospects; that they represent com pensation for the loss o f 
the prospects o f a predom inantly happy life; and that in general the dam ages should 
be m oderate, especially in the case o f a very young child whose prospects in life are 
extremely uncertain. Accordingly the damages were assessed at £200 only.
Infact, in subsequent cases, damages for the loss o f expectation o f life o f an adult 
killed instanteously were at a token figure which was for some tim e the am ount o f
120- [1958] C . A . N o  34a  [R eported at K em p and K em p, T he Q uantum  o f  D a m a g es. V o l . l  [2nd ed.] 1961  
p.353].
121- [1964] A . C. 326 .
122- supra c it..
123- [ 1941 ] 1 A ll E . R . 7 , [1941] A . C. 157.
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£350-400, and then £500. In Y orkshire E lectricity Board v. Navlon. the C ourt
o f Appeal thought that in view  of the fall in the value o f m oney, the am ount for an
adult should be increased to £1.000 but the H ouse o f Lords overru led  this and
resto red  the trial ju d g e 's  aw ard o f £500 as a reasonab le  figure . In C ain v. 
125W ilcock. the Court of Appeal approved an award o f £500 for a child o f two and 
half years. The result is that adults and children are now treated alike and in norm al 
cases the amount will be £500. The question is therefore, unlikely to be reopened in 
normal cases o f severe injuries, where in any event, since W estv . Shephard .126 the 
award under other headings will give ample compensation.
Yet in Benham  v. G am bling127 the House o f Lords did not consider the case o f a 
living plaintiff. It is clearly a decision based on reasons o f policy rather than o f  law, 
and these reasons apply only when the injured person is dead and som eone is seeking 
to m ake capital out o f his death. A t all events, it is subm itted that, w hen such a case 
has to be decided, the point rem ains open for argument, since it is understood that no 
one can provide the com plete solution. It is im possible to derive an arthim etical 
form ula from  a verbal proposition, and the exact quantification o f dam ages will, in 
the last resort, depend on the judge's instinct and experience o f other cases.
"It should be noted here that although com pensation claim s follow ing negligent 
treatm ent have considerably increased in recent years, the proportion o f successful 
claim s for dam ages in tort seems be m uch low er for m edical negligence than for all 
othercases o f negligence.There is a good deal o f evidence about the difficulty  o f 
proving negligence. It is not always possible to obtain the necessary inform ation on 
which to base a claim. The patient might not know what had actually happened and he 
m ight have difficu lty  in obtaining the services o f a m edical expert to assist him. 
W hen it is alleged that a doctor was negligent, his colleagues m ight naturally be
124- [1968] A . C. 529; [1 9 6 7 ]2  A ll E . R. 1.
125- [1968J3 A ll E .R .8 1 7 .
126- [1964] A . C. 326 .
127- [1941] 1 A ll E . R. 7 , [1941] A . C. 157.
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reluctant to give evidence. The m edical records [if there are any] m ight not contain
all the details o f the case, leaving am ple scope for d ifferen t in terp reta tions by
128witnesses for and against."
Equally, the role o f the defence organisations will have an impact.
In 1973 The Royal C om m ission on C ivil L iab ility  and C om pensation  for
Personal In ju ry 129 [Pearson Com m ission] chaired by a Law Lord, L ord Pearson,
was set up to consider to what extent, in what circum stances and by w hat m eans
com pensation should be payable in respect o f death and personal injury. They were
specifically  instructed  to exam ine the tort system  in the light o f o ther provisions
130m ade for com pensation either through insurance or social security benefits.
A m ongst other things they proposed that the governm ent w ould becom e strictly 
liable to victim s o f vaccine dam age, now effected in the V accine D am age Paym ents 
Act 1979 and that those w ho run m edical research  using vo lun teers m ust be 
resp o n sib le  fo r the  in ju ry  resu lting  from  clin ica l tria l. F u rth e rm o re  they  
recom m onded the adoption o f  a strict liability  schem e in the case o f  defective 
d ru g s .131
All this points to a situation which shows that there is considerable dissatisfaction
with the present position in medical injury cases and some unease about an acceptable
132scheme o f future com pensation provisions.
The Pearson C om m ission R eport also dealt w ith the num erous problem s of 
m edical injury, the position in law and considered possible com pensation reform  
plans for the future. The Pearson Commission distinguished betw een different kinds 
o f m edical treatm ent and drew  a distinct line betw een therapeutic treatm ent on one 
hand and clinical trials and research on the other.
W ith  regard to conventional or therapeutic treatm ent with norm al and approved
1 2 8 - P earson  C o m m iss io n  2 8 4  para, 1326-7 .
129- P earson  C o m m iss io n , 7 0 5 4 -1 /1 9 7 7 . C om nd. supra cit. p. 2 8 2  Para 1318.
130- B razier , op . c it ., at p. 144.
131- N o w  e ffe c ted  in the C on su m er P rotection  A ct 1987.
132- P earson  R eport 2 8 4  [1334].
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m ethods and m eans it recom m ended that the basis o f civil liability in tort for m edical
133injuries should continue to be negligence.
The Com m ission m ade it c lear that it recom m ended the continuation  o f the
negligence liability o f physicians, in spite o f the doubts its m em bers entertained
about the particu lar argum ents put to them  by the m edical p ro fession  fo r the
134reten tion  o f  the negligence action. M ost o f the ev idence from  the m edical
profession claim ed that negligence liability was one of the m eans whereby physicians
could show their sense o f responsibility , and therefore, ju stly  claim  professional
freedom . I f  negligence liab ility  w ere abolished and substitu ted  by a no-fau lt
com pensation system , there could be some attem pts to contro l docto rs ' e th ical
practice to prevent m istakes for which com pensation would have to be paid by some
central agency. It also was said that this could lead to a bureaucratic restriction  of
m edicine and a restriction on progress. It was further argued that the traditions o f
the m edical profession were not sufficient in them selves to prevent all lapses, which
135though small in num ber, m ight have disastrous effects.
As to these argum ents by the m edical profession in the U K, some m em bers o f
the Pearson Com m ission could not help but observe that they are unsound or, at the 
1
least, overstated. Nevertheless, and irrespective of these doubts, the Com m ission
m ade it clear that there w ould have to be a good case for exem pting any profession
137from  legal liabilities which apply to others, and the Com m ission did not regard
the special circum stance o f m edical injury as being sufficient to constitute such a 
138case.
The Com m ission also considered whether strict liability should be introduced as 
an additional m eans o f redress for an injured patient alongside negligence liability.
1 3 3 - ibid 2 8 8  [1347].
134- P earson  R eport I, 2 8 7  [1344],
1 3 5 - ibid 2 8 6 -7  [1342].
136- ibid 2 8 7  [1343].
137- ibid 2 8 7  [1 3 4 4 ].
138- id.
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W hilst this would avoid the difficulties o f proving or disproving negligence, there
139would rem ain the d ifficulty  o f proving that the injury was a m edical accident.
But even if  it were possible to lim it the scope o f this liability  satisfactorily , the
Com m ission thought that the im position o f strict liability , as with reversing  the
burden o f proof, m ight well lead to an increase in defensive m edicine, which in the
field o f conventional m edicine would be undesirable. Strict liability applied to
physicians in the norm al field o f their therapeutic duties would also tend to im ply
standards o f professional skill beyond those which the present law requires to be
141exhibited, and beyond those which could be fairly expected.
The Com m ission then decided not to recom m end that strict liability  should be
introduced in the field o f m edical injuries, except for one special category o f people,
142i. e. those who volunteer for research or clinical trials.
The Com m ission strongly emphasised that it is wrong that a person who exposes
him self to some m edical risk in the interest of the comm unity should have no right to
com pensation in the event o f injury. The Com m ission therefore recom m ended that
any volunteer for m edical research or clinical trials who suffers severe dam age as a
result, should have an action on the basis o f strict liability against the authority to
143whom  he had consented to make him self available.
The Pearson C om m ission considered, but rejected , the no fau lt m odel o f 
com pensation which operates in Sweden and New Zealand. It is, how ever, im portant 
to note that this rejection was substantially  based on cost, and the C om m ission 
indicated that continued scrutinyof the operation o f these schem es m ight ultim ately 
lead to their adoption.
One o f the experts from  New Zealand pointed out to the Pearson Com m ission the 
authorities handling com pensation claims under the no-fault com pensation schem e as
139- id. 2 8 5  [1337].
1 4 0 - id. 2 8 5  [1 3 3 6 ], 2 8 6  [1338],
1 4 1 - id. 2 8 6  [1338].
142- id. 2 8 6  [1338  ], 2 8 8  [1347].
1 4 3 - id. 2 8 6  [1 3 4 1 ].
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in troduced  in 1974 w ere fo llow ing  a res tric tiv e  in te rp re ta tion  o f  "m edical
m isadventure which seems concerned to avoid sliding down the slippery slope by not
com pensating illness or death every time m edical treatm ent fails," ^  arguably the
old d ifficu lties under negligence analysis in establishing m alpractice have been
replaced by a new set o f problem s o f a perhaps even m ore difficult nature, nam ely
estab lish ing  and fu lly  prov ing  the causation  link  betw een the alleged m edical
m isadventure and the dam age incurred.
The progress o f no-fault com pensation for m edical accidents or m isadventure in
these countries should be studied and assessed carefully, so that their experience can
be draw n upon. In the m eantim e however, every effort should be m ade to alleviate
the patient's burden o f proof where this burden becom es unbearable or is in the light
of public policy, unacceptable in view  o f the physician's professional responsibility
146for their m edical decisions. It should become a concern o f public policy and law
reform  to help those who are the w eakest part in the chain o f events fo llow ing
medical treatm ent where this is justifiable case o f negligence.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that, amongst the least welcom e features o f
seeking com pensation for m edical m ishap under m ost system s o f law, is that the
com plainant has to show  that the doctor w as negligent before a single coin o f
dam ages can be recovered. In the majority of m ishaps, the boundary betw een clinical
judgem ent and negligence may be too blurred for a decision to be reached and as the
onus o f proof is upon the plaintiff, the action fails. Yet the physical harm  suffered by
the patient rem ains the same, as does the need for financial restitution.
To avoid this central issue o f negligence, some countries, notably New Zealand
and Sweden, have adopted a "no-fault" system, where a fund adm inistered centrally
147by the governm ent and contributed to from  taxes, em ployers, etc., provides 
com pensation to patients according to their clinical and social needs, rather than as
1 4 4 - id. 2 8 8  [1 3 5 4 ].
145- id. 2 8 8  [1 3 5 4 ], 2 9 1-1  [1 3 6 4 -1 3 6 8 ].
146- D . G iesen  lo c . c it  at p. 180.
147- A ccid en t C om pensation  A ct 1982. [N. Z.]
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retribution upon a doctor for his negligence.
Though in theory this is attractive, the practical difficulties are im m ense and it 
seems that the schem es already in operation are increasingly fraught with problem s.
6.5 . C onclusion
In m edical practice, as elsew here, there is alm ost alw ays a right and a wrong 
way o f  going about solving a problem . If p ractitioner falls below  an acceptable 
standard  and so in ju res a pa tien t, the chances are that he o r she has been 
professionally negligent. That in turn m ust be very strong evidence o f negligence in 
law.
On the o ther hand, it is equally  true to say that no code or skill can provide 
ready-m ade answ ers to every problem . Eventually, a doctor has to be judged  simply 
according to the way he exercised his discretion in a particular situation- perhaps in 
an em ergency and w ithout all the necessary facts being available. W hether he acted 
wisely is to be decided by the judge in the particular case.
H ow ever, the law still has to ascertain the actual facts o f w hat happened to the 
patient and in a m edical investigation this is ex trem ely  d ifficu lt. The general 
reflection o f this chapter indicates that the whole system  o f claim ing dam ages for 
personal injuries is unstable and the inclination o f the judges seems sometimes to lean 
tow ards pro tection  o f m edical care providers ra ther the patient. In som e cases, 
people w ho are seriously injured obtain no com pensation whilst others m ay be well 
com pensated. On the o ther hand, the m edical profession becom es angry due to 
judicial interference and the consequent damage done to m edical providers.
To sum  up, som e points deserve considerable attention for their relevance to a 
full and practical understanding o f the law o f negligence and the potential for civil 
liability  in the delivery o f m edical care. As m entioned briefly earlier, there are a 
num ber o f practical determ inants o f negligence or m alpractice liability that should 
not be overlooked, some o f which have already been discussed in this chapter.
O bviously  the p la in tiff  in a m alpractice suit m ust rely  heav ily  on expert
1 9 3
w itnesses. Y et these  w itnesses are often  unsu itab le , expensive , or sim ply 
uncooperative. Even with experts to testify, and- ju st as im portant,- to assist in the 
preparation o f m alpractice case, a fully contested m alpractice trial can take a m onth 
or m ore to prepare and years to com plete appeals. The tim e and expense involved 
can be extraordinary.
Due to the expense o f  litigation, sm aller claim s are often im practical to pursue. 
Even when a large claim  is at stake, some plaintiffs cannot afford to w ait several 
years for a final award and m ay be forced to negotiate a settlem ent for less than they 
deserve.
Therefore, for the sake o f saving existing resources and time of both parties, and 
the courts too, law yers should have a full understanding o f  the substantive law, 
particularly  for the purpose o f predicting the potential for liability in a given set o f 
circum stances. They w ould require, at the least a m ore detailed review  o f relevant 
legal principles and a better understanding o f the intricate art o f com m on law , its 
judicial interpretations and its legislative m odifications, since even w here there is a 
m alpractice crisis, there is hardly a political consensus regarding either the nature of 
the p rob lem  or the requ ired  so lu tion . P erhaps m ore im p o rtan tly , there  are 
politically pow erful interest groups, m ost notably the legal profession which have a 
strong and vested  in terest that will resist any change that m ight adversely  affect 
them.
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e  P  P  T I  y  l i f l l  
C onsent to M edical Treatm ent
This part exam ines an im portant obligation ow ed by practitioners to their 
patients; the obligation to obtain the patient's consent to treatment.
7.1 C onsent to E xam ination or T reatm ent
To highlight that the central issue is patient's autonomy, James writes as follows:
T h e very foun dation  o f  the doctrine is every  m an's right to forego  treatm ent or ev en  cure if  
it en ta ils  w h at for h im  are in tolerable  co n seq u en ces or risks, h o w ev er  w arped or perverted his 
sen se  o f  va lues m ay be in the e y es  o f  the m edical profession , or even  o f  the com m u nity , so long as 
any d istortions fa ll short o f  w hat the law  regards as in com p eten cy . Ind ividual freedom  here is 
guaranteed o n ly  i f  p e o p le  are g iv en  the right to m ake c h o ice s  w h ich  w ou ld  genera lly  be regarded  
as fo o lish  ones.
-Harper and James ^
C onsent to exam ination o r treatm ent m ust always be obtained, though in m any 
instances it m ay be im plied by patients presenting them selves for exam ination .2 In 
a child  under sixteen, consent, preferably in writing, o f the parent or guardian must 
always be obtained,3 according to some writers.
In the case o f an unconscious patient or one o f unsound m ind, where the m atter is 
urgent and neither the legal guardian nor responsible relative is available to give 
consent it should be obtained from  the person who has charge o f the patient at the
1- F o w ler  v. H arper and F lam ing  J am es. Jr., T he L aw  o f  Torts, supp lim ent to vo l. 2  [B oston  , L ittle , 
B row n, 1968], sec . 1 7 .2 . A s  qu oted  from  T om  C h risto ffe l, H ealth and T h e L aw  A  H and book  for
Health P ro fe ss io n a ls . T h e  F ree P ress D iv is io n  o f  M acm illan  Inc. N e w  Y ork 1 9 82 , p. 2 6 7  .
2- B ernard K n ig h t, L egal A sp ects  o f  M ed ica l P ractice  [3rd E d .], S in g a p o re  1 9 8 6 , p. 3 2 . For
detailed  understanding se e  Sh eila  A . M. M cL ean & M aher, M ed icine. M orals, and the L a w . G ow er
A ldershot
1985, p. 79 .
3- F a m ily  L aw  R eport A c t 1969 , cf. K night, op. c it., at p .34 .
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time. In the circum stances the consent o f a headm aster or other person standing in 
for the tim e being will suffice, though a close friend o r com panion has no authority 
to give consent. Considering this point at a higher level could be suggested that to 
give consent, alternatively, "apart from  im plied consent, is the duty o f the physician, 
albeit a m oral rather than a legal one, to take all reasonable steps to preserve life."4
Indeed, in em phasizing this point Lew is refers to the im portant quotation from  
the decision in W ilson v. P ring le .5 The Court o f Appeal, speaking o f the legal rule 
allow ing a causalty  surgeon to perform  an urgent operation on an unconscious 
patient said:
"The patient can not consent, and there m ay be no next-of-k in  ava ilab le . H itherto it has 
been  custom ary to say in such ca ses that consent is  to be im plied  for w hat w ou ld  o therw ise  be a 
battery on the u n co n sc io u s body. It is better sim ply  to say that the su rgeon’s action  is acceptab le  
in the ordinary co n d u ct o f  everyday  life  and not battery. It w o u ld  dou btless b e  co n v en ien t to 
con tin u e  to  tie the lev e ls  o f  the "defences" to the facts o f  m y case  w here they are appropriate. But 
the rationalization exp la in s and u tilises the expressions o f  jud icia l op in ion  w h ich  appear in the  
authorities. It a lso  prevents the approach to the facts, w h ich , w ith respect to the ju d g e  in the 
present ca se , ca u ses h is jud gm en t to read lik e a ruling on a dem urrer in the days o f  sp ecia l 
pleading."^
There is no English reported case on the right or duty o f  a doctor to carry out 
em ergency treatm ent in a case w here no valid  consent can be obtained , but 
com m entators generally agree that treatm ent should be confined to what is necessary 
to deal w ith the em ergency .7 M oreover, it is advisable to seek a confirm atory  
opinion as to the proposed course o f action from a colleague.
W ith a m arried  person consent should be obtained from  the person undergoing
4- K night, op. cit., at p. 34 .
5- W ilson  v . Pringle f 198613 W LR  1.
6- ibid p. 10.
7- C h arles J. L e w is  , M ed ica l N e g lig e n c  A  P la in t if fs  G u id e . P rinted  and B o u n d  in G . B . by  
W heatton & C o . Ltd. E xteter 1 9 88 , p. 196.
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the exam ination or treatm ent. Consent o f a spouse is not valid except in the special 
circum stances which are m entioned above, o f an unconscious patient or a patient o f 
unsound m ind. An em ployer has no right to dem and exam ination o f a servant. The 
consent o f the em ployee should be obtained in the absence o f the em ployer so that it 
is freely considered and given.
In all cases, the practitioner should be satisfied that the consenting party know s 
and understands the reason for the exam ination or treatm ent and the proposed 
destination o f any report that may arise out o f the examination.
P ractitioners are advised to take special care w ith fo reigners w ho have an 
im perfect know ledge o f the language. Special considerations apply to prisoners in 
custody.
In the m ajority o f instances in the course o f the practice o f m edicine it m ay be 
safely assum ed that, by the very act o f attending at the practitioner's surgery or at an 
out-patient departm ent, consent is im plied  to exam ination, and som e w ould  say 
trea tm en t.8
It would be in fact, be cum bersom e and even impracticable to seek and obtain the 
consent o f every patient attending for advice. Thus it is for the practitioner to use his 
judgm ent and to be on the look out for the occasional instance where it w ould be wise 
to obtain  specific  consent. A m an m ight, fo r exam ple, be brought som ew hat 
unw illingly to the surgery by an em ployer o r forem an for an opinion and m ay, for 
fear perhaps o f losing  his job , be re luctan t to p ro test at that m om ent against 
exam ination. O r the practitioner may decide to perform  a treatm ent involving some 
risk to a patient, or som e disfigurem ent. These are fairly clear exam ples o f the need 
for consent.
It is techn ically  an assault to do anything to a patien t e ither in the way o f 
treatm ent or with a view  to making a diagnosis unless it is done with the consent of
8- K night, op . c it., at p. 3 4 .
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the patient, either w ritten  or im plied. In the vast m ajority o f cases the consent is 
im plied and there is no cause for anxiety. ^  W here there is doubt and where consent 
is obviously necessary, the patient should be clearly informed o f the course proposed 
and the practitioner should be satisfied that the patient understands the reason for an 
exam ination and that, if  it be the case, a report on the findings will be subm itted to a 
third party, for exam ple, an em ployer or an insurance company.
W hen a patien t presents h im self for exam ination as part o f the m achinery  o f 
taking out an insurance policy the implied consent is obvious, but generally speaking 
it is w iser and m ore satisfactory for the consent to be given in writing. N ot only is it 
an im portant protection for the practitioner but it also provides an opportunity to the 
patient to pause for a m om ent and to be quite certain o f his w illingness to subm it to 
w hatever procedure is proposed.
It is not alw ays easy for a practitioner to rem em ber that a patient m ay subm it to 
a procedure apparently w illingly simply because he does not realize what is being 
done. Subsequently, in a Court o f Law, he m ay be charged with doing som ething to 
the patient without his consent.
A patient m ay present with nasal sym ptom s and submit to an exam ination quite 
willingly. He will accept the introduction o f a nasal speculum  and an instrum ent or 
two as a part o f the exam ination but, should the p ractitioner then proceed, for 
exam ple, to rem ove a nasal polypus without inform ing the patient that he has m oved 
from  the realm  o f exam ination to that o f operation, he m ight well be charged with 
operating on the patient without his consent [i.e a technical assault] should the case go 
wrong and should the m atter com e before the Courts on a charge o f neg ligence.10
T he m ajority  o f hospitals have a stereotyped consent form  which patients are
9- K night, op. c it., at p . 33.
10- M argaret B razier , M ed ic in e . Patients and the L a w . H arm onsw orth, P en gu in  B o o k  1 9 8 7 , PP. 55 -
6.
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called upon to sign before undergoing an operation. The consent gives perm ission 
for the adm inistration o f  an anaesthetic and for the operation, leaving the extent o f 
the operation to the discretion o f the surgeon. n The wise practitioner w ill satisfy 
h im self that the form  has been signed in every case and in addition will ensure that 
the patient understands w hat procedure is proposed, m ost particularly in operations 
in w hich rem oval o f  a lim b or an eye o r som e drastic  alteration  in function is 
contem plated.
In short the practitioner m ust be satisfied always that the patient understands and 
has given his consent.
Q uite apart from  the need for the protection afforded by consent the advantages 
should alw ays be considered o f giving a patient as m uch as inform ation as possible 
about his illness and an explanation o f  the procedures p ro p o sed .12 Thereby, with 
the few  exceptions one achieves the co-operation o f the patient and freedom  from  
worry on the part o f the practitioner.
It w ill be convenient to sum m arise the general principles governing consent as a 
defence to a civil action before continuing with a m ore detailed discussion o f the 
notion o f consent as it specifically affects medical cases.
7.2 T ypes o f M edical C onsent
Consent m ay be either im plied or expressed; if expressed, it can be in writing or 
by word o f m outh. An expressed consent is more desirable than an im plied one and a 
w ritten one is preferable to oral consent, because it can m ore easily be proved as 
evidence ^
11_ ib id  at p. 57 .
12- ibid at p. 58 .
13- C lifford  H aw kin s, M ishap or M alp ractice? P ub lish ed  for T he M ed ica l D e fe n c e  U n io n , O xford , 
1985,
p. 180.
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7.3 T reatm ent and Consent
N o  m a n  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s k i l l  c a n  j u s t i f y  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  s u r g e o n  f o r  t h a t  o f  t h e
14patient
A doctor has no right to do any thing to a patient without his consent except in the 
case o f an em ergency when he m ust exercise his discretion. The general rule is that 
any d irec t physical con tac t with another person w ithout that person 's consent 
amounts in law to a battery. It gives grounds for an action for dam ages w ithout the 
need to prove that any actual harm or injury has been sustained.
The general rule that physical contact, including treatm ent, w ithout consent is 
unlaw ful is subject to necessary exceptions in the case o f those who are for some 
reason are unable to give or to refuse consent to proposed treatm ent. Such is m ost 
obviously the case with patients w ho are unconscious, say when brought in to the 
casualty departm ent for attention. Others who are incapable o f giv ing o r refusing 
consent are young children and those who are so m entally disordered that they can 
not understand what is invo lved .15
7.4 E xpress or Im plied Consent
The general legal requirem ent o f consent to treatm ent may be evidenced by what 
the patient says or writes. C onsent is im plied where a person's conduct is such that 
we can naturally conclude from  his behaviour, and the surrounding circum stances o f 
the particu lar situation, that he consents to the act being done, and the treatm ent 
being given. An example o f im plied consent w ould be a situation in which a person 
comes in in a state o f consciousness, to an accident and em ergency departm ent with 
bleeding w ounds requiring m edical attention. And where a person presents him self
14- K. M ant [ed.], T avlor's P rin c ip les and P ractice o f  M ed ica l Jurisprudence [3rd E d .], H ong  K ong  
1984,
p. 4 8 .
15- ibid
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for m edical exam ination his consent to w hat is necessary to carry out the proper 
exam ination in question will be im plied .16
Good sense m ust be used here. If there is any doubt at all whether consent m ay be 
im plied to everything that is proposed to be done to the patient, his or her express 
perm ission should be ob ta ined .17 An exam ple m ight be the pelvic exam ination o f a 
patient o f  the opposite sex.
H ow ever, consent will norm ally be given orally or even sim ply inferred  from  
conduct.18 It is, therefore, w ith these two ways o f obtaining patient's consent that 
param edical practitioners are likely to be concerned in the great m ajority o f cases.
If  a procedure is being perform ed on a patient for the first tim e it will usually be 
advisable to explain to the patient or client the nature and the purpose o f w hat is 
proposed. Such an explanation will normally be brief and it will usefully be couched 
in su ffic ien tly  n o n -te c h n ic a l language  to en ab le  the  p a tie n t p ro p e rly  to 
understand .19
W here express consent is sought, oral consent is in law as effective as w ritten 
consent. But there are obvious advantages o f written consent, the principal advantage 
being that o f the ready  availability  o f p roof in the event o f the actions o f the 
exam iner or other giver o f treatm ent being called in question .20 G enerally speaking 
consent form s are couched in general term s and this does give the docto r som e 
freedom  to carry  out w hatever o ther form s o f treatm ent he finds desirab le  or 
necessary in the course o f operation, but on the other hand a practitioner w ho goes 
outside the scope o f his authority , expressed  or im plied  is at least liab le  for 
assault.21 In o ther countries a different test has been developed w hereby the court
16- ibid
17- L . T aylor, T h e  D o cto r  and the L aw  [2nd E d .], G . B . Pitm an B o o k s Ltd. 1 9 82 , P. 109.
18- ibid at p. 106.
19- ibid at p. 105
20- ibid at p. 106.
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takes the right to assess and draw the extent o f the duty o f disclosure in any particular
case. This com m only the test o f 'inform ed consent.' If  the patient was not given
sufficient inform ation upon which he could reach an inform ed decision w hether to
accept the treatm ent proposed or not then he was not able to give a valid consent. It
was for the court to decide w hether he had been given that inform ation, not for the
doctors. T hese w ere tw o C anadian cases which provide im portan t and useful
22illustrations. In M arshall v. Curry a surgeon found during a hernia operation
that the patient had a grossly diseased testicle. H e feared blood poisoning as a result
and decided to rem ove it in the same operation.
The surgeon was sued because no express or im plied consent to the extended
operation had been given. The defence pleaded that the ex tended  operation was
necessary for the health o f the patient and necessary to preserve life; the testicle was
rem oved solely in the patient's interest and it w ould have been unreasonable to
postpone the necessary  operation for its rem oval. The patien t lost his claim  for
damages on the judge's ruling that when a doctor was faced with a situation neither
he nor the patien t had anticipated , he should take all p roper steps to fu lfill his
prim ary duty o f saving life or preserving health. This should be contrasted  with
23M urray v. M cM u rch v . The patien t w as undergoing  a caesen an  operation . 
Tum ors were discovered in the walls o f the uterus. In view  o f the risks inherent in 
another pregnancy the doctor tied the patient's Fallopian tubes to protect her. It was 
held that there was not such a degree o f urgency as to justify such a m ajor operation. 
The court's view  was that the hazard o f the tum or w ouldn't w arrant taking such a 
drastic step w ithout prior consent
M ost judgm ents on this point are from  A m erican and Canadian sources. D uring
21- C . R . A . M artin. L aw  R elatin g  to M edical Practice. B elfast. P itm an M ed ica l 1973 . p. 2 8 4 .
2 2 - [1 9 3 3  ]3 D .L .R . 26 0 .
23- [1 9 4 9  ] D . L . R . 4 4 2 .
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an operation on one ear the surgeon found the other m ore extensively diseased and
accordingly operated on both, successfully and skillfully. In this case, it was held, on
24appeal that the evidence did not justify the defendant's action.
In Devi v. W est M idlands R H A .25 dam ages o f £4000 for loss o f ability  to 
conceive and £2750  for serious neurosis w ere aw arded  fo r an unau thorized  
sterilization  perform ed in the course o f a m inor w om b opera tion  because the 
surgeons found the w om b was ruptured and believed it would be ruptured again in a 
pregnancy.
The DH HS, the M edical Defence Union and the M edical Protection Society, have 
designed a m odel consent form  to be used in hospitals and other appropriate health 
care institutions as a m atter o f daily routine.
The form  is as follows:
24 - TMoler v . W illia m s. N . W . 12, [U S A ], [1 9 0 5 ], 104. c f. D . F inch , H ealth S erv ice  L a w , L o n d o n , 
Sw eet & M a x w ell 1981 , p. 2 4 4 .
25- [1980]7  C L  44 .
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C onsent for O peration
...................................... H ospital
I .................................................................................................................................................................o f .......................................................
.................................................................................h ereb y  c o n se n t  to *under * c h ild .............................. to u n d ergo
the subm ission  o f  m y word
th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  ..........................................................................................................................................................
the nature and purpose o f  w hich has been explained to m e by 
D r /* M r ......................................................................................
I also con sen t to such  further or alternative operation m easures as m ay be found n ecessary  during the 
course o f  the above m entioned  operation and to the administration o f  general, loca l or other anaesthesia foany  
o f  these purposes.
N o  assurance has been g iven  to m e that the operation w ill be perform ed by any particular practitioner.
D a t e .......................................... S ig n e d .........................................................................................................................................
[ P a t i e n l / P a r e n l / G u a r d i a n J *
I co n firm  that I h a v e  e x p la in e d  the nature and p u rp ose  o f  th is o p era tio n  to the p a tie n t/ 
parent/guardian.*
D a t e ............................................... S ig n e d ........................................................................................................................................
[ M e d i c a l !  D e n t a l *  P r a c t i t i o n e r  ]
* D E L E T E  AS A PPR O PR IA T E
A ny deletions, insertions or am endm ents to the form  are to be m ade before the explanation is g iven  and the 
form subm itted for sign atu re .2 6 .
7.5 Inform ed C onsent to Treatm ent
If  a person is inform ed o f the nature and purpose o f therapy, then any consent 
obtained as a result will be a good defence against an action for battery. If, o f course, 
the practitioner's explanation was given in bad faith with the deliberate intention of 
m isleading the patient, apparent consent will in fact be unreal and invalid .27
The patient m ust be given a full and com prehensible explanation of the treatm ent
2 6- S. R . P eller , L a w  o f  D octors and P atient. L ew is & C o. Ltd. L ondon 1973 , p. 163.
27- G eo rg  J. A n n as, T h e  R ight o f  D o ctors, and A llied  H ealth  P ro fe ss io n a ls , B a llin g er  Pub. C o. 
C am bridge, M assachu setts 1981 , P .72 .
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which is proposed. The language o f the explanation should be as sim ple and as non­
technical as is possible in all circumstances. For only if  a patient can truly be said to 
know just what he or she is consenting to can such consent be valid in law .28
In respect o f a sane and conscious adult, the only person who can give a valid 
consent is the patient himself. The law does not recognize even the nearest and closest 
relative as endow ed with authority to act for the patient.
7.6 D isclosure to a Patient about his Illness
H ow  m uch and in w hat term s a practitioner tells his patient has alw ays been 
regarded as a m atter within the discretion o f the practitioner. Patients are now m ore 
en ligh tened  than they  w ere in  fo rm er tim es and are able to show  a fu lle r 
understanding o f their illness if  it is explained to them  with care. There m ight be 
patients who prefer ignorance about their illness, but in increasing num bers, there 
are patients w ho wish their doctors to tell them  all they can about their condition. It 
cannot be denied that a patient has a right to know the facts and the doctor's opinion 
about his case. There is not, nor can there be, any rule in this matter.
H ow  m uch, then, does the doctor have to reveal? A nd does a failure to reveal 
mean that no valid consent can be given, so that the doctor is liable in assault, or 
should it be seen as an aspect o f negligence, so that the action w ill lie only in 
negligence?
T he position  in E nglish  law  w as considered  in the case o f  C hatterton  V. 
Gerson.29 In this case an operation to relieve pain in a post-operative scar area had 
allegedly been carried out without consent and negligently. The operation had failed 
and led to claim  on the basis o f assault, on the ground that consent was vitiated due to 
lack o f a proper explanation as to the nature o f the procedure to be perform ed, and
28- ibid.
29- Chatterton v. G erson [1 9 8 1 ]!  Q. B . 4 3 2 .
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for negligence, on the point that the defendant was in breach o f his duty o f care 
tow ards her because his failure to give a proper explanation  o f  the proposed  
operation m ade it im possible for her to give informed consent.
The judge described the role o f consent in this way:
It is clear law  that in any contex t in w h ich  consent o f  the injured party is a d e fen ce  to w hat 
w o u ld  o th erw ise  be a crim e or a c iv il w rong, the co n sen t m ust be real, w h ere, for ex a m p le , a 
w om an 's co n sen t to sexu a l intercourse is obtained by fraud, her apparent co n sen t is not a d efen ce  
to charge o f  rape. It is  not d ifficu lt to state the princip le or appreciate its g o o d  sen se . A s so  often , 
the problem  lie s  in its app lication .
In m y jud gm en t w hat the court has to do in each  ca se  is to look  at all the circum stances and  
say  'w as there a real consent? ' I think ju stice  requires that in order to v itia te  the reality  o f  con sen t  
there m ust b e  a greater failure o f  com m u nication  betw een  doctor and patient than that in v o lv ed  
in a breach o f  duty if  the claim  is based on n eg ligen ce . W hen the claim  is based  on n eg lig en ce  the 
p la in tiff m ust prove not o n ly  the breach o f  duty to  inform , but that had the duty not broken sh e  
w o u ld  not have  ch o sen  to have the operation. W here the cla im  based  on trespass to  the person, 
o n c e  it is  sh ow n that the consent is unreal, then what the p la in tiff w ou ld  have dec id ed  i f  sh e  had  
b een  g iv en  the inform ation w h ich  w ou ld  have prevented vitiation o f  the reality  o f  her co n sen t is 
irrelevant.
In m y  ju d gm en t o n ce  the patient is in form ed in broad term s o f  the nature o f  the procedure  
w h ich  is intended, and g iv es  her consent, that con sen t is real, and the cau se  o f  the action  on  w hich  
to b ase  a c la im  for fa ilure to g o  into risks and im plications is  n e g lig en ce , not trespass ....in  m y  
ju d gm en t it w o u ld  b e  very m uch against the interest o f  ju stice  i f  action s w h ich  are really  based  on  
a fa ilure by  the d octor to perform  h is duty adequately  to inform  w ere p leaded  in tresp a ss .30
Therefore, the court concluded that the doctor had fulfilled his duty to explain. 
H ow ever, as stated in the quotation had the claim  been based in negligence, the 
plaintiff w ould had to prove not only a "breach o f duty to inform," but also that, had 
the duty not been broken, she would have decided against having the operation
O ne anxiety  w hich w ill from  tim e to tim e w orry every  p rac titio n er is the 
decision as to what is to be told to a seriously ill patient. It is p robable that m any 
patients w ho are not told o f the incurable nature o f their condition are nevertheless
30- ibid at p. 4 4 2 -4 3 .
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aware o f it. It is not only from  the spoken word that enlightenm ent is sought or 
obtained. The sufferer from  incurable disease may be aware o f it, or half aware o f it. 
One will seem to be happier w ithout firm  know ledge while another w ill insist on 
knowing and w hen told the truth w ill be relieved o f his uncertainty, and achieve 
peace o f mind. It is for the practitioner to watch carefully and decide what to disclose 
in each individual case.
7.7 T reatm ents W ithou t the Patient's Inform ed C onsent
In m any cases, if  treatm ent is given w ithout the patient's inform ed consent, this
may establish  a physician 's civil liability where the p lain tiff can not prove other
m alpractice. T reatm ent w ithout the patient's inform ed consent, m ay arise either
where consent is totally lacking or where it is invalid. Consent is legally valid only
where it is given by a patient with the legal capacity to consent, and who has been
sufficiently inform ed by the physician o f the treatm ent to be provided or operation 
31to be perform ed.
G enera lly  speaking , consen t is an essen tia l p re req u is ite  o f  all m ed ical
treatm ent.The necessity o f the patient's consent arises from  the hum an right o f self
determ ination w hich can not be r e n o u n c e d I t  is the patient w ho has the righ t to 
determ ine w hen he shall be treated therapeutically  and how , and if  a lternative
treatm ent o r operation  m ethods are available, then the patient m ust be given an
opportunity o f deciding both w hether he wishes to be treated at all, and if  so what
33method should be employed.
Every hum an being has a right to decide what shall be done with his ow n body; 
and a surgeon w ho perform s an operation without his patient's consent com m its an 
assault, for w hich he is liable in dam ages. The physician 's legal obligation to give
31- L epp v. H opp [1 9 7 7 ]7 8  D . L. R. 3rd [ont H .C .], p. 35.
32- B augh v . D elta  W ater Ltd r i97111W .L .R . 1295.
33- T he C anadian C ase  o f  Gorback v . Tin [1974]5  W . W . R. [an. Q . B ] ,5 .
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sufficient inform ation is in tended to provide inform ation  to the pa tien t about 
possible risks and consequences o f the illness, as well as about the intended treatm ent 
or operation, its consequences and possible side effects, and to guarantee the patient's 
absolute freedom  o f decision. The actual consent by the patien t is sufficien t 
consideration for an implied prom ise on the side o f the physician to exercise proper 
care and skill. 34
Before 1980 there was no English case on the subject o f w hether the absence o f 
full and inform ed consent m akes any ensuing treatm ent a trespass to the person, a
35 ^battery. But since then a helpful leading English case is Chatterton v. G erson. 
T he patient suffered intense pain from  a post-operative scar. All o ther m ethods of 
obtaining relief having failed she was advised to have an injection which the surgeon 
said w ould cause num bness over a larger area and perhaps involve tem porary loss of 
m uscle pow er. The operation gave short term  relief, but another injection proved 
necessary, at which no further explanation o f the procedure was given. In the event 
the acute pain was not affected but the patient lost all feeling in her right leg and foot. 
She made no com plaint against the surgeon with regard to the actual treatm ent, but 
argued that its im plications had not been fully or accurately explained to her.
The court held that there was no need for the explanation o f the effects o f the 
procedure to be spelled out a second time. "Once the patien t is inform ed in broad
term s o f the nature o f the procedure which is intended, and gives her consent, that 
3 7consent is real." Failure to divulge risks would lead to a claim  for negligence, not
34- S h eila  A. M . M cL ean, n 9 8 7 1 Tnformation D isclosure. C onsent, to M edical Treatm entand the L aw ." phD  
thesis, Faculty o f  Law  and F inancial Studies U niversity o f  G lasgow  U .K . p. 17i£ee also E verett v  G riffith s  
[1920J3 K .B . 163 , 193 , K oeh ler  v . C ook  [1975J65 D .L .R . 3rd 7 6 6 . [B .C . S .C .].
35- John D . F inch . H ealth Serv ice  L aw . L ondon, S w eet & M axw ell 1981, p. 2 5 0 .
36- Chatterton V . G erson  [1981] 1 Q . B . 4 3 2 .
37- Chatterton V . G erson [1 9 8 0 ]3 , W . L. R . 1003, [1981] Q . B . 4 4 3  C.
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trespass. The case o f Smith v. Auckland H ospital Board m ust be discussed, since it
38has been w idely referred  to in British Courts. The facts are that the p lain tiff 
suffered from  an aortic aneurism  and a surgeon in one o f the defendant Board 's 
Hospitals sought his consent to prim ary exploratory procedure, aortography, before 
deciding on the next step. In answ er to a question by the patient as to w hether there 
was any risk, the surgeon gave an answ er which was so evasive as to m islead the 
p lain tiff into the belief that there was no risk, although the surgeon was aw are that 
there w as a slight risk  o f the m ishap, w hich unfortunately  did occur, i.e. a 
gangrenous condition o f the right leg which resulted in the am putation o f the leg 
below the knee. The evasive answer was given for no other reason than to reassure 
the patient.
The patient claim ed that the surgeon em ployed by the Board had been negligent
in answ ering his question w hether there was any danger in aortography and that the
answ er had m isled him  into giving his consent. The plain tiff failed in his action the
lower court, on the grounds that there was no evidence on which the ju ry  could find
any breach o f duty and, alternatively, that even if  there had been such evidence, the
answ er given by the surgeon could not reasonably be found to be causative o f the
dam age suffered by the plaintiff.
Both these conclusions were attacked in the court o f appeal which allow ed the
p la in tiffs  appeal applying H edlev. B vrne and Co. Ltd v. H eller and partners 
39Ltd. They held that a doctor should use due care in answ ering a question put to 
him  by the patient w here the plaintiff, to the know ledge o f the doctor, intends to 
place reliance on what he has asked in deciding about consent. If in answering such a 
question the doctor fails to use due care and, as a result o f submitting to the treatm ent 
or procedure, the patient suffers injuries, the doctor will be liable to the patient in
38- M ason  & M cC all Sm ith, L aw  and M edical Ethics [2nd E d.], B utterw orth , L ond on  1987 , 154.
39- H ed le v . B vrne  and C o. Ltd v. H eller and Partners Ltd [1964] A .C . 4 6 5 .
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tort if  the evidence shows that it is probable that if a proper answ er had been given
the pa tien t w ould  have refused  to undergo the treatm ent o r p rocedure  e ither
im m ediately or after further questioning.
In the course o f his judgm ent, Sir H arold Barrow clough, C. J. said: "I do not
think that it will be disputed, and I can not im agine Mr. W indsor disputing that he
had not answ ered truthfully  in this case. O f course I do not m ean that he acted
m endaciously. He m eant only to reassure and he avoided a real answer, and one can
understand his reasons for that. But what he said was so reassuring as to be capable o f
the construction that there was no risk. That would not have been the truth: at least it
40fell short o f the truth."
41B ut to estab lish  liab ility  on the princip le  o f H edlev. Bvrne's case, the 
plain tiff had not only to establish that the surgeon had not answ ered him frankly but 
also that his injury resulted therefrom. The verdict o f the jury  in the low er court that 
was not disputed, Sir Harold said:
"Had I been trying the action m yself and without a jury I m ight have com e to the 
conclusion that this was not proved- even on balance o f probabilities that had he 
received a
proper answ er to his inquiry about the risks involved, the appellant would have 
declined to subm it h im self to the aortogram  procedure."42
The passage o f his judgm ent is parallel to the direction given to the ju ry  by the 
judge in the case of Bolam  v. Friem  H. M. C ..43
Thus, there is no conflict between B olam 's case and the decision o f the New 
Zealand C ourt o f A ppeal in Smith v. Auckland H ealth Board 44 They leave open
4 0 - [19 6 5 ] N . Z . 1 9 1 ,198 .
4 1 - Supra cit. p. 4 6 5 .
42- id.
43- [1 9 5 7 ]2  A ll E .R . 1 1 8 ,1 2 2  & [1957] 1 W . L. R. 582  Per M cN air J.
44- Sm ith v. A uckland H ospita B oatd [1964] N Z L R  241; [1965] N Z L R  191.
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both the case w here the risk  is m ore than slight and also the question  o f what
exp lanation  is ca lled  for in the case o f the tru ly  e lective opera tion  or o ther
procedure, A further exam ple o f the elective operation is where the operation is an
alternative to other m edical treatm ent, as by course o f injections,. This is illustrated
by the facts o f  H atcher v. B lack .4 -* The p la in tiff  suffered from  goitre. In this
controversial case the plain tiff was a singer, and the surgeon discussed with her the
alternative o f a thyroidectom y, which he regarded as much the preferable to course
lengthy drug treatm ent. He told her there was no risk to her voice in the operation,
although he knew there was inevitably a slight risk. Because the risk was so slight and
because it was vital that she should not worry about the operation, the surgeon felt
this untruth was justified. She took his advice and consented to the operation. During
the operation her larangal nerve was dam aged, this affecting her voice. She claim ed
against the surgeon, alleging negligence, and against her physician  for allegedly
having advised her that there was no risk whatsoever. The action, a ju ry  case, failed.
The judge indicated that a surgeon is justified  in telling a patient, untruthfully, that
there is no risk should he regard it as in the patient’s interest to do so. It is, however,
very doubtful whether the passage relied on is o f m ore than persuasive authority as it
was orbiter, the surgeon seemingly not having been sued on that ground, though the 
46allegation was made.
The doctrine o f 'inform ed consent' was born in the U nited States in C anterbury
v. Spence.47 D octors m ust disclose to their patients any m aterial risks inherent in a
proposed line o f  treatm ent. This m eans that the principle o f  inform ed consent is 
heavily based on the patient's rights.
T he 'B olam ' test48 sets the U. K. standard in relation to the standard o f care,
45- 'The T im e s’ 2nd  July 1954.
4 6 - id.
4 7 - B razier, op . c it., 60; c f. [1972] 4 6 4  F. 2nd. 7 7 2 , 7 8 0 .
48- B o lam  v. F riem  H M C  [1 9 5 7 ]! W  R L  582.
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that is that the doctor is not negligent if  he acts in accordance with the practice
accepted at the tim e as proper by a responsib le  body of m edical opinion. This
criterion {the Bolam  test} applies equally to diagnosis and treatment.
U ntil the case o f Sidaw av's v .- B oard o f G ovem ers o f the B eth lem  Roval
H o sp ita l/9 the courts adopted the Bolam  test w ithout further qualification. A good
illu stra tion  is to be found in the case o f  H ills v. P o tte r/ 0 w here the patien t
underw ent an operation to correct a deform ity in her neck, from  which she was left
paralyzed from  the neck dow nw ards. In dism issing the patient's action, the high
court held- "The standard o f care required o f a doctor when giving inform ation to a
patien t w ho had to decide w hether to undergo an operation w as the sam e as is
norm ally required o f a doctor in the course o f his diagnosis and treatm ent, nam ely
the exercise o f the ordinary skill which a doctor in the defendant's position w ould be
expected to possess. Accordingly, in giving advice prior to an operation a doctor or
surgeon did not have to inform  the patient o f all the details o f the proposed treatm ent
or the likely outcom e and the risks inherent in, it but was m erely required  to act in
accordance with a p ractice accepted as proper by a responsib le  body o f skilled
m edical practitioners."51
Im portantly , in H ills v. Potter the court drew  no distinction betw een claim s of
negligent advice and claim s o f negligent treatm ent or diagnosis. H ow ever, w hen a
negligent advice claim  came before the House o f Lords, this distinction was found to
be sufficiently im portant to justify  a difference o f approach, in the case o f Sidawav
52v. B oards o f G overners o f the B ethlem  Roval H osp ita l. The facts w ere that in 
1958 M rs. Sidaway injured an elbow at work and as a result, suffered persistent pain 
which treatm ent failed to rem ove. Later the pain spread to her left arm  too. In 1960
49- S id aw ay  v . Board o f  G o v em ers o f  the B ethlem  R oval H ospital [1985] A  C. 871; H L.
50- H ills  v. P otter [1984] 1 W  L R 641 .
51- ib id  at p. 6 4 6 .
5 2 - [1 9 8 5 ]  1 A ll E R . 64 3  [HL]
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she had ju st becom e the patient o f an em inent neuro-surgeon. An operation relieved 
the pain for a while. By 1973 once again the pain recurred and she was adm itted to 
hospital in 1974 when pressure on a nerve root was diagnosed as the cause o f her 
pain. The neuro-surgeon decided to operate to relieve the pressure. H ow ever, the 
operation to which she agreed involved risk o f damage to the spinal cord, assessed as 
less than a 1% risk. Due to the m ateria lized  risk  M rs. Sidaw ay, consequently  
suffered partial paralysis. She m aintained that the surgeon never w arned her o f the 
risk o f injury to the spinal cord, and that had she been w arned o f the risk, she would 
not have consented to the operation.
Throughout the long and expensive litigation Mrs. Sidaw ay's greatest handicap 
was that the surgeon died before the action came to trial.
T here w ere difficulties in identifying the extent to which M rs. S idaw ay was 
warned o f these risks. However, the trial judge found that she had been w arned o f the 
risk o f dam age to a nerve root, but not to the spinal cord. S ignificantly, she had not 
asked the surgeon any questions seeking am plification o f the risks nor m anifested 
any anxiety about them. At the first stage the judge endorsed the view that a lack o f 
full in fo rm ation  w ill not render an operation  a battery  p rov ided  the pa tien t 
understood the general nature o f the surgery proposed. The judge dism issed her 
claims in negligence too.
M rs. Sidaway appealed on the issue o f negligence and again failed in the court o f
Appeal. Eventually the case reached the House o f Lords, and in the H ouse o f Lords
only Lord Scarm an went as far as accepting the doctrine o f inform ed consent and
rejected the Bolam  test. Lord Scarm an referred to the landm ark case o f C anterbury
v. Spence53 w here the Court said, a risk is m aterial "when a reasonable person, in
53- C anterbury v . S p en ce  [1 9 7 2 ] 4 6 4  F .2d . [F ederal R eportor 2nd  S e r ie s]  p. 7 7 2 . A ls o  c f . in 
S idaw ay ca se  1985 A  C p. 8 74-5 .
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what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position would be likely
to attach significance to the risk or cluster o f risks in deciding w hether or not to
forego the proposed therapy." The arbiter o f what risks are m aterial in the view  of
the reasonable or prudent patient [and ought, therefore, to be disclosed] is the court
itse lf and not a "responsible body o f m edical op in ion ."54 But on the facts o f the
Sidaw ay case he agreed, in dism issing her appeal, on the ground she failed  to
establish on the evidence that the less than 1% risk was such that a reasonable patient
would have considered it important."
H ow ever, from  experience the professional has learned that the public can
understand a grea* deal, even about technical m atters, when decisions have to be 
m ade, and that even if  the patient does not wish to choose h im self or herself, he or
she w ants to know  w hat is being chosen and wants to be consulted. B earing this in
m ind, from  the circum stances of the decisions generally the law seem s to be that the
m edical pro fessional needs to be sure that the health  care consum er has been
consulted and has given a positive response to the proposed health care utilization.
7.8 C onsent for M edical E xperim entation
The previous sections o f this chapter assumed that consent should be obtained for 
acceptable d iagnosis or undertaking treatm ent in the best in terest o f the patient. 
H ow ever, there are additional problem s where what is contem plated is in the nature 
of an experim ent.
O bviously , w ithout research and experim entation  the p rog ress o f m edical 
science in producing new development of medicines and pharm acological substances 
would be im possible.55
54- ib id  A . C . p. 5 76 .
55- Juris D ieter  G iesek in g , M ed ica l M alpractice L aw  A  C om pparative Study o f  C iv il R ep o n sib ilitv  
A risin g  from  M ed ica l Car? 3 5 2  G iesek in g-ver lag  B e le fie ld , 19 8 1 , P. 221 .
A  fac in atin g  h istory  o f  the great su cc e sse s  in m ed icin e  and drug d e v e lo p m en t - in m ind  c o m e  the  
ev a lu a tio n  and w o r ld -w id e  a ck n o w led g m en t o f  p h arm aco log ica l su b stan ces lik e  Salvarsan  [1 9 1 0 ] ,
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The general intention o f an experim ent m ay be designed to increase academ ic
know ledge. It also may be that experim entation is needed to test the efficacy o f an
accepted treatm ent. It is therefore, necessary to have persons who are w illing to
submit them selves to research and experiments. The subjects m ay be the researchers
them selves, healthy volunteers or sick patients. Internationally accepted guidelines
are detailed in the Declaration o f Helsinki [1975] which em phasize the distinction to
be m ade between therapeutic and non-therapeutic experim entation.56
In setting out a proper fram ew ork and safeguards, the first m an statem ent was
the fam ous N urem berg Code. [1948] which required the subject's full know ledge
and voluntary consent. The declaration o f Helsinki is significant for the distinction it
outlines betw een experim entation when the aim  is essentially  therapeutic  fo r the
patient and experim entation whose essential object is purely scientific, w ithout direct
therapeutic value to the subject involved.
T herapeutic  research- The N urem berg Code stresses the physician 's need to
believe that the new m easure will be o f therapeutic value and that the risk o f its use is
justified  by the patient's need .57 The W orld M edical A ssociation declaration on
non-therapeutic research stresses the need to obtain a fully inform ed consent. The
Am erican M edical A ssociation has long had a sim ple code o f  eth ics for hum an
experim entation and these are classified in three basic categories
1- Voluntary consent o f the subject.
2- P rio r use o f  anim al experim entation  to investigate  the dangers o f each 
experim ent.
Insu lin  [1 9 2 2 ], P en c illin  [1 9 2 9 ], A n tih istam in ica  [1 9 3 2 ], D e so x y co rtico stero n  [1 9 4 0 ] , S u lfo n a m id a  
D iuretica  [1 9 5 0 ] , P rogesteron  [1 9 5 3 ], P o lio -V a cc in e  [1 9 5 4 ], C arbutam id [1 9 5 4 ], M ep rob an at[1955], 
Im p irom in  [1 9 5 8 ] ,  B e n o d ia z ep in e  [1 9 6 0 ] , e tc . can  be fou n d  in A . V o n  S c h lic h te g r o ll,  in D ie  
M ed iz in isch e  W elt 30: 3 2 4 -3 2 8  [1979],
56- S ee  the H andbook o f  M edical E thics [1 9 8 4 ], L ond on , B ritish  M ed ica l A sso c ia tio n , for th ese  and 
other E th ica l d efin itio n s.
57 - Paul A . F reuend , E xperim entation w ith H um an S u b jects . L ond on , A llen  & U n w in  1970 , p .47 .
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3- T he perform ance o f the experim ent under proper m edical pro tections and 
m anagem en t.^
Professionals have a great com m itm ent to m edical advance, and therefore  
require volunteers to test out theories. Patients as well as healthy volunteers should 
how ever be asked about their w illingness to subm it to the new treatm ent for the 
benefit o f  research .59 This is im portant, because in the circum stances o f scientific 
research, the position with regard to physician's civil liability would be m uch m ore 
clear than in a case where the aim is therapeutic.60
Patien t authorization for innovative therapy seem s to raise certain  problem s, 
since less is know n o f the proposed procedure's efficacy and risks. As W illiam , et
al., have dem onstrated, very little is Known about the efficacy even o f standard or
accepted m edical p r a c t i c e . B u t  the patient wants to know even if  the inform ation 
available is lim ited. So it is essential that the practitioner should inform  the patient in 
detail regarding the suggested innovation.
The im portan t po in t to let the patien t know  is generally  the nature  o f  the 
experim ental procedures and the probability o f risks. As Annas suggested, when a 
patient for such purpose is con sid e red , it is im portant that a group o f persons is 
p resen t to assure that the patient has understood all the p rocedure and all the
62probable risks which m ight happen.
58- R ob ert M . V ea tch , C ase  S tu d ies in M edical E th ic s . H arvard U n iv ersity  P ress C am b ridge M ass. 
L ond on  1 9 7 7 , p. 35 9 .
59 - P earson  R eport I. 2 8 9  [1 3 4 0 ].
60- ibid at [1340-1341].
6 1 - A . L . C o ch ra n e , E ffe c tiv en ess  and E ff ic ie n c y . [L ondon: N u ff ie ld  p ro v en c ia l H o sp ita l T rust, 
1972] John W . W illia m so n , Im proving M edical Practice and H ealth Care, [C am b ridge1972],
6 2 -  G e o r g e  J. A n n a s , L eo n a rd  H . G ia n ts, B arbara F . K atz. In fo rm ed  C o n se n t  to  H um an  
E xperim entation . T h e  Su b ject’s D ile m m a . B allinger P ublish ing C om pany, C am bridge M assachu setts  
1 9 7 7 , p. 2 2 .
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"Experim ents m ust be justified by a reasonable relationship betw een the objects 
to be achieved and the risks involved for the subject. If the subject has insufficient 
understanding o f the nature o f the experim ent and the risks involved, in the last 
analysis this denies his right to inform ation, and amounts to a denial o f the hum an 
right to self -determ ination.
The striking thing about the events concerning the trial o f  Nazi physicians for 
war crim es and crim es against hum anity during the 2nd w orld war, w as that the 
docto rs in sisted  that they had perform ed their experim ents w ith in  the eth ical 
fram ew ork o f the m edical profession. The N urem berg T ribunal, in rejecting the 
defense, stressed that when experim ents yield results for the good o f society that are 
unobtainable using other less dangerous [animal] research m eans or methods. In such
/ T O
c ircu m stan ce  they  can satisfy , m oral e th ic a l, and legal concep ts."  Such 
perform ance w ould  be acceptable by law provided that the resu lt is absolutely 
essential and useful for hum an beings, and the relationship o f the risk and result 
would be reasonable.
The T ribunal then set out principles know n as N urem erg C ode w hich involve 
hum an experim entation. In brief, experim ents should:
1. be based on voluntary consent;
2. yield fruitful results for the good o f society, unprocurable by other m ethods,
3. be justified  by earlier laboratory and animal tests and other studies;
4. be conducted in ways that minimize suffering and injury;
5. involve no risk o f death or disabling injury;
6. involve risk proportional to the anticipated benefit;
7. be based on proper preparation;
8. be conducted by qualified people;
6 3 - D . G ie se n , C iv il L ia b ility  o f  P h y s ic ia n s  for N e w  M eth o d s o f  T reatm ent and E x p er im en ts  
[1 9 7 6 ]2 5 ,1 . C . L . Q .
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9. perm it the subject to stop the experim ent at any time and;
10. be conducted by an experim enter prepared to term inate  the study when 
injury, disability, or death seems probable.6^
W hat does this m ean to the health professional planning an experim ent that 
involves hum an subjects? Certainly the N urenberg Code provides im portant ethical 
guidelines, but as it doesn 't control courts effectively, it seem s im portant to seek 
enforcing legal guidelines.
H ow ever, as A nnas reports there is one C anadian case regard ing  hum an 
experim entation.65 In this case a plain tiff volunteered to undergo an anesthetic test 
for the purpose o f m edical research to earn $50, consenting in the following terms.
... I have  vo lun teered  for tests upon m y person for the purpose o f  study o f  Heart and B lo o d  
C ircu lation  R esp o n sib le  under G eneral A naesthesia .
T he test to be undertaken in connection  w ithin this study have been  expla in ed  to m e and I 
understand fu lly  w hat is  proposed  to b e  done. I agree o f  m y ow n  free w ill to su bm it to  these  tests, 
and inconsid eration  o f  the rem uneration her after set forth, I do rea lize  the c h ie f  in vestig a tio n s.
D r...,their  a sso c ia te s , tech n icians and each thereof, other personn el in v o lv ed  in this stu d ies, 
the U n iv ersity  H osp ita l B oard and the U n iversity  o f  Saskatchew an are ab so lv ed  from  all 
resp o n sib ility  and c la im s w h atsoever  for any untow ard e ffec ts  or accidents due to  or arising out 
o f  sa id  tests, e ith er d irectly  or ind irectly .
66
I understand that I shall rece iv e  a rem uneration o f  $ 5 0  for o n e  test....
From  such a well defined consent what w ould be the loophole that m ade the 
consent ineffective and resulted in a finding that the doctor was liable?
On the basis o f this agreem ent the research procedure w as undertaken .T he 
anesthetic caused the plain tiff to suffer a cardiac arrest which eventually affected his 
m ental ability. The researchers were in actual fact testing a new  anaesthetic with 
which they had no previous experience.
64- C h risto ffe l, op. c it., at p . 2 9 0 .
65- H alushka v. U n iversity  o f  Saskatchew an, cf. D . L. R. 5 3 ,2 n d . 1966 , p. 4 3 6 .
6 6 - A n nas, op . c it ., p. 18.
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As a result o f the experim ent the plaintiff had changes in the cardiac rhythm  and 
was unconscious for a period o f four days. The respondent brought action against the 
appellants, basing his claim  for dam ages on two grounds, nam ely trespass to the 
person and negligence.
The Appeal C ourt o f Saskatchew an held that the researchers m ust com pletely 
disclose to their subjects all facts, probabilities and opinions which a reasonable man 
w ould consider before giving his consent. In research cases the court em phasized, 
there are no exceptions to full d isclosure as there m ay be in ord inary  m edical 
practice.
A bove all the experim enter m ust, when sick people are used in the course o f 
ex p erim en ta tio n , m ake it abso lu te ly  c lear that it is a case  o f  re sea rch  
experim entation and not o f therapeutic treatm ent. At the same tim e the sick person 
m ust be treated with all the therapies which are necessary for his health.
The appeal was dism issed and the subject was awarded $2,000.
To m inim ize risks to all the involved individuals, to enhance the advancem ent of
m edicine and to im pose control system s which could protect the basic rights and
freedom s o f  the  person  concerned  in dangerous experim en ts , p ro fess io n a l
supervision has been organized in d ifferent countries. For exam ple in the U nited
K ingdom  and U nited States, Ethical Com m ittees have been set up The A m erican
Review  C om m ittees work on the follow ing basis:- grants are aw arded for research
experim entation only on condition that the research protocol is checked by a relevant
board o f m edical experts to ascertain that it meets the criteria, such as the protection
of rights and w elfare, free and inform ed consent, and the evaluation o f the risks, and
benefits. In the U. K ., in a sim ilar procedure, the E thical C om m ittees com bine
67physicians, research workers, nurses and non- professionals.
6 7 - T . J. S c h n ey e r  , In form ed  C o n sen t and the D a n g er  o f  B ia s  in the F o rm ation  o f  M ed ica l  
D isc lo su re  P ra c tic e . [1 9 7 6  [U . S .], in 1076 W isconsin  L. R ed  1 2 4 ,1 6 2 .
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These Com m ittees are expected, and are in a position, efficiently to supervise all 
research experim entation carried out in clinics and laboratories, and if  necessary, to 
stop unethical conduct such as unacceptable experimentation on hum an beings..
A ny experim entation  is therefore, perform ed with care to obtain  inform ed 
consent and experim enters are quite w illing to go into reasonable detail in explaining 
potential risks to the person. The position as regards persons under a disability, and 
obviously children and m entally  incom petent persons, is d ifferent. C learly  they 
cannot them selves give consent to be a subject o f research, but others, such as parent 
or guardian, can do so on their behalf, Dr. R. E. W . Fisher has stated the ethical rule 
as regards children as follows:
"N o m edical procedure involving the slightest risk  or accom panied  by the 
sligh test physical or m ental pain m ay be inflicted  on a ch ild  for experim ental 
purposes unless there is a reasonable chance, at least a hope, that the ch ild  m ay 
benefit thereby."6 ^
G enerally children and the insane are considered incom petent research subjects 
by the law.
The fundam ental expression of the statem ent is that a parent or guardian cannot 
legally consent on behalf o f a child under 16 years o f age, or a m entally unfit person, 
with the intention o f control or for the purpose of research, if  there is a possibility of 
pain o r d iscom fort o r risk  occurence. The authority  o f the paren t o r guardian 
entitles them  only to p ro tect the w ell-being o f  the child  o r the d isab led  person. 
H ow ever, as suggested  above, consent can be given w hen som eth ing  serious 
involving pain, d iscom fort or risk is contem plated for the benefit o f  the child  or
disabled person .6^
M . R ev o lla rd , G eneral R eport in C iv il L iab ility  o f  p h y s ic ia n s . in p ro ceed in g  o f  F ifth  C o llo q u y  on
Erupean L aw  in L y o n s , 3 -4  June 1975 , Strasbourg 1975. U  K ., p. 79
68- T h e  L a n cet. 'Controls', 1 9 5 3 /2  p. 9 9 3 .
6 9 - S p eller  op . c it., at p. 5 8 .
2 2 0
T hese conclusions rest, in the cases o f children, the insane, or the aged, on the 
assum ption that such persons are not in a position to understand the risks involved or 
the nature o f the experim ent and thus cannot give m eaningful consent. In the case o f 
prisoners, another special group M cLean and M aher speculated on the reasons for 
p risoners vo lunteering . The objections to using prisoners rest, perhaps, on the 
notion that prisoners are under pressure to give consent which puts them  at an unfair 
disadvantage or which are inconsistent w ith legal or m oral standards. A prisoner 
may consent in order to give m eaning to his life or because he hopes for a reduction 
o f sentence or to receive favourable  treatm ent. P resum ably  w hat he th inks is 
sufficient to justify  the experim ental action, but both law and m orals disapprove of 
the use o f certain tactics in securing consent, such as falsification, failure to state 
crucial facts, and im proper pressure.70
In the U.S. the use o f prisoners in research is seemingly favoured. The National 
C om m ission  fo r the P ro tec tion  o f H um an Subjects m ade recom m endations 
regarding prison-based research that could have a m ajor im pact on future studies. 
The Com m ission approved such research in principle, provided certain  situations, 
including prio r approval by an institu tional review  board  are m et. In o rder to 
m inim ize the coerciveness o f the situation, the Com m ission specified that adequate 
liv ing standards m ust be prov ided  in prisons used  as a base for resea rch , a 
requirem ent that, if  enforced, is likely to m ean that no prison  research  w ill be
71conducted in the future.
The Com m ission also issued recom m endations on research involving individuals
70- S h eila  A . M . M cL ean & M aher. M ed icine. M orals, and the L a w , E nglan d , G ow er 1 9 8 5 , p. 118.
71 - S e e  R ep ort and R eco m m en d a tio n s: R esarch  In v o lv in g  P riso n ers [W a sh in g to n  D  C N a tio n a l  
C o m m iss io n s  for the P rotection  H um an S u bjects o f  B io -m ed ic a l and B eh a v o ra l R e se a ch , 1976] 
D H E W  pub n o  [os] 76 -1 3 1 .
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institu tionalized  as m entally  infirm , including individuals w ho are m entally  ill, 
m entally  retarded, em otionally  disturbed, psychotic o r senile, or who have other 
im pairm ents o f a sim ilar nature and who reside as patients in an institution. As with 
children, there are serious doubts about their legal capacity to consent. And as with 
prisoners, the use o f institutionalized populations raises the possibility  o f coercion. 
H ere too the C om m ission  approved  the participation  o f such persons in non- 
therapeutic experim ents, provided certain guidelines are fo llow ed. B esides prior 
approval by an in stitu tional rev iew  board, the recom m endations call for tw o 
additional safeguards. W here only m inim al risk is involved, subjects incapable o f 
consenting  m ay be used if  they do not expressly  object to participating. If  the 
research represents a m inor increase over m inim al risk, individuals incapable o f 
consenting m ay be used if  they assent, a Com m ission term  for a consent that w ould
72not m eet the usual test o f comprehension.
H ow ever, it does seem , that still in G reat Britain it is generally not considered 
perm issible to carry out any experim ents on m inors o r prisoners, even with consent 
of parents o r the prisoner if the experim ent is not to be o f direct potential benefit to 
the persons and if  there is any hazard involved.
G enerally, hum an experim entation, w hether with prisoners or free persons, was 
favoured by Freund. People m ay be used as guinea pigs provided that the risks or 
discom forts involved are com m ensurate with the likely benefits to society, and that
73nothing is done without the full and informed consent of the subject.
To  conclude, the m ajor them e that underlies and shapes the ph ilosoph ical 
reflection o f hum an experim entation is that the progress that m ay or m ay not com e 
from  scientific research is not autom atically worthy o f approbation.
H ence, to adequately protect an individual's autonom y and personhood and to
72- ibid but date o f  1978  pub no  [os] 7 8 -o o o 6 .
73- P aul a. Freund, E xperim entation  w ith  hum an subjects, G . B . A llen  & U n w in  1 9 7 2 , P reface.
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keep pace with pursuing scientific progress to the desired goal, it is essential to 
provide him  with enough inform ation to perm it him  to m ake up his ow n m ind 
concerning participation in the proposed experim entation.
7.9 C onsent to T reatm ent
In general situations, consent is legally im portant for any treatm ent-m edical or 
psychiatric, though some exceptions exist, for exam ple in an incom petent client. 
Prior to in itiating treatm ent it is o f crucial im portance to secure valid  consent in 
order to m aintain the basic rights o f clients to self-determination.
In brief, the doctrine o f consent can be traced back over two hundred years to an 
English case in w hich the K ing's Court opined that m edical surgery carried  out
74before consen t w as ob tained  from  the patien t constitu ted  a tortious assault. 
C urrent decisions are im posing liability for failing to obtain consen t to m edical
75treatm ent even if  the treatm ent was o f great significance to the patient. The aim  
of consent is to prevent unlaw ful assault and battery. G iven the problem s associated 
with certain  groups, it is o f interest to exam ine the law regarding the m entally ill. 
Unlike the situation in respect o f the sane, adult person, w hich is governed  by 
com m on law , the situation  o f the m entally  ill is covered  by leg isla tion . It is 
interesting, therefore, to note that the law deals in two different w ays with the same 
issue - that is, the provision o f consent.
7 .10 T he Legal Fram ew ork
The M ental H ealth  A ct 1959 w as concerned  to  redesign  the system  for 
com pulsory adm ission and discharge, before m oving to develop the m ental health
74- Slater v. B aker and S ta p le to n . [K. B . 1767], 95  Eng. Rep. p. 96 0 .
75- S ee  B a ilv  v. B e lin fa n te . 135 G a. A pp. 5 7 4 , 2 1 8  S. E . 2d  2 8 9  [1 9 7 5 ] [the fact that u n con sen ted  
tooth ex tra ctio n  w a s  properly  d o n e, not d efea t patient's c la im  a g a in st dentist; d irect v e rd ic t  for  
dentist reversed ].
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service from  confinem ent only to a m ore clearly therapeutic regim e, encouraged by 
the arrival o f often controversial new treatm ent, such as electroconvulsive therapy, 
and new tranquilizing drugs.
Basically, the attitude o f com m on law is sim ilar for psychiatric and for som atic 
m edical treatm ent, an action in assault, or m ore likely in negligence, is possible, 
except if  the condition o f the patient is a threat to his life. Regarding adm ission for 
treatm ent under the A ct o f 1959, s. 26 caused debate as ti its m eaning , since 
adm ission was arguably for treatm ent, on a compulsory basis, and it was understood 
that the p a tien t's  refusa l to consen t m ight be ignored  by the docto r in this 
76position. The M ental H ealth  A ct 1983 m akes it c lea r that adm ission  for 
interm ediate tw enty-eight day period authorizes the adm inistration o f treatm ent and 
for the first tim e expressly confers the authority to im pose treatm ent upon a patient 
77against his w ill. T he position  in relation to consent now  depends upon the 
d ivision o f  the treatm ent to be adm inistered, the treatm ent being  graduated  in 
accordance w ith its seriousness. Section 37 o f the A ct applies m ostly  to the
78seriousness types o f m edical treatm ent for mental disorder.
The A ct classifies according to the depth o f the condition o f the patient and is 
irreversible. Consent having been obtaied from  independent source. The procedure 
of the treatm ent is stated in the Mental Health Act o f 1983 and regulation o f 1983. A 
p roposed  code  o f  p rac tice  m ay be specified  by the M en ta l H ea lth  A ct 
79Commission.
The validity o f consent and refusal of consent are m ore confused in the situation
76- S ee  section  141. o f  the M ental H ealth A ct 1959.
77- T he M ental H ealth A ct 1983 ss. 2 [2][a] & 63.
78- M ental H ealth A c t 1983 s. 57.
79- D . A n derson-F ord , M ental H ealth L aw  and Practice for Socia l W ork ers , B utterw orth s, L on d on  
1984,
p. 106.
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of a psychiatric  patient w ho m ay not be capab le  o f grasp ing  the inform ation  
necessary to  give adequate consent or w here there are serious doubts about his 
freedom  to choose. At issue is the ability o f the patient to understand the inform ation 
necessary to give adequate consent. For exam ple, a m atron o f a hospital was highly 
depressed after her husband died, and admitted herself to a psychiatric hospital. The 
diagnosis was acute severe depression. On this ground the two psychiatrists agreed to 
electroshock therapy. The need for o f such therapy was explained to the patient, and 
she agreed to undergo it.
D uring  the application o f the treatm ent the patient experienced a convulsion 
sim ilar to an epileptic seizure. A t the next trial she m ade her stand, "I w on't let you 
touch m e again." Every effort was m ade to persuade her but she rem ained adam ant 
from which she was benefited.
Eventually , after heated argum ent it was decided that the treatm ent w as in the 
best interest o f the patient, so under the psychiatrist's d irection M rs. M alone was
80dragged to the electroshock room  to continue the treatm ent
A student who failed his com puter operating examination had faced depression.
On one occasion while he w as w alking about at m idnight he w as caught by 
policem en due to contradicting answers he gave them. At the same tim e, as he was 
not w illing to surrender, he was shot once in the shoulder and once in the thigh, and 
charged with m isconduct.
A fter hosp ita lization  for the shotgun w ounds M r. W atson was diagnosed  as 
incom petent to understand the nature o f the proceedings against him  or to participate 
in his own defense, and comm itted to a state mental hospital for treatm ent until found 
com petent to stand trial. But without any im provem ent after a week he refused the 
m edication the doctor prescribed for him  stating that he was agitated, threatened,
80- C obbs v. G rant [5 0 2  p 2d I, Cal. 1972]
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and he should be released without m edication, though the doctor believed he needed 
m edication.
The docto r thought that the patient was unlikely ever to agree to take the 
treatm ent vo luntarily , but that forced m edication w ould im prove the situation. 
W atson 's law yer also believed this in the given circum stances and the treatm ent
continued.^ *
In the case o f m ental patient, the purpose of having any kind of consent in any 
circum stance is a grow ing problem . One o f the m ost d ifficu lt features o f m any 
severely disturbed individuals is that they say one thing and m ean another, or they 
say things which at first seem m eaningless, but with skill, patience, and experience 
their m eaning  can often  be in terpreted. So the contrad iction  is a com m on one 
between the desire to grant the mental patient the nobility that com es from  assum ing 
his ability to m ake at least some judgm ents, and the desire to determ ine w hat will 
really benefit the patient, and what the patient really wants.
H ow ever, the only  solution to this dilem m a w ould seem  to depend on the 
professional com petence and ethical standards of the expert [Psychiatrist] directed by 
judicial protection and reconsideration. M edication should be available to all who 
might benefit. If the patient's refusal puts him  at risk and the treatm ent is relatively 
effective and safe, then to waive the individual's right would seem to be acceptable as 
long as it is in the best interest o f the patient.
There are other situations which also create problem s in respect o f consent, and 
which are w orthy o f brief consideration here.
7.11 C onsent to C ontraception
C onception m ay be prevented by chem ical, m echanical, o r surgical m ethods.
Chemical contraception involves the use o f spermicide. M echanical m ethods prevent
81- Jack H im m elste in , C om m entator, C ase  Stu dies in B ioeth ics: T he R ig h t to  R e fu se  P sy c h o a c tiv e  
Drugs, H a stin gs C enter R eport 3 [June 1973], 9 -10 .
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in filtra ting  sperm ; and surgical m ethods o f contraception range from  m enstrual 
extraction to s te r iliz a tio n .^
B irth control o r fam ily lim itation, in contem porary days, is a factor affecting 
the character and well being o f m odern societies. Consequently, it is involved with 
the lives o f  the individuals in m any ways, and birth control in m odern tim es is 
playing a key elem ent in planning for the future. ®
The practice o f birth control was for so long regarded as being outside legitim ate 
boundaries o f sc ien tific  study, that the com parative assessm en t o f d iffe ren t 
contraceptive m ethods, and even the overall evaluation o f fam ily planning practices 
are o f very recent d e v e lo p m en t.^
The advances in the scientific study o f contraception have been achieved by the 
developm ent o f laboratory techniques and elaboration o f contraceptive efficacy.
The legislative issue in relation to in birth control in England has been the extent 
to which local authorities and doctors working in the National Health Service should 
be allowed to provide contraception as a charge against public funds. A basic aim  of 
the early  birth contro l m ovem ent was to extend its m aternal and ch ild  w elfare 
functions by the giving o f contraceptive inform ation.
Partial success was achieved in 1930 w hen the M inistry o f H ealth, through its 
M em orandum  153 M C W , perm itted  ex isting  ch ild  w elfa re  cen tres  to give 
con tracep tive advice. Since then, there has been a record  o f  increasing  local 
authority subsidization o f the voluntary clinics through the provision o f ren t free 
prem ises and financial grants. ^
82- J. K . M ason , R . A . & M cC all Sm ith , M ed ico -lega l E ncyclop ed ia , B utterw orth L on d on  1 9 8 7 , p. 
122.
83- O rest and  P atricia  R unum , P opular A ttitudes to W ard Birth C ontrol in P re-in du stria l F rances  
and E n g la n d . L on d on  19 7 2 , 66 .
84- John P ee l, T ex t of Contraceptive Practice. C am bridge at the U n iversity  press 1969 , p. 35  .
8 5 - M . A . P y k e , E ugen  R ev .5 5 [1 9 6 3 ]
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The M inistry o f Health's ruling was that doctors m ay provide free advice to any 
wom an who requests it, but that free contraceptive supply m ay only be prescribed 
for those who require them  on m edical grounds; for social cases a charge m ust be 
made.
The N ational Health Service [Family Planning] Act o f 1967 now in the National 
Health Service Act 1977 rem oved that som ew hat inadequate distinction but only in 
the field o f local authority provision; in the hospital services and in general practice 
it rem ained the same, though it becomes meaningless with the adoption o f the three- 
tier system  as envisaged in the M inistry's Green P a p e r - ^  W hether free or not, to 
date the supplying o f contraceptives to a w om an is a m atter betw een her and her 
doctor. O bviously there is no legal or ethical obligation to obtain the consent o f a 
husband w hen the treatm ent is given on m edical grounds. H ow ever, it was 
w orthw hile to bear in mind that to use contraceptive or undergo sterilization w ithout 
the consen t o f the spouse could  lead to d ivorce p roceed ings on the basis o f 
unreasonable behaviour.
An exam ple has been seen in the case B axter v. B a x te r .87 In this case the wife 
refused  to perm it in tercourse  unless the husband used con tracep tives, but the 
husband objected. W hen the case reached to the House o f Lords she was supported.
In the case o f children the position is not clear. By the Fam ily Law Reform  Act 
1969 section 8[3], the legal age of consent is apparently given as 16 years o f age. Yet 
a child under 16 years may very well understand what is involved in m any proposed 
m edical treatm ents and may be able to give a valid consent.
W ith  respect to giving contraceptive advice to a girl under 16, a docto r is
unlikely to face prosecution where he has in good faith prescribed contraceptives. At
the sam e tim e, he has to attem pt to convince her to inform  her fam ily  o f  the
86- N atinal H ealth  S e r v ic e  the A d m in istra tiv e  Structure o f  M ed ica l and R e la ted  S e r v ic e s  in 
E ngland &  W ales [H M SO  L ondon 1968].
87- B axter v . B axter [1948] A . C . 274 .
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situation*00
Nowadays it is more or less easy to obtain contraceptives for an adult, but some 
obstacles m ight still arise with regard to m inors. In the U .S., the Suprem e Court's 
first com m ent on a m inor's righ t o f access to birth  control cam e in C arey  v. 
Population Services In ternational.89
In that case, the court quashed a part o f the New York law that prohibited the sale 
or d istribu tion  o f non p rescrip tion  con tracep tives to m inors under 16. F our 
m em bers o f the court agreed that the "right o f privacy in relation to the discussions 
affecting term ination extends to m inors as well as to adults....and since a state may 
not im pose a covering  prohib ition  or even a covering requirem ent o f parental 
consent on the choice o f a m inor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality  o f 
a co v e rin g  p ro h ib itio n  on the d is tr ib u tio n  o f  c o n tra c e p tiv e s  a fa r tio r i 
fo re c lo se d ."^
The four judges also found that allowing a m inor to obtain contraceptives from  a 
physician gives the physician absolute and possibly w ilful consideration  over the 
rights o f a m inor and that such pow er was impermissible.
The o ther three m em bers o f the court agreed with the result o f  the case but for 
other reasons.
This leaves m any questions to be answered and possibly states will still be able to 
regulate m inor's access to contraceptives m ore strictly than w ould be allow ed for 
adults.
The m ost reasonable practice is to encourage m inors to involve their parents in 
the decision m aking, but it m ust be appreciated that m any m inors can not, or will 
not, accept parental involvement.
In these circum stances, physicians w ould have to decide w hether or not to
8 8- P o iso n  G ee  and K night, T he E ssen cia l o f  Forensic M ed ic ine  [4th E d .], N e w  Y ork 1983 , p. 6 3 4 .
89- C arev v . P opu lation  S erv ice  In ternational. [1977] 431 U . S. 6 7 8 ,6 9 3 -6 9 4 .
90- ibid pp. 6 9 3 -6 9 4 .
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prescribe contraceptives in the absence o f parental involvem ent. In fact, the legal 
risk is small if  the physician does so with the m inor's consent, especially  when the 
m inor is m ature. If there is a problem , it is that he m ay have difficulty in collecting 
paym ents in the absence o f parental consent.
The doctor is under a legal and moral obligation not to disclose inform ation o f a 
patient without his consent. Although not yet English case reported on such situation, 
it is worthenoting case of Kitson v. P l a y f a i r . 9 *  but it is clear thatthe court w ould be 
preparedto restrain the dissem ination or use o f such inform ation in an appropriate 
case. The judgm ent o f the House o f Lords in G illick v. W est forfolk & W isebech 
AH A.92 regarding contraceptive advice and treatm ent to m inor, recently  affirm ed 
the duty o f confidentiality.93
H ow ever,the doctor regardless the lawyer, has no privilege which prevents him  
from  disclosing inform ation in court o f law. D octors are com pelled  w itnesses in 
re la tion  to their p ro fessional know ledge. N otw ithstand ing  judge  respec ts  the 
confidences received by a doctor in relation to his professional know ledge, and will 
not be directed to answer, unless it is not only relevant and necessary.94
7.12 C onsent to Sterilization
Sterilization involves the term ination o f the ability to reproduce. S terilization 
m ay be the desired result o f a surgical operation, or be undertaken to rem ove a 
d iseased reproductive organ o r to cure a particular m alfunction o f such an organ. 
W here the reproductive organ is not diseased, m ost sterilizations are effected  by 
vasectom y in the case o f males and tubal ligation in the case o f females.
V asectom y is a procedure that m erely shuts o ff the flow  of sperm  cells. A tubal
91- T h e T im es 2 8  M arch 1896.
92' G illick  v. W est forfolk & W isebech  A H A  [ 19861 A C  112.
93- S e e  T he Scottish C ases o f  A  B v. C  D  [1851] 14 D  177 & A  B v. C D  [19041 7 F 72.
94- A . H . G en . v . M ulholland & Foster [1963]1  A ll E R 7 6 7 , 771.
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litgation is the cutting o f the tube that connects the ovary and the uterus, and it leaves 
only a small likelihood o f pregnancy through a natural r e c o n n e c t i o n . ^
Sterilization o f both males and females is becoming a routine m atter. V asectom y 
is not regarded as a totally therapeutic situation, but tubal ligation in the fem ale is 
usually considered as having a medical p u rp o se .^
The legal position in the U K at present is that sterilization, for w hatever reason, 
social, m oral or eugenic is lawful, on the basis o f voluntary and com petent consent of 
the ind iv idual ob tained , w ith the understand ing  o f  the consequences o f  the 
procedure.97
V olun tary  con tracep tive  sterilization  o f unm arried  m inor patien ts presents 
special p roblem s so law s concerning the consent o f m inors should be carefully  
observed But if  a person is suffering from  disease resulting in incom petence and 
ought to be sterilized, can he/she give a valid consent? A lso it w ould appear that 
parents are not in position to consent to a non-therapeutic operation on a m inor.
In the case o f Re D [a m inor]99 an application was m ade to m ake a young girl a 
w ard o f court in o rder to prevent an operation for sterilization being perform ed. 
The girl was a m inor and the m other was in favour o f the operation. The court heard 
the application, and after hearing the m edical evidence, decided that the operation 
should not be carried out, because it was likely that she would be able m ake her own 
choice in later years.
It is interesting to note that the doctor who recom m ended the operation was not 
represented at the hearing as he was not a party to the proceedings.
Both the English and Scottish Defence Organisations have advised their m em bers
9 5 . M ason  &  Sm ith , op. c it., at p. 532 .
9 6 - K n igh t, o p .c it ., at p. 2 3 2 .
97 - ib id  at p. 533 .
98 - E . g. C o lo  R ev . Stat. 8 8 4 -9 3 2  [19791.
99- S o lic ito rs Journal [1975] V o l. 119 p. 6 9 6 ,1 0  Oct.; [1976] 1 A ll E .R . 326.
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on ethical issues with regard to sterilization in the form  o f birth c o n t r o l ’^ 0  It is 
unlikely if  it would ever have been criminal in Scotland owing to a lack o f evil intent. 
Specifically vasectom y has now been perm itted under the N H S [Fam ily Planning] 
A m endm ent A ct 1972. H ow ever, M yers po in ted  to  the d iffe ren ce  betw een  
sterilization and castration. His view was that the latter is an offence that consent can 
not legalize.
An additional problem  is o f civil liability in the case o f unsuccessful sterilization. 
It m ay be a problem  in relation to sterilization, since it is not alw ays certain  even 
after sterilization that fertility will not occur. Rarely some techniques are found to 
be inefficient.
In all these instances before consent can be valid the party should be inform ed of 
the risk  o f failure. If the operation was properly undertaken, and the procedure was 
done by an accepted com petent m em ber o f the m edical profession, then the chance 
o f a subsequent pregnancy is minimal.
I f  so, in w hat circum stances w ould the reversal o f sterilization occur? An 
exam ple can be found in the case o f Thake and another v. M aurice .102 The husband 
and wife lived together and agreed to avoid any additional bearing o f children. The 
husband consulted  a surgeon for vasectom y. The surgeon assured him  that the 
procedure was lasting and he would be perm anently sterile.
Consequently, the spouse signed a form  which gave consent to the operation o f 
vasectom y on the first p laintiff [husband], stating that the nature o f the operation had 
been explained to them  by the defendant [surgeon], that they had been told that the 
object o f the operation was to render him  sterile and incapable o f parenthood and 
that they understood the effect o f the operation was irreversible.
The operation was perform ed in 1975 by the defendant, and a few  m onths later
100- B ritish  M ed ica l J o m a u l. 1960  II, 1516.
101- D . W . M eyers, T he H um an B ody and the L a w . [19 7 0 ] E dinburgh, U n iv ersity  P ress, p. 18.
102- T hake and another v. M aurice [1984] 2  A ll E .R . P. 513 .
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the test showed his ejaculation to be sperm free. U nfortunately, the second plain tiff 
becam e pregnant, but failed, until it became too late for abortion.She bore a healthy 
child in 1978. M oreover, tests showed that the first p laintiff was again fertile.
The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant claim ing that their contract 
with defendant was not simply a contract to carry out vasectom y, but to sterilize the 
first p la in tiff perm anently.
The case analysed whether there is inefficient perform ance, m isrepresentation of 
inform ation, or contractual negligence. Finally, the judge said that the failure to give 
a w arning was plainly breach o f the contractual duty and awarded plaintiffs £9,677.
The m ain failure was the surgeon's failure to warn that the vasectom y could be 
follow ed by natural regaining o f fertility, but the other neglected onus was not to 
check after a num ber o f m onths. There would have been possible a proper procedure 
w hich includes adequate follow  up, in exam ining at least every  fo rtn igh t. The 
estim ated am ount aw arded was for the cost o f a layette and the upkeep o f baby 
daughter to the age o f 17. By the time this case cam e before the Court o f Appeal in 
Nov. 1985 [1986],103 this issue had been ruled on by the Court o f  A ppeal in July 
1984, in E m eh v. K enssington  and C helsea and W estm in ste r A rea  H ealth  
A u th o rity .104 The C ourt agreed with Pain J. and rejected the reasoning o f Jupp J. 
saying that it was fo r the Parliam ent to legislate for public policy and the court 
should follow the established rule on recovery o f dam ages. In Gold v. H aringey A. 
H. A .^ ^  the p la in tiff  bore a further child  in 1982 a fte r nature  reversed  an 
operation to sterilize her. She had not been warned o f this possibility nor counselled 
on alternatives to the operation she agreed to.
This case raised for first tim e in the clearest form  the question, is a surgeon
103- T hake v. M aurice [1986J2 W  L  R 337.
1 0 4 -[1 9 8 5 ]  Q . B . 1012.
105- [19 8 7 ]3  W L R  6 4 9 , C A.
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obliged to divulge the failure rate o f sterilisation before the operation? The day after 
the birth o f  her third child Mrs. G old was sterilised. The defendants said she was 
w arned o f the failure rate but the judge found that the risk  o f natural reversal o f 
vasectom y is low er than that attached to fem ale sterilisation. The expert evidence 
m ade it clear that in 1979 there was a body o f responsible m edical opinion that did 
not warn; so the simple application o f the Bolam test.106 the medical standard, would 
m ake it im possible for a court to hold that the surgeon had been negligent. This 
despite the fact that all the experts, including the consultant in question, said that they 
regarded it as good practice to warn and would always do so.
The im portant conclusion o f the judge was that the B olam  test, as confirm ed 
latter by the H ouse o f Lords in the Sidaway c a se ,107 was confined to therapeutic 
situations, i.e. situations where the doctor is concerned to treat the patient and where 
therefore there was a real need for him  to balance carefully w hat he should tell the 
patient prior to any operation or treatm ent.To tell too m uch m ight alarm  and deter 
when the patient, in his opinion, really needed the treatment.
The m ain point claim ed by M rs. G old was that the operation was negligently  
carried  out. In addition, the doctors had failed to warn her o f  the failure  rates o f 
fem ale sterilization, accepted as being 2 per 1000, o r 6 per 1000, if  carried  out 
im m ediately after childbirth . In com parison the failure rates for m ale vasectom y 
were m uch lower at about 5 per 10,000.
On the first ground the court held that the p lain tiff had failed to prove that Dr. 
A rzanghi, w ho carried out the operation, had been negligent. B ut the judge w ent on 
to hold the defendants liable on another ground. He held that they ought to have 
w arned  the p la in tiff  that the operation  m ight not succeed, and ought, in the 
circum stances, to have m entioned the alternative o f vasectom y. If they had, then,
106- B olam  v. FH M C  [1957J2 A ll HR 118.
107- S id aw av  v . Board o f  G o vem ers o f  the B ethlem  R oval H ospital [1985] A  C .871; H L.
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according to the ju d g e ’s findings, the p la in tiff w ould not have consented to the 
operation, and M r. G old w ould have been vasectom ised instead. T herefore, the 
defendants were negligent not to have w arned o f the risk o f failure. He aw arded 
dam ages o f £19,000. The defendants applead.
The Appeal was allowed. Lloyd LJ said the judgm ent would be reversed on both 
grounds. The judgm ent was wrong to hold that the Bolam test was an exception to the 
ordinary rule in actions for negligence. The test was the ordinary rule in actions for 
negligence. Since the test was the standard o f the ordinary skilled m an, it applied to 
all aspects o f m edical treatm ent. There could be no distinction betw een therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic  treatm ent. First, the d istinction was 'e lusive.' A distinction 
betw een advice given in a therapeutic and non-therapeutic context would m ove away 
from  the principle on which the Bolam test was itself based. The princip le  did not 
depend on the contex t in which any act was perform ed, o r any advice given. It 
depends on a m an or wom an professing skill or com petence in a field  beyond that 
possessed by som eone on the clapham  omnibus. If the giving o f contraceptive advice 
required no special skill, then there was an argum ent for saying that the Bolam  test 
should not apply. But that was not, and could not be suggested. The argum ent that the 
giving o f contraceptive advice m ight require a different sort o f skill and com petence 
from  the carrying out o f a m edical operation did not apply. The doctor's duty o f care 
in relation to diagnosis treatm ent, and advice, w hether the doctor was a specialist or 
GP, should not be dissected in to parts: "To dissect a doctor's advice in to that given 
in a therapeutic context and that given in a contraceptive context w ould be to go 
against the whole thrust o f the House of Lord's majority decision in S idaw ay."108
Lloyd LJ found no justification for the judge's statem ent that there was no body 
o f m edical opinion which w ould have failed to m ention a risk  o f failure in post­
partum  sterilization. On the evidence, there was a body o f responsible o f m edical
108- G old  v. H aringev H ealth A uthority T198713 W LR  P .657 .
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opinion w hich w ould not have w arned o f the failure o f fem ale sterilization nor 
m entioned possible a lternatives. The court, therefore , found it unnecessary  to 
consider w hether an adequate warning had been given to the p laintiff by her doctor.
The Court o f A ppeal m ade it clear that it w as not in this case called  upon to 
decide whether it was desirable or not that a plaintiff should be able to claim  damages 
for the birth o f a healthy child.
D ifficu lt ethical problem s m ay arise, in respect o f sterilisation if  the patient is 
m entally  subnorm al and/or a m inor. This m atter was highlighted in 1975 by the 
publicity  surrounding an 11 year old Sheffield girl whose operation was forbidden 
by a court o rder.109 The issue here is that children below the age o f 16 are not, by 
law considered com petent to give consent to an operation. In addition the operation 
is not therapeutic but is done for personal and social reasons. M ost doctors m ay 
believe it is w rong to operate in such cases in any circum stances; it is preferable to 
try to educate the child or persuade her, if need be, to use contraceptives, or to carry
out an abortion. Parental ability to persuade, even in the m entally  subnorm al 
may be effective.
O n the o ther hand, there are m any degrees o f m ental subnorm ality , and
Gardener* * * does not consider that it is alw ays realistic to refuse sterilization, for 
there are cases w here a severely  retarded  girl, even under c lose  paren tal or
institu tional care, has becom e pregnant. It is im portant that any such operation
undertaken on som eone who is unable to give consent should be d iscussed on as
broad a basis as possible with all those who have the w elfare o f the patient at heart.
judgm ent to
W hat is not legally perm issib le is for the doctor on his ow n clinical
109- S o lic ito rs Journal [19 7 5 ] V o l. 119 , 10 O ct. p. 6 96; R e  D  [ a m inor] [W ardship: S ter iliza tion ]  
[1976] 1 A ll E .R . 326 .
110- Journal o f  M ed ic in e  E th ics . [1975] C hild  Strilization  1 163.
111- G ardener, R . F. R . [1976] Journal o f  M ed ical E th ics, 2 99.
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112carry out a sterilization operation on a m inor even with the patient's consent. A 
num ber o f cases have recently reached British Courts, which confront the problem s 
o f w ho, if  anyone, has the authority to authorise the sterilisation o f the m entally 
handicapped.
In one case a fem ale o f 35, w as m entally -hand icapped  and had a sexual
relationship  with another m entally-handicapped  m inor m ale. The m other o f the
patient feared that she could become pregnant, and that she would not understand the
responsibility  o f this as a norm al person. Pregnancy, abortion and contraceptives
were dangerous for her health, so the m other decided that her daughter should be
sterilized so that she could enjoy her liberty to have sex without becom ing pregnant.
The m other asked the judge to let her daughter be sterilized. The judge agreed in
the interest o f the m entally handicapped patient.
Therefore, where, on a court's order, in good faith, and in the best interest o f  the
patient, an operation to sterilize the m ental-handicapped patient is carried out, the
113sterilization w ould not be unlawful due to lack o f the patient's consent.
In a sim ilar case T. v. T  and another a w om an of 19 years o f age, was 
m entally  hand icapped  and was pregnant. She w as an ep ilep tic  and cou ld  not 
understand her responsibility  for caring for a child  so the m other and the doctor 
decided to term inate the pregnancy, in her best interests. But before perform ing the 
abortion [and subsequent sterilization] the doctors w anted the m other and get an 
order from  the court because the M ental Health Act 1983 did not say any thing about 
an abortion perform ed on a m entally handicapped person. A lso the fetus was big and 
it w as considered  dangerous to abort through the vagina. T he m other got a 
declaration  from  the court allow ing doctors to operate and sterilize the pregnant 
daughter.
112- T h om son  W . A . R ., M ed ica l E th ics and P ractice. B risto l, John W right, [1 9 7 7 ], p. 34 .
113- R e  F  'In depend ent' 6  D ecem b er  1988.
114- T . v . T  and another [1988] Fam . 52.
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In Re B \ am inorl wardship: sterilization ^  A m entally handicapped girl aged 
17 years who had a mental age o f six, and whose ability to express herself was that of 
a tw o year old child, had been under the care o f a local authority . She had no 
understanding  o f the connection betw een sexual intercourse and pregnancy and 
birth, and w ould not be able to cope with birth nor care for a child  o f  her own. She 
was not capable o f consenting to marriage. She was, however, beginning to show the 
norm al sexual drive and inclinations for someone o f her physical age.
There was expert evidence that it was vital that she should not be perm itted  to 
becom e pregnant, but contraceptives should not prescribed since these drugs would 
react with the drugs adm inistered to control her m ental instability and epilepsy.The 
local authority, which had no wish to institutionalize her, applied to the court for her 
to be m ade a w ard o f  court and for leave to be given fo r her to undergo  a 
sterilization operation.
The official solicitor, acting as the m inor's guardian ad litem, did not support 
the application, on the grounds that it was difficult for him  to agree that the stage had 
been reached where sterilization should be the course adopted, as opposed to the Pill. 
He said, through counsel, that 'we ought to try to m eet the girl's problem  by control 
procedures, stopping short o f sterilization .'116
T he C ourt granted the application, d ism issing the appeal o f the solicitor. The 
official solicitor's appeal was dism issed by the House o f Lords on the grounds that 
the au thority  w as not com petent to judge w hether sterilization o f  the m entally  
incom petent should be adopted as desirable for general social purposes.
I f  on considering  the facts, sterilization, was for the w elfare and in the best 
interests o f the m inor, the court had jurisdiction to authorize the operation.
115- R e  B fm inorl W ardship: Sterilization  1 9 87 /2  W . L. R. P. 1213.
116- ib id  at pp. 1 2 1 8 -1 2 1 9 .
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7.13 Conclusion
In general, any unconsented-to touching, even a touching for the purpose o f 
providing m edical care , is techn ically  the in ten tional to rt o f  battery . F or the 
re q u is ite  c o n sen t to be v o lu n ta ry , it m ust be o b ta in ed  w ith o u t frau d , 
m isrepresentation, or undue coercion. For consent to be valid, the patien t m ust be 
both legally com petent, i.e. o f  proper age, and m entally competent. The definition o f 
m ental com petence to m ake decisions regarding m edical treatm ent [or any other 
individual decision] varies from  ju risd ic tio n  to ju risd ic tio n , bu t is genera lly  
considered a m edical judgm ent, creating som ething o f conflict o f in terest for the 
person seeking consent to treatm ent. All jurisdictions recognize that in an em ergency 
the requirem ent o f consent does not stop treatm ent, either reasoning that the consent 
is im plied by the circum stances or simply waived altogether in em ergency situations.
The requirem ent that consent be inform ed is m ore com plicated, both in term s of 
its legal defin ition  and in term s o f the practical im plications for providers. In 
general, com m on law [ o f which there is not a great deal concerning the definition o f 
inform ed consent] requires that the patient be given sufficient inform ation upon 
which to m ake an intelligent and inform ed choice. A t the least, the inform ation  
includes a d iscussion o f the alternatives, the risks o f each alternative , and the 
likelihood o f various outcomes.
But w hether or not a decision is properly inform ed is analysed in v irtually  all 
ju risd ic tions  not as a failure  to obtain consent p e r  se and therefore  under the 
definition o f civil b a tte ry , but in term s o f the provider's duty to obtain  consent; a 
failure sufficiently  to inform  the patient is, therefore, analysed as negligence in 
perform ing this duty. Thus the critical questions are defining the standard o f conduct 
for the provider, determ ining w hether that standard was violated, and determ ining 
w hether under the circum stances a violation o f the standard o f conduct actually [and
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proxim ately] caused dam age to the patient. The im plications o f analysing inform ed 
consent under negligence principles for the potential o f liability are significant, but 
often lost on the provider comm unity.
These im plications are not gone into here, since the aim  of this section has not 
been to describe in depth legal technicalities. Rather, as with as with each o f the 
chap ters in this part o f the d issertation , consent is used as an exam ple o f the 
m echanism s available to, and used by, the law to set standards for, and to control, 
m edical practice.
The question o f consent to treatm ent, as with negligence in general, is virtually 
exclusively  dealt w ith by com m on law principles. The legislature has - w ith the 
exception o f the m entally ill - shown no inclination to to intervene. This m eans of 
dealing with a m edico-legal issue is, in a sense, less effective than legislation, since it 
leaves m uch m ore scope for the discretion o f individual judges to shape a body of 
law. In addition, it m ay leave the practitioner in a less certain position. A rguably, 
how ever, this rem ains the only legal m echanism  suited to the sensitiv ity  and 
com plexity o f the m atters under consideration.
The next chapter will focus specifically on the way in which law intervenes in 
m atters which are fundam entally ethical.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T  
C onsent and Procedure Affecting R eproductive C apacity
Som etim es m edical ethics is approached by focusing on special issue areas such 
as abortion, sterilization and contraception. These areas have been dom inant among 
the issues o f m edical ethics for a num ber o f years. Though the specific problem s 
have changed with the introduction o f new laws, court decisions and attitudes, these
rem ain at the core o f ethical problem s. ^
These areas are sensitive because o f their effect on the individuals involved and 
because o f the intense political and social controversy concerning them. They have 
been recognized by the courts as being a fundam ental aspect o f the right o f privacy 
of the individuals involved. H ow ever, the divergence o f m oral and religious views 
concerning the propriety o f these procedures has led to social controversy. Som e 
believe that their view s should be public policy and should be enforced through the
legal system. ^
One of the concerns in m edical ethics that has created the m ost serious debate is 
the problem  o f abortion. This section discusses this issue and its legal and ethical 
implications.
8.1 A bortion
P rio r to 1803, the term ination o f pregnancy in England was punishable as a 
common law m isdem eanour. In 1861 the Offences Against the Person Act was passed. 
Sections 58 and 59 in particu lar form ed the basic prohib itory  regu lation  against
1- R obert M . V ea tch , C ase  S tu d ies in M ed ica l E th ics. H arvard U n iv ersity  p ress, C am b ridge 1 9 7 7 , 
p. 167.
2- ibid.
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abortion p ractice.^
It was an offence to procure or attem pt to procure an abortion.
The A ct subsequently has been the subject o f various judicial decisions. Perhaps 
the m ost notew orthy o f all, from  an historical as well as a legal-sociological point of
view , is the case of. R. v. B ourne.^ This 1938 case postulated  the law fullness o f 
abortion to preserve not only the w om an's life but also her m ental health. The 
defendant, Dr. Bourne, was cleared by a ju ry  for term inating the pregnancy o f a 
woman on the basis that she would become a mental ruin were she required  to carry 
out the full term  o f pregnancy
The post-w ar desire  for social change resu lted  in the im plem entation  o f the 
Abortion A ct 1967.^
U nder the A ct it is provided that if  two doctors, in good faith, have certified in their 
opinion that the risks to the physical or m ental health o f the wom an or her children 
are greater if  the pregnancy continues than are those o f term inating the pregnancy, 
then the pregnancy can be terminated.
The law  states that, in determ ining w hether continuation o f the pregnancy would 
constitute a risk  to her health, consideration m ay be taken o f the pregnant wom an's
3- S e e  International D ig e s t  o f  H ealth L eg isla tion , v o l. 30  [3], p . 401: see  se . 58  o f  the A ct 1 8 61 . E very  
w om an, b e in g  w ith  ch ild , w h o , w ith  intent to procure her o w n  m iscarriage, sh a ll u n la w fu lly  adm inister  
to h e r se lf  any  p o iso n  or other n o x io u s  th in g , or sh a ll u n la w fu lly  u se  an instrum ent or other m ean s  
w h a tso ev er  w ith  the lik e  intent, and w h o so ev er , w ith  intent to procure the m iscarriage  o f  any w om an , 
w hether sh e  be or n ot b e  w ith  c h ild , shall u n la w fu lly  adm inister to her or ca u se  to  be taken by her any  
p o ison  or any other n o x io u s th ing, or sh all un law fu lly  use  any instrum ent or other m eans thatsoever w ith  
the lik e  intent, shall be gu ilty  o f  fe lo n y ...
S ection  59  p rescribes that: W h o so ev er  un law fu lly  su pp ly  or procure any p o iso n  or other n o x io u s th ing, 
or any instrum ent or th ing  w h a tso ev er , k n o w in g  that the sa m e is  in ten d ed  to  b e  u n la w fu lly  u sed  or 
em p lo y ed  w ith  intent to  procure the m iscarriage o f  any w om an , w hether she be or be not w ith  ch ild , shall 
be gu ilty  o f  a m isd em ea n o r ...
4- R . v . B ourne 1 K . B . 687  [1939J3 A ll E. R. 615  [1938].
5- T he W ork in gs o f  the E n g lish  A bortion  L aw  are d iscu ssed  in depth  in the three v o lu m e  report o f  the 
com m ittee  o n  the w ork ing  on  the A bortion A ct kn ow n as L ane R eport [L ondon: H er M ajest’s Stationery  
O ffice  [1974].
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actual or reasonably foreseeable surroundings.^
The language of the Act combines both a mental health indicator with a social and 
econom ic indicator to balance the effect o f another child not only on the w om an but
also on her existing children. H ow ever, the A bortion Act 1967 specifically  
incorporates the Infant L ife Preservation Act 1929 which lays down the offence of 
child destruction.
The Act m akes it an offence for any person, by any wilful act, to cause a child 
capable o f  being born alive to die before it has an ex istence independent o f its 
mother. It is not so, however, if  the destruction is effected by an action which is done 
in good faith solely for preserving the life o f the mother. Pregnancy for 28 w eeks is 
prim a facie proof that the child was capable o f being bom  alive*^
It is w orth noting the distinction betw een Scots and E nglish  law- a basic 
differences lies in the emphasis on statute and case law in England in contrast to the 
pre-em inence o f  com m on law of Scotland. [To which the 1929 Act does not apply]. 
In E ngland the A ttorney G eneral m ust institute crim inal proceedings if  there is a 
prim a facie case that a statutory crime has been committed.
In Scotland, however, the Lord Advocate, [Crown Office] will first have the case 
investigated by the procurator fiscal and as a result m ight or m ight not take crim inal 
proceedings.
In E ngland all such m atters were brought before either m agistrates’ court to decide 
whether there was a prim a fa c ie  case or a coroner's court in the case o f  death from  
an operation. In the fam ous Bourne case the gynaecologist carried out an abortion 
and then as a test case invited the police to charge him with the crim e o f procuring an 
abortion. This could not have happened in Scotland. A doctor would either be found
6 - S h eila  MrT r .n n  and M aher. M ed ic in e . M orals and the L aw , E ngland G ow er 1985 , p. 35 .
7- Section  1 {1} {2} o f  the A ct 1929.
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guilty o f crim inal action or nothing w hat ever would be heard o f the case as all
follow  up o f a good faith case are to be held in private. In addition, there are further
differences in Scotland W here the allegation was an attem pte abortion the w om an
would have to have been shown to have been pregnant, but not In England; 2. the
intention to com m it a crim e m ust be established. 3. unless the w om an died in such
circum stances inquiry w ould not be raised either by the police  or p rocura to r to
initiate proceedings; and 4. if  good faith is accepted the m atter ends there.^ 
addition there is no time lim it im plied or expressed under Scots Law.
The Abortion Act 1967 has already altered the position o f case law to statute law 
transform ed the circum stances in England and W ales, but m ade little d ifference to 
the freedom  surv iv ing  in Scotland, apart from  the requ irem en t to notify  all 
term inations o f  pregnancy to the ch ief M edical O fficer o f the Scottish H om e and 
Health D epartm ent and to Registrer Nursing Hom es, carrying out such operations.
A bortion  is now  legal in England , W ales and Scotland but only  in the 
circumstances stated under the Act 1967 section 1 [1] [2].
The Legal Aspects o f Abortion in the U S A
Law s regulating abortion in the U. S. are relatively recent, products by and large 
o f around  the m iddle o f the nineteenth  century. In 1800 nothing w as enacted 
regard ing  abortion. By 1900 nearly  all states had in estab lished  law s against 
abortion.^
The U nited States Suprem e Court iconsidered abortio in the landm ark cases o f Doe 
v. B o lto n .10 and R oe v. W a d e .11 the fo llow ing situations appeared  in their 
respective states.
Doe v. Bolton challenged a Georgia State Statute as an unconstitutional violation
8- M . S im m s & K. H in dell, A bortion  L aw  R eform ed . Peter O w en , L ondon 1 9 71 , P. 14.
9- S e e  J M ohr, for a H istorica l Study o f  A bortion in the U . S ., A b ortion  in A m erica . T h e  O rig in s  
and E valuation  o f  N ation a l P o lic y , [O xford 1 978], 1 8 0 0 -1 9 0 0 .
10- D o e  v. B olton  4 1 0  U  S ., 35 L. Ed. 2d  2 0 1 ,9 3  s Ct. 7 3 9 ,4 1  U . S . L. W  [1 9 7 3 ], 4 2 3 3 .
11- R o e  v. W ade 4 1 0  U . S . 35 L. E d 2d 1 4 7 ,9 3 . S C t 7 0 5 ,4 1  U . S. L. W . 4 2 1 3  [1973].
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o f the right o f  a m arried pregnant woman to decide w hether to bear a child to full 
term. The action was brought to enjoin the state o f G eorgia from  enforcem ent o f its 
abortion law.
R oe v. W ade challenged a Texas S tatute restricting  abortion unless it was 
necessary to safeguard the life o f the woman. It was pointed out that the statute was 
an unconstitutional violation o f a wom an's right o f personal privacy protected by the 
A m endm ents to the Federal Constitution.
These cases, determ ined by the U S Suprem e Court decided that the foetus is not 
deem ed a person having constitutional protection from  abortion. The potentiality o f 
life has been determ ined to occur at v iability  estim ated to occur at or about 28 
weeks.
Follow ing the Bolton and W ade decisions some states were urged to give a 
decision on sim ilar grounds. H ence the Federal Court o f A ppeal in Jane D oe and 
H erbert Sand M ire v. B eilin M om erial H o sp ita l12 held that a hospital w hich is 
regulated  by the state o f W isconsin and which received H ill- B urton Funds m ay 
refuse to perform  abortions w ithout violating the Civil Rights Act. The court held 
that there exists no constitutional objection to a state statute or policy which leaves a 
private hospital free to decide for itself whether or not it will adm it abortion patients 
or to determ ine the conditions under which such patients will be accepted. The court 
also stated that acceptance o f  the federal funds does not im pose on a hospital any 
conditions related to the perform ance or non-perform ance o f abortion.
Following the decision in Roe v. W ade 1973, abortion is now legal. The decision 
overturned all state statutes prohibiting abortion. As recently as 1973 abortion was 
illegal by state law. ^
12- Jane D o e  and H erbert Sandm ire v. B eilin  M om erial H ospita l. 7th C. A . [M ay 1973], 73 - C - 23 0 .
13- Fred M . F roh ock , Abortion: A C ase Study in L aw  and M o ra ls , L on d on , G reen w o o d  P ress 1 9 83 , 
p. 8.
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The Roe v. W ade decision clearly brought about the possibility o f lawful abortion in 
the U S. It also extended a rem arkable scope o f privacy that does not flow  away all 
understanding o f private choice and action. ^  The decision is a consideration o f the 
interests o f the state and o f wom an. Justice B lackm un appears to be searching for a 
m iddle ground betw een the state's enforcing interests in the protection o f prenatal 
life, its m ore general interests in the preservation o f the life or health o f the wom an, 
and the in terests o f the w om an in being able to decide w hether to continue or 
term inate her pregnancy.
T he search for m iddle grounds entirely fails, how ever as soon as the legal 
argum ent on interests leads to a m oral test, in this case viability , as the borderline 
between the state's enforcing interests and the woman's freedom  to m ake a decision. 
One m ight have w ished that interests w ould also have been assigned to the unborn, 
still w ithout m entioning rights to life. Then the court m ight have left to subsequent 
legal cases a determ ination o f what fetal interests are in such areas as property and 
inheritance law.
W hen the Suprem e Court issued its decision in Roe v. W ade .15 it said that "a state 
criminal abortion statute that excepts from  crim inality only a life saving procedure on 
behalf o f the m other w ithout regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition o f  the 
other in terests involved is v io lative o f the D ue Process C lause o f the fourteenth  
A m endm ents." The C ourt discussed three stages o f  pregnancy, concluding that the 
right o f privacy o f the patient and her physicians precluded m ost state regulation  
during the first trim ester but that the state's interest in protecting the patient's health 
and the potential life of the fetus perm itted some form s o f regulation in the later stages 
of pregnancy.
In the com panion  decision, Doe v. B o lto n . 16 the Court declared  a G eorg ia
14- ib id  at p . 66 .
15- 410 U. S. 113 [1973].
1 6 - 4 1 0 U .S .  179 [1973].
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abortion statu te to be unconstitu tional and fu rther defined the types o f  state 
regulations that are not perm itte:
In the first stage o f pregnancy, the state is virtually  w ithout pow er to restrict or 
regulate the abortion procedure; the decision to perform  an abortion is to be between 
the w om an and her doctor. H ow ever, the state may insist that abortion be perform ed 
by a legally licensed physician. So the righ t that any w om an has in the first three 
m onths is to seek out a physician w illing to perform  an abortion and, if  such a 
physician is secured, to have the abortion perform ed free from  intervention by the 
state. The state w ould require that all abortions be perform ed by licensed doctors 
and it should be outside hospital.
In the second stage in Roe v. W ade , the Suprem e Court stated that, "for the stage 
subsequent to approxim ately the end o f the first trimester, the state, in prom oting its 
in terest in the health  o f the m other, m ay, if it chooses, regu la te  the abortion 
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to m aternal health." 17
W hen final stage o f pregnancy has been reached, the Suprem e C ourt reasoned that 
the state had acquired a com pelling in terest in the fetus that could override the 
w om an's righ t to privacy and ju stify  stringent regulation , even to the ex ten t of 
prohibiting  abortions. The court form ulated  its ru ling as to the last stages in the 
follow ing way. "For the stage subsequent to viability  the state, in p rom oting  its 
interest in the poten tia lity  o f  hum an life, m ay if  it chooses, regulate, and even 
prescribe abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate m edical judgm ent, 
for the preservation o f the life o f health o f the m other." 18 Thus, during the final 
stage o f pregnancy, a state m ay prohibit all abortions except those deem ed necessary 
to p ro tec t m aterna l life  or health . The sta te 's  leg is la tiv e  pow ers over the 
perform ance o f abortions increase as the pregnancy progresses tow ards term.
17- R o e  v. W ade Supra Cit.
18- ibid.
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The effect o f the Suprem e Court's decisions has shown all o r parts o f alm ost 
everyone o f the state abortion statutes in existence prior to 1973.
H ow ever, a recent U. S. Suprem e C ourt ru ling  has underm ined  an A m erican  
wom an's right to an abortion by allowing the individual states to im pose restrictions 
on the availability o f abortion.
In W ebster v. Reproductive Health Service. 19 provisions o f the M issouri statute 
regulating the perform ance o f abortions were held not to be unconstitutional. The 
Court stated that the life o f each hum an being begins at conception and that unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being, and also m andated 
that the laws o f M issouri were to be interpreted as providing unborn children with 
all the rights, privileges, and im m unities due to other persons and citizens.
In the U. K., the Pro-life lobby has m ade many, but as yet unsuccessful, attem pts to 
am end the 1967 Abortion Act and abortion is not a party political issue in Britain.
In the U S A  the clim ate is very different, the decision in Roe v. W ad e20 has 
been challenged by the recent decision, in W ebster, in the view expressed that a] the 
trim ester and v iability  fram ew ork o f Roe v. W ade should be abandoned, so that 
although tests pursuant to the provision requiring viability testing w ould show as a 
fetus was not viable in many cases of testing and in second trim ester abortions as the 
provision needs viability testing was constitutional to protecte potential hum an life.
The W ebste r afforded the Suprem e Court no occasion to decide w hether to 
overrule Roe v. W ade , since M issouri had determ ined that viability was the point at 
w hich its in terest in potential hum an life m ust be safeguarded, w hereas, the Texas 
statute at issue in Roe crim inalized the perform ance o f all abortion except when the 
m other's life was at stake.
19- U n ited  S tates Su prem e C ourt R eports L a w y ers’ E d ition  V . 106L  [Ed 2 n d ], NO. 1 A u g u st 2 2 , 1989  
C aliforn ia , p. 4 1 0 .
20- R o e  v. W ade [1973] 4 1 0 U S  113 L [Ed. End] 1 4 7 ,9 3  S C t 705 .
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Abortion is both a m oral and a political problem .lt is not clearly an issue to be 
governed by individual judgm ent. It is not an issue easily regulated by social rules. It 
occupies that difficult space where m orality and policies interchange. Resolution o f 
the abortion issue will have to consider both moral and political considerations in all 
dim ensions o f the problem s which are to be addressed.
The issue o f abortion is central to the im portant and legitim ate interests o f any 
state in preserving and protecting the health o f the pregnant woman. But if  the choice 
leads to abortion w here it is necessary, in appropriate m edical judgm ent, for the 
preservation o f the life or health o f the m other, the law seeks to secure rights to 
abortion.
8.1.1 C onsent
It is generally understood that neither in law nor in practice is the process o f 
consent a single, clearly  defined entity. Consent is a foundation o f the relation 
betw een the physician and patient and m odulated by the degree o f risk, alternative 
treatm ents and the value o f the out come.
There is a wide range o f opinion as to the significance o f consent. Consent is a 
dynam ic process rather than an end in itse lf and is certain ly  a legal transaction. 
A ccording to the dynam ic model, consent is a process whereby inform ation is shared 
and integrated in a supportive environm ent in which the patient actively participates 
in so far as this is possible in understanding the inform ation surrounding risks and 
suspected probabilities o f success and failure, as well as inform ation o f m orbidity  
and m ortality, the proposed therapy and alternative therapies availab le .^*
Inform ation that is clear and distinct, provided in such a way that the patient can 
understand and appreciate its significance, with continually  renew ed opportunities 
for participation m ust be the key. The patient also plays an im portant part in this
2 1- D en n is A . R obbins. L egal Issu e and Ethical Issues in C ancer Care, Illin os 1983 , P. 147.
249
p ro ce ss , im p a rtin g  in fo rm a tio n  and re f in in g  h is u n d e rs ta n d in g  th ro u g h
22questions. ^
Choosing and consenting are not as problem atic as they m ay appear for patients 
who are com petent to m ake informed valid and com petent decisions. However, those 
situations in w hich it is unclear w hether a patient is com petent or in w hich he is 
clearly incom petent, or where there is a m arried relationship generate m ore serious
p ro b le m s .^
For exam ple, where the w om an is m arried and living with her husband, her
w ritten consent is essential and the m atter should be discussed with the husband,
though his perm ission  is not strictly  needed especially  if  the grounds are the
preservation o f the life or prevention o f injury to the w om an.24 W here the abortion
is perform ed for grounds including the health of the wom an or any existing children
then naturally her husband's view s are part o f the environm ent which m ust be taken 
2 5into account. ^
The decision is very difficult where the abortion is perform ed because o f the 
risk  o f  a seriously  handicapped child  being born, and the husband refuses his 
consent. H ow ever if  the doctors both believe in good faith that the term ination is the 
right course, they do not legally require the husband's consent and it seem s likely 
that the husband would not succeed in a civil action based upon the loss o f a potential 
heir
C onsent is not necessary from  the father or putative father o f  an illegitim ate
pregnancy nor from a com m on law husband. Consent is not needed from  the parents
o f an unm arried girl betw een 16 & 18, though it w ould be advisable to discuss the
22- ibid at p. 148.
2 ^~ ibid at p. 149.
24 - C . J. P o iso n , et al, T he E ssentia ls o f  Forensic M ed icine. O xford , P ergom en  1 9 7 3 , p. 6 3 5 .
2 5 - ibid.
2 6 -  G e o r g e  J. A n n a s, T h e  R ig h ts o f  D o c to rs  N u rses  and A llie d  H ealth  P r o fe s s io n a ls . B a llin g e r  
P ub lish in g  C o. C am bridge, M assachusetts 1981 , p. 2 03 .
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m atter with them  [if she consents], especially if she is living at hom e with them. 
W hen a girl is below the age o f 16, the parents should be inform ed w hether the girl 
wishes it or not.
In the case o f such young girls consent for such term ination should be obtained
from  the parents, but if  they refuse and the girl is o f su ffic ien t m aturity  to
understand the issues, her own desires should be upheld and paren tal refusal be 
9 7ignored. If  the parents o f a girl under 16 wish for her pregnancy to be aborted, 
but she herself is unwilling, her wishes are not to be overruled.
Respectively , the A bortion Regulations 1968 m ade under the A ct contain the 
follow ing provisions:
a] The form s to be used by the certifying practitioners are set up [Certificate A 
and C ertificate B] the latter is the one used in an em ergency. Certificate A m ust be 
com pleted before the operation and Certificate B m ust be com pleted not later than 24 
hours afterw ards. These certificates m ust be retained.
b] Notification o f all abortions must be made to the C hief M edical O fficer at the
M inistry  o f  H ealth  or his counterpart [in S co tland].^8  In case o f  request this
inform ation is to be given to the president o f the G. M. C. if  doctor is charged with
9Qserious professional m isconduct in relation to the Act.
On the question o f paternal rights in respect o f abortion, there was a case in 
1978 in Paton v. British Pregnancy A dvisory Service where a husband opposed 
his w ife having from  an abortion. She had without his consent obtained a m edical 
certificate to a lawful abortion under the terms specified in the abortion Act 1967.
The Judge said, since the unborn child has no rights of its own and a father has no 
rights at com m on law over his illegitim ate child, the husband’s righ t to apply for
2 7 - ibid.
2 8 - A bortion  [A m enedm ent] R egu lations 1980 [SI 198 0 /1 7 2 4 ].
29- A bortion  [A m endem ent] R egulations 1976 [SI 1976/15].
30 - [19 7 9 ] Q . B . 27 6 .
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injunction had to be on the basis that he had the status o f husband, and that the courts 
had never exercised jurisdiction to control personal relationships in m arriage. In the 
absence o f such a right enforceable at law or in equity to halt his wife having this 
abortion or to stop the doctors from  carrying out the abortion, the abortion went 
ahead.
In this respect the father seems to accept the doctor’s decision because he didn't 
challenge the certificate for an injunction at all circum stances. If  it had been an 
unlaw ful abortion it would lead to crim inal liability. He realised that as long as the 
docto r's  perfo rm ance is under the law  it w ould  be un like ly  to succeed  on 
prosecution.
How ever, the husband continued his argument to the European C ourt o f Hum an 
R ights,31 claim ing that his right to fam ily and the right o f the unborn child to exist 
has been challenged. How ever, the court rejected his claim , saying that the abortion 
w as carriedou t on techn ical grounds, the husband 's righ t to fam ily  life m ust 
necessarily be subordinated to the need to protect the rights and health o f the mother. 
The unborn ch ild 's righ t to exist was sim ilarly  subordinate to the righ t o f  its 
m other's, in least at the initial m onths o f pregnancy.
In any event, under English Law  a child has no rights and therefore no locus 
standi as a litigant until birth.
T his princip le  is not affected by the fact that, once born, the child  m ay have 
under the C ongenitional D isabilities Civil L iability  A ct 1976 rights in respect o f 
dam age done to it in the womb or to its parent before conception.
In C v. S 32 the Court o f  Appeal ruled that an 18-week fetus was not a child  
capable o f being bom  alive within the m eaning o f the Infant Life [Preservation] Act 
1929, so that an otherw ise lawful term ination o f pregnancy at that stage under the
31- [1 9 8 0 ]3  E. H . R . R . 4 0 8 .
32- C v . S  [19 8 7 ]2  W  L  R  1108.
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A bortion Act 1967 was not a crime. The appeal com m ittee o f the H ouse o f Lords 
later that day rejected all the argum ents o f the father who sought an injunction to 
stop his girl-friend from  having the abortion. It w ould appear therefore that their 
Lordships, as well as agreeing with the issue decided by the Court o f Appeal, m ust 
have been o f the view  that the father had no standing to interfere with the m other's 
p roposed abortion and that the fetus was not a legal person for the purpose of 
bringing an action through his father [sem ble any one] to restrain  the act w hich 
w ould destroy it.
In the circum stances o f a m inor fem ale who desires an abortion she m ust have 
consent o f both parents prior to receiving an abortion for the sake o f best interest o f 
the m in o r .^
In the Am erican case Bellotti v. B aired .34 the facts were that, a 15 year old girl 
had a child already under local authority care and again she becom e pregnant. Then 
she decided  to abort, and her doctor agreed w ith the p resum ption  that if  she 
continued with the pregnancy she w ould suffer m ental problem s and her existing 
child w ould face danger.
H ow ever, the father objected to the abortion as it was against his relig ion. The 
local authority  seeking authorisation, applied to the court and the court authorised 
the abortion to take place in the best interests o f the girl. This decision is sim ilar to 
the approach taken by the House o f Lords in G illick v. W est Norfolk and W isbech A 
H A .35 If  the girl is m ature, physically and m entally, the doctor m ay exercise his 
service on the grounds o f her consent
33- A n nas, op . c it., at p. 204 .
34- B e llo tti v. B aird . [1979] 4 4 4  U . S. 6 22 .
3 5 --G illick  v. W est N orfo lk  and W isbech  A H A  [1986] A C  112.
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8.1.2 C onclusion
It appears that abortion is the m ost controversial and com plex issue o f social 
policy and personal m oral responsibility.
The first point is the risks are enorm ous. If the indications for the righ t and 
responsibility  to have an abortion are present, the pregnant lady who is forced to 
have baby against her will m ay suffer econom ically as well as psychologically  or 
physically.
On the o ther hand if abortion is to be considered as a m oral abuse it is not 
correct, and am ounts to the wilful destruction o f the defenceless foetus.
The second issue in the problem  is who is in the position to decide on w hether an 
abortion is to be perform ed, whether legally or ethically. Certainly, decision-m akers 
are the pregnant w om an [on the first instance], the parent, and the physician, but 
obviously conflict m ay arise between any o f those groups.
The third aspect o f the different issues in the abortion debate is the righ t to 
control one's own body, or in the case o f the physician the right to practice m edicine 
as one sees fit. All these aspects need certain right o f consent. A right, as used in 
ethics and public policy, is som ething which one is expected to have as a m orally  
justified  claim . To claim  right is to claim  a freedom  and is m erely the righ t to act 
w ithout being restricted.
The issue o f abortion and protection o f the human fetus is a m ajor controversy in 
m ost countries. It concerns basic questions, amongst which are when life begins, the 
rights o f the state to im pose its policies over individuals, and what policies should be 
enacted to lim it population growth. And there are m ulti dim ensional contem porary 
issues bearing  on polic ies, law , science and re lig ion . In a rap id ly  chang ing , 
interdependent world the ways with which one country deals with abortion have an 
im pact on other countries.
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C H A P T E R  MI N E  
Acts Relating to Drugs, Poisons and M edicinal Product
The preceding chapters have principally shown how Com m on Law , som etim es 
w ith som e statutory input, can shape and control m edicine. The issues discussed 
concern m atters o f ethical and m oral im portance backed up by law. Interestingly, the 
control o f the com m on law in each o f these exam ples leaves a certain am ount of 
discretion to m edical practitioners, subject always to the standards laid down by the 
their ow n professional bodies. There are, how ever,som e situations w here the 
in terven tion  o f the law  is both clear and direct. An exam ple, dealt w ithin this 
chapter, is the law relating to drugs, poisons and m edical products.
In the U K the words drug and poison used without qualification are not defined 
in any statute. They cannot be interpreted as including anything capable o f being 
adm inistered to any person.That in effect, is the m eaning w hich is im plied in the 
O ffences Against the Persons Act 1861, where it refers to the "unlawful applying or 
adm inistering of...any chloroform  laudanum , o r other stupefying or overpow ering 
drug m atter o r thing ...and to the destructive or noxious thing w hich restric ts a 
substance o f arsen ic."1
W ider statutory control began with the Pharm acy A ct 1868 in w hich fifteen 
substances were specified as poisons and restrictions p laced on their sale. In law, 
poison simply m eans any substances or preparation included in the current statutory 
poison list.2
T he Pharm acy and Poison Act 1933 provided for a poison list in parts. Those 
poisons in part 1 are substances mainly used in m edicine, and in part 2 substances in
1- S e e  O ffen ces  A gainst the P resons A ct 1861.
2- S e e  P harm acy A ct 1868.
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com m on household, agricultural or industrial use. Their use and distribution were 
controlled by a variety o f Dangerous Drugs Acts com m encing with the D angerous 
Drugs Act 1920, however, D D D's deals with specific drugs.
T he m anufactu re  o f vaccines, sera, toxins and certain  o ther therapeu tic  
substances has been controlled by licence since 1925. Later when pencillin and other 
an tib io tics  cam e in to  use it w as found necessary  to con tro l not on ly  their 
m anufacture, but also their supply because o f the dangers caused by indiscrim inate 
use.
The Therapeutic Substance Acts 1956/8 defined them  as substances capable of 
causing danger to the health o f the com m unity if used without proper safeguard. The 
A ct perm itted  supply to the public  only on the au tho rity  o f  a p rac titio n er 's  
prescription. A ntibiotics and other therapeutic substances were therefore controlled 
in a m anner not dissim ilar to poisons, but they were not in the poisons list.The sale or 
supply o f vaccines, sera and toxins were not restricted in any w ay.4
Controls becam e m ore varied and complex because o f extensive developm ents in 
pharm aceu tical research  and a consequen t increase  in the num ber o f  po ten t 
substances available. M edicines cam e to be regulated as substances likely to be 
harm ful in one way or another and it was felt that they ought to be regulated, subject 
to som e exceptions.T hey  should be controlled as a class quite separately  from  
poisons. W hilst this developm ent was taking place there was an upsurge in the misuse 
o f drugs generally and the dangerous drugs legislation was found inadequate to deal 
with it. So all the legislation relating to medicines, drugs, and poisons was recast and 
all the statutes m entioned above except the O ffences A gainst the Person Act 1861 
w ere replenished.
T here are now  three principal statutes. The M edicines A ct 1968 contro ls the
3- J. R . D a le  & G . F. A p p e lb e , P harm acy L aw  & E th ics  [3rd  E d .], T h e  P h a rm a ceu tica l P ress , 
L on d on  1 9 83 , Introduction p. xi.
4 - S e e  T he T herapeutic Substance A ct 1956.
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m anufacture and distribution o f m edicinal products, w hilst the Poison A ct 1972 
controls the sale o f non-medicinal poisons. The M isuse o f Drugs Act 1971 deals with 
the abuse o f controlled drugs.
9.1 M edicine Act 1968
T he A ct regu lates the m anufacture and d istribu tion  o f  m edicinal products 
w hether for hum an or anim al use. It is concerned with their safety, quality  and 
efficacy.
A m edicinal p roduct is defined  in section 130 as a substance  o r article  
m anufactured, sold supplied, im ported or exported for use by adm inistration  to 
hum an beings to be used for medical purpose.
The definition also extends to ingredients in certain circum stances and there is 
pow er in the Act to extend the definition.
An advisory body called the M edicines Com m ission advises the M inister on the 
adm in istra tion  o f the A ct. There are also adv isory  com m ittees, such as the 
Com m ittee on the Safety o f M edicines, the Veterinary Products Com m ittee and the 
British Pharm acopoeia Com m ission. The M edicines Com m ission is responsible for 
the preparation o f the British Pharm acopoeia.^
9.2 M isuse o f  D rugs Act 1971
The M isuse of Drugs Act 1971 replaced and extended the D angerous Drugs Acts 
and the D rugs [Prevention o f M isuse] Act 1964. The Act and the regulations m ade 
under it tightened the control over certain drugs and in troduced new  provisions 
relating to classification o f drugs, irresponsible prescribing and the collection o f 
inform ation about the m isuse of drugs.
An advisory council on the m isuse o f drugs set up under the A ct keeps drug
5- S ee  M ed ic in es A ct 1968 [s. 2].
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abuse under review  and advises the Secretary o f State on any necessary restrictions 
on drugs, on education, rehabilitation and treatm ent. The A ct also provides greater 
powers for the m aking o f regulations on various aspects o f drug control.
D rugs subject to the Act are term ed controlled drugs and are classified as A ,B,C, 
according to their relative harm fulness.6
In the m ain, the Act prohibits all activities in connection with controlled drugs, 
but provides that regulations may relax these total prohibitions, special licence being 
required for their law ful possession.7
The intention o f the Act is that, to have in possession or to supply to others any 
controlled drugss is an offence [SS 4 & 5]. U nlessotherw ise authorisation has been 
obtained from  an authorised person.
Legally the assumption o f possession has been described by Lord W ilberforce in 
the case o f  W arner v. M etropolitan  Police C om m issioner8 The c rite ria  fo r a 
lawful possessor is one who fully controls the substance with absolute aw areness of 
its physical availability, situation and its quality, before it has been delivered to him. 
It m ust still rem ain under his control until it has passed to another in the respect o f 
the A ct's requirem ent.
But in W arner's case possession was not according to the direction, thus he had 
unauthorized possession o f a drug seized from  the defendant which was contained in 
a box w hich he knew to contain something. His defence was he did not know what. 
The appellant w as charged with having drugs in his possession w ithout being duly 
authorized, contrary to the Act.
W hile he was driving a van carrying illegal drug he was stopped by police who 
had evidence o f the substance inquestion. Taking considerable time for argum ent the
6- S e e  M isu se  o f  D rugs A ct 1971, Schedu le 2.
7- [L icen ce  F ee] R egulations 1985.
8- L aw  R eports A ppeal C ases [1969]2  2 5 6  [A. C. ]
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House o f Lords decided that the appellant was guilty.
Im port and Export o f controlled drugs is prohibited except under licence by the 
Secretary o f  State. Production, supply and offering to supply are prohibited except 
when perm itted by regulations. The regulations therefore relate to the legitim ate use 
o f controlled  drugs and for these purposes classify them  into four schedules. This 
classification is o f m ore practical im portance to practitioners, pharm acists and other 
workers than class A, B, and C, in the Act which are for the purpose o f penalties.
9.3  N on-m edicinal Substances
U nder the Pharm acy and Poison Act 1933 a poison Board was established to 
advise the Secretary o f State on w hat should be sold by retailer only at pharm acies, 
and also by traders on a local authority list.
One o f the m ain feature o f the 1933 Act was the establishm ent o f a disciplinary 
body [ the S tatutory C om m ittee]. Proceeding under the A ct w here to be taken in 
C ourts o f  sum m ary  ju risd ic tio n .9 E ventually  this A ct w as rep ea led  by the 
M edicine Act 1968. The Poison Act 1972 deals only with non-medicinal po isons.10
Since 1968 the statutes relating to medicines, poisons and drugs have been almost 
entirely  repealed  and rep laced  by new legislation. The M edicine A ct 1968 now 
controls the m anufacture and distribution o f m edicines.11
It has been noted that the M edicines Act 1968 gives definition only on m edicinal 
su b stan ces, w hereas the ea rlie r  A ct dea lt w ith  n o n -m ed ic in a l po ison  and 
adm inistration o f anything noxious th in g .12 For exam ple the presum ption that a 
m edicinal substance could be noxious was held in R.v. M arcu s13 which involves the 
adm inistration o f sleeping pills. In R. v. C ato14 heroin caused death and was upheld
9- P harm acy and P o iso n  A c t 1933.
10- P o iso n  A c t 1972.
11- M ed ic in e  . A ct 1968.
12- W Iillia m s G ., T ext B o o k  o f  C rim inal L aw . [2nd Ed.] L ondon, S teven s 1983 , p. 2 1 0 .
13- [1981] 1 W L  R 774 .
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on appeal to be noxious.
Therefore, the law looks likely to conclude that the drug is a substance that has the 
ability to affect the brain as a result o f a narcotic. On the o ther hand it does not 
include all substances o f that character, but depends on the quantity, adm inistration, 
and design o f the substance.
9.3.1 T reatm ent
The practice o f m edicine has becom e increasingly scientifically  based. New 
dim ensions are, thus, introduced and new dilemm as posed. It is patently obvious that 
scientific m edicine can not im prove without extensive research w hile on the other 
hand the process tends to turn m edical practice into a series o f  problem  solving 
exercises- a diversion which even now stim ulates som e o f m edicine's m ost severe 
c ritic s .15
H ow ever, the developm ent o f drugs to relieve or prevent suffering has becam e a 
boom  industry. In the 2 0 th century countless m illions o f lives have been saved by 
these p roducts o f  m odern m edicine, not ju s t in the west, w here national health 
services are established, but also in developing countries. In these lands the rising 
cost o f drugs is a m uch greater strain on the econom y. It is clearly  expensive for 
nations w ithout their own drug industry to rely on im ported m edicine.
As the W orld H ealth Organization stresses, drugs are essential tools for health 
care and for the im provem ent o f the quality o f life. Some key m edicines prevent the 
people o f poor countries from  unnecessary suffering and prem ature death. ^
B ut in m ost countries, rich and poor alike, drugs are produced  and sold by 
private business. So even life saving m edicines are subject to norm al m arket forces.
14- [1 9 7 6 ]1  W . L. R. 110.
15- J. K . M ason  &  R . A . M cC a ll Sm ith , L aw  and M ed ica l E th ics [2nd  E d .] , B utterw orth s, L ond on  
1 9 8 7 , P . 9 .
14- D . M elrose, B itter P ills  M ed ic in e  and T he 3rd W orld  Poor. O xfam , E ngland 1 9 82 , p. 15.
2 6 0
In developing countries the m ass o f the poor lack purchasing pow er, so they have
little im pact on the dynam ics o f the drug m arket. Consequently, the type o f drugs
m arketed m ay bear no relation to a poor country’s m ost pressing disease problem s. 
17
The developm ent o f new drugs in recent years has brought im m easurable benefit 
to m ankind com pared to fifty years ago. A recent m edical graduate treats m any 
patients m ore successfully, as a result o f m ore efficient drugs. A lthough m arketing 
o f a new drug after satisfactory confirm ation o f its safety is desirab le, the final 
evaluation o f safety is only possible after it has been adm inistered to a variety  of 
patients. The approval o f the administrative authorities is thus only a parole and the 
process for safety testing is continuous through the whole life on a drug. ^
The clinical safety o f the drug encom passes the inform ation supplied  by the 
m anufacturer as well as the information that physicians com m unicate to the industry, 
ensuring continuous m odification o f the information o f drug s a fe ty .^
E xperts m ust ensure that the general public are protected from  unfam iliar and 
potentially  harm ful drugs. W hether physicians, especially in developing countries, 
are curren tly  aw are o f these responsib ilities rem ains questionable. Presum ably , 
inadequate laws and regulations are com bined with incom petence on the part o f the 
m edical practitiners. M edical education itself may need im provem ent in this respect.
9.3 .2  C lin ical T rials o f N ew  M edicines
The application o f new m edicine requires that m anufacturers have to ensure that 
any m edicinal products have fulfilled certain conditions laid down in rules applied to 
establish some criteria which have to be m et before official registration, m arketing
17- ib id  at p 27 .
18' T. Soda, D rug-Indu ced  S u ffer in g s . A m sterdam -O xford -prin ceton  1 9 8 0 , p. 5.
19- ib id  10.
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and approval o f the standards o f quality, efficacy, and safety takes place.
The law has intervened through the establishm ent of the Com m ittee on Safety of
M edicines [M edicines Act 1968], to ensure that a pharm aceutical m anufacturer must
dem onstrate the quality, effectiveness and relative safety o f the new drug, and m ust
to this end assure that analytical pharm acological, toxicological and clin ical tests
21have been perform ed in accordance requirem ents, prior to m arketing.
22
F o r exam ple  in R obinson v. Post O ffice w here a p la in tiff  developed  
encephalitis as a result o f an allergic reaction to an anti-tetanus injection a doctor was 
sued for being a negligent in not adm inistering a test dose o f an ti-tetanus serum  
before injecting with it a patient who had developed encephalitis, which led to brain 
dam age and paralysis.
T herefore,the  defendants w hose negligence w as responsible for the orig inal 
injury where held liable to com pensate him. In sim ilar circum stances a physician was 
liable for not having checked records or asked the patient w hether she was allergic
prior to adm inistering an injection o f procain pencillin .23
It w as the physician 's obligation to know  the com position and structure o f  the
new drug provided by the m anufacturer, as he is the only person w ho is capable o f
generating an assum ption on the effect o f the new drug on his patient's health. Since
the effect differs from  one another, it would be unreliable to depend on the result o f
clinical drug evaluation as com m unicated by the m anufacturer.
It is also his responsibility  to check if  another m edicine could produce the same
effect. If  a docto r fails to know  w hether his pa tien t possib ly  has had a drug
2 0 - S h e ila  A . M . M cL ea n , L ega l Issu es in M e d ic in e . in G . B . by  B id d le s  L td , G u ild fo rd , Surrey, 
19 81 , P .1 1 5 .
2 1 - ib id .
22- R ob in son  v. P ost O ff ic e  1197412 A ll E .R . 7 37  [C. A .l; W iteringham  v. R ae [1963J55  D . L . R. 
2nd
21- M ale  v. H opm ans [1 9 6 7 ]6 4  D . L .R . 2nd [ont C. A .], 105.
22- C h in  K eo w  v. G overnm ent o f  M alvsia  [1967] 1 W . L. R. 813 .
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adm in istered  fo r a long tim e w hich  m ight endanger his health , apart from  
m isadventure, this is a breach o f the high standard o f care required , and dam age
caused by this failure will make the doctor liable for dam ages to the p a tie n t .^
9.3 .4  Best T reatm ent or L east T reatm ent
In an in teresting  article in the O ct 1974 issue o f the Y ale scientific journal 
entitled  "Iatrogenic D isease: The physician as P athogen ,"25 a m edical student 
nam ed Alan Coiner gathered together m any references to show advances in m edicine 
can also bring about problem s. Although increasing the num ber o f transfusions may 
result in saving the lives o f those who might otherwise die o f anem ia or hem orrhage, 
the risks o f viral hepatitis follow ing blood transfusions raise  grave doubts as to 
w hether there isn't such a thing as over use o f transfusions. The follow ing narrative 
history illustrates that professionals tend to take the easiest o r m ost routine course 
and that som etim es the ignorance o f the lay consum er m ay have an unexpectedly 
wise effect.
A young boy with congenital heart disease was urgently in need o f heart surgery, 
and the surgeons were accustom ed to using eight pints o f blood to com pensate for 
blood loss while the patient was undergoing surgery. In this case the surgeons could 
not get consent as the fam ily belonged to a religion that banned blood transfusion. 
A fter heated argum ent eventually they offered to w ithdraw  the child 's blood prior to 
surgery, circulating it outside the body in plastic containers while they circulated a 
com plex salt solution through the child 's blood vessels during surgery. A fterw ards 
they would restore his own blood into his own body.
T he parents agreed, provided that the blood was never wholly rem oved from  the
2 3- C rossm an v . Stew art [1978J82 D. L. R. 677 .
2 4 - A . G eo rg e  A . S ilv er . A Spy in the H ouse o f  M ed ic in e . G erm antow n, A spen  S y stem s C orporation,
U S A ,  1976 , p. 20 8 .
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child 's body, in that a needle w ould rem ain in the vein so that there w ould be 
continuing contact. To the parents this would m ean that the blood he received back 
would be his own blood. The surgeon agreed, and the operation was perform ed in 
this way, The child survived and the surgeons learned from  the experience that they 
could dispense with eight pints o f blood; transfusions w ould now be needed only 
rarely during this type o f open heart surgery.26
9.3 .5  S ide E ffects o f Drugs
Sim ilar kinds o f stories might be told about a variety o f o ther m iracle substances 
w ithout w hich one w ould think that m odern surgery or m edicine could  not be 
practiced. A ntibiotics, for exam ple, are probably used too m uch. Som etim es even 
the w rong ones are used when another [or none] m ight be required. Chlorom ycetin, 
w hich is essential for the treatm ent o f typhoid  fever, should  not be used in the 
treatm ent o f any other disease that is not life threatening, because in a significant 
num ber o f  cases this drug m ay paralyze the bone m arrow , p roducing  a lethal 
anem ia. Even som e necessary  drugs carry w ith them  percep tib le  dangers o f 
m orbidity or fatality. If the patient is told of the possible consequences and still elects 
to have the drugs, then the physician has certainly done his duty. The patient has been 
warned and freely chooses to take the risk. A naesthesia, for exam ple, carries with it 
dangerous side effects. H ow ever during surgery anesthesia is generally  required. 
T he lea s t d angerous and m ost ca re fu lly  co n tro lled  use o f  an aesth e tics  is 
recom m ended o f course.
There are also instances where treatm ents intended to help patien ts are later 
found to be dangerous or destructive. In the early days radiotherapy was used rather 
w idely, before the long-term  effects were known. Radiation o f pregnant w om en to 
determ ine the position o f the fetus was considered extraordinarily useful and even
26- ib id  at p. 2 6 9 .
26 4
necessary in obstetrics. But it turned out that a significant num ber o f children who 
had suffered this radiation in uteri later developed leukemia.
Synthetic estrogen [stilbestrol], was used in pregnant wom en who suffered from 
threatened abortion. This is a clinical description o f a situation in which a w om an 
starts to bleed early  in pregnancy, w ith a strong possib ility  that she will lose the 
child. The use o f stilbestrol stopped the bleeding and seem ed to allow  the w om an to 
continue to carry the child  to term. It was used alm ost routinely  and som ew hat 
carelessly w henever w om an in early  pregnancy com plained  o f cram ps w ith the 
threat o f abortion, even if  they did not bleed. Recently it has been shown that the use 
o f stilbestrol in early pregnancy resulted in a significant num ber o f the children bom  
developing genital cancers in early adult life.27
M any other drugs have harm ful side effects on the patient. W here their use is 
absolutely necessary and the patient has been warned of the possibilities, certainly the 
drug should be used. The problem  is whether we know enough about their effects, to 
be able to weigh risk versus benefits and proceed to recom m end them.
It m ay be that in the long run the best treatm ent is the least treatm ent. It m ay be 
that the w isdom  o f some o f the o lder practitioners who relied  upon "The H ealing 
Pow er o f N ature", should be applied m ore frequently today, especially  since 25 or 
30 percent o f patients in hospitals are there because o f som ething the doctor did. It 
m ust be added quickly  that it is not necessarily  because o f  som eth ing  he did 
w rong.28
A lthough the contribution may be small, m odern practitioners can benefit from  
the know ledge and experience o f indigenous healers, particularly in the use o f herbal 
m edicines that can provide sim ple and ready  availab le  trea tm ent. T herefore, 
in tegration o f m odern and traditional practices has the advantage o f m axim izing
26- ib id  at p. 209 .
2 7 - S ilv er , op . c it., p. 2 6 9 .
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available skills and im proving traditional practices to safeguard health .29
H ow ever, in any event, the dem and for treatm ent lies in the hands o f doctors, 
who will have had no control over the production or investigation o f the product, but 
on w hose shoulders the burden o f alertness to adverse effects and the general 
problem s o f patient care w ill rest. And with his ex tended  responsib ility , "....the 
physician has come to stand as the guardian for his patient, protecting him  from  the 
thousands o f offered and advertised rem edies that range from  the harm less to the 
dangerous produced by those who seek wealth."30
U nderstandably, this has proved to be a com plicated  and d ifficu lt task  w ith 
regard to com pensation unless a new system of liability is introduced or the controls 
are tigh tened .31
H ow ever, legislation is in place concerning new m edical products concerning 
requirem ents for the testing, m anufacture and m arketing o f products, to safeguard 
the public by ensuring that all products m eet the standards o f quality, efficiency and 
safety which are acceptable in the state of present knowledge and experience.32
M oreover, the in itia l clin ical tria ls  o f  new  drugs ra re ly  p ro d u ce  ideal 
in fo rm a tio n , s ince  they  are p rim arily  geared  tow ards m ee tin g  the  lega l 
requirem ents. The law has intervened in the control o f the m arketing and production 
o f new  drugs v ia the establishm ent o f the Com m ittee on Safety o f M edicines, with 
overall responsib ility  for supervision in the area, and for the control o f p re ­
m arketing research and tria ls.33
C ertain ly , it is w orthw hile to consider on the o ther hand the possib ility  that 
drugs rather than helping or curing to some extent are doing harm.
2 8 - M elrose , op. c it ., at p. 126.
3 0 - M cL ean  op. c it., at p. 122.
3 1 - ib id  p. 122.
3 2 - M cL ean  op. c it., at pp. 122-3 .
3 3 - M cL ean  op. c it., at p. 115.
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C H A P T E R  T E N  
CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS
A s m ost o f the preceding chapters already contain their own conclusions and 
sum m ary on the m atters dealt w ith, in this short concluding chapter an attem pt is 
m ade to sum m arize the overall tone o f the research study which review s various 
aspects o f the developm ent, and operation o f the law relating to health [health law]. 
Exam ples have been used to show the variety o f legal m echanism s used to control the 
practice o f m edicine.
T he m aintenance o f health through the enforcem ent o f law both national and 
international has becom e a topic o f w idespread interest and concern, especially after 
the creation o f W orld H ealth O rganization. From  that tim e onw ards, the growth in 
the m ovem ents for hum an rights and the right to health have been closely correlated.
The developm ent o f medical science and practice over the last century can truly 
be ca lled  revo lu tionary . The h istory  o f m edicine and m edical e th ics is best 
understood w hen set against this background. As far as legislation is concerned, it 
should  be seen chiefly  in term s o f the com m on good; o f  ju stice  for all and the 
protection o f society's basic values.
To gain a clear understanding of present-day health care it is necessary to look at 
the h istorical events w hich have led to the form ulation o f curren t policies. For 
example, a m ajor feature among them  in the U nited Kingdom  was the establishm ent 
o f National Health Service, which along with other factors, has produced the benefits 
o f the health system now implemented.
D isregarding the proposed reform  o f the present N H  S, consideration o f the law 
and health policies shows that the British health care system  has evolved over the 
years increm entally . H ealth  services in the U. K. have developed  through an
2 6 7
accretion o f public program m es for health care, the old continuing along with the 
new, as well as through m edical research and technology. The success o f the health 
care system  in preserving people's health by protecting them  from the diseases which 
ravaged form er generations is one o f the outstanding achievem ents o f this country.
Since 1948 the establishment of the N H  S has provided an additional wide range 
o f program m es which m ade m edical treatm ent and care available to all, regardless 
o f their ability to pay in accordance with m edical need, and by no other criteria.
As stated before, health is an im portant factor in the developm ent process and 
there are com plex in terrela tionsh ips betw een health  and o ther socio-econom ic 
factors : its interaction with preventive, curative, education, research and legislation 
and population growth are prim e examples.
Such interrelationships m ade it inappropriate to look at health along with the rest 
o f the developm ent process so that the problem s of planning could be sim plified at 
national and local level. An approach is needed, therefore, through which a strategy 
can be developed which relates health to developm ent in the broadest possible way.
This entire process should be guided by consideration for the poorest sectors o f 
society, something o f which the proposed changes in the N H S take little account and 
which has given rise to the present opposition o f the British M edical Association and 
others on this matter.
D octors and other concerned com m entators fear that the present proposals will 
dam age patient care. They seek reform s based on sound planning through the careful 
identification o f objectives, thinking in term s o f alternative program m es, perhaps 
s tudy ing  the  U S ca tego rica l health  care  system s - th e ir  advan tag es  and 
disadvantages. W ithout such careful planning they feel the existing health policy 
structure m ay be dam aged, and all in all, the governm ent's proposed reform s will 
not achieve their expected ends.
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In connection with the health service it is also necessary to consider controversial 
issues arising from certain m edico-legal problem s discussed in the thesis.
In sim ple terms, the purpose o f m edicine may be seen as m aintaining the patient 
in the best o f health, dealing with his disease if  any, and enhancing his life span; the 
purpose o f law is to maintain the peaceful order o f society.
The m ajor part o f what the physician does in professional life falls within an area 
of legal laissez-faire [to let do as they choose]. The physician is free to conduct m ost 
o f his affairs w ithout legal restraints and com pulsion. But his freedom  from  legal 
control does not m ean that the m edical man is actually free to conduct h im self in all 
respects as he chooses. M edical organizations have long since been form ed which are 
invested with extensive control over the behaviour and rela tionsh ips o f m edical 
practitioners w ithin the area o f legal laissez-faire. The individual practitioner is not 
free to conduct his professional affairs as he likes, sim ply because there are no legal 
directives to guide his behaviour. He must conform  to codes o f ethics and other rules 
established by organization within his profession.
These codes and rules define the proprieties as regards dealings with colleagues, 
with assistants, with hospitals, and with patients.
The m edical profession perform s a public service and benefits itse lf too when it 
assum es responsibility for its m em bers. From  the view point o f the legal system  this 
professional control over professional conduct has the distinct advantage that it takes 
up the discip linary  burdens which w ould otherw ise have to be assum ed by legal 
agencies, and it is in the interest o f the profession as a w hole to see that each 
practitioner lives up to the high ideals o f m edicine. The conscientious and honorable 
m em bers o f the profession suffer for the m isdeeds and carelessness o f their errant 
brothers by being exposed to public hostility, and even unnecessary lawsuits.
On the o ther hand it m ust be realized that the law is serving as an instrum ent
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furthering professional objectives. And finally, the law has adopted the standards of 
m edicine as the criteria o f proper m edical skill and care. Its criteria are the standards 
o f m edical practice in the com m unity. The standards change with changes in the 
practice o f m edicine. The content o f the legal standards is determ ined by m edical 
opinion [as it has been seen in the Bolam te s t].1 Thus, even where the practice of 
m edicine is regulated by law, the legal regulations usually originate with the attitude 
of the m edical profession itself and their shape and application are determ ined by the 
standards and ideals of medicine.
H ow ever, the m arriage o f law and m edicine has not been one o f  continuous 
connubial bliss. M edicine has often had to fight for its point o f view and sometimes it 
may have overreached itself.
The considerations o f m edicine have becom e m ore and m ore im portant in legal 
cases and legal considerations have becom e o f secondary  im portance. Legal 
technicalities which had previously created difficulties in cases involving m edical 
m atters have been m ostly removed.
Also the authority to make decisions in legal cases has been given to experts who 
specialise in m edical policy rather than being left in the hands o f ju ries  w ho are 
laym en. M oreover, judicial decisions have been substantiated by legislation as the 
principle m eans for developing procedural and substantive rights in m edico-legal 
problem s. This allows a m uch m ore efficient, caring m ethod for the com plex issues 
arising  from  the industria lized , urbanized and highly  technolog ical society  o f 
m odern man.
H ow ever, there are still difficulties when m edicine faces law, and the doctor may 
yet encounter serious problem s w hen involved in legal cases. U sually  he is the 
principal witness upon which legal decisions are based.
1 - B o la m  v. Friern H o sp ita l M a n a a m e n t C o m m ittee  [19 5 7 ]2  All E R 118 ,  [1957]1  W  L 
R 5 8 2  at 5 8 6 .
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But his experience in the court-room  m ay lead to d isturbing elem ents in his 
attitude tow ards the law, and m ake him reluctant to take part in the legal process at 
all, as the physician's relationship with the law yer m ay be a tim e-consum ing one. If 
faced w ith ill-prepared law yers or postponed trials, the rela tionship  is under an 
additional strain should the doctor feel his time is being wasted.
H ow ever, the doctor him self is liable to scrutiny from  his ow n governing body, 
the G eneral M edical Council, which regulates the conduct o f doctors through laws 
relating to m edical practice. D espite this, there are grey areas o f m edical practice 
where it is the doctor's own conscience which sets the lim its o f his conduct, although 
the British M edical Association through its Ethical Com m ittee attem pts to deal with 
some o f these aspects. However, it has no authority over non-m em bers, and can only 
set an exam ple and draw attention to new problems.
It is recognized that every patient has a right to determ ine w hat is done to his or 
her body, and the law firm ly upholds this principle. This leads on to the notion of 
confidentiality, a vital elem ent in the relationship betw een patient and doctor, for if 
the patient is to feel that he can safely and frankly talk to his doctor and m ay divulge 
some inform ation which he wants the doctor to keep secret, then he m ust be sure that 
the doctor w ill not divulge this inform ation w ithout the patien t's  p rio r consent. 
D espite the doctor being governed by the H ippocratic Oath and the D eclaration of 
G eneva requiring him  to keep such inform ation secret forever, situations m ay arise 
w here the doctor is under pressure to divulge inform ation. It m ay be that a doctor 
would wish to discuss a case with his colleagues, in order better to treat his patient. 
The doctor m ay feel that m edical confidentiality as m uch preserves the relationships 
o f trust and confidence between doctors them selves as between doctors and patients.
D espite all this, and several exceptions to the rule o f confidentiality approved by 
the General M edical Council, the present law on confidentiality is vague and doctors
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and patients m ay look at the issue from  differing standpoints. A lthough a doctor is 
responsible to the patient with whom  he is in a professional relationship, he has an 
overriding duty to society, so that if asked in court of law to give evidence, he cannot 
refuse on the grounds that he would breach confidence in so doing. In some cases the 
law  actually requires the doctor to divulge inform ation obtained under the special 
doctor-patient relationship. Refusal to give such inform ation m ay result in crim inal 
prosecution.
If  a doctor attends a patient who is suffering from  any notifiab le  disease or 
whom  he knows has com m itted some crime, then he is required by law to inform  the 
relevant authorities. This duty can be illustrated by the case o f H unter v. M an n .2 
w here the docto r refused to give the police the nam es o f two people that he had 
treated , w ho w ere suspected o f the offence o f dangerous driving. A lthough the 
doctor claim ed he had a duty o f confidentiality tow ards his patients, and could not 
d isclose their nam es w ithout their consent, he h im se lf w as charged , and later 
convicted, because the court refused to recognized that the confidential relationship 
between doctor and patient afforded the doctor any defence in such a case.
The law states that, despite a doctor's duty regarding confidentiality , these are 
exceptions where his duty towards his patient is overriden by his duty to society. In 
such a case he m ust divulge without his patient's consent, inform ation which he has 
gained in his professional capacity. A doctor may voluntarily disclose inform ation in 
such a case, but if  the law  requires him  to act in the public in terest by disclosing 
inform ation then he m ust do so.
T he G eneral M edical C ouncil p rov ides m uch o f the  g u idance  on, and 
enforcem ent o f  confidentiality in practice. A lthough the G M  C has the pow er to 
reprim and a doctor who has been in breach o f confidence, the patien t who is the 
aggrieved party m ay not be adequately com pensated. For this reason, the law m ust
2 -[1 9 5 7 ]  S C  200.
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intervene in order to safeguard a patient's interests. The G M C itse lf m ay need a 
court's ruling in order to devise proper guidelines for doctors especially in cases o f 
d ifficult nature, e.g. the G illick  ^ case in which a question o f confidentiality  arose 
over the consent o f a 16 year old girl. Follow ing the C ourt o f A ppeal's decision, the 
G M C amended its recommendations.
The patient's interest is o f param ount im portance and some provision for checks 
and balances is unavoidable. Therefore, legal procedures have to be im posed on the 
relationship o f a doctor with his patient.
It has been said that the U nited K ingdom  is lacking in p roper guidelines on 
m edical ethics, for example, in the field of the patient's consent to treatm ent.
It has proved difficult to determ ine the nature o f the consent a doctor m ust obtain 
from  his patient, particularly where there have been changes in m edical practice and 
the doctor/patient relationship. In such a com plex area, there is a need for a doctor’s 
conduct to be regu la ted  by an ou tside body, not to underm ine the docto r's  
relationship with his patient, but to ensure that the patient's interest is well looked- 
after.
There are m any areas where a doctor's conduct cannot be regulated by codes o f 
ethics alone. Consent is one aspect o f a person's autonom y, where, subject to a few 
exceptions, in the context of m edical ethics, a doctor m ay not touch o r treat another 
w ithout his consent, otherw ise such action m ay result in a claim  for dam ages. To 
safeguard himself, a doctor must make sure that the consent he obtains from  a patient 
is both voluntary and "informed" consent.
The doctrine o f "inform ed" consent, how ever is an A m erican idea w hich has 
never been accepted as part o f English law. In the United K ingdom , to get proper 
consent, a doctor has a duty to inform  his patient o f the m aterial risks involved in the 
proposed treatm ent so that the patient has all the inform ation to give a valid consent.
3- G illick  v. W est N orfo lk  and W esbech  A . H. A . [1986] A . C . 112.
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H ow ever the law does recognise that the doctor has the defence o f 'therapeutic 
privilege' where he need not disclose everything. But doctors m ust not forget that a 
patient's rights are governed by law, and not by the profession. It is the patient, not 
the doctor who is to decide w hether the form er is to undergo an operation  or not 
basing his decision on the inform ation disclosed by the doctor.
The M aster o f the Rolls once said in Sidawav v. G overnors o f the Bethlem  Roval 
H ospital4 that "the law w ill not perm it the m edical p ro fession  to p lay G odT  
There is clearly a need for a patient to be adequately inform ed before consent can be 
given, and the patient w ill have recourse to law  should he feel a doctor has been 
negligent and m ade insufficient disclosure o f inform ation.
In the ligh t o f this, there are fears that doctors m ay reso rt to "defensive 
m edicine" if  they feel that the courts are im posing too high a standard o f  care on 
them , and for this reason that some argue that it m ay be better to leave the m edical 
profession to determ ine its own conduct.
A s the judge  in " S idaw av  says, "doctors m ay inevitably  be concerned  to 
safeguard them selves against claims, rather than concentrate on their prim ary duty 
o f treating their patients."6
As a resu lt o f  this, doctors m ight be biased about the law, and be inclined to 
regard it with deep suspicion.
Doctors m ight feel that lawyers, although ignorant o f m edicine, w ould tram ple 
underfoot the sensitive area o f doctor-patient relationships in their desire to enforce 
the law on m edical m atters. In addition to this, a doctor's clinical know ledge m ay be 
overriden by the ruling o f a judge who him self has no m edical experience. Law yers
4- S id a w a v  v. Board o f  G ovem ers o f  the B ethlem  R oval H ospital [1985] A  C .871; H  L.
5- C harles J. L e w is , M ed ica l M alpractice: A  P la in tiffs  G uide. G . B . P rinted by  A . W heaton  & C o. 
L td ., E xter  1 9 8 8 , p . 2 0 5 .
6- S id aw av  v . Board o f  G o v em ers o f  the B ethlem  R oval H o sp ita l, supra c it., at p. 887; H L.
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are p ro tected  from  disclosing inform ationto  a court o f  law for the sake o f their 
c lient,7 w hereas doctors have no such professional protection, and can be found 
guilty o f professional negligence by the courts.
It m ay be that a situation will arise in the U nited K ingdom , sim ilar to that found 
in the U S A where professional indem nity prem ium s are astronom ical and doctors 
are virtually forced to practice defensive medicine.
D espite this, there are those who see positive aspects in defensive m edicine. They 
argue that it m ay lead to good m edical practice since the doctor w ill inform  the 
patient m ore fully, and the patient will therefore be in a better position to consent to 
treatm ent or not. H ow ever, fears that the practice o f defensive m edicine will spread 
from  the U S A to this country m ay be groundless, as the tw o countries have w idely 
d ifferent system s o f m edical practice. In A m erica, defensive m edicine m ay be a 
m ethod o f boosting incom e, for exam ple, by the ordering o f diagnostic tests which 
are unnecessary. The only way to justify  the extra procedure aim ed prim arily  at 
charging higher fees is to blam e the legal system for its intervention.
W hatever the position , good m edical practice requires in form ation  o f risks 
involved in treatm ent to be disclosed. G ood patient-care cannot be achieved by the 
courts or laws, and all the law can do is to set the fram ew ork o f w hat is right w ithin 
which m edicine is to be practiced.
E thically  it is felt that the need for disclosure ought to be based on the needs o f
each particu lar patient and the patien t can w aive h is/her right to be inform ed.
D espite the difficulty for a court to determ ine w hether or not sufficient inform ation
has been disclosed, it is still a m atter that m ust be decided by law. For its part, the
m edical profession  can help to c larify  the position  before  litiga tion  arises by
ensuring  that the patien t's  in terests are param oun t- fo r exam ple, by sharing
7- S h e ila  A . M . M cL ean  & G . M aher, M ed ic in e . M orals, and the L aw  . G o w er, A ld ersh o t, 1 9 8 5 , 
p. 179.
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decision-m aking with the patient. If this course o f action were follow ed, then the 
courts would be less likely to intervene, and the medical profession could regulate its 
own conduct. The exception to this would be in cases involving serious m alpractice 
w here courts w ould have to step in as a m atter o f public policy  or in the public 
interest.
D octors can continue caring for their patients without fearing litigation, fighting 
diseases rather than lawyers. Doctors should in any case, have some basic knowledge 
o f the law  as it touches upon m edicine in order to practice m edicine efficiently . 
Unfam iliarity with the subject can only lead to suspicion o f it. To counteract this, it is 
suggested that doctors, especially in the highly com plex societies o f U K and U S A ,  
w here professional activities, such as the practice o f m edicine, are subject to m any 
legal restrictions, do fam iliarize them selves with basic legal principles pertaining to 
m edicine.
U ndisputably , m edical treatm ent m ay involve risks. As professionals, doctors 
are expected to weigh those risks and advise the patient o f the treatm ent necessary. 
The treatm ent m ust be carried out with due care. The doctor is expected to possess a 
skill and know ledge o f a norm ally com petent m em ber o f his/her profession. But a 
departure from  norm al and accepted professional practice is not alw ays evidence of 
negligence. It m ay be so if  the doctor does not adopt this norm al p rac tice .8 But it 
has been further held in Bolam  v. Friern H ospital M anagem ent C om m ittee9 that a 
"doctor w ho had acted in accordance with a practice accepted at the tim e as proper 
by a resp o n sib le  body o f  m edical op in ion  w hich m igh t adop t a d iffe ren t 
techn ique,"10is not negligent. In W hitehouse v. Jo rdan .11 the court held that, "the 
test whether a surgeon has been negligent is w hether he has failed to m easure up in
8- H unter v. H a n lev . [1955] S L  T  2 1 3 , 217 .
9- B o lam  v. Friern H M C  [1957] 1 W R L  582
10- B o lam  v. Friern H M C  , supra, c it., at. p. 587 .
11- W h iteh ou se  v . Jordan and another [ 1 9 8 1 ] 1 W L R  247.
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any respect to the standard o f the ordinary skilled surgeon exercising and professing 
to have the special skill o f a surgeon." 12The decision in Bolam was later follow ed 
by the H ouse o f Lords in S idaw av .1-^ The statem ent by Lord D enning  in Roe v. 
M inistry o f H ea lth .14 quoted m any tim es, perhaps sum s this up. L ord D enning 
stated, "W e should be doing a disservice to the com m unity  at large if  we were to 
im pose liability for everything that happens to go w rong...w e m ust not condem n as 
negligence that which is only a m isadven tu re ."15 This show s how  the courts in 
general and Lord Denning in particular, view an allegation o f negligence in respect 
o f the m edical profession.
This should reassure doctors that as far as charges o f negligence are concerned, 
the courts have a high regard for the medical profession and rarely find them  guilty 
of negligence, being aware o f the issues involved. Far from  trying to underm ine the 
doctor/patien t relationship legal intervention in this case seeks only to lay dow n 
standards for doctors to follow  since the profession itse lf has no m eans o f dealing 
with the situation.
However, in one area the m edical profession can itse lf be said to have provided 
adequate m easures to control the conduct o f its own m em bers: the field o f m edical 
research and experim ents. Before the start o f any project, the project itself is subject 
to scrutiny. This is carried  out by Research Ethical C om m ittees which sit in m ost 
m ajor hospitals where research is carried out. Com prising o f m em bers from  various 
professions, the com m ittee decides on the viability and and clinical capacity o f the
12- S id aw av  v. B oard o f  G o v em ers o f  the B eth lem  R o v a l H o sp ita l, supra, c it., at. p. 89 6 .
13- Ibid at p. 8 92 .
14- [1 9 54J2  Q . B . 6 6 . c f. D ie ter  G ie se n , International M ed ica l M alp ractice  L aw . A  C om p arative  
L a w  S tu dy o f  C iv il L iab ility  A risin g  from  M ed ica l C are, by  J. C . B . M ohr [Paol S ieb cck ] P. O . B ox  
2 0 4 0 , D - 7 4 0 0  T ub uingen  and M urtinus N ijh o o ff  P ub lish er , D ordrecht, B o sto n , L o n d o n , 1 9 8 8 , p. 
723.
15- R o e  v. M inistry o f  H ealth [1954J2 Q. B . p. 83.
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project.
Because this is a highly specialised field, the law is reluctant to intervene and set 
standards, and so leaves it to the m edical profession to set the proper guidelines and 
apply pressure on its own m em bers. How ever, if there is a com plaint o r claim  for 
com pensation due to negligence from  a patient for alleged injuries received during 
the experiment, the law will then take an interest in the case.
It is doubtfu l w hether the com m ittees can rea lly  carry  out their function 
properly , as there are huge differences am ong them . Som e consists o f  only one 
m em ber; som e never m eet at all. Presum ably, som e discuss their ow n business, 
because o f the pressure o f work on their m em bers.16
A nother reason m ay be that lay people do not understand the problem s facing the 
com m ittee, and do not feel qualified  to  m ake the judgm en ts requ ired . For this 
reason, there is an urgent need for these com m ittees to be restructured  and their 
m em bers educated, otherwise in future the law will be forced to intervene in an area 
w here previously it has refused to tread. A dditional control o f a sort exist at the 
international level.
A fter the inhum an experience o f N azi concen tra tion  cam p atrocities in 
connection w ith experim entation on hum an beings, the Code o f N urem berg [1947J 
w as prom ulgated as a solution for m edical ethics, laying out certain  principles in 
o rd e r to fu lfill, m oral, e th ica l, and lega l co n sid e ra tio n s  reg a rd in g  hum an 
experim entation.
A m ong these principles, emphasis was given to the following: 
a) the requirem ents o f a reasonab le  rela tionsh ip  betw een the ob ject to be 
achieved and the risks involved for the individual; 
b} inform ed consent;
16- M cL ean  and M aher, op. c it., p. 114; J. K. M ason & R . A . M cC all Sm ith , L aw  and M ed ica l E th ic s 
[2nd E d .], L on d on  Butterw orths 1987 , p. 2 5 7 .
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c} the overruling and all im portant principle that "concern for the interests of 
the subject m ust alw ays prevail over the in trerests o f science and s o c ie ty ." ^  
H ow ever, although inform ed consent is vital in the field o f experim entation, the 
rev ised  D eclaration  envisages the situation w here, in therapeutic  research  the 
physician may "consider...it essential not to obtain inform ed c o n se n t." ^
H ow ever, the duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality o f such consent 
always rests upon w hoever perform s, and guides the process o f experim entation. ^  
there m ay be doubts in some cases about w hether it constitutes freely given consent 
and, then, in respect to the extent o f the inform ation  that is requ ired  by l a w .^  
C onsent to treatm ent for the purpose o f research m ust be given com pletely  freely, 
and be really g e n u in e .^
Regardless o f the therapeutic purpose to be achieved by the procedure envisaged, 
it m ust be extrem ely doubtful w hether a valid  consent m ay be given by a parent, 
guardian, o r o ther "surrogate" on behalf o f a m inor or incom petent adult, ^  No 
reasonable parent w ould jeopardise a child 's interest, w hether for the benefit o f  a 
third party individual or society at large, ^  unless the expectations o f benefit to the 
child outweigh and clearly override all considerations to the c o n tra ry .^
It should be noted in this context that it was argued by m em bers o f the m edical 
profession that it is unethical to try to obtain inform ed consent from  parents soon 
after the birth o f an infant because parents m ight, as A m erican experience teaches, 
refuse to subm it their new borns to experim ents which leads to slow down progress
17- R ev ised  D eclaration  o f  H e ls in k i [1975/83] i 5.
18- Ibid. Para. 5.
19- C o d e  o f  N urem berg [1947] NO. 1.
20- R ev ised  D eclaration  o f  H els in k i [1 9 7 5 /8 3 ] patrs I - III.
2 1 - M cL ean  & M aher, op. c it., at pp. 116-18 .
22- S . R . Speller , L aw  o f  D octors and Patient. L ondon, H. K. L ew is & Co. Ltd. 1 9 73 , pP . 5 7 -9  .
23- S v. S T197013 A ll E R [H. L .], Lord R eid  at 112c, 113c, 107.
24- C o d e  o f  Fedral R egulation  s 1 P 7 0 ,4 6 . 3 01-9 .
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9 So f r e s e a r c h . B a s i n g  a practice on this consideration seem s o f uncertain ethical 
standing.
N either can consent to therapeutic research experim entation be given by m inors 
who are incapable o f discernm ent, in the sense o f decision by the H ouse o f Lords in 
the case o f G illick v.W est Norfolk and wesbech A. H. N evertheless, although 
the revised D eclarations dem and both the requirem ent o f inform ed consent and the 
principle that "in research on man, the need o f science and society should never take 
p recedence  over considerations re la ted  to  the w ell-be ing  o f the s u b je c t ," ^  
research on young children for non-therapeutic procedures is perform ed as a m atter 
of course, and is even held to be ethically justified.28
The doctrine o f inform ed consent is a prim e factor w hich perm itss people to 
work together in the practice o f medicine and research undertakings. It follow s that 
experim entation on a hum an subject which is not for that subject's benefit can never 
be justified without the subject's genuine consent.
The use o f experim ental procedures on children, therefore, is ethically justified  
only if  the procedure is either seen as a m eans to benefit the child which well lead to 
recovery from  his sickness or in the assum ption that it will prevent him  from  further 
risk in due course.^0
Although the GM C m aintains a register o f qualified practitioners, there is no law 
w hich expressly prohibits unregistered or unqualified persons from  practicing m ost 
types o f m edicine. The pow ers o f the G M C  are lim ited, as far as it requ ires 
reg is te red  doc to rs  to  m ain ta in  standards, perhaps m oreso  than  the pub lic  
appreciates.30
25- NO 14 B ulletin  o f  the Institute o f  M edical E th ics. [M ay 1986], 7.
26- G illick  v. W est N orfo lk  and W esbech  A . H . A  [1985] A ll E  R  4 0 2 , [H L].
R ev ised  D eclaration o f  H elsink i [1975 /83] iii 4 .
28- R . H . N ich o lso n . M ed ical R esearch w ith Children: E th ics. L a w , and p r a c tic e . O x fo rd  U n iv ersity  
P ress, O xford  M ed ica l P ub lications, 1986 , p. 23 1 .
29- J. B lu ste in , O n C hildren and P roxy C on sen t." [1 9 7 8 ]4  J. M . E. 138-40 .
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In its bluebook issued in April 1985,31 The GM C states that as a body it is "... 
not ordinarily  concerned with errors in diagnosis and treatm ent or with kind o f 
m atters which give rise to action in civil courts for negligence unless the docto r’s 
conduct in the case ....raises a question of serious professional m isconduct.”32
Regardless o f what has been said about doctors and the m edical profession, many 
patien ts still regard the doctor as a m iracle-w orker, and the publicity  attached to 
high-technology m edicine reinforces that perception. Patients consult doctors in the 
hope o f being cured, and if any injuries follow  their treatm ent, the reason for suing 
the doctor for dam ages is m ore aimed at financial com pensation rather than pointing 
an accusing finger at the doctor. It has also been seen that the courts are reluctant to 
decide on a doctor's alleged negligence, and Lord D enning especially  found it 
d ifficult to attach blam e on a docto r.33 Thus the doctor's interests seem  to be well 
and adequately protected.
The profession itself can continue to regulate the conduct o f its m em bers as long 
as it does so with due respect to patients' interests, although at any stage the law may 
have to intervene in order to uphold the doctor-patient relationship w here com m on 
law  requires the court to do so. Thus, unless otherw ise statute has in tervened  to 
restrict the range o f judge m ade law, the com m on law enables judges, w hen faced 
with a situation where a right recognised by law is not adequately protected, either to 
extend existing principles to cover the situation or to apply an existing rem edy to 
redress the injustice this is because statutes were not at all the favoured m echanism
30- M argaret B razier, M ed ic in e . Patients, and the L a w . H arm ondsw orth, P enguin  B o o k s, 1987,
P. 9.
31- G M  C  B lu eb ook  P rofessional Conduct: F itness to P ractise. [April [1 9 8 5 ], P. 10.
3 2 - Ibid.
33- For d iscu ssio n  se e  M cL ean , S . A . M . 'N e g lig e n c e -  A  D a g g er  at the D octor's B a c k ?' in R o b so n , 
P. and W athm an, P. [eds.] Justice. Lord D enn in g  and the C on stitu tio n . G ow er, A ldershot, 1981 ,
P. 113.
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for social control and conflict resolution. Even though statutes will supersede it, 
com m on law is still the basis for m uch of the law, especially as regards private law, 
such as personal injury [torts] etc. For exam ple, if  one person sues another for 
m alpractice and so on, the legal principle governing the outcom e will not be found in 
any statute book but in the com m on law as contained in reported judicial decision.
As m ight be im agined, this collection o f court decision runs into the m illions. 
Because the reasoning behind these decisions is often less than clear and succinct, and 
because com m on law adopts A nglo-Am erican custom  and tradition, com m on law is 
am orphous.
This com m on law interpretation o f duty has caused some constenation, at least 
w ithin the m edical profession, with regard to the im plications for physicians or 
o ther health providers w ho volunteer their services at the scene o f an acciden t.34 
For exam ple due to such situation in the late 1950s the Medical Association of the U S 
A had w aged a lobbying cam paign for a statutory am endm ent to the com m on law, 
fearing that the traditional notion o f duty as interpreted in their ju risd iction  w ould 
cause som e 'good Samaritan' physician to be held liable for fa iling  to prov ide 
adequate m edical treatm ent in an em ergency, or for providing m edical treatm ent but 
not accepting the victim  as patient.35
Therefore, upon which courts called to legal disputes in areas w here com m on 
law applied w ould reach a decision based sim ply on logic and fairness. W hat any 
other court had said about a sim ilar dispute w ould be irrelevant. In such a system , a 
jud icia l decision w ould affect the parties involved but w ould have no continuing 
significance; the Judge's reasoning could be forgotten.
Therefore, that is for legislatures to enact broadly w orded statutes establishing
34- K en neth  R . W in g , L aw  and the P ub lic  H ealth [2nd E d.] H ealth  A d m in istra tive  P ress, M ich igan  
1985 ,
p. 2 0 2 .
35- Ibid a tp .2 0 3 .
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basic goals, policies, and ground rules and then to delegate the task o f working out of 
the details to administrative agencies.
M oreover, there m ay be an urgent need to consider a statutory procedure or the 
am endm ent o f the existing statutes to enhance the present internal policing o f the 
profession so that there will be less need for legal intervention in the future.
W hatever one's view  on the present position, and before any feasible alternative 
can be found, one m ay feel that certain  m atters have to be left to the m edical 
profession itself to decide, while others m ust rely heavily on the law. U nless one is 
prepared to turn back the clock and place our faith in the herbalists and faith-healers, 
it is necessary  for the law  to in tervene at som e stage or o ther so that a proper 
standard o f com m unity health care can be set up and m aintained .
Regarding public health, there is a wide range o f legislation, which plays a vital 
role in achieving a healthy population, and there follow s an attem pt to show the 
fundam ental concepts behind the legal principles enforcing public health law.
A lthough the organized  practice o f E nvironm ental H ealth  Law  is o f recen t 
origin, the health m easures on which it is based have been long-recognised and m ost 
environm ental health concepts are related to public health law and practice.
Public health is closely involved w ith law bodies since it is an area o f public 
concern.
The area o f public health and public health law is still a grow ing field. Had time 
and space perm itted the subject o f public health w ould have been expanded further 
than it is in the given chapter. The m ain poin t is that it is at the governm ent's 
initiative that technology is advanced in order to prom ote and protect the health o f its 
citizens.
A basic aspect o f environm ental health is the im provem ent o f law s concerning 
food w hich cover every  facility  w here food is stored, transported , p rocessed ,
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packaged , served o r sold. Law s are also passed concern ing  the p lanning  and 
construction o f new buildings to ensure sanitary arrangem ents are adequate; that 
fire-risk is m inim al; that there is sufficient light; and that the building is sound and 
free from  dam p.
O ther law s concern safety at work e.g. requiring dangerous parts o f m achinery 
to be covered. In addition to this, the planning, design and construction  o f the 
w orkplace m ust all be regulated by environm ental health concerns, to m inim ize the 
possib ility  o f accidents. Even although this care in planning etc. m ay extend the 
com pletion time o f a project, the safeguarding o f the health o f the w ork-force is the 
governm ent's duty when legislating in the field o f environm ental health.
T herefore, the success or failure o f any governm ent m ust be m easured by the 
w elfare o f its citizens, practically nothing can be m ore im portant to a nation than its 
public health; that is to say, the general acceptability of the doctrine that the health of 
the people param ount concern o f any sound governm ent policy.
Finally, the w riter senses that m uch can be learned from this country concerning 
both social and m edical aspects o f prevention. It is realized that the preservation of 
life depends not only on m edical science, but also on co-ordinating preventive and 
curative m easures in health care with social and econom ic policies. The further 
im plem entation  o f  a health care system  is only possib le if  it is not restricted  by 
financial constraints, and m edicine is regarded as the highest priority in protecting a 
nation 's health. The initiation o f research and developm ent program m es is an vital 
elem ent for progress in health care. It is undeniable that uniform ly designed health 
legislation is a principal factor along w ith ex tended  health education  as part o f 
com prehensive  and condensed  program m e o f public  health  p ro tec tion  in the 
im plem entation o f public health policy.
As education and persuasion do not bring results unless the law and the legal
2 8 4
system stand behind them. To effect their m ission health w orkers m ust not know 
only their pow ers and duties, but also the lim itations placed on them  by law. M ore 
im portantly , the health professional will be better if  prepared with know ledge the 
function o f law  perta in ing  to their duty in o rder to recogn ize  prob lem s and 
im plication o f law, to be happened during utilizing their duty.
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